Having evaluated the likelihood for each scenario for the future of Libya (see detail here), we shall now present updated likelihoods that account for changes that have taken place since we began the evaluations. Because both intervention and spillover are already undoubtedly occurring in Libya, our scenarios are now considered sub-scenarios of Scenario 2: Intervention and spillover instead of independent scenarios. We shall then present the complete set of scenarios, with the updated likelihoods.
Now that we have evaluated each scenario for the future of Libya, we organized them into a single graph that allows for a more accurate strategic picture. Our complete set of scenarios now reflects updated likelihoods that account for recent events on the ground. The ceasefire and subsequent dialogue between the COR and GNA, the various crises and strategic shifts in the Middle East that have affected the ability of external actors to intervene, and counter-migration efforts by Italy and Libyan tribes have notably affected the likelihood of several scenarios.
Based on the current realities and updated likelihoods, we found that continued civil war was the most likely outcome of peace talks (98%); continued war with a change in strategic terms was twice as likely to occur as a total victory (66%); and increased intervention was nearly 45% likely to occur, with no increased intervention slightly higher at more than 55%.
Full article 2110 words – approx. 5 pages
Notes: In the following article, we shall use the acronym COR for the Council of Representatives (nationalists), GNC for the General National Congress (Islamists), and GNA for the UN-backed Government of National Accord (unity government).
Editor’s note: To assess conflict and war, and thus when we refer to war or civil war, we are using the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) dynamic scale for conflicts (Conflict Barometer 2016, pp.6-8). There may thus be discrepancy between the words we use and official statements and labelling. The latter are indeed decided for any political reasons, but do not necessarily aim at representing the reality on the ground.
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Although we have concluded our detailing of the scenarios for Libya’s future, we shall continue to monitor events on the ground and occasionally provide likelihood updates as needed.
Feature Photo: July Ceasefire posted by Government of National Accord Facebook page, 25 July 2017
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Safa Alharathy, “MP Abu Shagur resigns from HoR,” The Libya Observer, August 28, 2017
Shabina S. Khatri, “Report: Qatar spends nearly $40 billion to support crisis-hit economy,” Doha News, September 15, 2017
“Southern border reported blockaded as Qatrun leader confirms “big” drop in migrants coming from Niger,” Libya Herald, September 7, 2017
Sudarsan Raghavan, “Egypt’s long, bloody fight against the Islamic State in Sinai is going nowhere,” The Washington Post, September 15, 2017
The Anti-ISIS Coalition, Eye on ISIS in Libya, May 30, 2017
“Thousands take to public squares in Libya to back up Igtet’s call for reform,” Libyan Express, September 25, 2017
“Turkey sends military vehicles, equipment to Syrian border: Anadolu,” Reuters, September 17, 2017