



Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

ISTANBUL SUMMIT

1999

ISTANBUL DOCUMENT 1999

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ISTANBUL 1999

January 2000/Corr.

Original: ENGLISH

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CHARTER FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

Istanbul, November 1999

1. At the dawn of the twenty-first century we, the Heads of State or Government of the OSCE participating States, declare our firm commitment to a free, democratic and more integrated OSCE area where participating States are at peace with each other, and individuals and communities live in freedom, prosperity and security. To implement this commitment, we have decided to take a number of new steps. We have agreed to:

- Adopt the Platform for Co-operative Security, in order to strengthen co-operation between the OSCE and other international organizations and institutions, thereby making better use of the resources of the international community;
- Develop the OSCE's role in peacekeeping, thereby better reflecting the Organization's comprehensive approach to security;
- Create Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT), thereby enabling the OSCE to respond quickly to demands for assistance and for large civilian field operations;
- Expand our ability to carry out police-related activities in order to assist in maintaining the primacy of law;
- Establish an Operation Centre, in order to plan and deploy OSCE field operations;
- Strengthen the consultation process within the OSCE by establishing the Preparatory Committee under the OSCE Permanent Council.

We are committed to preventing the outbreak of violent conflicts wherever possible. The steps we have agreed to take in this Charter will strengthen the OSCE's ability in this respect as well as its capacity to settle conflicts and to rehabilitate societies ravaged by war and destruction. The Charter will contribute to the formation of a common and indivisible security space. It will advance the creation of an OSCE area free of dividing lines and zones with different levels of security.

I. OUR COMMON CHALLENGES

2. The last decade of the twentieth century has brought great achievements in the OSCE area, co-operation has replaced previous confrontation, but the danger of conflicts between States has not been eliminated. We have put Europe's old divisions behind us, but new risks and challenges have emerged. Since we signed the Charter of Paris it has become more obvious that threats to our security can stem from conflicts within States as well as from conflicts between States. We have experienced conflicts which have often resulted from flagrant violations of OSCE norms and principles. We have witnessed atrocities of a kind we had thought were relegated to the past. In this decade it has become clear that all such conflicts can represent a threat to the security of all OSCE participating States.

3. We are determined to learn from the dangers of confrontation and division between States as well as from tragedies of the last decade. Security and peace must be enhanced through an approach which combines two basic elements, we must build confidence among people within States and strengthen co-operation between States. Therefore, we will

strengthen existing instruments and develop new ones to provide assistance and advice. We will reinforce our efforts to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities. In parallel, we will strengthen our capacity to enhance confidence and security between States. We are determined to develop the means at our disposal to settle peacefully disputes between them.

4. International terrorism, violent extremism, organized crime and drug trafficking represent growing challenges to security. Whatever its motives, terrorism in all its forms and manifestations is unacceptable. We will enhance our efforts to prevent the preparation and financing of any act of terrorism on our territories and deny terrorists safe havens. The excessive and destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms and light weapons represent a threat to peace and security. We are committed to strengthening our protection against these new risks and challenges; strong democratic institutions and the rule of law are the foundation for this protection. We are also determined to co-operate more actively and closely with each other to meet these challenges.

5. Acute economic problems and environmental degradation may have serious implications for our security. Co-operation in the fields of economy, science and technology and the environment will be of critical importance. We will strengthen our responses to such threats through continued economic and environmental reforms, by stable and transparent frameworks for economic activity and by promoting market economies, while paying due attention to economic and social rights. We applaud the unprecedented process of economic transformation taking place in many participating States. We encourage them to continue this reform process, which will contribute to security and prosperity in the entire OSCE area. We will step up our efforts across all dimensions of the OSCE to combat corruption and to promote the rule of law.

6. We confirm that security in areas nearby, in particular in the Mediterranean area as well as areas in direct proximity to participating States, such as those of Central Asia, is of increasing importance to the OSCE. We recognize that instability in these areas creates challenges that directly affect the security and prosperity of OSCE States.

II. OUR COMMON FOUNDATIONS

7. We reaffirm our full adherence to the Charter of the United Nations, and to the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and all other OSCE documents to which we have agreed. These documents represent our common commitments and are the foundation for our work. They have helped us to bring about an end to the old confrontation in Europe and to foster a new era of democracy, peace and solidarity throughout the OSCE area. They established clear standards for participating States' treatment of each other and of all individuals within their territories. All OSCE commitments, without exception, apply equally to each participating State. Their implementation in good faith is essential for relations between States, between governments and their peoples, as well as between the organizations of which they are members. Participating States are accountable to their citizens and responsible to each other for their implementation of their OSCE commitments. We regard these commitments as our common achievement and therefore consider them to be matters of immediate and legitimate concern to all participating States.

We reaffirm the OSCE as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and as a primary organization for the peaceful settlement of disputes within its region and as a key instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis

management and post-conflict rehabilitation. The OSCE is the inclusive and comprehensive organization for consultation, decision-making and co-operation in its region.

8. Each participating State has an equal right to security. We reaffirm the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve. Each State also has the right to neutrality. Each participating State will respect the rights of all others in these regards. They will not strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other States. Within the OSCE no State, group of States or organization can have any pre-eminent responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE area or can consider any part of the OSCE area as its sphere of influence.

9. We will build our relations in conformity with the concept of common and comprehensive security, guided by equal partnership, solidarity and transparency. The security of each participating State is inseparably linked to that of all others. We will address the human, economic, political and military dimensions of security as an integral whole.

10. We will continue to uphold consensus as the basis for OSCE decision-making. The OSCE's flexibility and ability to respond quickly to a changing political environment should remain at the heart of the OSCE's co-operative and inclusive approach to common and indivisible security.

11. We recognize the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security and its crucial role in contributing to security and stability in our region. We reaffirm our rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, including our commitment on the issue of the non-use of force or the threat of force. In this connection, we also reaffirm our commitment to seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set out in the Charter of the United Nations.

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Based on these foundations we will strengthen our common response and improve our common instruments in order to meet the challenges confronting us more efficiently.

III. OUR COMMON RESPONSE

CO-OPERATION WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS: THE PLATFORM FOR CO-OPERATIVE SECURITY

12. The risks and challenges we face today cannot be met by a single State or organization. Over the last decade, we have taken important steps to forge new co-operation between the OSCE and other international organizations. In order to make full use of the resources of the international community, we are committed to even closer co-operation among international organizations.

We pledge ourselves, through the Platform for Co-operative Security, which is hereby adopted as an essential element of this Charter, to further strengthen and develop co-operation with competent organizations on the basis of equality and in a spirit of partnership. The principles of the Platform for Co-operative Security, as set out in the operational document attached to this Charter, apply to any organization or institution whose members individually and collectively decide to adhere to them. They apply across all

dimensions of security; politico-military, human and economic. Through this Platform we seek to develop and maintain political and operational coherence, on the basis of shared values, among all the various bodies dealing with security, both in responding to specific crises and in formulating responses to new risks and challenges. Recognizing the key integrating role that the OSCE can play, we offer the OSCE, when appropriate, as a flexible co-ordinating framework to foster co-operation, through which various organizations can reinforce each other drawing on their particular strengths. We do not intend to create a hierarchy of organizations or a permanent division of labour among them.

We are ready in principle to deploy the resources of international organizations and institutions of which we are members in support of the OSCE's work, subject to the necessary policy decisions as cases arise.

13. Subregional co-operation has become an important element in enhancing security across the OSCE area. Processes such as the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, which has been placed under the auspices of the OSCE, help to promote our common values. They contribute to improved security not just in the subregion in question but throughout the OSCE area. We offer the OSCE, in accordance with the Platform for Co-operative Security, as a forum for subregional co-operation. In this respect, and in accordance with the modalities in the operational document, the OSCE will facilitate the exchange of information and experience between subregional groups and may, if so requested, receive and keep their mutual accords and agreements.

SOLIDARITY AND PARTNERSHIP

14. Peace and security in our region is best guaranteed by the willingness and ability of each participating State to uphold democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. We individually confirm our willingness to comply fully with our commitments. We also have a joint responsibility to uphold OSCE principles. We are therefore determined to co-operate within the OSCE and with its institutions and representatives and stand ready to use OSCE instruments, tools and mechanisms. We will co-operate in a spirit of solidarity and partnership in a continuing review of implementation. Today we commit ourselves to joint measures based on co-operation, both in the OSCE and through those organizations of which we are members, in order to offer assistance to participating States to enhance their compliance with OSCE principles and commitments. We will strengthen existing co-operative instruments and develop new ones in order to respond efficiently to requests for assistance from participating States. We will explore ways to further increase the effectiveness of the Organization to deal with cases of clear, gross and continuing violations of those principles and commitments.

15. We are determined to consider ways of helping participating States requesting assistance in cases of internal breakdown of law and order. We will jointly examine the nature of the situation and possible ways and means of providing support to the State in question.

16. We reaffirm the validity of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. We will consult promptly, in conformity with our OSCE responsibilities, with a participating State seeking assistance in realizing its right to individual or collective self-defence in the event that its sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence are threatened. We will consider jointly the nature of the threat and actions that may be required in defence of our common values.

OUR INSTITUTIONS

17. The Parliamentary Assembly has developed into one of the most important OSCE institutions continuously providing new ideas and proposals. We welcome this increasing role, particularly in the field of democratic development and election monitoring. We call on the Parliamentary Assembly to develop its activities further as a key component in our efforts to promote democracy, prosperity and increased confidence within and between participating States.

18. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and the Representative on Freedom of the Media are essential instruments in ensuring respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The OSCE Secretariat provides vital assistance to the Chairman-in-Office and to the activities of our Organization, especially in the field. We will also strengthen further the operational capacities of the OSCE Secretariat to enable it to face the expansion of our activities and to ensure that field operations function effectively and in accordance with the mandates and guidance given to them.

We commit ourselves to giving the OSCE institutions our full support. We emphasize the importance of close co-ordination among the OSCE institutions, as well as our field operations, in order to make optimal use of our common resources. We will take into account the need for geographic diversity and gender balance when recruiting personnel to OSCE institutions and field operations.

We acknowledge the tremendous developments and diversification of OSCE activities. We recognize that a large number of OSCE participating States have not been able to implement the 1993 decision of the Rome Ministerial Council, and that difficulties can arise from the absence of a legal capacity of the Organization. We will seek to improve the situation.

THE HUMAN DIMENSION

19. We reaffirm that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law is at the core of the OSCE's comprehensive concept of security. We commit ourselves to counter such threats to security as violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief and manifestations of intolerance, aggressive nationalism, racism, chauvinism, xenophobia and anti-semitism.

The protection and promotion of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities are essential factors for democracy, peace, justice and stability within, and between, participating States. In this respect we reaffirm our commitments, in particular under the relevant provisions of the Copenhagen 1990 Human Dimension Document, and recall the Report of the Geneva 1991 Meeting of Experts on National Minorities. Full respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, besides being an end in itself, may not undermine, but strengthen territorial integrity and sovereignty. Various concepts of autonomy as well as other approaches outlined in the above-mentioned documents, which are in line with OSCE principles, constitute ways to preserve and promote the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities within an existing State. We condemn violence against any minority. We pledge to take measures to promote tolerance and to build pluralistic societies where all, regardless of their ethnic origin, enjoy

full equality of opportunity. We emphasize that questions relating to national minorities can only be satisfactorily resolved in a democratic political framework based on the rule of law.

We reaffirm our recognition that everyone has the right to a nationality and that no one should be deprived of his or her nationality arbitrarily. We commit ourselves to continue our efforts to ensure that everyone can exercise this right. We also commit ourselves to further the international protection of stateless persons.

20. We recognize the particular difficulties faced by Roma and Sinti and the need to undertake effective measures in order to achieve full equality of opportunity, consistent with OSCE commitments, for persons belonging to Roma and Sinti. We will reinforce our efforts to ensure that Roma and Sinti are able to play a full and equal part in our societies, and to eradicate discrimination against them.

21. We are committed to eradicating torture and cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the OSCE area. To this end, we will promote legislation to provide procedural and substantive safeguards and remedies to combat these practices. We will assist victims and co-operate with relevant international organizations and non-governmental organizations, as appropriate.

22. We reject any policy of ethnic cleansing or mass expulsion. We reaffirm our commitment to respect the right to seek asylum and to ensure the international protection of refugees as set out in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, as well as to facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons in dignity and safety. We will pursue without discrimination the reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons in their places of origin.

In order to enhance the protection of civilians in times of conflict, we will seek ways of reinforcing the application of international humanitarian law.

23. The full and equal exercise by women of their human rights is essential to achieve a more peaceful, prosperous and democratic OSCE area. We are committed to making equality between men and women an integral part of our policies, both at the level of our States and within the Organization.

24. We will undertake measures to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women, and to end violence against women and children as well as sexual exploitation and all forms of trafficking in human beings. In order to prevent such crimes we will, among other means, promote the adoption or strengthening of legislation to hold accountable persons responsible for these acts and strengthen the protection of victims. We will also develop and implement measures to promote the rights and interests of children in armed conflict and post-conflict situations, including refugees and internally displaced children. We will look at ways of preventing forced or compulsory recruitment for use in armed conflict of persons under 18 years of age.

25. We reaffirm our obligation to conduct free and fair elections in accordance with OSCE commitments, in particular the Copenhagen Document 1990. We recognize the assistance the ODIHR can provide to participating States in developing and implementing electoral legislation. In line with these commitments, we will invite observers to our elections from other participating States, the ODIHR, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and

appropriate institutions and organizations that wish to observe our election proceedings. We agree to follow up promptly the ODIHR's election assessment and recommendations.

26. We reaffirm the importance of independent media and the free flow of information as well as the public's access to information. We commit ourselves to take all necessary steps to ensure the basic conditions for free and independent media and unimpeded transborder and intra-State flow of information, which we consider to be an essential component of any democratic, free and open society.

27. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can perform a vital role in the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. They are an integral component of a strong civil society. We pledge ourselves to enhance the ability of NGOs to make their full contribution to the further development of civil society and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

THE POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION

28. The politico-military aspects of security remain vital to the interests of participating States. They constitute a core element of the OSCE's concept of comprehensive security. Disarmament, arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) are important parts of the overall effort to enhance security by fostering stability, transparency and predictability in the military field. Full implementation, timely adaptation and, when required, further development of arms control agreements and CSBMs are key contributions to our political and military stability.

29. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) must continue to serve as a cornerstone of European security. It has dramatically reduced equipment levels. It provides a fundamental contribution to a more secure and integrated Europe. The States Parties to this Treaty are taking a critical step forward. The Treaty is being strengthened by adapting its provisions to ensure enhanced stability, predictability and transparency amidst changing circumstances. A number of States Parties will reduce further their equipment levels. The adapted Treaty, upon its entry into force, will be open to voluntary accession by other OSCE participating States in the area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains and thereby will provide an important additional contribution to European stability and security.

30. The OSCE Vienna Document 1999, together with other documents adopted by the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) on politico-military aspects of security, provide valuable tools for all OSCE participating States in building greater mutual confidence and military transparency. We will continue to make regular use of and fully implement all OSCE instruments in this field and seek their timely adaptation in order to ensure adequate response to security needs in the OSCE area. We remain committed to the principles contained in the Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security. We are determined to make further efforts within the FSC in order to jointly address common security concerns of participating States and to pursue the OSCE's concept of comprehensive and indivisible security so far as the politico-military dimension is concerned. We will continue a substantial security dialogue and task our representatives to conduct this dialogue in the framework of the FSC.

THE ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSION

31. The link between security, democracy and prosperity has become increasingly evident in the OSCE area, as has the risk to security from environmental degradation and the depletion of natural resources. Economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility are indispensable for prosperity. On the basis of these linkages, we will ensure that the economic dimension receives appropriate attention, in particular as an element of our early warning and conflict prevention activities. We will do so, *inter alia*, with a view to promoting the integration of economies in transition into the world economy and to ensure the rule of law and the development of a transparent and stable legal system in the economic sphere.

32. The OSCE is characterized by its broad membership, its comprehensive approach to security, its large number of field operations and its long history as a norm-setting organization. These qualities enable it to identify threats and to act as a catalyst for co-operation between key international organizations and institutions in the economic and environmental areas. The OSCE stands ready to play this role, where appropriate. We will foster such co-ordination between the OSCE and relevant international organizations in accordance with the Platform for Co-operative Security. We will enhance the OSCE's ability to address economic and environmental issues in ways that neither duplicate existing work nor replace efforts that can be more efficiently undertaken by other organizations. We will focus on areas in which the OSCE has particular competence. The OSCE's efforts within the human dimension have significant economic effects and vice versa, for example by mobilizing human resources and talents and by helping to build vibrant civil societies. In the spirit of the 1998 Århus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, we will in particular seek to ensure access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters.

RULE OF LAW AND FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION

33. We reaffirm our commitment to the rule of law. We recognize that corruption poses a great threat to the OSCE's shared values. It generates instability and reaches into many aspects of the security, economic and human dimensions. Participating States pledge to strengthen their efforts to combat corruption and the conditions that foster it, and to promote a positive framework for good government practices and public integrity. They will make better use of existing international instruments and assist each other in their fight against corruption. As part of its work to promote the rule of law, the OSCE will work with NGOs that are committed to a strong public and business consensus against corrupt practices.

IV. OUR COMMON INSTRUMENTS

ENHANCING OUR DIALOGUE

34. We are determined to broaden and strengthen our dialogue concerning developments related to all aspects of security in the OSCE area. We charge the Permanent Council and the FSC within their respective areas of competence to address in greater depth security concerns of the participating States and to pursue the OSCE's concept of comprehensive and indivisible security.

35. The Permanent Council, being the regular body for political consultations and decision-making, will address the full range of conceptual issues as well as the day-to-day operational work of the Organization. To assist in its deliberations and decision-making and to strengthen the process of political consultations and transparency within the Organization, we will establish a Preparatory Committee under the Permanent Council's direction. This open-ended Committee will normally meet in informal format and will be tasked by the Council, or its Chairman, to deliberate and to report back to the Council.

36. Reflecting our spirit of solidarity and partnership, we will also enhance our political dialogue in order to offer assistance to participating States, thereby ensuring compliance with OSCE commitments. To encourage this dialogue, we have decided, in accordance with established rules and practices, to make increased use of OSCE instruments, including:

- Dispatching delegations from the OSCE institutions, with the participation of other relevant international organizations, when appropriate, to provide advice and expertise for reform of legislation and practices;
- Dispatching Personal Representatives of the Chairman-in-Office, after consultations with the State concerned, for fact-finding or advisory missions;
- Bringing together representatives of the OSCE and States concerned in order to address questions regarding compliance with OSCE commitments;
- Organizing training programmes aimed at improving standards and practices, *inter alia*, within the fields of human rights, democratization and the rule of law;
- Addressing matters regarding compliance with OSCE commitments at OSCE review meetings and conferences as well as in the Economic Forum;
- Submitting such matters for consideration by the Permanent Council, *inter alia*, on the basis of recommendations by the OSCE institutions within their respective mandates or by Personal Representatives of the Chairman-in-Office;
- Convening meetings of the Permanent Council in a special or reinforced format in order to discuss matters of non-compliance with OSCE commitments and to decide on appropriate courses of action;
- Establishing field operations with the consent of the State concerned.

OSCE FIELD OPERATIONS

37. The Permanent Council will establish field operations. It will decide on their mandates and budgets. On this basis, the Permanent Council and the Chairman-in-Office will provide guidance to such operations.

38. The development of OSCE field operations represents a major transformation of the Organization that has enabled the OSCE to play a more prominent role in promoting peace, security and compliance with OSCE commitments. Based on the experience we have acquired, we will develop and strengthen this instrument further in order to carry out tasks according to their respective mandates, which may, *inter alia*, include the following:

- Providing assistance and advice or formulating recommendations in areas agreed by the OSCE and the host country;
- Observing compliance with OSCE commitments and providing advice or recommendations for improved compliance;
- Assisting in the organization and monitoring of elections;
- Providing support for the primacy of law and democratic institutions and for the maintenance and restoration of law and order;
- Helping to create conditions for negotiation or other measures that could facilitate the peaceful settlement of conflicts;
- Verifying and/or assisting in fulfilling agreements on the peaceful settlement of conflicts;
- Providing support in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of various aspects of society.

39. Recruitment to field operations must ensure that qualified personnel are made available by participating States. The training of personnel is an important aspect of enhancing the effectiveness of the OSCE and its field operations and will therefore be improved. Existing training facilities in OSCE participating States and training activities of the OSCE could play an active role in achieving this aim in co-operation, where appropriate, with other organizations and institutions.

40. In accordance with the Platform for Co-operative Security, co-operation between OSCE and other international organizations in performing field operations will be enhanced. This will be done, *inter alia*, by carrying out common projects with other partners, in particular the Council of Europe, allowing the OSCE to benefit from their expertise while respecting the identity and decision-making procedures of each organization involved.

41. The host country of an OSCE field operation should, when appropriate, be assisted in building its own capacity and expertise within the area of responsibility. This would facilitate an efficient transfer of the tasks of the operation to the host country, and consequently the closure of the field operation.

RAPID RESPONSE (REACT)

42. We recognize that the ability to deploy rapidly civilian and police expertise is essential to effective conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. We are committed to developing a capability within the participating States and the OSCE to set up Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT) that will be at the disposal of the OSCE. This will enable OSCE bodies and institutions, acting in accordance with their respective procedures, to offer experts quickly to OSCE participating States to provide assistance, in compliance with OSCE norms, in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. This rapidly deployable capability will cover a wide range of civilian expertise. It will give us the ability to address problems before they become crises and to deploy quickly the civilian component of a peacekeeping operation when needed. These Teams could also be used as surge capacity to assist the OSCE with the rapid

deployment of large-scale or specialized operations. We expect REACT to develop and evolve, along with other OSCE capabilities, to meet the needs of the Organization.

OPERATION CENTRE

43. Rapid deployment is important for the OSCE's effectiveness in contributing to our conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation efforts and depends on effective preparation and planning. To facilitate this, we decide to set up an Operation Centre within the Conflict Prevention Centre with a small core staff, having expertise relevant for all kinds of OSCE operations, which can be expanded rapidly when required. Its role will be to plan and deploy field operations, including those involving REACT resources. It will liaise with other international organizations and institutions as appropriate in accordance with the Platform for Co-operative Security. The Centre's core staff will, to the extent possible, be drawn from personnel with appropriate expertise seconded by participating States and from existing Secretariat resources. This core will provide the basis for rapid expansion, to deal with new tasks as they arise. The precise arrangements will be decided in accordance with existing procedures.

POLICE-RELATED ACTIVITIES

44. We will work to enhance the OSCE's role in civilian police-related activities as an integral part of the Organization's efforts in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. Such activities may comprise:

- Police monitoring, including with the aim of preventing police from carrying out such activities as discrimination based on religious and ethnic identity;
- Police training, which could, *inter alia*, include the following tasks:
 - Improving the operational and tactical capabilities of local police services and reforming paramilitary forces;
 - Providing new and modern policing skills, such as community policing, and anti-drug, anti-corruption and anti-terrorist capacities;
 - Creating a police service with a multi-ethnic and/or multi-religious composition that can enjoy the confidence of the entire population;
 - Promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in general.

We will encourage the provision of modern equipment appropriate to police services that receive training in such new skills.

In addition, the OSCE will examine options and conditions for a role in law enforcement.

45. We shall also promote the development of independent judicial systems that play a key role in providing remedies for human rights violations as well as providing advice and assistance for prison system reforms. The OSCE will also work with other international organizations in the creation of political and legal frameworks within which the police can perform its tasks in accordance with democratic principles and the rule of law.

PEACEKEEPING

46. We remain committed to reinforcing the OSCE's key role in maintaining peace and stability throughout our area. The OSCE's most effective contributions to regional security have been in areas such as field operations, post-conflict rehabilitation, democratization, and human rights and election monitoring. We have decided to explore options for a potentially greater and wider role for the OSCE in peacekeeping. Reaffirming our rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, and on the basis of our existing decisions, we confirm that the OSCE can, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, decide to play a role in peacekeeping, including a leading role when participating States judge it to be the most effective and appropriate organization. In this regard, it could also decide to provide the mandate covering peacekeeping by others and seek the support of participating States as well as other organizations to provide resources and expertise. In accordance with the Platform for Co-operative Security, it could also provide a co-ordinating framework for such efforts.

THE COURT OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION

47. We reiterate that the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes is at the core of OSCE commitments. The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, in this respect, remains a tool available to those, a large number of participating States, which have become parties to the 1992 Convention of Stockholm. We encourage them to use this instrument to resolve disputes between them, as well as with other participating States which voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the Court. We also encourage those participating States which have not yet done so to consider joining the Convention.

V. OUR PARTNERS FOR CO-OPERATION

48. We recognize the interdependence between the security of the OSCE area and that of Partners for Co-operation, as well as our commitment to the relationship and the dialogue with them. We emphasize in particular the long-standing relations with our Mediterranean partners, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. We recognize the increased involvement in and support for the work of the OSCE by our Partners for Co-operation. Building on this interdependence, we are ready to develop this process further. Implementing and building on the Helsinki Document 1992 and the Budapest Document 1994, we will work more closely with the Partners for Co-operation to promote OSCE norms and principles. We welcome their wish to promote the realization of the Organization's norms and principles, including the fundamental principle of resolving conflicts through peaceful means. To this end, we will invite the Partners for Co-operation on a more regular basis to increased participation in the work of the OSCE as the dialogue develops.

49. The potential of the Contact Group and the Mediterranean seminars must be fully explored and exploited. Drawing on the Budapest mandate, the Permanent Council will examine the recommendations emerging from the Contact Group and the Mediterranean seminars. We will encourage the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation to draw on our expertise in setting up structures and mechanisms in the Mediterranean for early warning, preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention.

50. We welcome the increased participation in our work by Japan and the Republic of Korea. We welcome the contribution by Japan to OSCE field activities. We will seek to

strengthen further our co-operation with our Asian partners in meeting challenges of common interest.

VI. CONCLUSION

51. This Charter will benefit the security of all participating States by enhancing and strengthening the OSCE as we enter the twenty-first century. Today we have decided to develop its existing instruments and to create new tools. We will use them fully to promote a free, democratic and secure OSCE area. The Charter will thus underpin the OSCE's role as the only pan-European security organization entrusted with ensuring peace and stability in its area. We appreciate the completion of the work of the Security Model Committee.

52. The original of the present Charter, drawn up in English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish, will be transmitted to the Secretary General of the Organization, who will transmit a certified true copy of this Charter to each of the participating States.

We, the undersigned High Representatives of the participating States, mindful of the high political significance that we attach to the present Charter and declaring our determination to act in accordance with the provisions contained in the above text, have subscribed our signatures below.

Geschehen zu Istanbul am 19. November 1999 namens	Done at Istanbul, on 19 November 1999, in the name of	Hecho en Estambul, el 19 de noviembre de 1999 en nombre de	Fait à Istanbul, le 19 novembre 1999 au nom	Fatto a Istanbul il 19 novembre 1999 in nome	Совершено в Стамбуле 19 ноября 1999 года от имени
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DER REPUBLIK ALBANIEN
THE REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA
LA REPÚBLICA DE ALBANIA
DE LA REPUBLIQUE D'ALBANIE
DELLA REPUBBLICA DI ALBANIA
РЕСПУБЛИКИ АЛБАНИИ

Ilir META


Ministerpräsident
Prime Minister
Primer Ministro
Premier Ministre
Primo Ministro
Премьер-министр




DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
LA REPÚBLICA FEDERAL DE ALEMANIA
DE LA REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNE
DELLA REPUBBLICA FEDERALE DI GERMANIA
ФЕДЕРАТИВНОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ ГЕРМАНИЯ

Gerhard SCHRÖDER

Bundeskanzler
Federal Chancellor
Canciller Federal
Chancelier fédéral
Cancelliere Federale
Федеральный канцлер



DER VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON AMERIKA
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMERICA
DES ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE
DEGLI STATI UNITI D'AMERICA
СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ



William J. CLINTON

Präsident der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika
President of the United States of America
Presidente de los Estados Unidos de América
Président des Etats-Unis d'Amérique
Presidente degli Stati Uniti d'America
Президент Соединенных Штатов Америки


DES FÜRSTENTUMS ANDORRA
THE PRINCIPALITY OF ANDORRA
EL PRINCIPADO DE ANDORRA
DE LA PRINCIPAUTE D'ANDORRE
DEL PRINCIPATO DI ANDORRA
КНЯЖЕСТВА АНДОРРА



Marc FORNÉ MOLNÉ

Regierungschef
Head of Government
Jefe de Gobierno
Chef du Gouvernement
Capo del Governo
Глава правительства


DER REPUBLIK ARMENIEN
THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA
LA REPÚBLICA DE ARMENIA
DE LA REPUBLIQUE D'ARMENIE
DELLA REPUBBLICA DI ARMENIA
РЕСПУБЛИКИ АРМЕНИЯ



Robert KOCHARYAN

Präsident der Republik
President of the Republic
Presidente de la República
Président de la République
Presidente della Repubblica
Президент Республики

DER REPUBLIK ÖSTERREICH
THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA
LA REPÚBLICA DE AUSTRIA
DE LA REPUBLIQUE D'AUTRICHE
DELLA REPUBBLICA D'AUSTRIA
АВСТРИЙСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ



Thomas KLESTIL

Bundespräsident
Federal President
Presidente Federal
Président fédéral
Presidente Federale
Федеральный президент


DER ASERBAIDSCHANISCHEN REPUBLIK
THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN
LA REPÚBLICA DE AZERBAIYÁN
DE LA REPUBLIQUE D'AZERBAÏDJAN
DELLA REPUBBLICA DI AZERBAIGIAN
АЗЕРБАЙДЖАНСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ

Heydar ALIYEV

Präsident der Republik
President of the Republic
Presidente de la República
Président de la République
Presidente della Repubblica
Президент Республики



DER REPUBLIK BELARUS
THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS
LA REPÚBLICA DE BELARÚS
DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU BELARUS
DELLA REPUBBLICA DI BELARUS
РЕСПУБЛИКИ БЕЛАРУСЬ



Alexander LUKASHENKO

Präsident der Republik
President of the Republic
Presidente de la República
Président de la République
Presidente della Repubblica
Президент Республики


DES KÖNIGREICHS BELGIEN
THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM
EL REINO DE BÉLGICA
DU ROYAUME DE BELGIQUE
DEL REGNO DEL BELGIO
КОРОЛЕВСТВА БЕЛЬГИИ



Louis MICHEL

Stellvertretender erster Minister und Minister für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs
Vice primer Ministro y Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores
Vice-Premier Ministre et Ministre des Affaires étrangères
Vice Primo Ministro e Ministro degli Affari Esteri
Заместитель Премьер-министра и Министр иностранных дел


BOSNIENS UND HERZEGOWINAS
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
BOSNIA Y HERZEGOVINA
DE LA BOSNIE-HERZEGOVINE
DELLA BOSNIA-ERZEGOVINA
БОСНИИ И ГЕРЦЕГОВИНЫ



Ante JELAVIC

Vorsitzender des Staatspräsidiums
Chairman of the Presidency
Presidente de la Presidencia
Président du Collège présidentiel
Presidente della Presidenza
Председатель Президиума

DER REPUBLIK BULGARIEN
THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA
LA REPÚBLICA DE BULGARIA
DE LA REPUBLIQUE DE BULGARIE
DELLA REPUBBLICA DI BULGARIA
РЕСПУБЛИКИ БОЛГАРИИ



Petar STOYANOV

Präsident der Republik
President of the Republic
Presidente de la República
Président de la République
Presidente della Repubblica
Президент Республики

KANADAS
CANADA
CANADÁ
DU CANADA
DEL CANADA
КАНАДЫ




Jean CHRETIEN

Premierminister
Prime Minister
Primer Ministro
Premier Ministre
Primo Ministro
Премьер-министр

DER REPUBLIK ZYPERN
THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS
LA REPÚBLICA DE CHIPRE
DE LA REPUBLIQUE DE CHYPRE
DELLA REPUBBLICA DI CIPRO
РЕСПУБЛИКИ КИПР


Glaucos CLERIDES

Handwritten signature of Glaucos Clerides in black ink, consisting of a stylized first name and a more formal last name.

Präsident der Republik
President of the Republic
Presidente de la República
Président de la République
Presidente della Repubblica
Президент Республики


DER REPUBLIK KROATIEN
THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
LA REPÚBLICA DE CROACIA
DE LA REPUBLIQUE DE CROATIE
DELLA REPUBBLICA DI CROAZIA
РЕСПУБЛИКИ ХОРВАТИИ

Zlatko MATEŠA

Handwritten signature of Zlatko Matešić in black ink, written in a cursive style.

Ministerpräsident
Prime Minister
Primer Ministro
Premier Ministre
Primo Ministro
Премьер-министр


DES KÖNIGREICHS DÄNEMARK
THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK
EL REINO DE DINAMARCA
DU ROYAUME DU DANEMARK
DEL REGNO DI DANIMARCA
КОРОЛЕВСТВА ДАНИИ



Poul Nyrup RASMUSSEN

Ministerpräsident
Prime Minister
Primer Ministro
Premier Ministre
Primo Ministro
Премьер-министр


DES KÖNIGREICHS SPANIEN
THE KINGDOM OF SPAIN
EL REINO DE ESPAÑA
DU ROYAUME D'ESPAGNE
DEL REGNO DI SPAGNA
КОРОЛЕВСТВА ИСПАНИИ



Ramón de MIGUEL

Staatssekretär für Außenpolitik und Fragen der Europäischen Union
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and European Matters
Secretario de Estado de Política Exterior y para la Unión Europea
Secrétaire d'Etat à la politique extérieure et pour l'Union européenne
Segretario di Stato per la Politica Estera e per l'Unione Europea
Статс-секретарь по вопросам внешней политики и делам Европейского союза

DER REPUBLIK ESTLAND
THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA
LA REPÚBLICA DE ESTONIA
DE LA REPUBLIQUE D'ESTONIE
DELLA REPUBBLICA DI ESTONIA
ЭСТОНСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ



Mart LAAR

Ministerpräsident
Prime Minister
Primer Ministro
Premier Ministre
Primo Ministro
Премьер-министр

DER REPUBLIK FINNLAND - DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION
THE REPUBLIC OF FINLAND - EUROPEAN UNION
LA REPÚBLICA DE FINLANDIA - UNIÓN EUROPEA
DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DE FINLANDE - UNION EUROPEENNE
DELLA REPUBBLICA DI FINLANDIA - UNIONE EUROPEA
ФИНЛЯНДСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ - ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СОЮЗА



Martti AHTISAARI



Romano PRODI


Präsident der Republik Finnland und in
seiner Eigenschaft als amtierender Präsident
des Rates der Europäischen Union
President of the Republic of Finland and in
his capacity as current President of the
Council of the European Union
Presidente de la República de Finlandia y en
su calidad de actual Presidente del Consejo
de la Unión Europea
Président du Conseil des ministres de la
République de Finlande et en sa qualité de
Président en exercice du Conseil de l'Union
européenne
Presidente della Repubblica di Finlandia e in
qualità di attuale Presidente del Consiglio
dell'Unione Europea
Президент Финляндской Республики и в
своем качестве очередного Председателя
Совета Европейского союза

Präsident der Europäischen Kommission
President of the European Commission
Presidente de la Comisión Europea
Président de la Commission européenne
Presidente della Commissione Europea
Председатель Европейской комиссии

DER FRANZÖSISCHEN REPUBLIK
THE FRENCH REPUBLIC
LA RÉPUBLICA FRANCESA
DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
DELLA REPUBBLICA FRANCESE
ФРАНЦУЗСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ

Jacques CHIRAC

Präsident der Französischen Republik
President of the French Republic
Presidente de la República Francesa
Président de la République française
Presidente della Repubblica Francese
Президент Французской Республики

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Chirac', is written over a horizontal line that extends across the page.

GEORGIENS
GEORGIA
GEORGIA
DE LA GEORGIE
DELLA GEORGIA
ГРУЗИИ

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'E. Shevardnadze', is written in a cursive style.

Eduard SHEVARDNADZE

Präsident
President
Presidente
Président
Presidente
Президент


DES VEREINIGTEN KÖNIGREICHS GROSSBRITANNIEN UND NORDIRLAND
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
EL REINO UNIDO DE GRAN BRETAÑA E IRLANDA DEL NORTE
DU ROYAUME-UNI DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE ET D'IRLANDE DU NORD
DEL REGNO UNITO DI GRAN BRETAGNA E IRLANDA DEL NORD
СОЕДИНЕННОГО КОРОЛЕВСТВА ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИИ И СЕВЕРНОЙ
ИРЛАНДИИ



The Rt Hon Robin COOK MP

Minister für auswärtige Angelegenheiten und Commonwealth-Fragen
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores y del Commonwealth
Ministre des Affaires étrangères et du Commonwealth
Ministro degli Affari Esteri e del Commonwealth
Министр иностранных дел и по делам Содружества


DER GRIECHISCHEN REPUBLIK
THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC
LA REPÚBLICA HELÉNICA
DE LA REPUBLIQUE HELLENIQUE
DELLA REPUBBLICA ELLENICA
ГРЕЧЕСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ



Costas SIMITIS

Ministerpräsident der Griechischen Republik
Prime Minister of the Hellenic Republic
Primer Ministro de la República Helénica
Premier Ministre de la République hellénique
Primo Ministro della Repubblica Ellenica
Премьер-министр Греческой Республики


DER REPUBLIK UNGARN
THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY
LA REPÚBLICA DE HUNGRÍA
DE LA REPUBLIQUE DE HONGRIE
DELLA REPUBBLICA DI UNGHERIA
ВЕНГЕРСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ



Viktor ORBÁN

Ministerpräsident
Prime Minister
Primer Ministro
Premier Ministre
Primo Ministro
Премьер-министр

IRLANDS
IRELAND
IRLANDA
DE L'IRLANDE
DELL'IRLANDA
ИРЛАНДИИ



Bertie AHERN T.D.

Taoiseach (Premierminister)
Taoiseach (Prime Minister)
Taoiseach (Primer Ministro)
Taoiseach (Premier Ministre)
Taoiseach (Primo Ministro)
Тишок (Премьер-министр)


DER REPUBLIK ISLAND
THE REPUBLIC OF ICELAND
LA REPÚBLICA DE ISLANDIA
DE LA REPUBLIQUE D'ISLANDE
DELLA REPUBBLICA D'ISLANDA
РЕСПУБЛИКИ ИСЛАНДИИ



David ODDSSON

Ministerpräsident
Prime Minister
Primer Ministro
Premier Ministre
Primo Ministro
Премьер-министр

DER ITALIENISCHEN REPUBLIK
THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC
LA REPUBBLICA ITALIANA
DE LA REPUBLIQUE ITALIENNE
DELLA REPUBBLICA ITALIANA
ИТАЛЬЯНСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ



Massimo D'ALEMA

Präsident des Ministerrates der Italienischen Republik
President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic
Presidente del Consejo de Ministros de la República Italiana
Président du Conseil des ministres de la République italienne
Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri della Repubblica Italiana
Председатель Совета министров Итальянской Республики

DER REPUBLIK KASACHSTAN
THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN
LA REPÚBLICA DE KAZAKSTÁN
DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU KAZAKHSTAN
DELLA REPUBBLICA DEL KAZAKISTAN
РЕСПУБЛИКИ КАЗАХСТАН



Nursultan NAZARBAYEV

Präsident der Republik Kasachstan
President of the Republic of Kazakhstan
Presidente de la República de Kazakstán
Président de la République du Kazakhstan
Presidente della Repubblica del Kazakistan
Президент Республики Казахстан

DER KIRGISISCHEN REPUBLIK
THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC
LA REPÚBLICA DE KIRGUISTÁN
DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU KIRGHIZISTAN
DELLA REPUBBLICA DEL KIRGHISTAN
КЫРГЫЗСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ




Askar AKAEV

Präsident der Kirgisischen Republik
President of the Kyrgyz Republic
Presidente de la República de Kirguistán
Président de la République kirghize
Presidente della Repubblica del Kirghistan
Президент Кыргызской Республики

DER REPUBLIK LETTLAND
THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA
LA REPÚBLICA DE LETONIA
DE LA REPUBLIQUE DE LETTONIE
DELLA REPUBBLICA DI LETTONIA
ЛАТВИЙСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ

Andris ŠKĒLE

Ministerpräsident
Prime Minister
Primer Ministro
Premier Ministre
Primo Ministro
Премьер-министр




DER EHEMALIGEN JUGOSLAWISCHEN REPUBLIK MAZEDONIEN
THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
LA EX REPÚBLICA YUGOSLAVA DE MACEDONIA
DE L'EX-REPUBLIQUE YOUGOSLAVE DE MACEDOINE
DELL'EX REPUBBLICA JUGOSLAVA DI MACEDONIA
БЫВШЕЙ ЮГОСЛАВСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ МАКЕДОНИИ

Ljubco GEORGIEVSKI

See page 42

Ministerpräsident der Republik
Prime Minister of the Republic
Primer Ministro de la República
Premier Ministre de la République
Primo Ministro della Repubblica
Премьер-министр Республики


DES FÜRSTENTUMS LIECHTENSTEIN
THE PRINCIPALITY OF LIECHTENSTEIN
EL PRINCIPADO DE LIECHTENSTEIN
DE LA PRINCIPAUTE DE LIECHTENSTEIN
DEL PRINCIPATO DEL LIECHTENSTEIN
КНЯЖЕСТВА ЛИХТЕНШТЕЙН



Mario FRICK

Regierungschef
Head of Government
Jefe del Gobierno
Chef du Gouvernement
Capo del Governo
Глава правительства

DER REPUBLIK LITAUEN
THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA
LA REPÚBLICA DE LITUANIA
DE LA REPUBLIQUE DE LITUANIE
DELLA REPUBBLICA DI LITUANIA
ЛИТОВСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ



Valdas ADAMKUS

Präsident der Republik Litauen
President of the Republic of Lithuania
Presidente de la República de Lituania
Président de la République de Lituanie
Presidente della Repubblica di Lituania
Президент Литовской Республики

DES GROSSHERZOGTUMS LUXEMBURG
THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG
EL GRAN DUCADO DE LUXEMBURGO
DU GRAND-DUCHE DE LUXEMBOURG
DEL GRANDUCATO DEL LUSSEMBURGO
ВЕЛИКОГО ГЕРЦОГСТВА ЛЮКСЕМБУРГ




Jean-Claude JUNCKER

Premierminister
Prime Minister
Primer Ministro
Premier Ministre
Primo Ministro
Премьер-министр




DER REPUBLIK MALTA
THE REPUBLIC OF MALTA
LA REPÚBLICA DE MALTA
DE LA REPUBLIQUE DE MALTE
DELLA REPUBBLICA DI MALTA
РЕСПУБЛИКИ МАЛЬТА



Edward FENECH ADAMI

Ministerpräsident
Prime Minister
Primer Ministro
Premier Ministre
Primo Ministro
Премьер-министр

DER REPUBLIK MOLDAU
THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
LA REPÚBLICA DE MOLDOVA
DE LA REPUBLIQUE DE MOLDAVIE
DELLA REPUBBLICA DI MOLDOVA
РЕСПУБЛИКИ МОЛДОВА



Petru LUCINSCHI

Präsident der Republik
President of the Republic
Presidente de la República
Président de la République
Presidente della Repubblica
Президент Республики

DES FÜRSTENTUMS MONACO
THE PRINCIPALITY OF MONACO
EL PRINCIPADO DE MÓNACO
DE LA PRINCIPAUTE DE MONACO
DEL PRINCIPATO DI MONACO
КНЯЖЕСТВА МОНАКО



Jean GRETHER

Botschafter
Ambassador
Embajador
Ambassadeur
Ambasciatore
Посол

DES KÖNIGREICHS NORWEGEN
THE KINGDOM OF NORWAY
EL REINO DE NORUEGA
DU ROYAUME DE NORVEGE
DEL REGNO DI NORVEGIA
КОРОЛЕВСТВА НОРВЕГИИ



Kjell Magne BONDEVIK

Ministerpräsident
Prime Minister
Primer Ministro
Premier Ministre
Primo Ministro
Премьер-министр

DER REPUBLIK USBEKISTAN
THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN
LA REPÚBLICA DE UZBEKISTÁN
DE LA REPUBLIQUE D'OUZBEKISTAN
DELLA REPUBBLICA DI UZBEKISTAN
РЕСПУБЛИКИ УЗБЕКИСТАН



Abdulaziz KAMILOV

Minister für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores
Ministre des Affaires étrangères
Ministro degli Affari Esteri
Министр иностранных дел

DES KÖNIGREICHS DER NIEDERLANDE
THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS
EL REINO DE LOS PAÍSES BAJOS
DU ROYAUME DES PAYS-BAS
DEL REGNO DEI PAESI BASSI
КОРОЛЕВСТВА НИДЕРЛАНДОВ

Jozias van AARTSEN


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Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores
Ministre des Affaires étrangères
Ministro degli Affari Esteri
Министр иностранных дел




DER REPUBLIK POLEN
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LA REPÚBLICA DE POLONIA
DE LA REPUBLIQUE DE POLOGNE
DELLA REPUBBLICA DI POLONIA
РЕСПУБЛИКИ ПОЛЬША

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Präsident der Republik
President of the Republic
Presidente de la República
Président de la République
Presidente della Repubblica
Президент Республики




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THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC
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DE LA REPUBLIQUE PORTUGAISE
DELLA REPUBBLICA PORTOGHESE
ПОРТУГАЛЬСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ



António GUTERRES

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Prime Minister
Primer Ministro
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Primo Ministro
Премьер-министр

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ROMANIA
RUMANIA
DE LA ROUMANIE
DELLA ROMANIA
РУМЫНИИ



Emil CONSTANTINESCU

Präsident
President
Presidente
Président
Presidente
Президент


DER RUSSISCHEN FÖDERATION
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
LA FEDERACIÓN RUSA
DE LA FEDERATION DE RUSSIE
DELLA FEDERAZIONE RUSSA
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ



Igor IVANOV

Minister für auswärtige Angelegenheiten der Russischen Föderation
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores de la Federación Rusa
Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Fédération de Russie
Ministro degli Affari Esteri della Federazione Russa
Министр иностранных дел Российской Федерации

DER REPUBLIK SAN MARINO
THE REPUBLIC OF SAN MARINO
LA REPÚBLICA DE SAN MARINO
DE LA REPUBLIQUE DE SAINT-MARIN
DELLA REPUBBLICA DI SAN MARINO
РЕСПУБЛИКИ САН-МАРИНО



Giuseppe ARZILLI

Marino BOLLINI

Kapitänregenten von San Marino
Captains Regent of San Marino
Capitanes Regentes de San Marino
Capitaines Régents de Saint-Marin
Capitani Reggenti di San Marino
Капитаны-регенты Сан-Марино

DES HEILIGEN STUHL
THE HOLY SEE
LA SANTA SEDE
DU SAINT-SIEGE
DELLA SANTA SEDE
СВЯТЕЙШЕГО ПРЕСТОЛА

Angelo Cardinal SODANO

Staatssekretär Seiner Heiligkeit
Secretary of State of His Holiness
Secretario de Estado de Su Santidad
Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Sainteté
Segretario di Stato di Sua Santità
Государственный секретарь Его Святейшества

+ Angelo Card. Sodano

DER SLOWAKISCHEN REPUBLIK
THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC
LA REPÚBLICA ESLOVACA
DE LA REPUBLIQUE SLOVAQUE
DELLA REPUBBLICA SLOVACCA
СЛОВАЦКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ

Rudolf Schuster


Rudolf SCHUSTER

Präsident der Slowakischen Republik
President of the Slovak Republic
Presidente de la República Eslovaca
Président de la République slovaque
Presidente della Repubblica Slovacca
Президент Словацкой Республики

DER REPUBLIK SLOWENIEN
THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA
LA REPÚBLICA DE ESLOVENIA
DE LA REPUBLIQUE DE SLOVENIE
DELLA REPUBBLICA DI SLOVENIA
РЕСПУБЛИКИ СЛОВЕНИИ

Janez DRNOVŠEK

Ministerpräsident
Prime Minister
Primer Ministro
Premier Ministre
Primo Ministro
Премьер-министр



DES KÖNIGREICHS SCHWEDEN
THE KINGDOM OF SWEDEN
EL REINO DE SUECIA
DU ROYAUME DE SUEDE
DEL REGNO DI SVEZIA
КОРОЛЕВСТВА ШВЕЦИИ



Anna LINDH

Ministerin für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ministra de Asuntos Exteriores
Ministre des Affaires étrangères
Ministro degli Affari Esteri
Министр иностранных дел

DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN EIDGENOSSENSCHAFT
THE SWISS CONFEDERATION
LA CONFEDERACIÓN SUIZA
DE LA CONFEDERATION SUISSE
DELLA CONFEDERAZIONE SVIZZERA
ШВЕЙЦАРСКОЙ КОНФЕДЕРАЦИИ

Joseph DEISS

Bunderrat, Vorsteher des Eidgenössischen Departements für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Federal Councillor, Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
Consejero federal, Jefe del Departamento Federal de Asuntos Exteriores
Conseiller fédéral, Chef du Département fédéral des Affaires étrangères
Consigliere Federale, Capo del Dipartimento Federale degli Affari Esteri
Федеральный советник, Глава Федерального департамента иностранных дел



DER REPUBLIK TADDSCHIKISTAN
THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN
LA REPÚBLICA DE TAYIKISTÁN
DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU TADJIKISTAN
DELLA REPUBBLICA DEL TAGIKISTAN
РЕСПУБЛИКИ ТАДЖИКИСТАН



Imomali RAHMONOV


Präsident der Republik
President of the Republic
Presidente de la República
Président de la République
Presidente della Repubblica
Президент Республики

DER TSCHECHISCHEN REPUBLIK
THE CZECH REPUBLIC
LA REPÚBLICA CHECA
DE LA REPUBLIQUE TCHEQUE
DELLA REPUBBLICA CESA
ЧЕШСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ



Václav HAVEL

Präsident der Republik
President of the Republic
Presidente de la República
Président de la République
Presidente della Repubblica
Президент Республики



TURKMENISTANS
TURKMENISTAN
TURKMENISTÁN
DU TURKMENISTAN
DEL TURKMENISTAN
ТУРКМЕНИСТАНА

Boris SHIKHMURADOV

Minister für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores
Ministre des Affaires étrangères
Ministro degli Affari Esteri
Министр иностранных дел

DER REPUBLIK TÜRKEI
THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
LA REPÚBLICA DE TURQUÍA
DE LA REPUBLIQUE TURQUE
DELLA REPUBBLICA DI TURCHIA
ТУРЕЦКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ



Süleyman DEMİREL


Präsident
President
Presidente
Président
Presidente
Президент

DER UKRAINE
UKRAINE
UCRANIA
DE L'UKRAINE
DELL'UCRAINA
УКРАЇНИ



Leonid KUCHMA

Präsident
President
Presidente
Président
Presidente
Президент



**GOVERNMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
PRESIDENT**

Istanbul, 19 November 1999

Your Excellency,

The Republic of Macedonia accepts the Charter for European Security done in Istanbul on 19 November 1999 and declares its determination to act in accordance with the provisions contained in it.

We consider that with this letter the Republic of Macedonia becomes a State signatory of the Charter for European Security.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

H.E. Ambassador Jan Kubis
Secretary General of the OSCE

Ljubco Georgievski

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Ljubco Georgievski'.

Operational Document – the Platform for Co-operative Security

I. The Platform

1. The goal of the Platform for Co-operative Security is to strengthen the mutually reinforcing nature of the relationship between those organizations and institutions concerned with the promotion of comprehensive security within the OSCE area.
2. The OSCE will work co-operatively with those organizations and institutions whose members individually and collectively, in a manner consistent with the modalities appropriate to each organization or institution, now and in the future:
 - Adhere to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the OSCE principles and commitments as set out in the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, the Helsinki Document 1992, the Budapest Document 1994, the OSCE Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security and the Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the twenty-first century;
 - Subscribe to the principles of transparency and predictability in their actions in the spirit of the Vienna Document 1999 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures;
 - Implement fully the arms control obligations, including disarmament and CSBMs, to which they have committed themselves;
 - Proceed on the basis that those organizations and institutions of which they are members will adhere to transparency about their evolution;
 - Ensure that their membership in those organizations and institutions is based on openness and free will;
 - Actively support the OSCE's concept of common, comprehensive and indivisible security and a common security space free of dividing lines;
 - Play a full and appropriate part in the development of the relationships between mutually reinforcing security-related institutions in the OSCE area;
 - Are ready in principle to deploy the institutional resources of international organizations and institutions of which they are members in support of the OSCE's work, subject to the necessary policy decisions as cases arise. In this regard, participating States note the particular relevance of co-operation in the areas of conflict prevention and crisis management.
3. Together these principles and commitments form the Platform for Co-operative Security.

II. Modalities for Co-operation

1. Within the relevant organizations and institutions of which they are members, participating States will work to ensure the organizations' and institutions' adherence to the

Platform for Co-operative Security. Adherence, on the basis of decisions taken by each member State within relevant organizations and institutions, will take place in a manner consistent with the modalities appropriate to each organization or institution. Contacts and co-operation of the OSCE with other organizations and institutions will be transparent to participating States and will take place in a manner consistent with the modalities appropriate to the OSCE and those organizations and institutions.

2. At the 1997 Ministerial Meeting in Copenhagen, a decision was taken on the Common Concept for the Development of Co-operation between Mutually Reinforcing Institutions. We acknowledge the extensive network of contacts elaborated since then, in particular the growing co-operation with organizations and institutions active both in the politico-military field and in the human and economic dimensions of security, and the strengthening of co-operation between the OSCE and the various United Nations bodies and agencies, recalling the OSCE's role as a regional arrangement under the Charter of the United Nations. We are determined to develop this further.

3. The growing importance of subregional groupings in the work of the OSCE is another important area, and we support the growth in co-operation with these groups based on this Platform.

4. Development of co-operation can be further enhanced through extensive use of the following instruments and mechanisms:

- Regular contacts, including meetings; a continuous framework for dialogue; increased transparency and practical co-operation, including the identification of liaison officers or points of contact; cross-representation at appropriate meetings; and other contacts intended to increase understanding of each organization's conflict prevention tools.

5. In addition, the OSCE may engage in special meetings with other organizations, institutions and structures operating in the OSCE area. These meetings may be held at a political and/or executive level (to co-ordinate policies or determine areas of co-operation) and at a working level (to address the modalities of co-operation).

6. The development of the OSCE field operations in recent years has represented a major transformation of the Organization. In view of the adoption of the Platform for Co-operative Security, existing co-operation between the OSCE and other relevant international bodies, organizations and institutions in field operations should be developed and built upon in accordance with their individual mandates. Modalities for this form of co-operation could include: regular information exchanges and meetings, joint needs assessment missions, secondment of experts by other organizations to the OSCE, appointment of liaison officers, development of common projects and field operations, and joint training efforts.

7. Co-operation in responding to specific crises:

- The OSCE, through its Chairman-in-Office and supported by the Secretary General, and the relevant organizations and institutions are encouraged to keep each other informed of what actions they are undertaking or plan to undertake to deal with a particular situation;

- To this end, participating States encourage the Chairman-in-Office, supported by the Secretary General, to work with other organizations and institutions to foster co-ordinated approaches that avoid duplication and ensure efficient use of available resources. As appropriate, the OSCE can offer to serve as a flexible framework for co-operation of the various mutually reinforcing efforts. The Chairman-in-Office will consult with participating States on the process and will act in accordance with the results of these consultations.
8. The Secretary General shall prepare an annual report for the Permanent Council on interaction between organizations and institutions in the OSCE area.

ISTANBUL SUMMIT DECLARATION

1. We, the Heads of State or Government of the participating States of the OSCE, have assembled in Istanbul on the eve of the twenty-first century and of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act. Since we last met we have transformed the OSCE to meet unprecedented challenges. When we met in Lisbon, the first large-scale OSCE field operation had just been established, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the three intervening years, we have increased dramatically the number and size of our field operations. Our common institutions have grown in number and in the level of their activities. The OSCE has expanded the scale and substance of its efforts. This has greatly strengthened the OSCE's contribution to security and co-operation across the OSCE area. We pay special tribute to the women and men whose dedication and hard work have made the Organization's achievements possible.

2. Today, we adopted a Charter for European Security in order to strengthen security and stability in our region and improve the operational capabilities of our Organization. We task the OSCE Permanent Council to take the necessary decisions to implement promptly the new steps agreed upon in this Charter. We need the contribution of a strengthened OSCE to meet the risks and challenges facing the OSCE area, to improve human security and thereby to make a difference in the life of the individual, which is the aim of all our efforts. We reiterate unreservedly our commitment to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and to abstain from any form of discrimination. We also reiterate our respect for international humanitarian law. We pledge our commitment to intensify efforts to prevent conflicts in the OSCE area, and when they occur to resolve them peacefully. We will work closely with other international organizations and institutions on the basis of the Platform for Co-operative Security, which we adopted as a part of our Charter.

3. The situation in Kosovo, FRY, in particular the humanitarian situation, remains a major challenge for the OSCE. Our thoughts still go out to the large number of Kosovo Albanians and others who lost their lives, those who saw their property destroyed and the hundreds of thousands who were expelled from and abandoned their homes. Now most of these refugees have returned. As the difficult work of rehabilitation advances, remaining refugees will be able to return. The OSCE Mission in Kosovo forms an essential part of the broader United Nations Mission working under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. The OSCE Mission today has more than 1,400 staff members, and plays a vital role in the process of rebuilding a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo; the first class from the OSCE Police School has graduated, and the OSCE training of judicial and administrative personnel has started. The Organization assists in developing a civil society, in supporting the formation of a pluralistic political party landscape, free media and a viable NGO community. The OSCE plays a leading role in promoting and protecting human rights, and establishing respect for the rule of law. The success of this work is essential if democracy is to take root. We pledge to give it our full support. As we advance in these areas, we accelerate our work towards creating the necessary conditions for the first free elections in Kosovo, which the OSCE has been tasked to organize. We will seek to involve the local population increasingly in the efforts of the OSCE Mission.

4. Against the background of years of repression, intolerance and violence in Kosovo, the challenge is to build a multi-ethnic society on the basis of substantial autonomy respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, pending final settlement in accordance with UNSCR 1244. We expect this Resolution to be fully implemented and strictly adhered to by all concerned. We will assist all inhabitants of Kosovo. But they, and those who aspire to be their leaders, must work together towards a

multi-ethnic society where the rights of each citizen are fully and equally respected. They must fight decisively against the cycle of hate and revenge and bring about reconciliation among all ethnic groups. Over the recent months, we have witnessed a new exodus from Kosovo, this time of Serbs and other non-Albanians. The necessary conditions must be restored so that those who have fled recently can return and enjoy their rights. Those who fought and suffered for their rights must now stand up for the equal rights of others. We firmly reject any further violence and any form of ethnic discrimination. Failure to oppose such acts will affect the security of the region.

5. The democratic shortcomings in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia remain one of the fundamental sources of grave concern in the region. The leaders and people of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia must put the country firmly on the path towards democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. When conditions permit, the OSCE stands ready to assist in order to accelerate democratization, promote independent media and hold free and fair elections in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We emphasize our desire to see the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a full partner. Real progress towards democracy will be a positive step towards equal participation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the international community, including in the OSCE, and will create a new basis for growth and prosperity.

6. We remain committed to a democratic, multi-ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina based on the General Framework Agreement for Peace. We underline the importance of improving the functioning of common institutions, and of the continued assumption by those and other institutions of tasks undertaken by the international community. We expect Bosnia and Herzegovina to rapidly adopt the permanent election law, so that it can be implemented prior to the general elections scheduled for the autumn of 2000. We appeal to all the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take decisive steps towards bringing its two entities closer together and to create a situation where persons, goods and services can circulate freely within a single State to the benefit of stability and prosperity. We underline the importance of respect for the rule of law and of vigorous efforts to fight organized crime and corruption, which constitute a great threat to economic reform and prosperity. We remain committed to the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, in particular minority returns.

7. We underscore the importance of working with Croatian authorities to intensify efforts towards reconciliation in Croatia. The OSCE pledges to continue its assistance to a multi-ethnic Croatia through post-war confidence-building and reconciliation. We look forward to faster progress towards the return of refugees and displaced persons and the implementation of relevant international standards, particularly those related to equal treatment without regard to ethnicity, freedom of the media, and free and fair elections. The OSCE's police monitoring in the Danubian region of Croatia, which has played a valuable role in protecting the rights of individuals, demonstrates the OSCE's ability to develop new operational capabilities quickly and efficiently.

8. We reaffirm our commitment to assist Albania as it continues its social, political and economic reform process following the setbacks caused by the upheaval of 1997 and the Kosovo refugee crisis of 1999. Noting the recent progress, we call upon the Government and all political parties to improve the political atmosphere, thereby strengthening democratic institutions. We encourage the new Government of Albania to continue its fight against crime and corruption. The OSCE is committed to continue its assistance and to work closely with the European Union and international organizations within the framework of the "Friends of Albania".

9. We commend the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for its commitment to domestic reforms designed to enhance stability and economic prosperity. We reaffirm the OSCE's determination to support its efforts in this process, and emphasize the importance of continued attention to the development of inter-ethnic relations.

10. We pay tribute to the Governments and peoples of Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as most affected countries, as well as those of other neighbouring countries for their hospitality during the Kosovo refugee crisis and for their generosity in shouldering a heavy political and economic burden during this period.

11. Our experiences in South Eastern Europe demonstrate the need for a broader view of the region. We therefore welcome the adoption by the Cologne Ministerial Conference on 10 June 1999 of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, launched on the initiative of the European Union, which plays a leading role in co-operation with other participating and facilitating States, international organizations and institutions. We reinforce the message from the Sarajevo Summit: regional co-operation will serve as a catalyst for the integration of countries in the region into broader structures. The OSCE, under whose auspices the Stability Pact is placed, has a key role to play in contributing to its success, and we task the Permanent Council to develop a regional strategy to support its aims. We welcome the reports provided to us by the Special Co-ordinator for the Stability Pact and the Special Envoy of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office. The OSCE will work in close concert with our participating States and with non-governmental organizations in the region.

12. We consider that the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is crucial to achieving lasting peace and justice in the region, and reiterate the obligation of all to co-operate fully with the Tribunal.

13. During this year we have witnessed a significant increase in our co-operation with the five participating States in Central Asia. Political dialogue has gained from a growing number of high-level visits from the Central Asian States to the OSCE and by OSCE representatives to Central Asia. With the continuing support of our partners in Central Asia, the OSCE has now established offices in all five States. This in particular has contributed to an expansion of our co-operative activities in all OSCE dimensions. Reiterating our target of achieving comprehensive security throughout the OSCE area, we strongly welcome these positive developments. We are convinced that necessary progress in the difficult and complex transition process will be stimulated by an increase in our efforts based on co-operation and our common commitments. Strengthening the rule of law, the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as the development of civil societies constitute one of the centrepieces in our broad framework of co-operative efforts. In this regard, we welcome the process of signing of Memoranda of Understanding between the ODIHR and the Central Asian participating States.

14. We share the concerns expressed by the participating States in Central Asia regarding international terrorism, violent extremism, organized crime and drug and arms trafficking. We agree that national, regional and joint action by the international community is necessary to cope with these threats, including those stemming from areas neighbouring the OSCE participating States. We further recognize the importance of addressing economic and environmental risks in the region, such as issues related to water resources, energy and erosion. We are convinced that strengthening regional co-operation will promote stability and security in Central Asia, and we welcome the active approach taken by the Chairman-in-Office to this effect.

15. Reaffirming our strong support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, we stress the need for solving the conflicts with regard to the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Georgia, particularly by defining the political status of these regions within Georgia. Respect for human rights and development of joint democratic institutions as well as the prompt, safe and unconditional return of refugees and internally displaced persons will contribute to peaceful settlement of these conflicts. We underscore the importance of taking concrete steps in this direction. We welcome progress reached at this Summit Meeting in the Georgian-Russian negotiations on the reduction of Russian military equipment in Georgia.

16. With regard to the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia, some progress has been made towards solving the conflict. We emphasize the importance of maintaining and intensifying the dialogue which is now under way. In light of further progress, we believe that an early meeting in Vienna, with participation of experts from this region, should be used to take decisive steps towards a solution. The establishment by the parties concerned of a legal framework for refugee and internally displaced persons housing and property restitution will facilitate the early return of refugees and internally displaced persons to the region. We also urge the early signing of the Georgian-Russian economic rehabilitation agreement and encourage further international economic assistance.

17. We continue to support the leading role of the United Nations in Abkhazia, Georgia. We emphasize the importance of breaking the current deadlock with regard to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict. In this respect we - and in particular those of us who belong to the Friends of the United Nations Secretary-General - are ready to work with the United Nations to prepare and submit a draft document addressing the distribution of constitutional competencies between the central authorities of Georgia and authorities of Abkhazia, Georgia. We reiterate our strong condemnation as formulated in the Budapest and Lisbon Summit Documents, of the "ethnic cleansing" resulting in mass destruction and forcible expulsion of predominantly Georgian population in Abkhazia, Georgia, and of the violent acts in May 1998 in the Gali region. In light of the precarious situation of the returnees, we recommend that a fact-finding mission with the participation of the OSCE and the United Nations be dispatched early next year to the Gali region to assess, *inter alia*, reported cases of continued "ethnic cleansing". Such a mission would provide a basis for increased international support for the unconditional and safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons and contribute to the general stability in the area. We consider the so-called presidential elections and referendum in Abkhazia, Georgia, this year as unacceptable and illegitimate.

18. We welcome the encouraging steps which have been recently taken in the process of the settlement of the Trans-Dniestrian problem. The Summit in Kiev (July 1999) became an important event in this regard. However, there have been no tangible shifts on the major issue - defining the status of the Trans-Dniestrian region. We reaffirm that in the resolution of this problem the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova should be ensured. We stand for the continuation and deployment of the negotiation process and call on all sides and in particular the Trans-Dniestrian authorities to demonstrate the political will required to negotiate a peaceful and early elimination of the consequences of the conflict. We appreciate the continuation of the mediating efforts of the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the OSCE in the negotiation process on the future status of the Trans-Dniestrian region within the Republic of Moldova. We take note of the positive role of the joint peacekeeping forces in securing stability in the region.

19. Recalling the decisions of the Budapest and Lisbon Summits and Oslo Ministerial Meeting, we reiterate our expectation of an early, orderly and complete withdrawal of

Russian troops from Moldova. In this context, we welcome the recent progress achieved in the removal and destruction of the Russian military equipment stockpiled in the Trans-Dniestrian region of Moldova and the completion of the destruction of non-transportable ammunition.

We welcome the commitment by the Russian Federation to complete withdrawal of the Russian forces from the territory of Moldova by the end of 2002. We also welcome the willingness of the Republic of Moldova and of the OSCE to facilitate this process, within their respective abilities, by the agreed deadline.

We recall that an international assessment mission is ready to be dispatched without delay to explore removal and destruction of Russian ammunition and armaments. With the purpose of securing the process of withdrawal and destruction, we will instruct the Permanent Council to consider the expansion of the mandate of the OSCE Mission to Moldova in terms of ensuring transparency of this process and co-ordination of financial and technical assistance offered to facilitate withdrawal and destruction. Furthermore, we agree to consider the establishment of a fund for voluntary international financial assistance to be administered by the OSCE.

20. We received the report of the Co-Chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group on the evolving situation and recent developments connected with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and commend their efforts. We applaud in particular the intensified dialogue between the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, whose regular contacts have created opportunities to dynamize the process of finding a lasting and comprehensive solution to the problem. We firmly support this dialogue and encourage its continuation, with the hope of resuming negotiations within the OSCE Minsk Group. We also confirm that the OSCE and its Minsk Group, which remains the most appropriate format for finding a solution, stand ready to further advance the peace process and its future implementation, including by providing all necessary assistance to the parties.

21. We welcome the opening of an OSCE Office in Yerevan this year and the decision to open a similar office in Baku. These steps will enable the OSCE to strengthen our co-operation with Armenia and Azerbaijan.

22. We strongly support the work of the Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus, which has worked closely with the Belarusian authorities as well as with opposition parties and leaders and NGOs in promoting democratic institutions and compliance with OSCE commitments, thus facilitating a resolution of the constitutional controversy in Belarus. We emphasize that only a real political dialogue in Belarus can pave the way for free and democratic elections through which the foundations for real democracy can be developed. We would welcome early progress in this political dialogue with the OSCE participation, in close co-operation with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. We stress the necessity of removing all remaining obstacles to this dialogue by respecting the principles of the rule of law and the freedom of the media.

23. In connection with the recent chain of events in North Caucasus, we strongly reaffirm that we fully acknowledge the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and condemn terrorism in all its forms. We underscore the need to respect OSCE norms. We agree that in light of the humanitarian situation in the region it is important to alleviate the hardships of the civilian population, including by creating appropriate conditions for international organizations to provide humanitarian aid. We agree that a political solution is essential, and that the assistance of the OSCE would contribute to achieving that goal. We welcome the

willingness of the OSCE to assist in the renewal of a political dialogue. We welcome the agreement of the Russian Federation to a visit by the Chairman-in-Office to the region. We reaffirm the existing mandate of the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya. In this regard, we also welcome the willingness of the Russian Federation to facilitate these steps, which will contribute to creating conditions for stability, security, and economic prosperity in the region.

24. In a year which has seen the deployment of our largest ever mission, we have been able to welcome the successful conclusion of the work of one of our smallest, the OSCE Representative to the Joint Committee on the Skrunda Radar Station. We congratulate the parties involved in decommissioning the Radar Station on their efforts, undertaken in a spirit of constructive co-operation.

25. We welcome the successful completion of the work of the OSCE Mission to Ukraine. This work has been an important contribution by the OSCE to the process of stabilization in its Autonomous Republic of Crimea. We look forward to continued co-operation between Ukraine and the OSCE, including through the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, on the basis of its mandate and the Memorandum of Understanding.

26. With a large number of elections ahead of us, we are committed to these being free and fair, and in accordance with OSCE principles and commitments. This is the only way in which there can be a stable basis for democratic development. We appreciate the role of the ODIHR in assisting countries to develop electoral legislation in keeping with OSCE principles and commitments, and we agree to follow up promptly ODIHR's election assessments and recommendations. We value the work of the ODIHR and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly - before, during and after elections - which further contributes to the democratic process. We are committed to secure the full right of persons belonging to minorities to vote and to facilitate the right of refugees to participate in elections held in their countries of origin. We pledge to ensure fair competition among candidates as well as parties, including through their access to the media and respect for the right of assembly.

27. We commit ourselves to ensuring the freedom of the media as a basic condition for pluralistic and democratic societies. We are deeply concerned about the exploitation of media in areas of conflict to foment hatred and ethnic tension and the use of legal restrictions and harassment to deprive citizens of free media. We underline the need to secure freedom of expression, which is an essential element of political discourse in any democracy. We support the Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media in its efforts to promote free and independent media.

28. In the year of the 10th anniversary of the adoption of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and putting the OSCE's Copenhagen commitments into practice, we commit ourselves to actively promote children's rights and interests, especially in conflict and post-conflict situations. We will regularly address the rights of children in the work of the OSCE, including by organizing a special meeting dedicated to children in armed conflict during the year 2000. We will pay particular attention to the physical and psychological well-being of children involved in or affected by armed conflict.

29. The Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities should, under the authority of the Chairman-in-Office and the Secretary General and in close co-operation with the relevant OSCE field operations, develop regular reports concerning economic and environmental risks to security. These reports should include questions of promoting public awareness of the relationship between economic and environmental problems and security and the relationship between our Organization and others concerned with the promotion of

economic and environmental security within the OSCE area. Such reports will be discussed by the Permanent Council.

30. We reaffirm our commitment to ensure that laws and policies fully respect the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, in particular in relation to issues affecting cultural identity. Specifically, we emphasize the requirement that laws and policies regarding the educational, linguistic and participatory rights of persons belonging to national minorities conform to applicable international standards and conventions. We also support the adoption and full implementation of comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation to promote full equality of opportunities for all. We commend the essential work of the High Commissioner on National Minorities. We reaffirm that we will increase our efforts to implement the recommendations of the High Commissioner on National Minorities.

31. We deplore violence and other manifestations of racism and discrimination against minorities, including the Roma and Sinti. We commit ourselves to ensure that laws and policies fully respect the rights of Roma and Sinti and, where necessary, to promote anti-discrimination legislation to this effect. We underline the importance of careful attention to the problems of the social exclusion of Roma and Sinti. These issues are primarily a responsibility of the participating States concerned. We emphasize the important role that the ODIHR Contact Point for Roma and Sinti issues can play in providing support. A further helpful step might be the elaboration by the Contact Point of an action plan of targeted activities, drawn up in co-operation with the High Commissioner on National Minorities and others active in this field, notably the Council of Europe.

32. In line with our commitment to ensure full equality between women and men, we look forward to an early approval and implementation of an OSCE gender action plan.

33. In the framework of our commitment to further strengthening of the operational capacities of the OSCE Secretariat, we will improve the OSCE employment conditions so that it can better compete for and retain well qualified personnel to enable the Secretariat to carry out its tasks and fulfil its other responsibilities. We will take into account the need for geographic diversity and gender balance when recruiting personnel to OSCE institutions and field operations.

34. We note that a large number of participating States have not been able to implement the 1993 Rome Ministerial Council decision on legal capacity of the OSCE institutions and on privileges and immunities. With a view to improve this situation, a determined effort should be made to review issues related to the implementation of commitments under the 1993 Rome Ministerial decision. To this end, we task the Permanent Council, through an informal open-ended working group to draw up a report to the next Ministerial Council Meeting, including recommendations on how to improve the situation.

35. To address the challenges in the OSCE area quickly and efficiently new instruments are required. We welcome the establishment, in the Charter, of a Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT) programme for the OSCE. We commit ourselves to make this concept fully operational at the shortest possible time. We are determined as a matter of priority to implement the decision made in the Charter. We will provide the expertise required and commit the necessary resources according to established procedures. We take note of the letter from the Secretary General to the Permanent Council concerning the rapid deployment of expertise. We request the Permanent Council and the Secretary General to establish a task force within the Conflict Prevention Centre aimed at developing the REACT programme and a budget that will enable REACT to be fully operational by 30 June 2000.

36. We task the Permanent Council and the Secretary General to implement within the same time frame, our decision in the Charter to set up an Operation Centre within the Conflict Prevention Centre, with a small core staff having expertise relevant for all kinds of OSCE operations, which can be expanded rapidly when required, and the decisions made to strengthen the Secretariat and our field operations.

37. We have in the Charter reaffirmed our commitment to the rule of law and stressed the need to combat corruption. We task the Permanent Council to examine how best to contribute to efforts to combat corruption, taking into account efforts of other organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Council of Europe and the United Nations. The results of this work will be reported to the 2000 Ministerial Meeting.

38. The fact that we are meeting in Turkey, which only recently suffered terrible earthquakes, brings home to us the major impact of natural disasters. We need to strengthen the international community's ability to respond to such events, by improving the co-ordination of the efforts of participating States, international organizations and NGOs. We task the Permanent Council to discuss this matter further.

39. We welcome the successful adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The adapted Treaty will provide a greater degree of military stability through a stricter system of limitations, increased transparency and lower levels of conventional armed forces in its area of application. We hope the States Parties will move forward expeditiously to facilitate completion of national ratification procedures, taking into account their common commitment to, and the central importance of, full and continued implementation of the Treaty and its associated documents until and following entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation. Upon entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation, OSCE participating States with territory in the area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains may apply for accession to the adapted Treaty, thereby providing an important additional contribution to European stability and security.

40. We welcome the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation's efforts to advance security dialogue, co-operation, transparency and mutual confidence, as well as its work on the OSCE concept of comprehensive and indivisible security in accordance with its mandate of Helsinki 1992. We welcome the conclusion of the review process resulting in the adoption of the Vienna Document 1999 on confidence- and security-building measures, a key element of politico-military co-operation and stability. It improves current CSBMs and emphasizes the importance of regional co-operation. We remain fully committed to the principles contained in the Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security. We welcome the decision of the FSC to launch a broad and comprehensive discussion on all aspects of the problem of the spread of small arms and light weapons and to study concrete measures to deal with this issue, in order to respond to the challenge to peace and stability stemming from the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled spread of these weapons.

41. We note with satisfaction that the negotiations on regional stability, as foreseen under Article V of Annex 1-B of the General Framework Agreement for Peace have entered their substantive phase. A successful outcome to the on-going Article V negotiations would make a significant contribution to security and stability in the region. We urge the states participating in the Article V negotiations to aim to conclude their work by the end of 2000. We appreciate the OSCE's active role in facilitating the implementation of the Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Agreement

on Sub-Regional Arms Control negotiated under Annex 1-B of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

42. We reaffirm the significance of the Open Skies Treaty: in this respect, convinced that trial flights are in no way a substitute for the regime of observation flights as set forth in the Treaty, we urge early completion of the process of its ratification and entry into force.

43. We note the widespread human suffering caused by anti-personnel mines and note the entry into force on 1 March 1999 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. We also note the entry into force on 3 December 1998 of the Amended Mines Protocol to the UN Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects. We reaffirm our support for international co-operation in promoting global humanitarian action against anti-personnel mines, including promoting mine clearance activities, mine awareness programs, and the care, rehabilitation and social and economic reintegration of mine victims.

44. We take note of the report of the Chairman-in-Office on discussions held this year with regard to reviewing the scale and criteria for financing OSCE activities and instruct the Permanent Council to continue its discussions with a view to reaching agreement before the OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting in November/December 2000, so that this agreement can be applied after 31 December 2000, in accordance with the decision taken at the 1997 Copenhagen Ministerial Council Meeting.

45. We reconfirm the importance we attach to the relationship with our Partners for Co-operation as set out in the Charter for European Security. In light of our relationship with our Mediterranean Partners, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, we reaffirm that strengthening security and co-operation in the Mediterranean area is of major importance to the stability in the OSCE area. We therefore intend to enhance our dialogue and joint activities with them. We will furthermore strengthen our relationship with Japan and the Republic of Korea. We appreciate the contributions made by Japan to OSCE activities.

46. We express our gratitude to the High Commissioner on National Minorities, Mr. Max van der Stoep, for his willingness to continue in his position until a new High Commissioner on National Minorities has been appointed at the latest at the OSCE Ministerial Meeting in Vienna in November/December 2000.

47. The next Ministerial Council will take place in Vienna in November/December 2000, and will take a decision on the time and place of the next meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the OSCE participating States.

48. We welcome and accept the offer of Romania to exercise the function of Chairman-in-Office in 2001.

**STATEMENTS PERTAINING TO THE
ISTANBUL SUMMIT DECLARATION**

STATEMENT
BY H.E. MR. ILIR META,
PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA

“It is with profound regret that I am forced to deliver this statement. The Istanbul Summit Declaration that we adopted today includes a variety of issues whose resolution is vital to the future of this Organization. However, I would like to remind the Summit that Kosovo remains a major challenge for the OSCE.

Sporadic incidents cannot put an aggressor and his victim on an equal footing. It is widely recognized that it is Milošević regime that perpetrated the massacres of Kosovo and the subsequent ethnic cleansing of the Albanian people of Kosovo. We cannot turn a blind eye to this fact. It is this regime that remains the main source of instability and a serious threat to the security in the region.

Furthermore, we are of the opinion that the Summit Declaration does not give enough credit to the OSCE for the work it has done in Kosovo. We deeply regret, in particular, that this Declaration has omitted all mention of the commendable work done by the OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission.

I kindly request that this statement be attached to the Journal of the day.”

Interpretative statement under paragraph 79 (Chapter 6) of
the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations

By the delegation of the Republic of Macedonia:

“In connection with the reference used for our country in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Istanbul Summit Declaration, the Delegation of the Republic of Macedonia stresses the fact that the constitutional name of our State is the Republic of Macedonia.

The Delegation of the Republic of Macedonia requests that this interpretative statement be attached to the Declaration.”

Interpretative statement under paragraph 79 (Chapter 6) of
the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations

By the delegations of Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Turkey:

“In connection with paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Istanbul Summit Declaration, the following OSCE participating States: Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Turkey would like to state that they have recognized the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name.

The delegations of the above-mentioned States request that this interpretative statement be attached to the Declaration.”

Interpretative statement under paragraph 79 (Chapter 6) of
the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations

By the delegation of Greece:

“With reference to the statements made today by the Delegation of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the OSCE and others on the adoption of the Istanbul Summit Declaration, we would like to recall that, in conformity with Decision No. 81/95 (PC.DEC/81) of 12 October 1995, the Permanent Council, welcoming as a participating State of the OSCE the State whose application was contained in the letter of application dated 9 October 1995 (REF.PC/598/95), decided that that State would be provisionally referred to for all purposes within the OSCE as ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ pending settlement of the difference which has arisen over the name of that State.

Mr. Chairman, we request that the above statement be attached to the Istanbul Summit Declaration.”

VIENNA DOCUMENT 1999
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES

- (1) Representatives of the participating States of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, San Marino, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Uzbekistan and Yugoslavia^{*} met in Vienna in accordance with the provisions relating to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe contained in the Concluding Documents of the Madrid, Vienna and Helsinki Follow-up Meetings of the CSCE.
- (2) The Negotiations were conducted from 1989 to 1999.
- (3) The participating States recalled that the aim of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is, as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations as well as in their international relations in general.
- (4) The participating States recognized that the mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures which are adopted in the present document and which are in accordance with the mandates of the Madrid^{**}, Vienna and Helsinki Follow-up Meetings of the CSCE serve by their scope and nature and by their implementation to strengthen confidence and security among the participating States.
- (5) The participating States recalled the declaration on Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force contained in paragraphs (9) to (27) of the Document of

^{*} On 13 December 1992 the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials agreed to maintain in force its decision of 8 July 1992 to suspend the participation of Yugoslavia in the CSCE and review it as appropriate.

^{**} The zone of application for CSBMs under the terms of the Madrid mandate is set out in Annex I.

the Stockholm Conference and stressed its continuing validity as seen in the light of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe.

- (6) On 17 November 1990, the participating States adopted the Vienna Document 1990, which built upon and added to the confidence- and security-building measures contained in the Document of the Stockholm Conference 1986. On 4 March 1992, the participating States adopted the Vienna Document 1992, which built upon and added to the confidence- and security-building measures contained in the Vienna Document 1990. On 28 November 1994, the participating States similarly adopted the Vienna Document 1994.
- (7) In fulfilment of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of November 1990 and the Programme for Immediate Action, set out in the Helsinki Document 1992, they continued the CSBM negotiations under the same mandate, and have adopted the present document which integrates a set of new confidence- and security-building measures with measures previously adopted.
- (8) The participating States have adopted the following:

I. ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION

INFORMATION ON MILITARY FORCES

- (9) The participating States will exchange annually information on their military forces concerning the military organization, manpower and major weapon and equipment systems, as specified below, in the zone of application for confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). Participating States which have no military forces to be reported will so inform all other participating States.
- (10) The information will be provided in an agreed format to all other participating States not later than 15 December of each year. It will be valid as of 1 January of the following year and will include:
- (10.1) 1. Information on the command organization of those military forces referred to under points 2 and 3 specifying the designation and subordination of all formations* and units** at each level of command down to and including brigade/regiment or equivalent level. The information will be designed in such a way as to distinguish units from formations.
- (10.1.1) Each participating State providing information on military forces will include a statement indicating the total number of units contained therein and the resultant annual evaluation quota as provided for in paragraph (109).
- (10.2) 2. For each formation and combat unit*** of land forces down to and including brigade/regiment or equivalent level the information will indicate:
- (10.2.1) - the designation and subordination;
- (10.2.2) - whether it is active or non-active****;
- (10.2.3) - the normal peacetime location of its headquarters indicated by exact geographic terms and/or co-ordinates;
- (10.2.4) - the peacetime authorized personnel strength;

* In this context, formations are armies, corps and divisions and their equivalents.

** In this context, units are brigades, regiments and their equivalents.

*** In this context, combat units are infantry, armoured, mechanized, motorized rifle, artillery, combat engineer and army aviation units. Those combat units which are airmobile or airborne will also be included.

**** In this context, non-active formations or combat units are those manned from zero to fifteen per cent of their authorized combat strength. This term includes low strength formations and units.

- (10.2.5) - the major organic weapon and equipment systems, specifying the numbers of each type of:
 - (10.2.5.1) - battle tanks;
 - (10.2.5.2) - helicopters;
 - (10.2.5.3) - armoured combat vehicles (armoured personnel carriers, armoured infantry fighting vehicles, heavy armament combat vehicles);
 - (10.2.5.4) - armoured personnel carrier look-alikes and armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes;
 - (10.2.5.5) - anti-tank guided missile launchers permanently/integrally mounted on armoured vehicles;
 - (10.2.5.6) - self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre and above);
 - (10.2.5.7) - armoured vehicle launched bridges.
- (10.3) For planned increases in personnel strength above that reported under paragraph (10.2.4) for more than 21 days by more than 1,000 troops for each active combat unit and by more than 3,000 troops for each active formation, excluding personnel increases in the formation's subordinate formations and/or combat units subject to separate reporting under paragraph (10.2); as well as
 - (10.3.1) for each non-active formation and non-active combat unit which is planned to be temporarily activated for routine military activities or for any other purpose with more than 2,000 troops for more than 21 days;
 - (10.3.2) the following additional information will be provided in the annual exchange of military information:
 - (10.3.2.1) - designation and subordination of the formation or combat unit;
 - (10.3.2.2) - purpose of the increase or activation;
 - (10.3.2.3) - for active formations and combat units the planned number of troops exceeding the personnel strength indicated under paragraph (10.2.4) or for non-active formations and combat units the number of troops involved during the period of activation;
 - (10.3.2.4) - start and end dates of the envisaged increase in personnel strength or activation;
 - (10.3.2.5) - planned location/area of activation;

(10.3.2.6) - the numbers of each type of the major weapon and equipment systems as listed in paragraphs (10.2.5.1) to (10.2.5.7) which are planned to be used during the period of the personnel increase or activation.

(10.3.3) In cases where the information required under paragraphs (10.3) to (10.3.2.6) cannot be provided in the annual exchange of military information, or in cases of changes in the information already provided, the required information will be communicated at least 42 days prior to such a personnel increase or temporary activation taking effect or, in cases when the personnel increase or temporary activation is carried out without advance notice to the troops involved, at the latest at the time the increase or the activation has taken effect.

(10.4) For each amphibious formation and amphibious combat unit^{*} permanently located in the zone of application down to and including brigade/regiment or equivalent level, the information will include the items as set out above.

(10.5) 3. For each air formation and air combat unit^{**} of the air forces, air defence aviation and of naval aviation permanently based on land down to and including wing/air regiment or equivalent level, the information will include:

(10.5.1) - the designation and subordination;

(10.5.2) - the normal peacetime location of the headquarters indicated by exact geographic terms and/or co-ordinates;

(10.5.3) - the normal peacetime location of the unit indicated by the air base or military airfield on which the unit is based, specifying:

(10.5.3.1) - the designation or, if applicable, name of the air base or military airfield; and

(10.5.3.2) - its location indicated by exact geographic terms and/or co-ordinates;

(10.5.4) - the peacetime authorized personnel strength^{***};

(10.5.5) - the numbers of each type of:

(10.5.5.1) - combat aircraft;

(10.5.5.2) - helicopters

organic to the formation or unit.

* Combat units as defined above.

** In this context, air combat units are units, the majority of whose organic aircraft are combat aircraft.

*** As an exception, this information need not be provided on air defence aviation units.

DATA RELATING TO MAJOR WEAPON AND EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS

- (11) The participating States will exchange data relating to their major weapon and equipment systems as specified in the provisions on Information on Military Forces within the zone of application for CSBMs.
- (11.1) Data on existing weapon and equipment systems, if not already provided, will be provided once to all other participating States at the time of the entry into force of this document.
- (11.2) Data on new types or versions of major weapon and equipment systems will be provided by each State when its deployment plans for the systems concerned are provided for the first time in accordance with paragraphs (13) and (14) below or, at the latest, when it deploys the systems concerned for the first time in the zone of application for CSBMs. If a participating State has already provided data on the same new type or version, other participating States may, if appropriate, certify the validity of those data as far as their system is concerned and indicate the national nomenclature if different.
- (11.3) Participating States will inform each other when a type or version of a major weapon and equipment system is no longer in service with their armed forces.
- (12) The data for each type or version of major weapon and equipment systems will be provided according to Annex III.

INFORMATION ON PLANS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR WEAPON AND EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS

- (13) The participating States will exchange annually information on their plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems as specified in the provisions on Information on Military Forces within the zone of application for CSBMs.
- (14) The information will be provided in an agreed format to all other participating States not later than 15 December of each year. It will cover plans for the following year and will include:
- (14.1) - the type and name of the weapon/equipment systems to be deployed;
- (14.2) - the total number of each weapon/equipment system;
- (14.3) - whenever possible, the number of each weapon/equipment system planned to be allocated to each formation or unit;

- (14.4) - the extent to which the deployment will add to or replace existing weapon/equipment systems.

II. DEFENCE PLANNING*

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

(15) General provisions

The participating States will exchange annually information as specified below in paragraphs (15.1) to (15.4), to provide transparency about each OSCE participating State's intentions in the medium to long term as regards size, structure, training and equipment of its armed forces, as well as defence policy, doctrines and budgets related thereto, based on their national practice and providing the background for a dialogue among the participating States, including the date on which the military budget for the forthcoming fiscal year was approved by the competent national authorities and the identification of those authorities. The information will be provided to all other participating States not later than three months after the military budget, referred to in paragraph (15.4.1), has been approved by the competent national authorities.

Participating States which, for whatever reasons, will not be able to meet the deadline required above will give notification of the delay, while explaining the reasons, and provide an envisaged date for the actual submission.

Participating States which do not have armed forces and therefore have no information to provide in accordance with this chapter of the Vienna Document will so inform all other participating States.

This NIL report will be provided together with the Annual Exchange of Military Information (paragraph (9)) not later than 15 December of each year for the following year.

(15.1) Defence policy and doctrine

In a written statement participating States will address:

- (15.1.1) - their defence policy, including military strategy/doctrine as well as changes occurring thereto;
- (15.1.2) - their national procedures for defence planning, the stages of defence planning, the institutions involved in the decision-making process as well as changes occurring thereto;
- (15.1.3) - their current personnel policy and the most substantial changes in it.

* The application of the measures relating to defence planning is not restricted by the zone of application for CSBMs set out in Annex I.

If the information under this point has remained the same, participating States may refer to the previously exchanged information.

(15.2) Force planning

In a written statement participating States will address in the form of a general description:

- (15.2.1) - The size, structure, personnel, major weapon and equipment systems of their armed forces;
- (15.2.2) - The deployment of their armed forces and the envisaged changes thereto;
- (15.2.3) - In view of the reorganization of the defence structure in a number of participating States, similar information will be provided on other forces, including paramilitary forces, on a voluntary basis and as appropriate;
- (15.2.3.1) - The scope and the status of the information on such forces will be reviewed after their status has been further defined, in the process of reorganization;
- (15.2.4) - The training programmes for their armed forces and planned changes thereto in the forthcoming years;
- (15.2.5) - The procurement of major equipment and major military construction programmes on the basis of the categories as set out in the United Nations Instrument mentioned in paragraph (15.3), either ongoing or starting in the forthcoming years, if planned, and the implications of such projects, accompanied by explanations, where appropriate;
- (15.2.6) - The realization of the intentions previously reported under this paragraph.

In order to facilitate the understanding of the information provided, the participating States are encouraged to use illustrative charts and maps, wherever applicable.

- (15.2.7) If no changes are foreseen, this should be stated where applicable.

(15.3) Information on previous expenditures

Participating States will report their defence expenditures of the preceding fiscal year (i.e., the most recent fiscal year for which figures are available) on the basis of the categories as set out in the United Nations "Instrument for Standardized International Reporting of Military Expenditures" adopted on 12 December 1980.

They will provide, in addition, any appropriate clarification, if necessary, as to possible discrepancies between expenditures and previously reported budgets, and information on the relation of the military budget to the gross national product (GNP) as a percentage.

(15.4) Information on budgets

The written statement will be supplemented with the following information, where available (i.e., relevant and releasable facts, figures and/or estimates under consideration in the national procedures for defence planning described in paragraph (15.1.2)):

(15.4.1) On the forthcoming fiscal year

(15.4.1.1) - budget figures on the basis of the categories as set out in the United Nations Instrument mentioned in paragraph (15.3);

(15.4.1.2) - status of budget figures.

The participating States will furthermore provide the following information in as far as available:

(15.4.2) On the two fiscal years following the forthcoming fiscal year

(15.4.2.1) - the best estimates itemizing defence expenditures on the basis of the categories as set out in the United Nations Instrument mentioned in paragraph (15.3);

(15.4.2.2) - status of these estimates.

(15.4.3) On the last two years of the forthcoming five fiscal years

(15.4.3.1) - the best estimates specifying the total and figures for the following three main categories:

- operating costs,
- procurement and construction,
- research and development;

(15.4.3.2) - status of these estimates.

(15.4.4) Explanatory data

(15.4.4.1) - an indication of the year which has been used as the basis for any extrapolation;

(15.4.4.2) - clarifications of the data as specified in paragraphs (15.3) and (15.4), especially with regard to inflation.

CLARIFICATION, REVIEW AND DIALOGUE

(15.5) Request for clarification

To increase transparency, each participating State may ask any other participating State for clarification of the information provided. Questions should be submitted within a period of two months following the receipt of a participating State's information. Participating States will make every effort to answer such questions fully and promptly. It should be understood that these exchanges are informational only. The questions and replies may be transmitted to all other participating States.

(15.6) Annual discussion meetings

Without prejudice to the possibility of having ad hoc discussions on the information and clarification provided, the participating States will hold each year a meeting for a focused and structured dialogue to discuss the issues relating to defence planning. The Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting as foreseen in Chapter XI of the Vienna Document could be used for the purpose. Such discussions may extend to the methodology of defence planning and the implications originating from the information provided.

(15.7) OSCE High-level military doctrine seminars

The participating States are also encouraged to hold periodic high-level military doctrine seminars similar to those already held.

(15.8) Study visits

To increase knowledge of national defence planning procedures and promote dialogue, each participating State may arrange study visits for representatives of other OSCE participating States to meet with officials at the institutions involved in defence planning and appropriate bodies such as government agencies (planning, finance, economy), ministry of defence, general staff and relevant parliamentary committees.

Such exchanges could be organized within the framework of military contacts and co-operation.

POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

(15.9) Participating States are encouraged to provide any other factual and documentary information relating to their defence planning. This may include:

- (15.9.1) - the list and, if possible, the texts of major publicly available documents, in any of the OSCE working languages, reflecting their defence policy, military strategies and doctrines;

(15.9.2) - any other publicly available documentary reference material on their plans relating to paragraphs (15.1) and (15.2), e.g., military documents and/or “white papers”.

(15.10) This documentary information may be provided to the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) which will distribute lists of received information and make it available upon request.

III. RISK REDUCTION

MECHANISM FOR CONSULTATION AND CO-OPERATION AS REGARDS UNUSUAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES

- (16) Participating States will, in accordance with the following provisions, consult and co-operate with each other about any unusual and unscheduled activities of their military forces outside their normal peacetime locations which are militarily significant, within the zone of application for CSBMs and about which a participating State expresses its security concern.
- (16.1) The participating State which has concerns about such an activity may transmit a request for an explanation to another participating State where the activity is taking place.
- (16.1.1) The request will state the cause, or causes, of the concern and, to the extent possible, the type and location, or area, of the activity.
- (16.1.2) The reply will be transmitted within not more than 48 hours.
- (16.1.3) The reply will give answers to questions raised, as well as any other relevant information in order to explain the activity in question and dispel the concern.
- (16.1.4) The request and the reply will be transmitted to all other participating States without delay.
- (16.2) The requesting State, after considering the reply provided, may then request a meeting with the responding State to discuss the matter.
- (16.2.1) Such a meeting will be convened within not more than 48 hours.
- (16.2.1.1) The request for such a meeting will be transmitted to all participating States without delay.
- (16.2.1.2) The requesting and the responding States are entitled to ask other interested participating States, in particular those which have also expressed concern or might be involved in the activity, to participate in the meeting.
- (16.2.1.3) Such a meeting will be held at a venue to be mutually agreed upon by the requesting and the responding States. If there is no agreement, the meeting will be held at the CPC.
- (16.2.1.4) The meeting will be held under the chairmanship of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office (CiO) or of his representative.
- (16.2.1.5) The CiO or his representative, after appropriate consultations, will prepare and transmit a report of the meeting to all participating States without delay.

- (16.3) Either the requesting or the responding State or both may ask for a meeting of all participating States.
- (16.3.1) The CiO or his representative will, within 48 hours, convene such a meeting, during which the requesting and responding States will present their points of view. They will endeavour in good faith to contribute to a mutually acceptable solution.
- (16.3.1.1) The Permanent Council (PC) and the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) jointly will serve as the forum for such a meeting.
- (16.3.1.2) The PC and FSC will jointly assess the situation. Accordingly, appropriate measures for stabilizing the situation and halting activities that give rise to concern may then be recommended to the States involved.

CO-OPERATION AS REGARDS HAZARDOUS INCIDENTS OF A MILITARY NATURE

- (17) Participating States will co-operate by reporting and clarifying hazardous incidents of a military nature within the zone of application for CSBMs in order to prevent possible misunderstandings and mitigate the effects on another participating State.
- (17.1) Each participating State will designate a point to contact in case of such hazardous incidents and will so inform all other participating States. A list of such points will be kept available at the CPC.
- (17.2) In the event of such a hazardous incident the participating State whose military forces are involved in the incident should provide the information available to other participating States in an expeditious manner. Any participating State affected by such an incident may also request clarification as appropriate. Such requests will receive a prompt response.
- (17.3) Matters relating to information about such hazardous incidents may be discussed by participating States in the FSC, or at the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting.
- (17.4) These provisions will not affect the rights and obligations of participating States under any international agreement concerning hazardous incidents, nor will they preclude additional methods of reporting and clarifying hazardous incidents.

**VOLUNTARY HOSTING OF VISITS TO DISPEL CONCERNS
ABOUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES**

- (18) In order to help to dispel concerns about military activities in the zone of application for CSBMs, participating States are encouraged to invite other participating States to take part in visits to areas on the territory of the host State in which there may be cause for such concerns. Such invitations will be without prejudice to any action taken under paragraphs (16) to (16.3).
- (18.1) States invited to participate in such visits will include those which are understood to have concerns. At the time invitations are issued, the host State will communicate to all other participating States its intention to conduct the visit, indicating the reasons for the visit, the area to be visited, the States invited and the general arrangements to be adopted.
- (18.2) Arrangements for such visits, including the number of the representatives from other participating States to be invited, will be at the discretion of the host State, which will bear the in-country costs. However, the host State should take appropriate account of the need to ensure the effectiveness of the visit, the maximum amount of openness and transparency and the safety and security of the invited representatives. It should also take account, as far as practicable, of the wishes of visiting representatives as regards the itinerary of the visit. The host State and the States which provide visiting personnel may circulate joint or individual comments on the visit to all other participating States.

IV. CONTACTS

VISITS TO AIR BASES

- (19) Each participating State with air combat units reported under paragraph (10) will arrange visits for representatives of all other participating States to one of its normal peacetime air bases¹ on which such units are located in order to provide the visitors with the opportunity to view activity at the air base, including preparations to carry out the functions of the air base, and to gain an impression of the approximate number of air sorties and type of missions being flown.
- (20) Each participating State will arrange at least one such visit in any five-year period. A new common schedule of five-year periods for participating States to arrange air base visits began on 1 January 1997.
- Prior indications given by participating States of forthcoming schedules for such visits for the subsequent year(s) may be discussed at the Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings.
- (21) As a rule, up to two visitors from each participating State will be invited.
- (22) When the air base to be visited is located on the territory of another participating State, the invitations will be issued by the participating State on whose territory the air base is located (host State). In such cases, the responsibilities as host delegated by this State to the participating State arranging the visit will be specified in the invitation.
- (23) The State arranging the visit will determine the programme for the visit in co-ordination with the host State, if appropriate. The visitors will follow the instructions issued by the State arranging the visit in accordance with the provisions set out in this document.
- (24) The modalities regarding visits to air bases will conform to the provisions in Annex IV.
- (25) The invited State may decide whether to send military and/or civilian visitors, including personnel accredited to the host State. Military visitors will normally wear their uniforms and insignia during the visit.
- (26) The visit to the air base will last for a minimum of 24 hours.
- (27) In the course of the visit, the visitors will be given a briefing on the purpose and functions of the air base and on its current activities, including appropriate information on the air force structure and operations so as to explain the specific role and subordination of the air base. The State arranging

the visit will provide the visitors with the opportunity to view routine activities at the air base during the visit.

(28) The visitors will have the opportunity to communicate with commanders and troops, including those of support/logistic units located at the air base. They will be provided with the opportunity to view all types of aircraft located at the air base.

(29) At the close of the visit, the State arranging the visit will provide an opportunity for the visitors to meet together and also with State officials and senior air base personnel to discuss the course of the visit.

(30) **PROGRAMME OF MILITARY CONTACTS AND CO-OPERATION**

MILITARY CONTACTS

(30.1) To improve further their mutual relations in the interest of strengthening the process of confidence- and security-building, the participating States will, on a voluntary basis and as appropriate, promote and facilitate:

- (30.1.1) - exchanges and visits between members of the armed forces at all levels, especially those between junior officers and commanders;
- (30.1.2) - contacts between relevant military institutions, especially between military units;
- (30.1.3) - exchanges of visits of naval vessels and air force units;
- (30.1.4) - reservation of places in military academies and schools and on military training courses for members of the armed forces from the participating States;
- (30.1.5) - use of the language facilities of military training institutions for the foreign-language instruction of members of the armed forces from the participating States and the organization of language courses in military training institutions for military foreign-language instructors from the participating States;
- (30.1.6) - exchanges and contacts between academics and experts in military studies and related areas;
- (30.1.7) - participation and contribution by members of the armed forces of the participating States, as well as civil experts in security matters and defence policy, to academic conferences, seminars, symposia and study visits;
- (30.1.8) - issuing of joint academic publications on security and defence issues;

- (30.1.9) - sporting and cultural events between members of their armed forces.

MILITARY CO-OPERATION

Joint military exercises and training

- (30.2) The participating States will conduct, on a voluntary basis and as appropriate, joint military training and exercises to work on tasks of mutual interest.

Visits to military facilities, to military formations and observation of certain military activities

- (30.3) In addition to the provisions of the Vienna Document regarding visits to air bases, each participating State will arrange for representatives of all other participating States to visit one of its military facilities or military formations, or to observe military activities below thresholds specified in Chapter VI. These events will provide the visitors or observers with the opportunity to view activity of that military facility, observe the training of that military formation or observe the conduct of that military activity.
- (30.4) Each participating State will make every effort to arrange one such visit or observation in any five-year period.
- (30.5) In order to ensure maximum efficiency and cost-effectiveness, the participating States may conduct such visits or observations in conjunction with, *inter alia*, other visits and contacts organized in accordance with provisions of the Vienna Document.
- (30.6) The modalities regarding visits to air bases specified in paragraphs (19) to (29) of the Vienna Document will, *mutatis mutandis*, be applied to the visits.

Observation visits

- (30.7) Participating States conducting military activities subject to prior notification according to Chapter V, but at levels lower than those specified in Chapter VI, are encouraged to invite observers from other participating States, especially neighbouring States, to observe such military activities.
- (30.8) Arrangements for such visits will be at the discretion of the host State.

Provision of experts

- (30.9) The participating States express their willingness to provide to any other participating State available experts to be consulted on matters of defence and security.

- (30.10) For that purpose participating States will designate a point of contact and will inform all other participating States accordingly. A list of such points will be kept available at the CPC.
- (30.11) At the discretion of participating States, communications between them on this subject may be transmitted through the OSCE Communications Network.
- (30.12) The modalities regarding provision of experts will be agreed directly between the participating States concerned.

Seminars on co-operation in the military field

- (30.13) Subject to the approval of the appropriate OSCE bodies, the CPC will organize seminars on co-operation between the armed forces of the participating States.
- (30.14) The agenda of the seminars will concentrate primarily on OSCE-oriented tasks, including the participation of the armed forces in peacekeeping operations, in disaster and emergency relief, in refugee crises and in providing humanitarian assistance.

Exchange of information on agreements on military contacts and co-operation

- (30.15) The participating States will exchange information on agreements on programmes of military contacts and co-operation concluded with other participating States within the scope of these provisions.

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- (30.16) The participating States have decided that the Programme of Military Contacts and Co-operation will be open to all OSCE participating States in respect of all their armed forces and territory. The implementation of this Programme will be assessed at Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings as foreseen in Chapter XI.

**DEMONSTRATION OF NEW TYPES OF MAJOR WEAPON AND
EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS**

- (31) The first participating State which deploys with its military forces in the zone of application a new type of major weapon and equipment system as specified in the provisions on Information on Military Forces will arrange at the earliest opportunity, but not later than one year after deployment has started, a demonstration for representatives of all other participating States², which may coincide with other events stipulated in this document.
- (32) When the demonstration is carried out on the territory of another participating State, the invitation will be issued by the participating State on whose territory the demonstration is carried out (host State). In such cases, the

responsibilities as host delegated by this State to the participating State arranging the demonstration will be specified in the invitation.

- (33) The State arranging the demonstration will determine the programme for the demonstration in co-ordination with the host State, if appropriate. The visitors will follow the instructions issued by the State arranging the demonstration in accordance with the provisions set out in this document.
- (34) The modalities regarding demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems will conform to the provisions in Annex IV.
- (35) The invited State may decide whether to send military and/or civilian visitors, including personnel accredited to the host State. Military visitors will normally wear their uniforms and insignia during the visit.

PROVISION OF INFORMATION ON CONTACTS

- (36) In order to facilitate planning for multinational contacts open for participation to all OSCE States, the participating States will provide information annually on their plans for contacts as specified below:
- Visits to air bases (paragraphs (19) to (29))
 - Visits to military facilities, to military formations and observation of certain military activities (paragraphs (30.3) to (30.6))
 - Observation visits (paragraphs (30.7) to (30.8))
 - Demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems (paragraphs (31) to (35))
- (37) The information will be provided to the CPC no later than 15 November of each year and will cover plans for the following calendar year. The participating States will notify the CPC in advance of any changes to the above information, as appropriate. The CPC will inform all participating States of the information provided no later than 1 December.

V. PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

- (38) The participating States will give notification in writing in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (151) and (152) to all other participating States 42 days or more in advance of the start of notifiable³ military activities in the zone of application for CSBMs.
- (39) Notification will be given by the participating State on whose territory the activity in question is planned to take place (host State) even if the forces of that State are not engaged in the activity or their strength is below the notifiable level. This will not relieve other participating States of their obligation to give notification, if their involvement in the planned military activity reaches the notifiable level.
- (40) Each of the following military activities, including those where forces of other participating States are participants, in the field, conducted as a single activity in the zone of application for CSBMs at or above the levels defined below will be notified:
- (40.1) The engagement of formations of land forces⁴ of the participating States in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components.
- (40.1.1) This military activity will be subject to notification whenever it involves at any time during the activity:
- at least 9,000 troops, including support troops, or
 - at least 250 battle tanks, or
 - at least 500 ACVs, as defined in Annex III, paragraph (2), or
 - at least 250 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket-launchers (100 mm calibre and above)
- if organized into a divisional structure or at least two brigades/regiments, not necessarily subordinate to the same division.
- (40.1.2) The participation of air forces of the participating States will be included in the notification if it is foreseen that in the course of the activity 200 or more sorties by aircraft, excluding helicopters, will be flown.
- (40.2) The engagement of military forces in an amphibious landing⁵, heliborne landing or parachute assault in the zone of application for CSBMs.
- (40.2.1) These military activities will be subject to notification whenever any of them involves at least 3,000 troops.

(40.3) The engagement of formations of land forces of the participating States in a transfer from outside the zone of application for CSBMs to arrival points in the zone, or from inside the zone of application for CSBMs to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated.

(40.3.1) The arrival or concentration of these forces will be subject to notification whenever it involves, at any time during the activity:

- at least 9,000 troops, including support troops, or
- at least 250 battle tanks, or
- at least 500 ACVs, as defined in Annex III, paragraph (2), or
- at least 250 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre and above)

if organized into a divisional structure or at least two brigades/regiments, not necessarily subordinate to the same division.

(40.3.2) Forces which have been transferred into the zone will be subject to all provisions of agreed CSBMs when they depart their arrival points to participate in a notifiable exercise or to be concentrated within the zone of application for CSBMs.

(41) Notifiable military activities carried out without advance notice to the troops involved are exceptions to the requirement for prior notification to be made 42 days in advance.

(41.1) Notification of such activities, above the agreed thresholds, will be given at the time the troops involved commence such activities.

(42) Notification will be given in writing of each notifiable military activity in the following agreed form:

(43) **(A) General information**

(43.1) The designation of the military activity;

(43.2) The general purpose of the military activity;

(43.3) The names of the States involved in the military activity;

(43.4) The level of command organizing and commanding the military activity;

(43.5) The start and end dates of the military activity.

(44) **(B) Information on different types of notifiable military activities**

(44.1) The engagement of formations of land forces of the participating State in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components:

(44.1.1) The total number of troops taking part in the military activity (i.e., ground troops, amphibious troops, airmobile or heliborne and airborne troops) and the number of troops participating for each State involved, if applicable;

(44.1.2) The designation, subordination, number and type of formations and units participating for each State down to and including brigade/regiment or equivalent level;

(44.1.3) The total number of battle tanks for each State;

(44.1.4) The total number of armoured combat vehicles for each State and the total number of anti-tank guided missile launchers mounted on armoured vehicles;

(44.1.5) The total number of artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre or above);

(44.1.6) The total number of helicopters, by category;

(44.1.7) Envisaged number of sorties by aircraft, excluding helicopters;

(44.1.8) Purpose of air missions;

(44.1.9) Categories of aircraft involved;

(44.1.10) The level of command organizing and commanding the air force participation;

(44.1.11) Naval ship-to-shore gunfire;

(44.1.12) Indication of other naval ship-to-shore support;

(44.1.13) The level of command organizing and commanding the naval force participation.

(44.2) The engagement of military forces in an amphibious landing, heliborne landing or parachute assault in the zone of application for CSBMs:

(44.2.1) The total number of amphibious troops involved in notifiable amphibious landings, and/or the total number of troops involved in notifiable parachute assaults or heliborne landings;

(44.2.2) In the case of a notifiable landing, the point or points of embarkation, if in the zone of application for CSBMs.

(44.3) The engagement of formations of land forces of the participating States in a transfer from outside the zone of application for CSBMs to arrival points in the zone, or from inside the zone of application for CSBMs to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated:

(44.3.1) The total number of troops transferred;

(44.3.2) Number and type of formations participating in the transfer;

(44.3.3) The total number of battle tanks participating in a notifiable arrival or concentration;

(44.3.4) The total number of armoured combat vehicles participating in a notifiable arrival or concentration;

(44.3.5) The total number of artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre and above) participating in a notifiable arrival or concentration;

(44.3.6) Geographical co-ordinates for the points of arrival and for the points of concentration.

(45) **(C) The envisaged area in the zone of application for CSBMs and time-frame of the activity**

(45.1) The area of the military activity delimited by geographic features together with geographic co-ordinates, as appropriate;

(45.2) Start and end dates of each phase of activity in the zone of application for CSBMs of participating formations (e.g., transfer, deployment, concentration of forces, active exercise, recovery);

(45.3) Tactical purpose of each phase and corresponding geographical area delimited by geographic co-ordinates; and

(45.4) Brief description of each phase.

(46) **(D) Other information**

(46.1) Changes, if any, in relation to information provided in the annual calendar regarding the activity;

(46.2) Relationship of the activity to other notifiable activities.

VI. OBSERVATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

- (47) The participating States will invite observers from all other participating States to the following notifiable military activities:
- (47.1) - The engagement of formations of land forces⁶ of the participating States in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components.
- (47.2) - The engagement of military forces in an amphibious landing, heliborne landing or parachute assault in the zone of application for CSBMs.
- (47.3) - In the case of the engagement of formations of land forces of the participating States in a transfer from outside the zone of application for CSBMs to arrival points in the zone, or from inside the zone of application for CSBMs to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable activity or to be concentrated, the concentration of these forces. Forces which have been transferred into the zone will be subject to all provisions of agreed confidence- and security- building measures when they depart their arrival points to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated within the zone of application for CSBMs.
- (47.4) The above-mentioned activities will be subject to observation whenever the number of troops engaged equals or exceeds 13,000 or where the number of battle tanks engaged equals or exceeds 300, or where the number of armoured combat vehicles engaged as defined in Annex III, paragraph (2), equals or exceeds 500, or where the number of self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre and above) engaged equals or exceeds 250. In the case of an amphibious landing, heliborne landing or parachute assault, the activity will be subject to observation whenever the number of troops engaged equals or exceeds 3,500.
- (48) The host State will be the participating State on whose territory the notified activity will take place.
- (49) The host State may delegate responsibilities as host to another participating State or States engaged in the military activity on the territory of the host State, which will be the delegated State. In such cases, the host State will specify the allocation of responsibilities in its invitation to observe the activity.
- (50) Each participating State may send up to two observers to the military activity to be observed. The invited State may decide whether to send military and/or civilian observers, including personnel accredited to the host State. Military observers will normally wear their uniforms and insignia while performing their tasks.

- (51) The modalities regarding observation of certain military activities will conform to the provisions in Annex IV.
- (52) The host or delegated State will determine a duration of observation which permits the observers to observe a notifiable military activity from the time that agreed thresholds for observation are met or exceeded until, for the last time during the activity, the thresholds for observation are no longer met.
- (53) The observers may make requests with regard to the observation programme. The host or delegated State will, if possible, accede to them.
- (54) The observers will be granted, during their mission, the privileges and immunities accorded to diplomatic agents in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
- (55) The participating States will ensure that official personnel and troops taking part in an observed military activity, as well as other armed personnel located in the area of the military activity, are adequately informed regarding the presence, status and functions of observers.
- (56) The host or delegated State will not be required to permit observation of restricted locations, installations or defence sites.
- (57) In order to allow the observers to confirm that the notified activity is non-threatening in character and that it is carried out in conformity with the appropriate provisions of the notification, the host or delegated State will:
- (57.1) - at the commencement of the observation programme give a briefing on the purpose, the basic situation, the phases of the activity and possible changes as compared with the notification, and provide the observers with an observation programme containing a daily schedule;
 - (57.2) - provide the observers with a map to a scale of one to not more than 250,000 depicting the area of the notified military activity and the initial tactical situation in this area. To depict the entire area of the notified military activity, smaller-scale maps may be additionally provided;
 - (57.3) - provide the observers with appropriate observation equipment; in addition, the observers will be permitted to use their own binoculars, maps, photo and video cameras, dictaphones and hand-held passive night-vision devices. The above-mentioned equipment will be subject to examination and approval by the host or delegated State. It is understood that the host or delegated State may limit the use of certain equipment in restricted locations, installations or defence sites;
 - (57.4) - be encouraged, whenever feasible and with due consideration for the security of the observers, to provide an aerial survey, preferably by helicopter, of the area of the military activity. If carried out, such a survey should provide the observers with the opportunity to observe

from the air the disposition of forces engaged in the activity in order to help them gain a general impression of its scope and scale. At least one observer from each participating State represented at the observation should be given the opportunity to participate in the survey. Helicopters and/or aircraft may be provided by the host State or by another participating State at the request of and in agreement with the host State;

(57.5) - give the observers briefings, once daily at a minimum, with the help of maps on the various phases of the military activity and their development, and on the geographic location of the observers; in the case of a land force activity conducted in combination with air or naval components, briefings will be given by representatives of all forces involved;

(57.6) - provide opportunities to observe directly forces of the State(s) engaged in the military activity so that the observers get an impression of the flow of the entire activity; to this end, the observers will be given the opportunity to observe combat and support units of all participating formations of a divisional or equivalent level and, whenever possible, to visit units below divisional or equivalent level and communicate with commanders and troops. Commanders and other senior personnel of the participating formations as well as of the visited units will inform the observers of the mission and disposition of their respective units;

(57.7) - guide the observers in the area of the military activity; the observers will follow the instructions issued by the host or delegated State in accordance with the provisions set out in this document;

(57.8) - provide the observers with opportunities for timely communication with their embassies or other official missions and consular posts; the host or delegated State is not obligated to cover the communication expenses of the observers;

(57.9) - at the close of each observation, provide an opportunity for the observers to meet together and also with host State officials to discuss the course of the observed activity. Where States other than the host State have been engaged in the activity, military representatives of those States will also be invited to take part in this discussion.

(58) The participating States need not invite observers to notifiable military activities which are carried out without advance notice to the troops involved unless these notifiable activities have a duration of more than 72 hours. The continuation of these activities beyond this time will be subject to observation while the agreed thresholds for observation are met or exceeded. The observation programme will follow as closely as practically possible all the provisions for observation set out in this document.

(59) The participating States are encouraged to permit media representatives from all participating States to attend observed military

activities in accordance with accreditation procedures set down by the host State. In such instances, media representatives from all participating States will be treated without discrimination and given equal access to those facets of the activity open to media representatives.

(59.1) The presence of media representatives will not interfere with the observers carrying out their functions nor with the flow of the military activity.

(60) The host or delegated State will provide the observers with transportation from a suitable location announced in the invitation to the area of the notified activity so that the observers are in position before the start of the observation programme. It will also provide the observers with appropriate means of transportation in the area of the military activity, and return the observers to another suitable location announced in the invitation at the conclusion of the observation programme.

VII. ANNUAL CALENDARS

- (61) Each participating State will exchange, with all other participating States, an annual calendar of its military activities subject to prior notification⁷, within the zone of application for CSBMs, forecast for the subsequent calendar year. A participating State which is to host military activities subject to prior notification conducted by any other participating State(s) will include these activities in its annual calendar. It will be transmitted every year in writing, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (151) and (152), not later than 15 November for the following year.
- (62) If a participating State does not forecast any military activity subject to prior notification, it will so inform all other participating States in the same manner as prescribed for the exchange of annual calendars.
- (63) Each participating State will list the above-mentioned activities chronologically and will provide information on each activity in accordance with the following model:
- (63.1) - number of military activities to be reported;
 - (63.2) - activity number;
 - (63.2.1) - type of military activity and its designation;
 - (63.2.2) - general characteristics and purpose of the military activity;
 - (63.2.3) - States involved in the military activity;
 - (63.2.4) - area of the military activity, indicated by geographic features, where appropriate, and defined by geographic co-ordinates;
 - (63.2.5) - planned duration of the military activity, indicated by envisaged start and end dates;
 - (63.2.6) - envisaged total number of troops⁷ engaged in the military activity;
 - (63.2.7) - envisaged total number of troops for each State involved, if applicable. For activities involving more than one State, the host State will provide such information;
 - (63.2.8) - types of armed forces involved in the military activity;
 - (63.2.9) - envisaged level of the military activity and designation of the direct operational command under which this military activity will take place;

- (63.2.10) - number and type of divisions whose participation in the military activity is envisaged;
 - (63.2.11) - any additional information concerning, *inter alia*, components of armed forces which the participating State planning the military activity considers relevant.
- (64) Should changes regarding the military activities in the annual calendar prove necessary, they will be communicated to all other participating States no later than in the appropriate notification.
- (65) Should a participating State cancel a military activity included in its annual calendar or reduce it to a level below notification thresholds, that State will inform the other participating States immediately.
- (66) Information on military activities subject to prior notification not included in an annual calendar will be communicated to all participating States as soon as possible, in accordance with the model provided in the annual calendar.

VIII. CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS

- (67) The following provisions will apply to military activities subject to prior notification⁷:
- (67.1) No participating State will carry out within three calendar years more than one military activity subject to prior notification, involving more than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks or 2,000 ACVs or 900 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre and above).
- (67.2) No participating State will carry out within one calendar year more than six military activities subject to prior notification each one involving more than 13,000 troops or 300 battle tanks or 500 ACVs or 300 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre and above) but not more than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks or 2,000 ACVs or 900 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre and above).
- (67.2.1) Of these six military activities, no participating State will carry out within a calendar year more than three military activities subject to prior notification, each one involving more than 25,000 troops or 400 battle tanks or 800 ACVs or 400 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre and above).
- (67.3) No participating State will carry out simultaneously more than three military activities subject to prior notification, each one involving more than 13,000 troops or 300 battle tanks or 500 ACVs or 300 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre and above).
- (68) Each participating State will communicate, in writing, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (151) and (152), to all other participating States, by 15 November each year, information concerning military activities subject to prior notification involving more than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks or 2,000 ACVs or 900 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre and above), which it plans to carry out or host in the second subsequent calendar year. Such a communication will include preliminary information on the activity, as to its general purpose, time-frame and duration, area, size and States involved.
- (69) If a participating State does not forecast any such military activity, it will so inform all other participating States in the same manner as prescribed for the exchange of annual calendars.
- (70) No participating State will carry out a military activity subject to prior notification involving more than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks or 2,000 ACVs or 900 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre and above) unless it has been the

object of a communication as defined above and unless it has been included in the annual calendar, not later than 15 November each year.

- (71) If military activities subject to prior notification are carried out in addition to those contained in the annual calendar, they should be as few as possible.

IX. COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION

- (72) According to the Madrid mandate, the confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed upon “will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content”.
- (73) The participating States recognize that national technical means can play a role in monitoring compliance with agreed confidence- and security-building measures.

INSPECTION

- (74) In accordance with the provisions contained in this document each participating State has the right to conduct inspections on the territory of any other participating State within the zone of application for CSBMs. The inspecting State may invite other participating States to participate in an inspection.
- (75) Any participating State will be allowed to address a request for inspection to another participating State within the zone of application for CSBMs.
- (76) No participating State will be obliged to accept on its territory within the zone of application for CSBMs more than three inspections per calendar year.
- (76.1) When a participating State has accepted three inspections in a calendar year, it will so inform all other participating States.
- (77) No participating State will be obliged to accept more than one inspection per calendar year from the same participating State.
- (78) An inspection will not be counted if, due to *force majeure*, it cannot be carried out.
- (78.1) If the inspecting State is prevented from carrying out an inspection due to *force majeure*, it shall explain in detail the reasons without delay.
- (78.2) If the receiving State is prevented from accepting an inspection due to *force majeure*, it shall without delay, through diplomatic or other official channels, explain in detail the reasons and provide, if possible, an estimated duration of the circumstances giving rise to the claim of *force majeure*. This may take place as follows:
- (78.2.1) - through the reply to the relevant request for an inspection; or

- (78.2.2) - through an appropriate communication delivered to the inspecting State after replying positively to the request for an inspection and before the inspection team has arrived at the point of entry; or
- (78.2.3) - after the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry. In this case, a corresponding explanation shall be provided immediately to the leader of the inspection team.
- (79) The participating State which has received such a request will reply in the affirmative to the request within the agreed period of time, subject to the provisions contained in paragraphs (76) and (77).
- (80) The participating State which requests an inspection will be permitted to designate for inspection on the territory of another State within the zone of application for CSBMs, a specific area. Such an area will be referred to as the "specified area". The specified area will comprise terrain where notifiable military activities are conducted or where another participating State believes a notifiable military activity is taking place. The specified area will be defined and limited by the scope and scale of notifiable military activities but will not exceed that required for an army level military activity.
- (81) In the specified area the inspection team accompanied by the representatives of the receiving State will be permitted access, entry and unobstructed survey, except for areas or sensitive points to which access is normally denied or restricted, military and other defence installations, as well as naval vessels, military vehicles and aircraft. The number and extent of the restricted areas should be as limited as possible. Areas where notifiable military activities can take place will not be declared restricted areas, except for certain permanent or temporary military installations which, in territorial terms, should be as small as possible, and consequently those areas will not be used to prevent inspection of notifiable military activities. Restricted areas will not be employed in a way inconsistent with the agreed provisions on inspection.
- (82) Within the specified area, the forces of participating States other than the receiving State will also be subject to the inspection. Representatives of these forces will co-operate with the receiving State during the inspection.
- (83) Inspection will be permitted on the ground, from the air, or both.
- (84) The representatives of the receiving State will accompany the inspection team, including when it is in land vehicles and an aircraft from the time of their first employment until the time they are no longer in use for the purposes of inspection.
- (85) In its request, which will be submitted at least 36 hours, but not more than five days, prior to the estimated entry into the territory of the receiving State, the inspecting State will notify the receiving State of:
- (85.1) - the location of the specified area defined by geographical co-ordinates;

- (85.2) - the preferred point(s) of entry for the inspection team;
- (85.3) - mode of transport to and from the point(s) of entry and, if applicable, to and from the specified area;
- (85.4) - where in the specified area the inspection will begin;
- (85.5) - whether the inspection will be conducted from the ground, from the air, or both simultaneously;
- (85.6) - whether aerial inspection will be conducted using an airplane, a helicopter, or both;
- (85.7) - whether the inspection team will use land vehicles provided by the receiving State or, if mutually agreed, its own vehicles;
- (85.8) - additional equipment for the inspection which is subject to specific consent under paragraph (95);
- (85.9) - other participating States participating in the inspection, if applicable;
- (85.10) - information for the issuance of diplomatic visas to inspectors entering the receiving State;
- (85.11) - the preferred OSCE working language(s) to be used during the inspection.

(86) The reply to the request will be given in the shortest possible period of time, but within not more than 24 hours. Within 36 hours after the issuance of the request, the inspection team will be permitted to enter the territory of the receiving State.

(87) Any request for inspection as well as the reply thereto will be communicated to all participating States without delay.

(88) The receiving State should designate the point(s) of entry as close as possible to the specified area. The receiving State will ensure that the inspection team will be able to reach the specified area without delay from the point(s) of entry. The receiving State will, in its reply, indicate which of the six official OSCE working language(s) will be used during the inspection.

(89) All participating States will facilitate the passage of the inspection teams through their territory.

(90) Within 48 hours after the arrival of the inspection team at the specified area, the inspection will be terminated.

(91) There will be no more than four inspectors in an inspection team. The inspecting State may invite other participating States to participate in an inspection. The inspection team may consist of nationals from up to three participating States. The inspection team will be headed by a national of the

inspecting State, which will have at least as many inspectors in the team as any invited State. The inspection team will be under the responsibility of the inspecting State, against whose quota the inspection is counted. While conducting the inspection, the inspection team may divide into two subteams.

- (92) The inspectors and, if applicable, auxiliary personnel will be granted during their mission the privileges and immunities in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
- (93) The participating States will ensure that troops, other armed personnel and officials in the specified area are adequately informed regarding the presence, status and functions of inspectors and, if applicable, auxiliary personnel. The receiving State will ensure that no action is taken by its representatives which could endanger inspectors and, if applicable, auxiliary personnel. In carrying out their duties, inspectors and, if applicable, auxiliary personnel will take into account safety concerns expressed by representatives of the receiving State.
- (94) The receiving State will provide the inspection team with appropriate board and lodging in a location suitable for carrying out the inspection, and, when necessary, medical care; however this does not exclude the use by the inspection team of its own tents and rations.
- (95) The inspection team will have use of its own maps and charts, photo and video cameras, binoculars, hand-held passive night vision devices, and dictaphones. The team may use additional equipment for the inspection, to be specified in the request, and subject to the specific consent of the receiving State. Upon arrival in the specified area the inspection team will show the equipment to the representatives of the receiving State. In addition, the receiving State may provide the inspection team with a map depicting the area specified for the inspection.
- (96) The inspection team will have access to appropriate telecommunications equipment of the receiving State for the purpose of communicating with the embassy or other official missions and consular posts of the inspecting State accredited to the receiving State.
- (97) The receiving State will provide the inspection team with access to appropriate telecommunications equipment for the purpose of continuous communication between the subteams.
- (98) Inspectors will be entitled to request and to receive briefings at agreed times by military representatives of the receiving State. At the inspectors' request, such briefings will be given by commanders of formations or units in the specified area. Suggestions of the receiving State as to the briefings will be taken into consideration.
- (99) The inspecting State will specify whether aerial inspection will be conducted using an airplane, a helicopter or both. Aircraft for inspection will be chosen by mutual agreement between the inspecting and receiving States. Aircraft will be chosen which provide the inspection team with a continuous

view of the ground during the inspection. Aircraft for inspection will be provided by the receiving State unless otherwise agreed by the inspecting and receiving States.

- (100) After the flight plan, specifying, *inter alia*, the inspection team's choice of flight path, speed and altitude in the specified area, has been filed with the competent air traffic control authority the inspection aircraft will be permitted to enter the specified area without delay. Within the specified area, the inspection team will, at its request, be permitted to deviate from the approved flight plan to make specific observations provided such deviation is consistent with paragraph (80) as well as flight safety and air traffic requirements. Directions to the crew will be given through a representative of the receiving State on board the aircraft involved in the inspection.
- (101) One member of the inspection team will be permitted, if such a request is made, at any time to observe data on navigational equipment of the aircraft and to have access to maps and charts used by the flight crew for the purpose of determining the exact location of the aircraft during the inspection flight.
- (102) Aerial and ground inspectors may return to the specified area as often as desired within the 48-hour inspection period.
- (103) The receiving State will provide for inspection purposes land vehicles with cross-country capability. Whenever mutually agreed, taking into account the specific geography relating to the area to be inspected, the inspecting State will be permitted to use its own vehicles.
- (104) If land vehicles or aircraft are provided by the inspecting State, there will be one accompanying driver for each land vehicle, or accompanying aircraft crew.
- (105) The inspecting State will prepare a report of its inspection using a format agreed by the participating States. The report will be communicated to all participating States expeditiously but within no more than 14 days after the end of the inspection.
- (106) The inspection expenses will be incurred by the receiving State except when the inspecting State uses its own aircraft and/or land vehicles. The inspecting State will be responsible for travel expenses to and from the point(s) of entry.

EVALUATION

- (107) Information provided under the provisions on Information on Military Forces and on Information on Plans for the Deployment of Major Weapon and Equipment Systems will be subject to evaluation.
- (108) Subject to the provisions below each participating State will provide the opportunity to visit active formations and units in their normal peacetime

locations as specified in points 2 and 3 of the provisions on Information on Military Forces to allow the other participating States to evaluate the information provided.

- (108.1) Non-active formations and combat units temporarily activated will be made available for evaluation during the period of temporary activation and in the area/location of activation indicated under paragraph (10.3.2). In such cases the provisions for the evaluation of active formations and units will be applicable, *mutatis mutandis*. Evaluation visits conducted under this provision will count against the quotas established under paragraph (109).
- (109) Each participating State will be obliged to accept a quota of one evaluation visit per calendar year for every sixty units, or portion thereof, reported under paragraph (10). However, no participating State will be obliged to accept more than fifteen visits per calendar year, and the number of visits per calendar month may not exceed two visits. No participating State will be obliged to accept more than one fifth of its quota of visits from the same participating State; a participating State with a quota of less than five visits will not be obliged to accept more than one visit from the same participating State during a calendar year. No formation or unit may be visited more than twice during a calendar year and more than once by the same participating State during a calendar year.
- (109.1) A participating State will inform all other participating States when, if applicable, its quota is filled.
- (110) No participating State will be obliged to accept more than one visit at any given time on its territory.
- (111) If a participating State has formations or units stationed on the territory of other participating States (host States) in the zone of application for CSBMs, the maximum number of evaluation visits permitted to its forces in each of the States concerned will be proportional to the number of its units in each State. The application of this provision will not alter the number of visits this participating State (stationing State) will have to accept under paragraph (109).
- (112) Requests for such visits will be submitted not later than five days, but not earlier than seven days, prior to the estimated entry into the territory of the receiving State.
- (113) The request will specify:
- (113.1) - the formation or unit to be visited;
- (113.2) - the proposed date of the visit;
- (113.3) - the preferred point(s) of entry as well as the date and estimated time of arrival for the evaluation team;

- (113.4) - the mode of transport to and from the point(s) of entry and, if applicable, to and from the formation or unit to be visited;
 - (113.5) - additional equipment for the evaluation which is subject to specific consent under paragraph (131);
 - (113.6) - the names, ranks and nationalities of the members of the team and, if applicable, information for the issue of diplomatic visas;
 - (113.7) - the preferred OSCE working language(s) to be used during the visit.
- (114) If a formation or unit of a participating State is stationed on the territory of another participating State, the request will be addressed to the host State and sent simultaneously to the stationing State.
- (115) The reply to the request will be given within 48 hours after the receipt of the request.
- (116) In the case of formations or units of a participating State stationed on the territory of another participating State, the reply will be given by the host State in consultation with the stationing State. After consultation between the host State and the stationing State, the host State will specify in its reply any of its responsibilities which it agrees to delegate to the stationing State.
- (117) The reply will indicate whether the formation or unit will be available for evaluation at the proposed date at its normal peacetime location.
- (118) Formations or units may be in their normal peacetime location but be unavailable for evaluation. Each participating State will be entitled in such cases not to accept a visit; the reasons for the non-acceptance and the number of days that the formation or unit will be unavailable for evaluation will be stated in the reply. Each participating State will be entitled to invoke this provision up to a total of five times for an aggregate of no more than 30 days per calendar year.
- (119) If the formation or unit is absent from its normal peacetime location, the reply will indicate the reasons for and the duration of its absence. The requested State may offer the possibility of a visit to the formation or unit outside its normal peacetime location. If the requested State does not offer this possibility, the requesting State will be able to visit the normal peacetime location of the formation or unit. The requesting State may however refrain in either case from the visit.
- (120) Visits will not be counted against the quotas of receiving States, if they are not carried out. Likewise, if visits are not carried out, due to *force majeure*, they will not be counted.
- (120.1) If the visiting State is prevented from carrying out an evaluation visit due to *force majeure*, it shall explain in detail the reasons without delay.

- (120.2) If the receiving State is prevented from accepting an evaluation visit due to *force majeure*, it shall without delay, through diplomatic or other official channels, explain in detail the reasons and provide, if possible, an estimated duration of the circumstances giving rise to the claim of *force majeure*. This may take place as follows:
- (120.2.1) - through the reply to the relevant request for an evaluation visit; or
 - (120.2.2) - through an appropriate communication delivered to the visiting State after replying positively to the request for an evaluation visit and before the evaluation team has arrived at the point of entry; or
 - (120.2.3) - after the arrival of the evaluation team at the point of entry. In this case, a corresponding explanation shall be provided immediately to the leader of the evaluation team.
- (121) The reply will designate the point(s) of entry and indicate, if applicable, the time and place of assembly of the team. The point(s) of entry and, if applicable, the place of assembly will be designated as close as possible to the formation or unit to be visited. The receiving State will ensure that the team will be able to reach the formation or unit without delay. The receiving State will, in its reply, indicate which of the six official OSCE working language(s) will be used during the evaluation visit.
- (122) The request and the reply will be communicated to all participating States without delay.
- (123) Participating States will facilitate the passage of teams through their territory.
- (124) The evaluation team will have no more than three members unless otherwise agreed by the visiting and the receiving States prior to the visit. The evaluation team may consist of nationals from up to three participating States. Such a team will be headed by, and under the responsibility, of a national of the visiting State. The visiting State is considered to be that participating State whose request for the evaluation visit is communicated to the receiving State. The official request of the visiting State - in compliance with paragraph (113.6) - will always include information on the size of the team and the nationality of the visitors. For quota purposes, the visit will be identical to a national visit. Without prejudice to the relevant provisions of paragraph (109), the receiving State will not refuse such a visit due to its bi-national or tri-national nature.
- (125) The members of the team and, if applicable, auxiliary personnel will be granted during their mission the privileges and immunities in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
- (126) The visit will take place in the course of a single working day and last up to 12 hours.

- (127) The visit will begin with a briefing by the officer commanding the formation or unit, or his deputy, in the headquarters of the formation or unit, concerning the personnel as well as the major weapon and equipment systems reported under paragraph (10).
- (127.1) In the case of a visit to a formation, the receiving State may provide the possibility to see personnel and major weapon and equipment systems reported under paragraph (10) for that formation, but not for any of its formations or units, in their normal locations.
- (127.2) In the case of a visit to a unit, the receiving State will provide the possibility to see the personnel and the major weapon and equipment systems of the unit reported under paragraph (10) in their normal locations.
- (128) Access will not have to be granted to sensitive points, facilities and equipment.
- (129) The team will be accompanied at all times by representatives of the receiving State.
- (130) The receiving State will provide the team with appropriate transportation during the visit to the formation or unit.
- (131) The evaluation team will have use of its own maps and charts, photo and video cameras, personal binoculars, and dictaphones. The team may use additional equipment for the evaluation, to be specified in the request, and subject to the specific consent of the receiving State. Upon arrival at the location of the formation or unit being visited the evaluation team will show the equipment to the representatives of the receiving State.
- (132) The visit will not interfere with activities of the formation or unit.
- (133) The participating States will ensure that troops, other armed personnel and officials in the formation or unit are adequately informed regarding the presence, status and functions of members of teams and, if applicable, auxiliary personnel. Participating States will also ensure that no action is taken by their representatives which could endanger the members of teams and, if applicable, auxiliary personnel. In carrying out their duties, members of teams and, if applicable, auxiliary personnel will take into account safety concerns expressed by representatives of the receiving State.
- (134) Travel expenses to and from the point(s) of entry, including expenses for refuelling, maintenance and parking of aircraft and/or land vehicles of the visiting State, will be borne by the visiting State according to existing practices established under the CSBM inspection provisions.
- (134.1) Expenses for evaluation visits incurred beyond the point(s) of entry will be borne by the receiving State, except when the visiting State uses its own aircraft and/or land vehicles in accordance with paragraph (113.4).

- (134.2) The receiving State will provide appropriate board and, when necessary, lodging in a location suitable for carrying out the evaluation as well as any urgent medical care which may be required.
- (134.3) In the case of visits to formations or units of a participating State stationed on the territory of another participating State, the stationing State will bear the costs for the discharge of those responsibilities which have been delegated to it by the host State under the terms of paragraph (116).
- (135) The visiting State will prepare a report of its visit using a format agreed by the participating States which will be communicated to all participating States expeditiously, but within no more than 14 days after the end of the visit.
- (136) The communications concerning compliance and verification will be transmitted preferably through the OSCE Communications Network.
- (137) Each participating State will be entitled to request and obtain clarification from any other participating State concerning the application of agreed confidence- and security-building measures. The requested participating State will provide promptly relevant clarification to the requesting participating State unless otherwise specified in this document. Communications in this context will, if appropriate, be transmitted to all other participating States.

X. REGIONAL MEASURES

- (138) The participating States are encouraged to undertake, including on the basis of separate agreements, in a bilateral, multilateral or regional context, measures to increase transparency and confidence.
- (139) Taking into account the regional dimension of security, participating States, on a voluntary basis, may therefore complement OSCE-wide confidence- and security-building measures through additional politically or legally binding measures, tailored to specific regional needs.
- (140) On a voluntary basis, numerous measures provided for in the Vienna Document, in particular, could be adapted and applied in a regional context. Participating States may also negotiate additional regional CSBMs, in accordance with the principles set out in paragraph (142).
- (141) The framework for the negotiation of measures relating to regional military confidence-building and co-operation should be determined by the preferences of the States involved and the nature of the measures to be agreed upon.
- (142) Such measures should:
- (142.1) - be in accordance with the basic OSCE principles, as enshrined in its documents;
 - (142.2) - contribute to strengthening the security and stability of the OSCE area, including the concept of the indivisibility of security;
 - (142.3) - add to existing transparency and confidence;
 - (142.4) - complement, not duplicate nor replace, existing OSCE-wide CSBMs or arms control agreements;
 - (142.5) - be in accordance with international laws and obligations;
 - (142.6) - be consistent with the Vienna Document;
 - (142.7) - not be detrimental to the security of third parties in the region.
- (143) Agreed regional CSBMs form part of the OSCE-wide web of interlocking and mutually reinforcing agreements. Negotiation and implementation within the OSCE area of regional or other agreements not binding on all OSCE participating States are a matter of direct interest to all participating States. Participating States are therefore encouraged to inform the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) of the regional CSBM initiatives undertaken and agreements reached, as well as of their implementation, when appropriate. The FSC could be the repository of regional CSBM agreements.

- (144) There are a wide range of possible measures which could serve regional needs, such as:
- (144.1) - exchange of information on defence planning, military strategy and doctrine as far as they refer to a particular regional context;
 - (144.2) - further development of the provisions with regard to risk reduction;
 - (144.3) - enhancement of the existing mechanism for consultation and co-operation as regards unusual military activities conducted by participating States;
 - (144.4) - joint training courses and manoeuvres;
 - (144.5) - intensification of military contacts and co-operation, particularly in border areas;
 - (144.6) - establishment of cross-border communications networks;
 - (144.7) - reduction of the thresholds for military activities, in particular with regard to border areas;
 - (144.8) - reduction of the thresholds for notifications and observations of certain military activities that a State is allowed to carry out in a given period, particularly in border areas;
 - (144.9) - agreement on additional inspection and evaluation visits by neighbouring States, especially in border areas;
 - (144.10) - increase in the size of evaluation teams and agreement to multinational evaluation teams;
 - (144.11) - creation of bi-national or regional verification agencies to co-ordinate “out of the region” verification activities.
- (145) A list of proposals, as well as a compilation of bilateral and regional measures prepared by the CPC will serve as a source of inspiration and reference for participating States.
- (146) Participating States are encouraged to provide the CPC with appropriate information on such measures. The CPC is tasked with continuously updating the above-mentioned document, and making it available to the participating States.
- (147) If requested by the parties directly involved, the FSC may assist in the development, negotiation and implementation of regional measures. It may also, if asked by those parties, direct the CPC to provide technical assistance, facilitate the process of information exchange or assist in any agreed verification activities relating to regional CSBMs.

XI. ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT MEETING

- (148) The participating States will hold each year a meeting to discuss the present and future implementation of agreed CSBMs. Discussion may extend to:
- (148.1) - Clarification of questions arising from such implementation;
 - (148.2) - operation of agreed measures, including the use of additional equipment during inspections and evaluation visits;
 - (148.3) - implications of all information originating from the implementation of any agreed measures for the process of confidence- and security-building in the framework of the OSCE.
- (149) Before the conclusion of each year's meeting the participating States will normally agree upon the agenda and dates for the subsequent year's meeting. Lack of agreement will not constitute sufficient reason to extend a meeting, unless otherwise agreed. Agenda and dates may, if necessary, be agreed between meetings.
- (150) The Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) will hold such meetings. It will consider, as required, suggestions made during the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM) aiming at the improvement of the implementation of CSBMs.
- (150.1) One month prior to the meeting, the CPC will circulate a survey of exchanged annual information and ask participating States to confirm or to correct applicable data.
 - (150.2) Within one month after the AIAM, the CPC will circulate a survey of such suggestions.
 - (150.3) Any participating State may request assistance in implementing the provisions of this document from any other participating State.
 - (150.4) Participating States which, for whatever reason, have not exchanged annual information according to this document and have not provided an explanation under the FSC announcing and reminding mechanism, will during the meeting explain the reasons why and provide an expected date for their full compliance with this commitment.

XII. FINAL PROVISIONS

OSCE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK

- (151) The participating States will use the OSCE Communications Network for the transmission of messages relating to agreed measures contained in this document. The Network complements the use of diplomatic channels.
- (152) The use and the arrangements of the OSCE Communications Network are therefore governed by the relevant OSCE documents.

OTHER PROVISIONS

- (153) The text of this document will be published in each participating State, which will disseminate it and make it known as widely as possible.
- (154) The Secretary General of the OSCE is requested to transmit the present document to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to the Governments of the Partners for Co-operation Japan and the Republic of Korea and of the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia).

IMPLEMENTATION

- (155) Participating States are encouraged to provide the CPC with a copy of all CSBM notifications and information exchanged. In accordance with the Charter of Paris, which tasked the CPC with supporting the implementation of CSBMs, the CPC will provide to all participating States, on a regular basis, a factual presentation of all CSBM information exchanged.
- The factual presentation should facilitate the analysis of this information by participating States and will not entail any conclusions by the CPC.
- (156) The participating States will implement this set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures in order to promote security co-operation and to reduce the risk of military conflict.
- (157) In order to strengthen compliance with agreed confidence- and security-building measures and in addition to other relevant provisions of this document, the participating States will, as necessary, consider in appropriate OSCE bodies how to ensure full implementation of those measures.

- (158) The measures adopted in this document are politically binding and will come into force on 1 January 2000, unless specified otherwise.

Istanbul, 16 November 1999

ANNEX I

Under the terms of the Madrid mandate, the zone of application for CSBMs is defined as follows:

“On the basis of equality of rights, balance and reciprocity, equal respect for the security interests of all CSCE participating States, and of their respective obligations concerning confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, these confidence- and security-building measures will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area* and air space. They will be of military significance and politically binding and will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content.

As far as the adjoining sea area* and air space is concerned, the measures will be applicable to the military activities of all the participating States taking place there whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe as referred to above, which they will agree to notify. Necessary specifications will be made through the negotiations on the confidence- and security-building measures at the Conference.

Nothing in the definition of the zone given above will diminish obligations already undertaken under the Final Act. The confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed upon at the Conference will also be applicable in all areas covered by any of the provisions in the Final Act relating to confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.

* In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe.”

Wherever the term “the zone of application for CSBMs” is used in this document, the above definition will apply. The following understanding will apply as well:

The commitments undertaken in letters to the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE Council by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan on 29 January 1992 have the effect of extending the application of CSBMs in the Vienna Document 1992 to the territories of the above-mentioned States insofar as their territories were not covered already by the above.

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which had observer status at the time when the Vienna Document 1994 was negotiated, has been a participating State since 12 October 1995, and Andorra has been a participating State since 25 April 1996.

As a consequence, “the zone of application for CSBMs” as defined in this annex extends, as of the given dates, to the territories of the above-mentioned States.

ANNEX II

Standardized format for comprehensive NIL reports

I. ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION

INFORMATION ON MILITARY FORCES

§10.1 [Participating State] informs all other participating States that it does not dispose of armed forces or relevant branches thereof within the zone of application and consequently presents (a) NIL report(s) for the forthcoming year 20xx as regards commitments set out in the following Chapters of the Vienna Document (please tick as appropriate):

Command organization of military forces

- §10.1.1 Total number of units and the resultant annual evaluation quota
- §10.2+10.4 Formations and combat units of land forces and amphibious formations and amphibious combat units
- §10.3 Planned increases in personnel strength
- §10.3.1 Temporary activation of non-active units and formations
- §10.5 Air formations and air combat units of the air forces, air defence aviation and naval aviation permanently based on land
- §11 DATA RELATING TO MAJOR WEAPON AND EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS
- §13 INFORMATION ON PLANS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR WEAPON AND EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS

II. DEFENCE PLANNING

- §15.1 Defence policy and doctrine
- §15.2 Force planning
- §15.3 Information on previous expenditures
- §15.4 Information on budgets

VII. ANNUAL CALENDARS

§61

VIII. CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS

§68

ANNEX III

(1) BATTLE TANKS

- (1.1) Type
- (1.2) National Nomenclature/Name
- (1.3) Main Gun Calibre
- (1.4) Unladen Weight
- (1.5) Data on new types or versions will, in addition, include:
 - (1.5.1) Night Vision Capability yes/no
 - (1.5.2) Additional Armour yes/no
 - (1.5.3) Track Width cm
 - (1.5.4) Floating Capabilities yes/no
 - (1.5.5) Snorkelling Equipment yes/no

(2) ARMOURED COMBAT VEHICLES

(2.1) Armoured Personnel Carriers

- (2.1.1) Type
- (2.1.2) National Nomenclature/Name
- (2.1.3) Type and Calibre of Armaments, if any
- (2.1.4) Data on new types or versions will, in addition, include:
 - (2.1.4.1) Night Vision Capability yes/no
 - (2.1.4.2) Seating Capacity
 - (2.1.4.3) Floating Capability yes/no
 - (2.1.4.4) Snorkelling Equipment yes/no

(2.2) Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles

- (2.2.1) Type
- (2.2.2) National Nomenclature/Name
- (2.2.3) Type and Calibre of Armaments
- (2.2.4) Data on new types or versions will, in addition, include:
 - (2.2.4.1) Night Vision Capability yes/no
 - (2.2.4.2) Additional Armour yes/no
 - (2.2.4.3) Floating Capability yes/no
 - (2.2.4.4) Snorkelling Equipment yes/no

(2.3) Heavy Armament Combat Vehicles

- (2.3.1) Type
- (2.3.2) National Nomenclature/Name
- (2.3.3) Main Gun Calibre
- (2.3.4) Unladen Weight
- (2.3.5) Data on new types or versions will, in addition, include:
 - (2.3.5.1) Night Vision Capability yes/no
 - (2.3.5.2) Additional Armour yes/no
 - (2.3.5.3) Floating Capability yes/no
 - (2.3.5.4) Snorkelling Equipment yes/no

- (3) **ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIER LOOK-ALIKES AND
ARMoured INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLE LOOK-ALIKES**
 - (3.1) Armoured Personnel Carrier Look-Alikes
 - (3.1.1) Type
 - (3.1.2) National Nomenclature/Name
 - (3.1.3) Type and Calibre of Armaments, if any
 - (3.2) Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle Look-Alikes
 - (3.2.1) Type
 - (3.2.2) National Nomenclature/Name
 - (3.2.3) Type and Calibre of Armaments, if any
- (4) **ANTI-TANK GUIDED MISSILE LAUNCHERS
PERMANENTLY/INTEGRALLY MOUNTED ON ARMoured
VEHICLES**
 - (4.1) Type
 - (4.2) National Nomenclature/Name
- (5) **SELF-PROPELLED AND TOWED ARTILLERY PIECES, MORTARS
AND MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS (100 mm CALIBRE AND
ABOVE)**
 - (5.1) Artillery pieces
 - (5.1.1) Type
 - (5.1.2) National Nomenclature/Name
 - (5.1.3) Calibre
 - (5.2) Mortars
 - (5.2.1) Type
 - (5.2.2) National Nomenclature/Name
 - (5.2.3) Calibre
 - (5.3) Multiple Launch Rocket Systems
 - (5.3.1) Type
 - (5.3.2) National Nomenclature/Name
 - (5.3.3) Calibre
 - (5.3.4) Data on new types or versions will, in addition, include:
 - (5.3.4.1) Number of Tubes

(6) ARMoured VEHICLE LAUNCHED BRIDGES

(6.1) Type

(6.2) National Nomenclature/Name

(6.3) Data on new types or versions will, in addition, include:

(6.3.1) Span of the Bridge __m

(6.3.2) Carrying Capacity/Load Classification __metric tons

(7) COMBAT AIRCRAFT

(7.1) Type

(7.2) National Nomenclature/Name

(7.3) Data on new types or versions will, in addition, include:

(7.3.1) Type of Integrally Mounted Armaments, if any

(8) HELICOPTERS

(8.1) Type

(8.2) National Nomenclature/Name

(8.3) Data on new types or versions will, in addition, include:

(8.3.1) Primary Role (e.g., specialized attack, multi-purpose attack, combat support, transport)

(8.3.2) Type of Integrally Mounted Armaments, if any

(9) Each participating State will, at the time the data are presented, ensure that other participating States are provided with photographs presenting the right or left side, top and front views for each of the types of major weapon and equipment systems concerned.

(10) Photographs of armoured personnel carrier look-alikes and armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes will include a view of such vehicles so as to show clearly their internal configuration illustrating the specific characteristic which distinguishes each particular vehicle as a look-alike.

(11) The photographs of each type will be accompanied by a note giving the type designation and national nomenclature for all models and versions of the type which the photographs represent. The photographs of a type will contain an annotation of the data for that type.

ANNEX IV

The following provisions will apply in conformity with the events as set out in Chapters IV and VI:

(1) Invitations

Invitations will be extended in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (151) and (152) to all participating States 42 days or more in advance of the event. For military activities covered by paragraph (41), invitations will be extended together with notification given in accordance with paragraph (41.1). The invitations will include the following information as applicable:

- (1.1) the type of event, e.g., visits to air bases, military facilities or military formations, a demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems or an observation of certain military activities;
- (1.2) the location where the event will take place, including geographic co-ordinates in case of visits to air bases;
- (1.3) State arranging the event and, if different, the host State;
- (1.4) responsibilities delegated;
- (1.5) whether the event is combined with other events;
- (1.6) number of visitors or observers invited;
- (1.7) date, time and place of assembly;
- (1.8) planned duration of the event;
- (1.9) anticipated date, time and place of departure at the end of the programme;
- (1.10) arrangements for transportation;
- (1.11) arrangements for board and lodging, including a point of contact for communications with visitors or observers;
- (1.12) language(s) to be used during the programme;
- (1.13) equipment to be issued by the State arranging the event;
- (1.14) possible authorization by the host State and, if different, the State arranging the event, of the use of special equipment that the visitors or observers may bring with them;
- (1.15) arrangements for special clothing to be issued;

(1.16) any other information including, if applicable, the designation/name of the air base, military facility or formation to be visited, the designation of the military activity to be observed and/or the type(s) of major weapon and equipment system(s) to be viewed.

(2) Replies

(2.1) Replies, indicating whether or not the invitation is accepted, will be given in writing, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (151) and (152), not later than 21 days before the event and will include the following information:

(2.1.1) reference to invitation;

(2.1.2) name and rank of visitors or observers;

(2.1.3) date and place of birth;

(2.1.4) passport information (number, date and place of issue, expiration date);

(2.1.5) travel arrangements, including airline name and flight number, if applicable, and time and place of arrival.

(2.2) Within two working days after the deadline for replies, the inviting State will communicate to all participating States a list of replies received.

(2.3) If the reply to the invitation is not received in time, it will be assumed that no visitors or observers will be sent.

(2.4) Replies in response to invitations covered by paragraph (41.1) will be given no later than three days after the invitation is issued.

(3) Financial aspects

(3.1) The invited State will cover the travel expenses of its representative(s) to the place of assembly and from the place of departure, possibly the same as the place of assembly, as specified in the invitation.

(3.2) The State arranging the event will cover travel arrangements and expenses from the place of assembly and to the place of departure - possibly the same as the place of assembly - as well as appropriate civil or military board and lodging in a location suitable for carrying out the event.

(4) Other provisions

The participating State(s) will, in due co-operation with the visitors or observers, ensure that no action is taken which could be harmful to their safety.

Furthermore, the State arranging the event will:

- (4.1) give equal treatment and offer equal opportunities to all visitors or observers to carry out their functions;
- (4.2) restrict to the minimum necessary the time reserved for transfer and administrative activities during the event;
- (4.3) provide any urgent medical care which may be required.

Chairman's Statement
of 28 November 1994

It is understood that the implementation aspects of CSBMs in the case of contiguous areas of participating States specified in the understanding of Annex I which share frontiers with non-European non-participating States may be discussed at future Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings.

ENDNOTES

- 1 In this context, the term normal peacetime air base is understood to mean the normal peacetime location of the air combat unit indicated by the air base or military airfield on which the unit is based.
- 2 This provision will not apply if another participating State has already arranged a demonstration of the same type of major weapon and equipment system.
- 3 In this document, the term notifiable means subject to notification.
- 4 In this context, the term land forces includes amphibious, airmobile or heliborne forces and airborne forces.
- 5 In this document, amphibious landing includes total troops launched from the sea by naval and landing forces embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on shore.
- 6 In this context, the term land forces includes amphibious, airmobile or heliborne forces and airborne forces.
- 7 As defined in the provisions on Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities.

**DECISION ON THE SPREAD OF SMALL ARMS
AND LIGHT WEAPONS
(FSC.DEC/6/99)**

The participating States of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE):

Recognizing that the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms and light weapons manufactured for military use (hereinafter referred to as “small arms”), which have contributed to the intensity and duration of the majority of recent armed conflicts, are of great concern to the international community; pose a threat and a challenge to peace and security, in particular as an element in terrorist activity and armed conflicts; are closely related to high levels of violence and crime; reduce the prospect of sustainable development and undermine the efforts to ensure a truly indivisible and comprehensive security;

Supporting the decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations to convene an international Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, to be held no later than the year 2001, and to encourage the Conference to take a broad and comprehensive approach while addressing this issue;

Convinced of the important contribution that appropriate measures with regard to small arms can make in the OSCE region; and taking note of the impetus given by the various initiatives in other fora, in particular the European Union “Joint Action” on small arms;

Recalling Chapter IV of the Lisbon Document 1996 on the “Development of the Agenda of the Forum for Security Co-operation”, in which it was decided that the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) would consider further efforts to develop Norm- and Standard-Setting Measures (NSSMs), as well as the possibility of the adoption of the new NSSMs; and

Seeking to make their own specific contribution to managing this problem:

- Decide that the FSC:
 - includes the problem of the spread of small arms and light weapons as an item of priority on its agenda after the Istanbul Summit and launches a broad and comprehensive discussion on all its aspects;
 - tasks its Working Group B, in accordance with the provisions set out in this Decision, with the further analysis of the issue and the examination of measures in the OSCE region stemming from the discussion within the FSC. This should be done without duplicating efforts already undertaken or under way in other fora;
 - convenes a seminar with the participation of experts, to be held in Vienna no later than Spring 2000, devoted to the examination of concrete measures in accordance with the provisions of this Decision; and
- requests the FSC Chairman to submit, at the next meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, a report on the work undertaken and the achievements reached.

While addressing the study and the development of measures, the FSC will be guided, *inter alia*, by the following approaches:

- combating and thereby contributing to the reduction and the ending of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms, taking into account requirements for legitimate national and collective defence, participation in peacekeeping operations under the United Nations Charter, and internal security;
- exercising due restraint and ensuring that small arms are produced, transferred and held only in accordance with legitimate defence and security needs as outlined above, and in accordance with appropriate international and regional arms export criteria, in particular as provided for in the Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers;
- building confidence, security and transparency through appropriate measures on small arms;
- ensuring that, in line with its comprehensive concept of security, the OSCE addresses, in its appropriate fora, concerns related to the issue of small arms as part of an overall assessment of the security situation of a particular country, and takes practical measures which will assist in this respect;
- combating illicit trafficking through the adoption and implementation of national controls, such as effective border and customs mechanisms, and through enhanced co-operation and information exchange among law enforcement and customs agencies at international, regional and national levels; and
- developing appropriate measures on small arms such as their collection, safe storage and destruction linked to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants at the end of armed conflicts.

**AGREEMENT ON ADAPTATION OF THE TREATY
ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE**

The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the States Parties,

Conscious of the fundamental changes that have occurred in Europe since the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed in Paris on 19 November 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Determined to sustain the key role of the Treaty as the cornerstone of European security,

Noting the fulfilment of the objective of the original Treaty of ensuring that the numbers of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty within the area of application of the Treaty would not exceed 40,000 battle tanks, 60,000 armoured combat vehicles, 40,000 pieces of artillery, 13,600 combat aircraft and 4,000 attack helicopters,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Preamble of the Treaty shall be deleted and replaced by:

“The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the States Parties,

Guided by the Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 10 January 1989,

Guided by the objectives and the purposes of the Organization for (formerly Conference on) Security and Co-operation in Europe, within the framework of which the negotiation of this Treaty was conducted in Vienna,

Recalling their obligation to refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Conscious of the need to prevent any military conflict in Europe,

Conscious of the common responsibility which they all have for seeking to achieve greater stability and security in Europe, and bearing in mind their right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance,

Striving to develop further and consolidate a new pattern of security relations among all the States Parties based on peaceful cooperation and thereby to contribute to establishing a common and indivisible security space in Europe,

Committed to the objectives of maintaining a secure, stable and balanced overall level of conventional armed forces in Europe lower than heretofore, of eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and security and of eliminating the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action in Europe,

Affirming that this Treaty is not intended to affect adversely the security interests of any State,

Having taken note of the Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe held in Istanbul from 17 to 19 November 1999, as well as of the statements made by certain States Parties concerning their political commitments referred to therein,

Affirming their commitment to continue the conventional arms control process including negotiations, taking into account the opening of the Treaty for accession by other participating States of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe with territory in the geographic area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains as well as future requirements for European stability and security in the light of political developments in Europe,

Have agreed as follows:”

Article 2

Article I of the Treaty shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“Article I

1. Each State Party shall carry out the obligations set forth in this Treaty in accordance with its provisions, including those obligations relating to the following five categories of conventional armed forces: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and combat helicopters.
2. Each State Party shall also carry out the other measures set forth in this Treaty designed to ensure security and stability.

3. Conventional armaments and equipment of a State Party in the categories limited by the Treaty shall only be present on the territory of another State Party in conformity with international law, the explicit consent of the host State Party, or a relevant resolution of the United Nations Security Council. Explicit consent must be provided in advance, and must continue to be in effect as provided for in Article XIII, paragraph 1 *bis*.

4. This Treaty incorporates the Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Existing Types, with an Annex thereto; the Protocol on National Ceilings for Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on National Ceilings; the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings for Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings; the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reclassification of Specific Models or Versions of Combat-Capable Trainer Aircraft into Unarmed Trainer Aircraft, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification; the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reduction of Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Reduction; the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Categorisation of Combat Helicopters and the Recategorisation of Multi-purpose Attack Helicopters, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation; the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Information Exchange, with an Annex on the Format for the Exchange of Information, hereinafter referred to as the Annex on Format; the Protocol on Inspection; and the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group.

Each of these documents constitutes an integral part of this Treaty.”

Article 3

1. In Article II of the Treaty, paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (G) shall be deleted.
2. In Article II of the Treaty, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B) shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“(B) The term “area of application” means the entire land territory of the States Parties in Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains, which includes all the European island territories of the States Parties, including the Faroe Islands of the Kingdom of Denmark, Svalbard including Bear Island of the Kingdom of Norway, the islands of Azores and Madeira of the Portuguese Republic, the Canary Islands of the Kingdom of Spain and Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya of the Russian Federation.

In the case of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, the area of application includes all territory lying west of the Ural River and the Caspian Sea.

In the case of the Republic of Turkey, the area of application includes the territory of the Republic of Turkey north and west of a line extending from the point of intersection of the Turkish border with the 39th parallel to Muradiye, Patnos, Karayazi, Tekman, Kemaliye, Feke, Ceyhan, Dogankent, Gözne and thence to the sea.”

3. In Article II of the Treaty, paragraph 1, subparagraph (H) shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“(H) The term “designated permanent storage site” means a place with a clearly defined physical boundary containing conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty which are counted within national ceilings but which are not subject to limitations on conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in active units.”

4. In Article II of the Treaty, paragraph 1, subparagraph (J) shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“(J) The term “conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty” means battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters subject to the numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV, V, VII, the Protocol on National Ceilings and the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings.”

5. In Article II of the Treaty, paragraph 1, subparagraph (U) shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“(U) The term “reduction liability” means the number in each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty that a State Party commits itself to reduce pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty, in order to ensure compliance with Article IV.”

Article 4

In Article III of the Treaty, paragraph 1 shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“1. For the purposes of this Treaty, the States Parties shall apply the following counting rules:

All battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, as defined in Article II, within the area of application shall be subject to the numerical limitations and other provisions set forth in Articles IV, V, VII, the Protocol on National Ceilings and the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings, with the exception of those which in a manner consistent with a State Party’s normal practices:

- (A) Are in the process of manufacture, including manufacturing-related testing;
- (B) Are used exclusively for the purposes of research and development;

- (C) Belong to historical collections;
- (D) Are awaiting disposal, having been decommissioned from service in accordance with the provisions of Article IX;
- (E) Are awaiting, or being refurbished for, export or re-export and are temporarily retained within the area of application. Such battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters shall be located elsewhere than at sites declared under the terms of Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange or at no more than 10 such declared sites which shall have been notified in the previous year's annual information exchange. In the latter case, they shall be separately distinguishable from conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty;
- (F) Are, in the case of armoured personnel carriers, armoured infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs), heavy armament combat vehicles (HACVs) or multi-purpose attack helicopters, held by organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions; or
- (G) Are in transit through the area of application from a location outside the area of application to a final destination outside the area of application, and are in the area of application for no longer than a total of seven days."

Article 5

Article IV of the Treaty shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

"Article IV

1. Within the area of application, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters so that the numbers do not exceed the national ceiling, the subceiling for active units and the subceiling for sub-categories established in accordance with this Article and the Protocol on National Ceilings for that State Party. The subceiling for active units shall establish the maximum number of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery that a State Party may hold in active units within the area of application. The subceiling for active units shall be equal to the national ceiling unless otherwise specified by the Protocol on National Ceilings. Any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery under a national ceiling in any category in excess of the corresponding subceiling for active units shall be located in designated permanent storage sites. The subceiling for sub-categories shall establish the maximum aggregate number of armoured infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles and the maximum number of heavy armament combat vehicles that a State Party may hold within the area of application in the category of armoured combat vehicles.

2. Within the area of application all conventional armaments and equipment in the categories limited by the Treaty: shall be accounted for and controlled by a State Party; shall, in accordance with the provisions in Article III, be counted against the national ceiling of a State Party; shall in the area of application be transferred only to other States Parties as provided for in this Treaty; and shall be subject to the

provisions of the Protocol on Information Exchange. In the case that a State Party is unable to exercise its authority in this respect, any State Party can raise the matter in accordance with the provisions in Article XVI and Article XXI with a view to addressing the situation and ensuring full observance of Treaty provisions with respect to such conventional armaments and equipment in the categories limited by the Treaty. The inability of a State Party to exercise its authority in respect of the above mentioned conventional armaments and equipment in the categories limited by the Treaty shall not in itself release a State Party from any Treaty obligations.

3. Each State Party shall have the right to change its national ceiling, its subceiling for active units and its subceiling for sub-categories as follows:

- (A) Each State Party shall have the right, in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 6 of this Article, to increase its national ceiling, its subceiling for active units and its subceiling for sub-categories in any category or sub-category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. Any such increase shall be preceded or accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the national ceiling, the subceiling for active units or the subceiling for sub-categories of one or more other States Parties in the same category or sub-category, except as provided for in paragraph 6 of this Article. The State Party or States Parties undertaking the corresponding decrease in their national ceiling, subceiling for active units or subceiling for sub-categories shall notify all States Parties of their consent to the corresponding increase in the national ceiling, subceiling for active units or subceiling for sub-categories of another State Party. No national ceiling for a State Party with territory in the area of application shall exceed that State Party's territorial ceiling in the same category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty.
- (B) Each State Party shall have the right to decrease unilaterally its national ceiling, subceiling for active units or subceiling for sub-categories in any category or sub-category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. A unilateral decrease in the national ceiling, subceiling for active units or subceiling for sub-categories of a State Party shall by itself confer no right on any other State Party to increase its national ceiling, subceiling for active units or subceiling for sub-categories.

4. Within each five-year period between conferences of States Parties held in accordance with Article XXI, paragraph 1, each State Party shall have the right to increase its national ceiling or subceiling for active units:

- (A) In the categories of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery by no more than 40 battle tanks, 60 armoured combat vehicles and 20 pieces of artillery or 20 percent of the national ceiling established for that State Party in the Protocol on National Ceilings for battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery, whichever is greater, but in no case exceeding 150 battle tanks, 250 armoured combat vehicles and 100 pieces of artillery;
- (B) In the categories of combat aircraft and attack helicopters by no more than 30 combat aircraft and 25 attack helicopters.

Each State Party shall have the right to increase its national ceiling or subceiling for active units in excess of the levels set forth in paragraph 4, subparagraphs (A) and (B) above, subject to the consent of all other States Parties.

5. A State Party intending to change its national ceiling, subceiling for active units or subceiling for sub-categories shall provide notification to all other States Parties at least 90 days in advance of the date, specified in the notification, on which such a change is to take effect. For increases subject to the consent of all other States Parties, the change shall take effect on the date specified in the notification provided that no State Party, within 60 days of the notification, objects to the change and notifies its objection to all other States Parties. A national ceiling, a subceiling for active units or a subceiling for sub-categories shall remain in effect until a change to that ceiling or subceiling takes effect.

6. In addition to the provisions of paragraph 4, any State Party with a subceiling for active units lower than its national ceiling in the categories of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery shall have the right to increase that subceiling, provided that:

- (A) The increase in the subceiling for active units is accompanied by a decrease in its national ceiling in the same category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty;
- (B) For each battle tank, armoured combat vehicle or piece of artillery by which a State Party increases its subceiling for active units, that State Party will decrease its national ceiling by four in the same category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty;
- (C) The resultant subceiling for active units does not exceed the new national ceiling achieved through the decrease mandated by subparagraph (B) above.”

Article 6

Article V of the Treaty shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“Article V

1. Within the area of application, as defined in Article II, each State Party shall limit the total number of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery on its territory and of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery of other States Parties that it permits to be present on its territory and each State Party shall limit its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery present on the territory of other States Parties so that the overall numbers do not exceed the territorial ceilings and the territorial subceilings established in accordance with this Article and the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings, except as otherwise provided for in Article VII.

2. Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery present on the territory of a State Party for an operation in support of peace conducted under and consistent with a resolution or a decision of the United Nations Security Council or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe shall be exempt from that State Party’s territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling. The duration of the presence of these battle

tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery on the territory of a State Party shall be consistent with such a resolution or decision.

Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery present on the territory of a State Party for an operation in support of peace pursuant to this paragraph shall be subject to notification in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange.

3. Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in transit shall be exempt from the territorial ceilings of transited States Parties and from territorial subceilings without prejudice to the exemption from counting rules under Article III, paragraph 1, subparagraph (G), provided that:

- (A) Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in transit to a location within the area of application do not cause the territorial ceiling of the State Party of final destination to be exceeded, except as otherwise provided for in Article VII. For battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in transit to a location outside the area of application there shall be no numerical limit;
- (B) Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in transit do not remain on the territory of the transited States Parties in the area of application longer than a total of 42 days; and
- (C) Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in transit do not remain on the territory of any single transited State Party, or on a territory with a territorial subceiling, in the area of application longer than 21 days.

Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in transit under this paragraph shall be subject to notification in accordance with Section XII of the Protocol on Information Exchange. Any State Party may request clarification in the Joint Consultative Group with regard to a notified transit. The States Parties involved shall respond within seven days of the request.

4. Each State Party shall have the right to change its territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling as follows:

- (A) Each State Party shall have the right, in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Article, to increase its territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling for battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in any category. Any such increase shall be preceded or accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the same category in the territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling of one or more other States Parties, subject to the provisions of the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings regarding relevant territorial ceilings and territorial subceilings. The State Party or States Parties undertaking the corresponding decrease in their territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling shall notify all States Parties of their consent to the corresponding increase in the territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling of another State Party.
- (B) Each State Party shall have the right to decrease unilaterally its territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling for battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in any category; however, no territorial ceiling in any category shall be at any time lower than the corresponding national ceiling. A unilateral

decrease in the territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling of a State Party shall by itself confer no right on any other State Party to increase its territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling. Any decrease in a national ceiling under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 6, shall result in a decrease of the corresponding territorial ceiling by an amount equal to the decrease in the national ceiling.

5. Subject to the provisions above, within each five-year period between conferences of States Parties held in accordance with Article XXI, paragraph 1, each State Party shall have the right to increase its territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling by no more than 40 battle tanks, 60 armoured combat vehicles and 20 pieces of artillery or 20 percent of the territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling established for that State Party in the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings for battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery, whichever is greater, but in no case exceeding 150 battle tanks, 250 armoured combat vehicles and 100 pieces of artillery.

Each State Party shall have the right to increase its territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling in excess of the levels set forth in this paragraph, subject to the consent of all other States Parties.

6. A State Party intending to change its territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling in any category shall provide notification to all other States Parties at least 90 days in advance of the date, specified in the notification, on which such a change is to take effect. For increases subject to the consent of all other States Parties, the change shall take effect on the date specified in the notification provided that no State Party, within 60 days of the notification, objects to the change and notifies its objection to all other States Parties. A territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling shall remain in effect until a change to that ceiling or subceiling takes effect.”

Article 7

Article VI of the Treaty shall be deleted.

Article 8

Article VII of the Treaty shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“Article VII

1. Each State Party shall have the right to exceed on a temporary basis, for military exercises and temporary deployments, the territorial ceilings and territorial subceilings established in the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings, subject to the provisions of this Article.

(A) Military exercises:

(1) Each State Party shall have the right to host on its territory military exercises which cause its territorial ceiling to be exceeded, and, for States Parties with a territorial subceiling, to conduct or host exercises which cause its territorial subceiling to be exceeded in accordance with the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings;

- (2) The number of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery present on the territory of a State Party in excess of its territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling for a military exercise, alone or in combination with any other military exercise or any temporary deployment on that territory, shall not exceed the number of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery specified for each State Party in subparagraph (B), sub-subparagraph (1), of this paragraph and in the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings;
 - (3) A military exercise or successive military exercises notified in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange, that result in a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling being exceeded for more than 42 days shall thereafter be considered a temporary deployment as long as the territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling continues to be exceeded.
- (B) Temporary deployments:
- (1) Each State Party shall have the right to host on its territory temporary deployments in excess of its territorial ceiling, and, for States Parties with a territorial subceiling, to conduct or host temporary deployments in excess of their territorial subceiling. For this purpose, territorial ceilings and territorial subceilings may be exceeded, on a temporary basis, by no more than 153 battle tanks, 241 armoured combat vehicles and 140 pieces of artillery, unless otherwise set forth in the relevant provisions of the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings. In exceptional circumstances and unless otherwise set forth in the relevant provisions of the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings, a territorial ceiling may be exceeded, on a temporary basis, by no more than 459 battle tanks, 723 armoured combat vehicles and 420 pieces of artillery.
 - (2) Upon notification of a temporary deployment exceeding a territorial ceiling by more than 153 battle tanks, 241 armoured combat vehicles, and 140 pieces of artillery, the Depositary shall convene a conference of the States Parties in accordance with Article XXI, paragraph 1 *bis*.
2. Should a military exercise, in conjunction with a temporary deployment taking place simultaneously on the territory of the same State Party, cause the territorial ceiling to be exceeded by more than 153 battle tanks, 241 armoured combat vehicles or 140 pieces of artillery, any State Party shall have the right to request the Depositary to convene a conference of the States Parties in accordance with Article XXI, paragraph 1 *bis*.

For exercises and temporary deployments pursuant to paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B), of this Article, an explanatory report shall be provided to the Joint Consultative Group by the States Parties involved. In the case of temporary deployments, the report shall be submitted as soon as possible and in any case no later than the notification foreseen in Section XVIII, paragraph 4, subparagraph (A), sub-subparagraph (2), and subparagraph (B), sub-subparagraph (2), of the Protocol on

Information Exchange. Subsequent updates shall be provided every two months until the territorial ceiling or the territorial subceiling is no longer exceeded.”

Article 9

Article VIII of the Treaty shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“Article VIII

1. Any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters in excess of the numerical limitations set forth in Article IV and in the Protocol on National Ceilings shall be eliminated only by means of reduction in accordance with the Protocol on Reduction, the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation, the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification, the footnote to Section I, paragraph 2, subparagraph (A), of the Protocol on Existing Types and the Protocol on Inspection. In the case of accession, any reductions by the acceding State as well as the time limit within which they shall be carried out shall be specified in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement on Accession.

2. The categories of conventional armaments and equipment subject to reductions are battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. The specific types are listed in the Protocol on Existing Types.

- (A) Battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles shall be reduced by destruction, conversion for non-military purposes, placement on static display, use as ground targets, or, in the case of armoured personnel carriers, modification in accordance with the footnote to Section 1, paragraph 2, subparagraph (A), of the Protocol on Existing Types.
- (B) Artillery shall be reduced by destruction or placement on static display, or, in the case of self-propelled artillery, by use as ground targets.
- (C) Combat aircraft shall be reduced by destruction, placement on static display, use for ground instructional purposes, or, in the case of specific models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft, reclassification into unarmed trainer aircraft.
- (D) Specialised attack helicopters shall be reduced by destruction, placement on static display, or use for ground instructional purposes.
- (E) Multi-purpose attack helicopters shall be reduced by destruction, placement on static display, use for ground instructional purposes, or recategorisation.

3. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall be deemed to be reduced upon execution of the procedures set forth in the Protocols listed in paragraph 1 of this Article and upon notification as required by these Protocols. Armaments and equipment so reduced shall no longer be counted against the numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV, V, the Protocol on National Ceilings and the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings.

4. Reduction of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall be carried out at reduction sites, unless otherwise specified in the Protocols listed in paragraph 1 of this Article, within the area of application. Each State Party shall have the right to designate as many reduction sites as it wishes, to revise without restriction its designation of such sites and to carry out reduction and final conversion simultaneously at a maximum of 20 sites. States Parties shall have the right to share or co-locate reduction sites by mutual agreement.

5. Any reductions, including the results of the conversion of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty for non-military purposes, shall be subject to inspection, without right of refusal, in accordance with the Protocol on Inspection.”

Article 10

Article IX of the Treaty shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“Article IX

1. In the case of removal from service by decommissioning of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, within the area of application:

- (A) Such conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall be decommissioned and awaiting disposal at no more than eight sites which shall be notified as declared sites in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange and shall be identified in such notifications as holding areas for decommissioned conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. If sites containing conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty decommissioned from service also contain any other conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty, the decommissioned conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall be separately distinguishable; and
- (B) The numbers of such decommissioned conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall not exceed, in the case of any individual State Party, one percent of its notified holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, or a total of 250, whichever is greater, of which no more than 200 shall be battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery, and no more than 50 shall be attack helicopters and combat aircraft.

2. Notification of decommissioning shall include the number and type of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty decommissioned and the location of decommissioning and shall be provided to all other States Parties in accordance with Section X, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B), of the Protocol on Information Exchange.”

Article 11

1. In Article X of the Treaty, paragraph 4 shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“4. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty located within designated permanent storage sites shall be counted as conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty not in active units, including when they are temporarily removed in accordance with paragraphs 7, 8 and 10 of this Article.

Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in storage other than in designated permanent storage sites shall be counted as conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in active units.”

2. In Article X of the Treaty, paragraph 9 shall be deleted.

3. In Article X of the Treaty, paragraph 10 shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“10. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty removed from designated permanent storage sites pursuant to paragraph 8 of this Article shall be returned to designated permanent storage sites no later than 42 days after their removal, except for those items of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty removed for industrial rebuild.

Such items shall be returned to designated permanent storage sites immediately on completion of the rebuild.”

Article 12

Article XI of the Treaty shall be deleted.

Article 13

Article XII of the Treaty shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“Article XII

1. Armoured infantry fighting vehicles held by organisations of a State Party designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions are not limited by this Treaty.

2. The foregoing notwithstanding, in order to enhance the implementation of this Treaty and to provide assurance that the number of such armaments held by such organisations of a State Party shall not be used to circumvent the provisions of this Treaty, any such armaments in excess of the levels set forth in subparagraphs (A), (B) or (C) of this paragraph, whichever is greater, shall constitute a portion of the permitted levels in the category of armoured combat vehicles, as established in Articles IV and V and in the Protocol on National Ceilings and the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings, and changed in accordance with Articles IV and V:

(A) Holdings of armoured infantry fighting vehicles held, within the area of application, by organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions, present on the territory of the State Party as

notified pursuant to the information exchange effective as of 19 November 1990; or

- (B) Five percent of the national ceiling established for the State Party in the Protocol on National Ceilings in the category of armoured combat vehicles, as changed in accordance with Article IV; or
- (C) 100 such armoured infantry fighting vehicles.

In the case of acceding States, the numbers shall be established in the Agreement on Accession.

3. Each State Party shall further ensure that organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions refrain from the acquisition of combat capabilities in excess of those necessary for meeting internal security requirements.

4. A State Party that intends to reassign battle tanks, artillery, armoured infantry fighting vehicles, combat aircraft and attack helicopters in service with its conventional armed forces to any organisation of that State Party not a part of its conventional armed forces shall notify all other States Parties no later than the date such reassignment takes effect.

Such notification shall specify the effective date of the reassignment, the date such equipment is physically transferred, as well as the numbers, by type, of the conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty being reassigned.”

Article 14

1. In Article XIII of the Treaty, paragraph 1 shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each State Party shall provide notifications and exchange information pertaining to its conventional armaments and equipment and to the conventional armaments and equipment of other States Parties that it permits to be present on its territory, in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange.”

2. In Article XIII of the Treaty, the following paragraph 1 *bis* shall be added:

“1. *bis* The presence of conventional armaments and equipment of a State Party on the territory of another State Party as set forth in Article V, paragraph 1, for transit as set forth in Article V, paragraph 3, for military exercises as set forth in Article VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), and for temporary deployment as set forth in Article VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B), shall be in accordance with Article I, paragraph 3. Consent of the host State Party shall be reflected through the appropriate notifications in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange.”

Article 15

Article XIV of the Treaty shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“Article XIV

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each State Party shall have the right to conduct, and the obligation to accept, within the area of application, inspections in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on Inspection.
2. The purpose of such inspections shall be:
 - (A) To verify, on the basis of the information provided pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange, the compliance of States Parties with the numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV, V, VII, the Protocol on National Ceilings and the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings;
 - (B) To monitor any reductions of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters carried out at reduction sites in accordance with Article VIII and the Protocol on Reduction;
 - (C) To monitor the certification of recategorised multi-purpose attack helicopters and reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft carried out in accordance with the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation and the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification, respectively.
3. No State Party shall exercise the rights set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article in order to elude the objectives of the verification regime.
4. In the case of an inspection conducted jointly by more than one State Party, one of them shall be responsible for the execution of the provisions of this Treaty.
5. The number of inspections pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of the Protocol on Inspection which each State Party shall have the right to conduct and the obligation to accept during each specified time period shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Section II of that Protocol.
6. The number of inspections, pursuant to Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, that each State Party shall have the right to conduct and the State Party whose territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling is temporarily exceeded shall have the obligation to accept shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of that Section.
7. Each State Party which carries out disposal of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in excess of reduction liabilities shall provide for confirmation of the results of the disposal either by inviting an observation team or through the use of cooperative measures, in accordance with the provisions of Section XII of the Protocol on Inspection.”

Article 16

In Article XVI of the Treaty, paragraph 2 shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

- “2. Within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group, the States Parties shall:
- (A) Address questions relating to compliance with or possible circumvention of the provisions of this Treaty;
 - (B) Seek to resolve ambiguities and differences of interpretation that may become apparent in the way this Treaty is implemented;
 - (C) Consider and, if possible, agree on measures to enhance the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty;
 - (D) Address, upon the request of any State Party, questions concerning the intention of any State Party to revise its national ceiling upwards under Article IV, paragraph 4, or its territorial ceiling under Article V, paragraph 5;
 - (E) Receive and consider the explanatory report, and any subsequent updates, provided in accordance with Article VII, paragraph 2;
 - (F) Update the lists contained in the Protocol on Existing Types, as required by Article II, paragraph 2;
 - (G) Consider measures of cooperation to enhance the verification regime of the Treaty, including through the appropriate utilisation of results of aerial inspections;
 - (H) Resolve technical questions in order to seek common practices among the States Parties in the way this Treaty is implemented;
 - (I) Work out or revise, as necessary, rules of procedure, working methods, the scale of distribution of expenses of the Joint Consultative Group and of conferences convened under this Treaty and the distribution of costs of inspections between or among States Parties;
 - (J) Consider and work out appropriate measures to ensure that information obtained through exchanges of information among the States Parties or as a result of inspections pursuant to this Treaty is used solely for the purposes of this Treaty, taking into account the particular requirements of each State Party in respect of safeguarding information which that State Party specifies as being sensitive;
 - (K) Consider, upon the request of any State Party, any matter that a State Party wishes to propose for examination by any conference to be convened in accordance with Article XXI; such consideration shall not prejudice the right of any State Party to resort to the procedures set forth in Article XXI;
 - (L) Consider any request to accede to this Treaty, pursuant to Article XVIII, by acting as the body through which the States Parties may establish, and recommend approval of, the terms under which a requesting State accedes to the Treaty;

- (M) Conduct any future negotiations, if the States Parties so decide; and
- (N) Consider matters of dispute arising out of the implementation of this Treaty.”

Article 17

Article XVII of the Treaty shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“Article XVII

The States Parties shall transmit information and notifications required by this Treaty in written form.

They shall use diplomatic channels or other official channels designated by them, including and in particular, the OSCE Communications Network.”

Article 18

Article XVIII of the Treaty shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“Article XVIII

1. Any participating State of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe whose land territory lies in Europe within the geographic area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains may submit to the Depository a written request to accede to this Treaty.
2. The requesting State shall include in its request the following information:
 - (A) The designation of its existing types of conventional armaments and equipment;
 - (B) Its proposed national and territorial ceilings and the related subceilings for each category of armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty; and
 - (C) Any other information deemed relevant by the requesting State.
3. The Depository shall notify all States Parties of the request and of the information provided by the requesting State.
4. The requesting State may modify or supplement this information. Any State Party may request additional information.
5. States Parties shall, beginning no later than 21 days after the notification pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article, hold meetings of the Joint Consultative Group at which the States Parties shall address the request, conduct negotiations and establish the terms for accession. The requesting State may be invited to attend meetings of the Joint Consultative Group if the States Parties so decide.
6. Each request shall be considered individually by the States Parties in an expeditious manner. Any decision shall be taken by consensus.

7. The agreed terms for accession shall be enshrined in an Agreement on Accession between the States Parties and the requesting State, which shall be circulated to all States Parties and the requesting State by the Depositary and deposited in the archives of the Depositary.

8. Upon the receipt of confirmation of approval of the Agreement on Accession by all States Parties, the Depositary shall so inform all States Parties and the requesting State. The requesting State may then, subject to ratification in accordance with its constitutional procedures, submit an instrument of accession to the Treaty that shall acknowledge the terms and conditions of the Agreement on Accession.

9. This Treaty shall enter into force for the requesting State 10 days after the deposit of its instrument of accession to the Treaty with the Depositary, at which time the requesting State shall become a State Party to the Treaty.”

Article 19

In Article XXI of the Treaty, paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“1. Forty-six months after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Depositary shall convene a conference of the States Parties to conduct a review of the operation of this Treaty, to include, *inter alia*, a review of the operation and the levels of national ceilings, territorial ceilings and territorial subceilings, and related commitments, together with other Treaty elements, taking into account the need to ensure that the security of no State Party is diminished.

1. *bis* Upon notification of a temporary deployment exceeding a territorial ceiling by more than 153 battle tanks, 241 armoured combat vehicles or 140 pieces of artillery, or upon request by a State Party pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 2, the Depositary shall convene a conference of the States Parties at which the hosting and deploying States Parties shall explain the nature of the circumstances which have given rise to the temporary deployment. The conference shall be convened without delay but no later than seven days after the notification and shall continue for up to 48 hours unless otherwise agreed by all States Parties. The Chairman of the Joint Consultative Group shall inform the Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Co-operation of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe of the situation.

2. The Depositary shall convene an extraordinary conference of the States Parties if requested to do so by any State Party which considers that exceptional circumstances relating to this Treaty have arisen. In order to enable the other States Parties to prepare for this conference, the request shall include the reason why that State Party deems an extraordinary conference to be necessary. The conference shall consider the circumstances set forth in the request and their effect on the operation of this Treaty. The conference shall open no later than 15 days after receipt of the request and, unless it decides otherwise, shall last no longer than three weeks.”

Article 20

1. In Article XXII of the Treaty, paragraph 1 shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by each State Party in accordance with its constitutional procedures; it shall be open for accession by States pursuant to Article XVIII. Instruments of ratification and, in the case of accession, instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, hereby designated the Depositary.”

2. In Article XXII of the Treaty, paragraph 3 shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“3. The Depositary shall promptly inform all States Parties of:

- (A) The deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession;
- (B) The entry into force of this Treaty;
- (C) Any withdrawal in accordance with Article XIX and its effective date;
- (D) The text of any amendment proposed in accordance with Article XX;
- (E) The entry into force of any amendment to this Treaty;
- (F) Any request to accede to the Treaty pursuant to Article XVIII;
- (G) Any request to convene a conference in accordance with Article XXI;
- (H) The convening of a conference pursuant to Article XXI; and
- (I) Any other matter of which the Depositary is required by this Treaty to inform the States Parties.”

Article 21

The following Protocol on National Ceilings for Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe shall be added:

**“PROTOCOL ON NATIONAL CEILINGS FOR
CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY
ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE**

The States Parties hereby agree upon the following national ceilings,
subceilings for active units and subceilings for sub-categories pursuant to Article IV
of the Treaty.

State Party	Battle tanks	Armoured combat vehicles			PIECES OF artillery	Combat aircraft	Attack Helicopters
		TOTAL	of which AIFVs and HACVs	OF WHICH HACVS			
The Republic of Armenia	220	220	135	11	285	100	50
The Republic of Azerbaijan	220	220	135	11	285	100	50
The Republic of Belarus(1)	1,800	2,600	1,590	130	1,615	294	80
The Kingdom of Belgium	300	989	600	237	288	209	46
The Republic of Bulgaria	1,475	2,000	1,100	100	1,750	235	67
Canada	77	263	263	0	32	90	13
The Czech Republic(2)	957	1,367	954	69	767	230	50
The Kingdom of Denmark	335	336	210	17	446	82	18
The French Republic	1,226	3,700	1,983	535	1,192	800	374
Georgia	220	220	135	11	285	100	50
The Federal Republic of Germany	3,444	3,281	3,281	80	2,255	765	280
The Hellenic Republic	1,735	2,498	1,599	70	1,920	650	65
The Republic of Hungary(3)	835	1,700	1,020	85	840	180	108
The Republic of Iceland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The Italian Republic	1,267	3,172	1,970	0	1,818	618	142
The Republic of Kazakhstan	50	200	0	0	100	15	20
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The Republic of Moldova	210	210	130	10	250	50	50
The Kingdom of the Netherlands	520	864	718	0	485	230	50
The Kingdom of Norway	170	275	181	0	491	100	24
The Republic of Poland(4)	1,730	2,150	1,700	107	1,610	460	130
The Portuguese Republic	300	430	267	77	450	160	26
Romania	1,375	2,100	552	72	1,475	430	120
The Russian Federation(5)	6,350	11,280	7,030	574	6,315	3,416	855
The Slovak Republic(6)	478	683	476	34	383	100	40
The Kingdom of Spain	750	1,588	1,228	191	1,276	310	80
The Republic of Turkey	2,795	3,120	1,993	93	3,523	750	130
Ukraine(7)	4,080	5,050	3,095	253	4,040	1,090	330
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	843	3,017	1,335	200	583	855	350
The United States of America	1,812	3,037	2,372	0	1,553	784	396

(1) Of which no more than 1,525 battle tanks, 2,175 armoured combat vehicles and 1,375 pieces of artillery in active units.

- (2) Of which no more than 754 battle tanks, 1,223 armoured combat vehicles and 629 pieces of artillery in active units.
- (3) Of which no more than 658 battle tanks, 1,522 armoured combat vehicles and 688 pieces of artillery in active units.
- (4) Of which no more than 1,362 battle tanks, 1,924 armoured combat vehicles and 1,319 pieces of artillery in active units.
- (5) Of which no more than 5,575 battle tanks and 5,505 pieces of artillery in active units.
- (6) Of which no more than 376 battle tanks, 611 armoured combat vehicles and 314 pieces of artillery in active units.
- (7) Of which no more than 3,130 battle tanks, 4,350 armoured combat vehicles and 3,240 pieces of artillery in active units.”

Article 22

The following Protocol on Territorial Ceilings for Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe shall be added:

**“PROTOCOL ON TERRITORIAL CEILINGS FOR
CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE
TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE**

The States Parties hereby agree upon the following territorial ceilings and territorial subceilings pursuant to Article V of the Treaty.

STATE PARTY	BATTLE TANKS	Armoured combat vehicles	PIECES OF ARTILLERY
The Republic of Armenia (3)(4)	220	220	285
The Republic of Azerbaijan (3)(4)	220	220	285
The Republic of Belarus (5)	1,800	2,600	1,615
The Kingdom of Belgium (5)	544	1,505	497
The Republic of Bulgaria (3)(4)	1,475	2,000	1,750
The Czech Republic (5)	957	1,367	767
The Kingdom of Denmark (5)	335	336	446
The French Republic (5)	1,306	3,820	1,292
Georgia (3)(4)	220	220	285
The Federal Republic of Germany (5)	4,704	6,772	3,407
The Hellenic Republic (3)(4)	1,735	2,498	1,920
The Republic of Hungary (5)	835	1,700	840
The Republic of Iceland (3)(4)	0	0	0
The Italian Republic (5)	1,642	3,805	2,062
The Republic of Kazakhstan (5)	50	200	100
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (5)	143	174	47
The Republic of Moldova (3)(4)	210	210	250
The Kingdom of the Netherlands (5)	809	1,220	651
The Kingdom of Norway (3)(4)	170	282	557
The Republic of Poland (5)	1,730	2,150	1,610
The Portuguese Republic (5)	300	430	450
Romania (3)(4)	1,375	2,100	1,475
The Russian Federation (5)	6,350	11,280	6,315
- of which (1)(3)(4)	1,300	2,140	1,680
The Slovak Republic (5)	478	683	383
The Kingdom of Spain (5)	891	2,047	1,370
The Republic of Turkey (3)(4)	2,795	3,120	3,523
Ukraine (5)	4,080	5,050	4,040
- of which (2)(3)(4)	400	400	350
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland(5)	843	3,029	583

- (1) In the Leningrad Military District, excluding the Pskov oblast; and in the North Caucasus Military District, excluding: the Volgograd oblast; the Astrakhan oblast; that part of the Rostov oblast east of the line extending from Kushchevskaya to Volgodonsk to the Volgograd oblast border, including Volgodonsk; and Kushchevskaya and a narrow corridor in Krasnodar kray leading to Kushchevskaya. This territorial subceiling shall not be exceeded

pursuant to Article VII for military exercises and temporary deployments in the category of armoured combat vehicles.

- (2) In the Odessa oblast.
- (3) States Parties which shall increase their territorial ceilings or territorial subceilings pursuant to Article V, paragraph 5, only in conjunction with a corresponding decrease, pursuant to Article V, paragraph 4, subparagraph (A), in the territorial ceilings or territorial subceilings of other States Parties, as identified by this footnote.
- (4) States Parties which shall not exceed their territorial ceilings or territorial subceilings pursuant to Article VII by more than 153 battle tanks, 241 armoured combat vehicles and 140 pieces of artillery.
- (5) States Parties which shall not exceed their territorial ceilings or territorial subceilings pursuant to Article VII by more than 459 battle tanks, 723 armoured combat vehicles and 420 pieces of artillery.”

Article 23

In the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reclassification of Specific Models or Versions of Combat-Capable Trainer Aircraft into Unarmed Trainer Aircraft:

1. In Section I, paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be deleted and replaced by the following:
 - “1. Each State Party shall have the right to remove from the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Article IV of the Treaty and in the Protocol on National Ceilings only those specific models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft listed in Section II, paragraph 1, of this Protocol in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Protocol.
 - (A) Each State Party shall have the right to remove from the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Article IV of the Treaty and in the Protocol on National Ceilings individual aircraft of the specific models or versions listed in Section II, paragraph 1, of this Protocol that have any of the components set forth in Section III, paragraphs 1 and 2, of this Protocol only by total disarming and certification.
 - (B) Each State Party shall have the right to remove from the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Article IV of the Treaty and in the Protocol on National Ceilings individual aircraft of the specific models or versions listed in Section II, paragraph 1, of this Protocol that do not have any of the components set forth in Section III, paragraphs 1 and 2, of this Protocol by certification alone.
2. Models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft listed in Section II of this Protocol may be disarmed and certified, or certified alone, within 40 months after entry into force of the Treaty. Such aircraft shall count against the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Article IV of the Treaty and in the Protocol on National Ceilings until such aircraft have been certified as unarmed in accordance

with the procedures set forth in Section IV of this Protocol. Each State Party shall have the right to remove from the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Article IV of the Treaty and in the Protocol on National Ceilings no more than 550 such aircraft, of which no more than 130 shall be of the MiG-25U model or version.”

2. In Section II, paragraph 1 shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“1. Each State Party shall have the right to remove from the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Article IV of the Treaty and in the Protocol on National Ceilings in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol only the following specific models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft:

SU-15U
SU-17U
MiG-15U
MiG-21U
MiG-23U
MiG-25U
UIL-28”

3. Section IV shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“SECTION IV. PROCEDURES FOR CERTIFICATION

1. Each State Party that intends to disarm and certify, or certify alone, models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft shall comply with the following certification procedures in order to ensure that such aircraft do not possess any of the components listed in Section III, paragraphs 1 and 2, of this Protocol.

2. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties in accordance with Section X, paragraph 3, of the Protocol on Inspection of each certification. In the event of the first certification of an aircraft that does not require total disarming, the State Party that intends to conduct the certification shall provide to all other States Parties the information required in Section III, paragraph 3, subparagraphs (A), (B) and (C), of this Protocol for an armed model or version of the same aircraft type.

3. Each State Party shall have the right to inspect the certification of combat-capable trainer aircraft in accordance with Section X of the Protocol on Inspection.

4. The process of total disarming and certification, or certification alone, shall be deemed completed when the certification procedures set forth in this Section have been completed regardless of whether any State Party exercises the certification inspection rights described in paragraph 3 of this Section and Section X of the Protocol on Inspection, provided that within 30 days of receipt of the notification of completion of the certification and reclassification provided pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Section no State Party has notified all other States Parties that it considers that there is an ambiguity relating to the certification and reclassification process. In the event of such an ambiguity being raised, such reclassification shall not be deemed complete until the matter relating to the ambiguity is resolved.

5. The State Party conducting the certification shall notify all other States Parties in accordance with Section X of the Protocol on Inspection of completion of the certification.

6. Certification shall be conducted within the area of application. States Parties shall have the right to share locations for certification.”

Article 24

In the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reduction of Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe:

1. In Section VIII, paragraphs 2 and 10 shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“2. Each State Party shall determine the number of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles it will convert. This number shall not exceed:

(A) For battle tanks, 5.7 percent (not to exceed 750 battle tanks) of the national ceiling established for that State Party in the Protocol on National Ceilings, or 150 items, whichever is greater; and

(B) For armoured combat vehicles, 15 percent (not to exceed 3,000 armoured combat vehicles) of the national ceiling established for that State Party in the Protocol on National Ceilings, or 150 items, whichever is greater.”

“10. If, having completed the procedures specified in paragraph 6 of this Section on a given vehicle, it is decided not to proceed with final conversion, then the vehicle shall be destroyed in accordance with the appropriate procedures set forth elsewhere in this Protocol.”

2. In Section IX, paragraph 1 shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“1. Each State Party shall have the right to reduce its reduction liability for each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in the event of destruction by accident by an amount no greater than 1.5 percent of the national ceiling established for that State Party in the Protocol on National Ceilings in that category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty.”

3. In Section X, paragraph 2 shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“2. No State Party shall use static display to reduce more than one percent of the national ceiling established for that State Party in the Protocol on National Ceilings in each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, or eight items, whichever is the greater number.”

4. In Section XI, paragraph 2 shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“2. No State Party shall reduce by use as ground targets numbers of battle tanks or armoured combat vehicles greater than 2.5 percent of the national ceiling established for that State Party in the Protocol on National Ceilings in each of those two categories of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. In

addition, no State Party shall have the right to reduce by use as ground targets more than 50 self-propelled pieces of artillery.”

5. In Section XII, paragraph 2 shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“2. No State Party shall reduce by use for ground instructional purposes numbers of combat aircraft or attack helicopters greater than five percent of the national ceiling established for that State Party in the Protocol on National Ceilings in each of those two categories of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty.”

Article 25

In the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Categorisation of Combat Helicopters and the Recategorisation of Multi-Purpose Attack Helicopters:

1. In Section I, paragraph 3 shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“3. Notwithstanding the provisions in paragraph 2 of this Section, and as a unique exception to that paragraph, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine shall have the right to hold an aggregate total not to exceed 100 Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters equipped for reconnaissance, spotting, or chemical/biological/radiological sampling which shall not be subject to the limitations on attack helicopters in Article IV of the Treaty and in the Protocol on National Ceilings. Such helicopters shall be subject to exchange of information in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange and to internal inspections in accordance with Section VI, paragraph 33, of the Protocol on Inspection.

Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters in excess of the following limits:

Republic of Armenia: 4;
Republic of Azerbaijan: 4;
Republic of Belarus: 16;
Georgia: 4;
Republic of Kazakhstan: 0;
Republic of Moldova: 4;
Russian Federation: 50;
Ukraine: 18,

shall be categorised as specialised attack helicopters regardless of how they are equipped and shall count against the limitations on attack helicopters in Article IV of the Treaty and in the Protocol on National Ceilings. The provisions of Article IV, paragraph 3, and Article IV, paragraph 5, of the Treaty shall apply, *mutatis mutandis*, in respect of any changes to the above limits.”

2. Section IV shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“SECTION IV. PROCEDURES FOR CERTIFICATION

1. Each State Party that is recategorising multi-purpose attack helicopters shall comply with the following certification procedures, in order to ensure that such

helicopters do not possess any of the features listed in Section III, paragraph 1 of this Protocol.

2. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties of each certification in accordance with Section X, paragraph 3, of the Protocol on Inspection.

3. Each State Party shall have the right to inspect the certification of helicopters in accordance with Section X of the Protocol on Inspection.

4. The process of recategorisation shall be deemed complete when the certification procedures set forth in this Section have been completed regardless of whether any State Party exercises the certification inspection rights described in paragraph 3 of this Section and Section X of the Protocol on Inspection, provided that within 30 days of receipt of the notification of completion of the certification and recategorisation provided pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Section no State Party has notified all other States Parties that it considers that there is an ambiguity relating to the certification and recategorisation process. In the event of such an ambiguity being raised, such recategorisation shall not be deemed complete until the matter relating to the ambiguity is resolved.

5. The State Party conducting the certification shall notify all other States Parties in accordance with Section X of the Protocol on Inspection of completion of the certification and recategorisation.

6. Certification shall be conducted within the area of application. States Parties shall have the right to share locations for certification.”

Article 26

The Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, with an Annex on the Format for the Exchange of Information, shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“PROTOCOL ON NOTIFICATION AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

The States Parties hereby agree on procedures and provisions regarding notification and exchange of information pursuant to Article XIII of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

SECTION I. INFORMATION ON THE STRUCTURE OF EACH STATE PARTY’S LAND FORCES AND AIR AND AIR DEFENCE AVIATION FORCES WITHIN THE AREA OF APPLICATION

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the following information about the structure of its land forces and air and air defence aviation forces within the area of application:

(A) The command organisation of its land forces, specifying the designation and subordination of all combat, combat support and combat service support

formations and units at each level of command down to the level of brigade/regiment or equivalent level, including air defence formations and units subordinated at or below the military district or equivalent level. Independent units at the next level of command below the brigade/regiment level directly subordinate to formations above the brigade/regiment level (i.e., independent battalions) shall be identified, with the information indicating the formation or unit to which such units are subordinated;

- (B) The command organisation of its air and air defence aviation forces, specifying the designation and subordination of formations and units at each level of command down to wing/air regiment or equivalent level. Independent units at the next level of command below the wing/air regiment level directly subordinate to formations above the wing/air regiment level (i.e., independent squadrons) shall be identified, with the information indicating the formation or unit to which such units are subordinated; and
- (C) The designation and subordination of military installations as specified in Section III, paragraph 3, subparagraphs (A) and (B), of this Protocol.

SECTION II. INFORMATION ON THE OVERALL HOLDINGS IN EACH CATEGORY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY AND ON THE OVERALL HOLDINGS OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT SUBJECT TO THE TREATY

- 1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties information on:
 - (A) Overall numbers and numbers by type of its holdings in each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty and subject to the numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on National Ceilings;
 - (B) Overall numbers and numbers by type of its holdings of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery by States Parties' territory and territory with a subceiling as countable against the numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings;
 - (C) Overall numbers and numbers by type of its holdings of combat aircraft and attack helicopters by States Parties' territory as countable against the numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on National Ceilings; and
 - (D) Overall numbers and numbers by type of its holdings of the following conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty:
 - (1) Armoured vehicle launched bridges;
 - (2) Armoured infantry fighting vehicles held by organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions;

- (3) Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters having been decommissioned and awaiting disposal; and
- (4) Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters.

SECTION III. INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT IN SERVICE WITH THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES OF THE STATES PARTIES

1. For each of its formations and units notified pursuant to Section I, paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B), of this Protocol, as well as separately located battalions/squadrons or equivalents subordinate to those formations and units, each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the following information:

- (A) The designation and peacetime location of its formations and units at which conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in the following categories are held, including headquarters, specifying the geographic name and coordinates:
 - (1) Battle tanks;
 - (2) Armoured combat vehicles;
 - (3) Artillery;
 - (4) Combat aircraft; and
 - (5) Attack helicopters;
- (B) The holdings of its formations and units notified pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, giving numbers (by type in the case of formations and units at the level of division or equivalent and below) of the conventional armaments and equipment listed in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, and of:
 - (1) Combat support helicopters;
 - (2) Unarmed transport helicopters;
 - (3) Armoured vehicle launched bridges;
 - (4) Armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes;
 - (5) Armoured personnel carrier look-alikes;
 - (6) Primary trainer aircraft;
 - (7) Reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft; and

- (8) Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters not subject to the numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on National Ceilings¹;
 - (C) The designation and peacetime location of its formations and units, other than those notified pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, at which the following categories of conventional armaments and equipment, as defined in Article II of the Treaty, specified in the Protocol on Existing Types, or enumerated in the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification, are held, including headquarters, specifying the geographic name and coordinates:
 - (1) Combat support helicopters;
 - (2) Unarmed transport helicopters;
 - (3) Armoured vehicle launched bridges;
 - (4) Armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes;
 - (5) Armoured personnel carrier look-alikes;
 - (6) Primary trainer aircraft;
 - (7) Reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft; and
 - (8) Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters not subject to the numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on National Ceilings¹;
 - (D) The holdings of its formations and units notified pursuant to subparagraph (C) of this paragraph giving numbers (by type in the case of formations and units at the level of division or equivalent and below) in each category specified above.
2. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties information on conventional armaments and equipment in service with its conventional armed forces but not held by its land forces or air or air defence aviation forces, specifying:
- (A) The designation and peacetime location of its formations and units down to the level of brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment or equivalent as well as units at the next level of command below the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment level which are separately located or are independent (i.e., battalions/squadrons or equivalent) at which conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in the following categories are held, including headquarters, specifying the geographic name and coordinates:
 - (1) Battle tanks;
 - (2) Armoured combat vehicles;

¹ Pursuant to Section I, paragraph 3 of the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation

- (3) Artillery;
 - (4) Combat aircraft; and
 - (5) Attack helicopters; and
- (B) The holdings of its formations and units notified pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, giving numbers (by type in the case of formations and units at the level of division or equivalent and below) of conventional armaments and equipment listed in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, and of:
- (1) Combat support helicopters;
 - (2) Unarmed transport helicopters;
 - (3) Armoured vehicle launched bridges;
 - (4) Armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes;
 - (5) Armoured personnel carrier look-alikes;
 - (6) Primary trainer aircraft;
 - (7) Reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft; and
 - (8) Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters not subject to the numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on National Ceilings.²

3. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the following information:

- (A) The location of its designated permanent storage sites, specifying geographic name and coordinates, and the numbers and types of conventional armaments and equipment in the categories listed in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B), of this Section held at such sites;
- (B) The location of its military storage sites not organic to formations and units identified as objects of verification, independent repair and maintenance units, military training establishments and military airfields, specifying geographic name and coordinates, at which conventional armaments and equipment in the categories listed in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B), of this Section are held or routinely present, giving the holdings by type in each category at such locations; and
- (C) The location of its sites at which the reduction of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty will be undertaken pursuant to the Protocol on Reduction, specifying the location by geographic name and coordinates, the holdings by type in each category of conventional armaments and equipment

²

Pursuant to Section I, paragraph 3 of the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation

limited by the Treaty awaiting reduction at such locations, and indicating that it is a reduction site.

SECTION IV. INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION AND NUMBERS OF BATTLE TANKS, ARMoured COMBAT VEHICLES, ARTILLERY, COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND ATTACK HELICOPTERS WITHIN THE AREA OF APPLICATION BUT NOT IN SERVICE WITH CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

1. Each State Party shall provide information to all other States Parties on the location and numbers of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters within the area of application not in service with its conventional armed forces but of potential military significance.

(A) Accordingly, each State Party shall provide the following information:

- (1) In respect of its battle tanks, artillery, combat aircraft and specialised attack helicopters, as well as armoured infantry fighting vehicles as specified in Article XII of the Treaty, held by organisations down to the independent or separately located battalion or equivalent level designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions, the location, including geographic name and coordinates, of sites at which such armaments and equipment are held and the numbers and types of conventional armaments and equipment in these categories held by each such organisation;
- (2) In respect of its armoured personnel carriers, heavy armament combat vehicles and multi-purpose attack helicopters held by organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions, the aggregate numbers in each category of such armaments and equipment in each administrative region or division;
- (3) In respect of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters awaiting disposal having been decommissioned in accordance with the provisions of Article IX of the Treaty, the location, including geographic name and coordinates, of sites at which such armaments and equipment are held and the numbers and types at each site;
- (4) In respect of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters which are awaiting or are being refurbished for export or re-export and are temporarily retained within the area of application, each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties, following entry into force of the Treaty and coincident with each annual exchange of information pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, of this Protocol, an identifiable location of each site at which there are normally more than a total of 15 battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery or more than five combat aircraft or more than 10 attack helicopters which are, pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1, subparagraph (E), of the Treaty, awaiting or

are being refurbished for export or re-export and are temporarily retained within the area of application.

Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties, following entry into force of the Treaty and coincident with each exchange of information pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, of this Protocol:

- (a) The numbers of such battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters as of 1 January of the following year; and
- (b) The total number by type of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters removed from the “awaiting export” category during the previous 12 months and their disaggregation by disposition: reassigned to the conventional armed forces or to internal security forces, transferred to the category “decommissioned and awaiting disposal”, disposed of or transferred outside of the area of application.

The States Parties shall, within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group, agree as to the form in which the information on the numbers shall be provided pursuant to this provision;

- (5) In respect of its battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles which have been reduced and are awaiting conversion pursuant to Section VIII of the Protocol on Reduction, the location, including geographic name and coordinates, of each site at which such armaments and equipment are held and the numbers and types at each site; and
- (6) In respect of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters used exclusively for the purpose of research and development pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B), of the Treaty, each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties following entry into force of the Treaty and coincident with each exchange of information pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, of this Protocol the aggregate numbers in each category of such conventional armaments and equipment.

SECTION V. INFORMATION ON OBJECTS OF VERIFICATION AND DECLARED SITES

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties information specifying its objects of verification, including the total number and the designation of each object of verification, and enumerating its declared sites, as defined in Section I of the Protocol on Inspection, providing the following information on each site:

- (A) The site’s designation and location, including geographic name and coordinates;

- (B) The designation of all objects of verification, as specified in Section I, paragraph 1, subparagraph (I), of the Protocol on Inspection, at that site, it being understood that subordinate elements at the next level of command below the brigade/regiment or wing/air regiment level located in the vicinity of each other or of the headquarters immediately superior to such elements may be deemed as not separately located, if the distance between such separately located battalions/squadrons or equivalent or to their headquarters does not exceed 15 kilometres;
- (C) The overall numbers by type of conventional armaments and equipment in each category specified in Section III of this Protocol held at that site and by each object of verification, as well as those belonging to any object of verification located at another declared site, specifying the designation of each such object of verification;
- (D) In addition, for each such declared site, the number of conventional armaments and equipment not in service with its conventional armed forces, indicating those that are:
 - (1) Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters awaiting disposal having been decommissioned in accordance with the provisions of Article IX of the Treaty or reduced and awaiting conversion pursuant to the Protocol on Reduction; and
 - (2) Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters held by organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions;
- (E) Declared sites that hold battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft or attack helicopters awaiting or being refurbished for export or re-export and temporarily retained within the area of application or used exclusively for research and development shall be identified as such, and the aggregate numbers in each category at that site shall be provided; and
- (F) Point(s) of entry/exit associated with each declared site, with geographic name and coordinates, including at least one commercial airport, if possible operating international flights.

2. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties of its passive declared site inspection quota calculated in accordance with Section II, paragraph 10, of the Protocol on Inspection.

SECTION VI. INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF SITES FROM WHICH CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN

1. Each State Party shall provide annually to all other States Parties, coincident with the annual exchange of information provided pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B), of this Protocol, information about the locations of sites which have been notified previously as declared sites from which all conventional armaments and equipment in the categories listed in Section III,

paragraph 1, of this Protocol have been withdrawn since the signature of the Treaty if such sites continue to be used by the conventional armed forces of that State Party. The locations of these sites shall be notified for three years following such withdrawal.

SECTION VII. TIMETABLE FOR THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION
IN SECTIONS I TO V OF THIS PROTOCOL

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the information pursuant to Sections I to V of this Protocol as follows:
 - (A) 30 days following entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, with information effective as of the date of entry into force, unless entry into force occurs within 60 days of the 15th day of December, in which case:
 - (1) If entry into force occurs subsequent to the 15th day of December, the annual exchange that took place on the 15th day of December shall be considered the information exchange pursuant to paragraph 1, subparagraph (A) above, and may be supplemented, in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol, as agreed by the States Parties; or
 - (2) If entry into force occurs prior to the 15th day of December, the exchange of information scheduled for the 15th day of December shall take place 30 days after entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation, unless the States Parties otherwise agree, pursuant to the provisions of this Protocol; and
 - (B) Thereafter on the 15th day of December of every year, with the information effective as of the first day of January of the following year.
2. No later than the first day of July of each year, the Russian Federation shall provide information equal to that in the annual information exchange on its forces in the geographic area subject to being reported on in the additional information provided by the Russian Federation as of 1 July 1999.

SECTION VIII. INFORMATION ON CHANGES IN ORGANISATIONAL
STRUCTURES OR HOLDINGS OF CONVENTIONAL
ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE
TREATY

1. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties of:
 - (A) Any permanent change in the organisational structure of its conventional armed forces within the area of application as notified pursuant to Section I of this Protocol, including separately located units which are identified as objects of verification; any change in the designation or any change of the location of formations or units as notified pursuant to Sections I and III of this Protocol; any creation of an object of verification or of a declared site; and any redesignation or relocation of an object of verification as notified pursuant to

Section V of this Protocol. Such notification shall be given at least 42 days in advance; and

- (B) Any change of 10 percent or more, calculated on the basis of the most recent update of the annual exchange of information, including the most recent applicable notification of a change in holdings of 10 percent or more, in any one of the categories of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty assigned to any of its combat, combat support or combat service support formations and units down to the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment, independent or separately located battalion/squadron or equivalent level as notified in Section III, paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B), and paragraph 2, subparagraphs (A) and (B), of this Protocol or permanently present at or assigned to any of its installations notified pursuant to Section III, paragraph 3, subparagraphs (A) and (B), which are identified as objects of verification.

Such notification shall be given no later than five working days after such a change occurs and shall include the actual holdings after the notified change. The closure of an object of verification shall be indicated. The notification shall include information about the source of armaments and equipment added, including but not limited to new production, import, transfer from conventional armed forces, transfer from forces other than the conventional armed forces, or relocation from outside the area of application. If the armaments and equipment have been transferred from another unit or installation identified as an object of verification within the area of application, the notification shall include the designation, unit record number and the location of the losing unit or installation identified as an object of verification if there has been a 10 percent or greater change in that losing unit or installation identified as an object of verification. The notification shall also include information about the disposition of the armaments and equipment withdrawn, including but not limited to decommissioning, disposal, withdrawal from the area of application, transfer to conventional armed forces, transfer to forces other than conventional armed forces or awaiting export. If the armaments and equipment have been transferred to another unit or installation identified as an object of verification within the area of application, the notification shall include the designation, the unit record number and the location of the gaining unit or installation identified as an object of verification if there has been a 10 percent or greater change in that gaining unit or installation identified as an object of verification. For a source or destination outside of the area of application, only that fact shall be noted.

2. Ukraine shall provide information for changes of five percent or more in any one of the categories of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty assigned to any of its combat, combat support or combat service support formations and units down to the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment, independent or separately located battalion/squadron or equivalent level as notified in Section III, paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B), and paragraph 2, subparagraphs (A) and (B), of this Protocol in respect of its assigned holdings within the Odessa oblast reported in the annual information exchange. Such notification shall be given no later than five working days after such a change occurs and shall include the actual holdings after the notified change.

SECTION IX. INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF BATTLE TANKS, ARMoured COMBAT VEHICLES AND ARTILLERY LIMITED BY THE TREATY WHICH ARE NOT ON THE TERRITORY OF THE STATE PARTY THAT IS DECLARED AS THEIR PEACETIME LOCATION AS OF 1 JANUARY

1. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties by 21 January each year, with information effective as of 1 January, about its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery which are, as of 1 January, not situated on the territory of the State Party or the territory with a subceiling that is declared as their peacetime location, as reported pursuant to the annual exchange of information:

- (A) The notified peacetime location, by State Party and territory with a subceiling, the designation of formation or unit, the unit record number, if applicable, and the number of its absent battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery by types; and
- (B) The actual location of such armaments and equipment as of 1 January, unless located as part of the unit to which they are assigned in which case the actual location of the unit by geographic coordinates by State Party and territory with a subceiling shall be reported, or unless the actual location is a declared site, in which case the location of the declared site, its record number and site name shall be reported.

2. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties by 21 January each year, with information effective as of 1 January, about its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery which have been moved from outside of the area of application onto the territory of a State Party in the area of application or territory with a subceiling and were not reported pursuant to the annual exchange of information at their actual location. The notification shall include the number of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery by types; and the actual location of such armaments and equipment as of 1 January, unless located as part of the unit to which they are assigned in which case the actual location of the unit by geographic coordinates by State Party and territory with a subceiling shall be reported, or unless the actual location is a declared site, in which case the location of the declared site, its record number and site name shall be reported.

SECTION X. INFORMATION ON THE ENTRY INTO AND REMOVAL FROM SERVICE WITH THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES OF A STATE PARTY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties following entry into force of the Treaty and coincident with each annual exchange of information provided pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B), of this Protocol:

- (A) Aggregate information on the numbers and types of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty which entered into service with its

conventional armed forces within the area of application during the previous 12 months, and their disaggregation by source, including but not limited to new production, import or transfer from outside the area of application, resubordination from internal security forces; and

- (B) Aggregate information on the numbers and types of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty which:
 - (1) Have been removed from service with its conventional armed forces within the area of application during the previous 12 months, their last reported location and their disaggregation by disposition, including but not limited to decommissioning, resubordination to internal security forces, awaiting export, disposal through destruction/modification, withdrawal from the area of application; and
 - (2) Have been withdrawn from the “decommissioned and awaiting disposal” category during the previous 12 months and their disaggregation by disposition, including but not limited to reassignment to internal security forces, placement in the category of awaiting export, recommissioning, disposal through destruction/modification, withdrawal from the area of application.

SECTION XI. INFORMATION ON ENTRY INTO AND EXIT FROM THE AREA OF APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY IN SERVICE WITH THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES OF THE STATES PARTIES

1. Each State Party shall provide annually to all other States Parties following entry of the force of the Treaty and coincident with each annual exchange of information provided pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B), of this Protocol:

- (A) Aggregate information on the numbers and types of each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in service with its conventional armed forces that have entered the area of application within the last 12 months and whether any of these armaments and equipment were organised in a formation or unit;
- (B) Aggregate information on the numbers and types of each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in service with its conventional armed forces that have been removed from, and remain outside of, the area of application within the last 12 months and the last reported locations within the area of application of such conventional armaments and equipment; and
- (C) Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in service with its conventional armed forces within the area of application which exit and re-enter the area of application, including for purposes such as training or military activities, within a seven-day period shall not be subject to the reporting provisions in this Section.

SECTION XII. CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT IN TRANSIT THROUGH OR WITHIN THE AREA OF APPLICATION

1. Conventional armaments and equipment in the categories specified in Section III of this Protocol which entered the area of application in transit shall be reported pursuant to this Protocol only if they remain within the area of application for a period longer than seven days.

2. In the case of transit of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in accordance with Article V of the Treaty, each State Party undertaking such transit shall provide to all other States Parties the following information no later than the day the conventional armaments and equipment in transit enter the territory of the first transited State Party or a territory with a subceiling:

- (A) Start date of the transit;
- (B) Mode of transportation;
- (C) First State Party transited;
- (D) The categories of armaments and equipment in transit; and
- (E) The State Party or the territory with a subceiling into which the conventional armaments and equipment in transit entered the area of application; or
- (F) The State Party or the territory with a subceiling of origin of the conventional armaments and equipment in transit, as applicable.

3. Each State Party undertaking such transit shall provide to all other States Parties the following information as soon as possible, but no later than five days after the conventional armaments and equipment in transit enter the territory of the first transited State Party or a territory with a subceiling:

- (A) Start date of the transit;
- (B) Mode of transportation;
- (C) The States Parties or territories with subceilings to be transited;
- (D) The State Party of final destination, if applicable;
- (E) The expected duration of the transit through the territory of each transited State Party or the territory with subceilings;
- (F) The total numbers of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery in transit; and
- (G) Additional information, to include related notifications.

4. Each transited State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the following information no later than five days after the date the battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in transit enter its territory:

- (A) The total numbers of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or pieces of artillery involved;
- (B) The expected duration of the transit through its territory; and
- (C) Additional information, to include related notifications.

5. If the final destination is within the area of application, the State Party of final destination shall notify all other States Parties that the transit is over not later than five days after the conventional armaments and equipment arrive on its territory.

6. Each State Party undertaking transit of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery shall notify all other States Parties no later than five days after the conventional armaments and equipment in transit entered the territory of the State Party or the territory with a subceiling of final destination or departed the area of application of the following information:

- (A) Reference to the notifications issued pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Section;
- (B) Start and end dates of the transit;
- (C) The State Party or the territory with a subceiling where transit began;
- (D) The total numbers of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery involved;
- (E) The States Parties or territories with subceilings that were transited;
- (F) The territory of the State Party or the territory with a subceiling of final destination or the territory of the State Party or the territory with a subceiling transited prior to departure from the area of application, as applicable; and
- (G) Additional information, to include notifications resulting from the arrival of the conventional armaments and equipment in transit at its final destination, if it is in the area of application.

**SECTION XIII. QUARTERLY INFORMATION ON BATTLE TANKS,
ARMOURED COMBAT VEHICLES AND ARTILLERY
ACTUALLY PRESENT IN THE AREA OF APPLICATION
AND ON THE TERRITORY OF A STATE PARTY**

1. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties of the total numbers of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery actually present in the area of application by territory of a State Party and territory with a subceiling as countable against the numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings.

2. Each State Party with territory within the area of application shall notify all other States Parties of the total number of its and the total number of any other State Party's battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery actually present on its territory and on territory with a subceiling as countable against its numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings.

3. The information pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Section shall be provided on each 31 January, with the information effective as of 1 January; on each 30 April, with the information effective as of 1 April; on each 31 July, with the information effective as of 1 July; and on each 31 October, with the information effective as of 1 October.

SECTION XIV. QUARTERLY INFORMATION ON COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND ATTACK HELICOPTERS ACTUALLY PRESENT IN THE AREA OF APPLICATION WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF A STATE PARTY

1. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties of the total numbers of its combat aircraft and attack helicopters actually present in the area of application and countable against its numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on National Ceilings, including the numbers by States Parties' territory where assigned.

The information shall be provided on each 31 January, with the information effective as of 1 January; on each 30 April, with the information effective as of 1 April; on each 31 July, with the information effective as of 1 July; and on each 31 October, with the information effective as of 1 October.

SECTION XV. INFORMATION ON CHANGES IN THE NUMBER OF BATTLE TANKS, ARMOURED COMBAT VEHICLES, OR ARTILLERY PRESENT ON THE TERRITORY OF A STATE PARTY OR IN A TERRITORY WITH A SUBCEILING

1. Each State Party shall, subject to the provisions of Section XI, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C), of this Protocol and excluding armaments and equipment which have been notified pursuant to Sections XII, XVIII and XX of this Protocol, notify all other States Parties of changes, in any territory or territory with a subceiling, to the levels in the most recent notification provided pursuant to Section XIII of this Protocol and subsequent notifications provided pursuant to this paragraph, whenever the level of change equals or exceeds 30 battle tanks or 30 armoured combat vehicles or 10 pieces of artillery. The notifications shall contain the following information:

- (A) The previously notified levels of holdings, by territory of a State Party or territory with a subceiling;
- (B) The amount by which the notified levels have been changed;
- (C) The new levels of holdings, by territory of a State Party or territory with a subceiling; and
- (D) The effective date of the change.

2. Notifications pursuant to this Section shall be given no later than five working days after the previously notified levels have been exceeded.

SECTION XVI. INFORMATION RELATING TO CERTAIN EVENTS
INVOLVING COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND ATTACK
HELICOPTERS

1. Each State Party with territory in the area of application shall, subject to the provisions of Section XI, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C), of this Protocol, notify all other States Parties of changes in the total number of its combat aircraft and of its attack helicopters countable against numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on National Ceilings, whenever the level of change equals or exceeds 18 combat aircraft or 18 attack helicopters above the levels in the most recent notification provided pursuant to:

- (A) Section II, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), of this Protocol and subsequent notifications provided pursuant to this paragraph; or
- (B) Section XIV of this Protocol and subsequent notifications provided pursuant to this paragraph if these levels exceed the levels notified under subparagraph (A) above.

2. Each State Party without territory in the area of application shall, subject to the provisions of Section XI, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C), of this Protocol, notify all other States Parties of changes in the total number of its combat aircraft and of its attack helicopters countable against numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on National Ceilings whenever the level of change equals or exceeds 18 combat aircraft or 18 attack helicopters above or below the levels in the most recent notification provided pursuant to either:

- (A) Section II, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), of this Protocol and subsequent notifications provided pursuant to this paragraph; or
- (B) Section XIV of this Protocol and subsequent notifications provided pursuant to this paragraph.

3. Notifications pursuant to this Section shall be given no later than five working days after each such change occurs and shall include:

- (A) The previously notified levels of holdings;
- (B) The amount by which the notified levels have changed;
- (C) The new levels of holdings; and
- (D) The effective date of the change.

SECTION XVII. INFORMATION ON AUTHORISATION TO MAKE USE OF
A STATE PARTY'S HEADROOM

1. Each State Party with territory in the area of application shall notify all other States Parties of the entitlement authorised for use by another State Party of the headroom between its national holdings of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery on its territory and its territorial ceiling in those categories. Such notification shall be provided no later than the effective date of the authorisation and shall specify the maximum headroom authorised for use by a State Party, the start date and the effective duration of the authorisation. The notifying State Party shall update its notification if it modifies the authorisation.

2. The total number of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery set out in an authorisation shall not exceed, in any of these categories, the amount of headroom not already taken up by all extant authorisations for any period of time.

SECTION XVIII. INFORMATION WHEN A TERRITORIAL CEILING OR A
TERRITORIAL SUBCEILING IS TEMPORARILY
EXCEEDED

1. Each State Party with territory within the area of application shall notify all other States Parties whenever its territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling is temporarily exceeded in accordance with Article VII of this Treaty.

2. Each State Party which participates with its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery in an activity that results in exceeding either another State Party's territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling or its own territorial subceiling shall notify all other States Parties.

3. Where a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling is exceeded as a result of a military exercise:

(A) The State Party on whose territory the military exercise is to be conducted shall notify all other States Parties no later than 42 days in advance of the date a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling is to be exceeded of the following: the designation and the general purpose of the exercise; the participating States Parties; the date of the start of the exercise and its estimated duration; the total number of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery involved in the exercise and the total number of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery in excess of a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling; the dates of the beginning and of the end of that stage of the exercise during which a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling will remain exceeded; and the area of the exercise defined by geographic coordinates;

(B) Each State Party which participates in the exercise with its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery shall notify all other States Parties no later than 42 days in advance of the date a territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling is to be exceeded of the total number of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery involved in the military exercise; where applicable, the location of the objects of verification of origin, the command

element of origin, the designation of formations and units and unit record numbers; the area of deployment, defined by geographic coordinates, and estimated dates of arrival and departure of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery; and additional explanatory information;

- (C) No later than the date a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling is exceeded, the notifications pursuant to subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph shall be updated if there is any change to the data notified 42 days in advance;
 - (D) Where a State Party exceeds its own territorial subceiling, all notifications pursuant to this paragraph shall be provided by that State Party;
 - (E) If a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling is to remain exceeded for more than 42 days, as soon as possible but no later than on day 43 after a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling has been exceeded:
 - (1) The State Party whose territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling is exceeded shall provide notification of the purpose and estimated duration of the exceeding; the States Parties involved in the exceeding; the total number of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery in excess of a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling; and the area of deployment defined by geographic coordinates; and
 - (2) Each State Party which participates in the temporary deployment with its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery shall provide notification of the total number of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery and the area of deployment defined by geographic coordinates;
 - (F) Each State Party shall provide notification whenever a cumulative increase of 30 battle tanks, 30 armoured combat vehicles, or 10 pieces of artillery to the numbers previously notified pursuant to subparagraph (A) or (B) of this paragraph occurs. Such notification shall be given no later than five days after such an increase occurs.
4. Where a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling is exceeded as a result of temporary deployment:
- (A) The State Party whose territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling is exceeded shall provide notification to all other States Parties:
 - (1) No later than the date a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling is exceeded, the date of exceeding; the designation of the operation, its purpose and estimated duration; the States Parties involved; the total number of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery in excess of a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling; and the area of deployment;
 - (2) No later than 21 days after the date a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling is exceeded a notification to update the information

pursuant to sub-subparagraph (1) of this paragraph including the area of deployment defined by geographic coordinates shall be issued; and

- (3) Whenever the numbers of temporarily deployed battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery in excess of the corresponding territorial ceiling exceed the levels of 153 battle tanks or 241 armoured combat vehicles or 140 pieces of artillery;
- (B) The State Party which deploys battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery in excess of a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling shall notify all other States Parties:
- (1) No later than the date a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling is exceeded, of the total number of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in excess of a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling and the area of deployment; and
 - (2) No later than 21 days after the date a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling is exceeded, of the purpose and anticipated duration of the temporary deployment, the total number of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery involved, the area of deployment defined by geographic coordinates, and where applicable, the objects of verification, their locations and the command element of origin, and the designation of formations and units and unit record numbers;
- (C) Subsequent updates shall be provided every 90 days until a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling is no longer exceeded;
- (D) Each State Party shall provide notification whenever a cumulative increase of 30 battle tanks, 30 armoured combat vehicles, or 10 pieces of artillery occurs in addition to the numbers previously notified by that State Party pursuant to subparagraph (A), (B) or (C) of this paragraph. Such notification shall be given no later than five days after such an increase occurs;
- (E) Where a State Party exceeds its own territorial subceiling, all notifications pursuant to this paragraph shall be provided by that State Party.

5. The State Party whose territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling has been exceeded as a result of a military exercise or as a result of a temporary deployment shall notify all other States Parties whenever the numbers of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery present on its territory no longer exceed its territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling.

6. If a territorial ceiling is exceeded at or below the levels of 153 battle tanks, 241 armoured combat vehicles or 140 pieces of artillery, such armaments and equipment shall not be subject to information exchange pursuant to paragraph 4, subparagraph (A), sub-subparagraph (2), paragraph 4, subparagraph (B), sub-subparagraph (2), and paragraph 4, subparagraph (C), of this Section if all of those armaments and equipment are properly declared at their actual temporary location on the territory of another State Party in the information exchange pursuant

to Section VII, paragraph (1), subparagraph (A), of this Protocol and thereafter in each annual information exchange.

SECTION XIX. INFORMATION ON ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIER AMBULANCES

1. Without prejudice to the principle that armoured ambulances shall not be subject to Treaty limitations, annually each State Party shall provide, on the 15th day of December, all other States Parties with information on the overall holdings of armoured personnel carrier ambulances and locations containing more than 18 armoured personnel carrier ambulances.

SECTION XX. INFORMATION IN THE CASE OF AN OPERATION IN SUPPORT OF PEACE

1. Each State Party which deploys battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery on the territory of another State Party for an operation in support of peace in accordance with Article V, paragraph 2, of the Treaty shall, no later than five days after the start of the deployment of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery, provide information on the mandate, anticipated duration and designation of the operation, the total number of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery involved in the operation and the command authority under which they operate; the objects of verification and command element of origin, where applicable; and the intended territory of destination of the armaments and equipment within the area of application.

2. Subsequent updates shall be provided by each State Party issuing notification pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section every 90 days until the end of the operation and the complete withdrawal of the armaments and equipment involved.

SECTION XXI. FORMAT FOR THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the information specified in this Protocol in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII of the Treaty and the Annex on Format. In accordance with Article XVI, paragraph 5, of the Treaty, changes to the Annex on Format shall be deemed improvements to the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty relating only to minor matters of a technical nature.

SECTION XXII. OTHER NOTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO THE TREATY

1. The Joint Consultative Group shall develop a document relating to notifications required by the Treaty. Such document shall list all such notifications, specifying those that shall be made in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty, and shall include appropriate formats, as necessary, for such notifications. In accordance with Article XVI, paragraph 5, of the Treaty, changes to this document, including any formats, shall be deemed to be improvements to the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty relating only to minor matters of a technical nature.

**ANNEX
ON THE FORMAT FOR THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION**

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties information pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol, in accordance with the formats specified in this Annex. The information in each data listing shall be provided in written form supplemented by an electronic data version on diskette in the agreed format. The written text in one of the six official languages of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe shall be the official version. In each table (column a), each data entry shall be assigned a sequential line number.

2. Each set of listings shall begin with a cover page showing the name of the State Party providing the listings, the language in which the listings are being provided, the date on which the listings are to be exchanged and the effective date of the information set forth in the listings. The cover page shall be followed by a table of contents, a list of abbreviations used, an index showing the relation between unit record number, Chart and page, Charts I to VI as specified in this Annex, a list of annual notifications, a list of standing diplomatic clearance numbers, complete updated list of inspectors and transport crew members, if applicable, and additional related information to include a list of officially recognised holidays.

**SECTION I. INFORMATION ON THE STRUCTURE OF LAND FORCES
AND AIR AND AIR DEFENCE AVIATION FORCES
WITHIN THE AREA OF APPLICATION**

1. Pursuant to Section I of the Protocol, each State Party shall provide information on the command organisation of its land forces, including air defence formations and units subordinated at or below the military district or equivalent level, and air and air defence aviation forces in the form of two separate hierarchical data listings as set forth in Chart I.

2. The data listings shall be provided beginning at the highest level and proceeding through each level of command down to the level of brigade/regiment, independent battalion, and wing/air regiment, independent squadron or their equivalent. Each designated permanent storage site, military storage site, independent repair and maintenance unit, military training establishment and military airfield shall be included. For example, a military district/army/corps could be followed by any subordinate independent regiments, independent battalions, depots, training establishments, then each subordinate division with its regiments/independent battalions. After all the subordinate organisations are listed, entries shall begin for the next military district/army/corps. An identical procedure shall be followed for air and air defence aviation forces.

(A) Each organisation shall be identified (column b) by a unique designator (i.e., formation or unit record number) which shall be used on subsequent listings with that organisation and for all subsequent information exchanges; its national designation (i.e., name) (column c); and, in the case of divisions, brigades/regiments, independent battalions, and wings/air regiments, independent squadrons or equivalent organisations, where appropriate, the

formation or unit type (e.g., infantry, tank, artillery, fighter, bomber, supply);
and

- (B) For each organisation, the two levels of command within the area of application immediately superior to that organisation shall be designated (columns d and e).

CHART I: COMMAND ORGANISATION OF THE LAND FORCES AND AIR
AND AIR DEFENCE AVIATION FORCES OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

SECTION II. INFORMATION ON THE OVERALL HOLDINGS IN EACH
CATEGORY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND
EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY AND ON THE
OVERALL HOLDINGS OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL
ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT SUBJECT TO THE
TREATY

1. Pursuant to Section II, paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B), of the Protocol, each State Party shall provide data on its overall holdings by type of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery (Chart IIA) subject to the numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on National Ceilings, and the number by types of those overall holdings countable against any of the limits set forth in the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings (column b), and on its overall holdings by type of combat aircraft and attack helicopters (Chart IIB) subject to the numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on National Ceilings) (column b) and pursuant to Section II, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C), the number of those holdings located on the territory of each State Party.
2. Data on armoured combat vehicles shall include the total numbers of heavy armament combat vehicles, armoured infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers, and their number (column f/e) and type (column e/d) in each of these sub-categories (column d/c).
3. In the case of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery stored in accordance with Article X of the Treaty, the total of such armaments and equipment in designated permanent storage sites shall be specified (column g).
4. Pursuant to Section II, paragraph 1, subparagraph (D), of this Protocol, each State Party shall provide data (Chart IIC) on its overall holdings by type of:
 - (A) Armoured vehicle launched bridges (columns a to d);
 - (B) Armoured infantry fighting vehicles held by organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions (columns a to d);
 - (C) Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters having been decommissioned and awaiting disposal (columns a to d); and
 - (D) Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters (columns a to d).

CHART IIA: OVERALL HOLDINGS OF BATTLE TANKS, ARMoured COMBAT VEHICLES AND ARTILLERY SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

CHART IIB: OVERALL HOLDINGS OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND ATTACK HELICOPTERS SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

CHART IIC: OVERALL HOLDINGS OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT SUBJECT TO THE TREATY OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

CHART IID: INFORMATION ON AGGREGATE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL PROVIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION IV, PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE CONCLUDING ACT OF THE NEGOTIATION ON PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

SECTION III. INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT IN SERVICE WITH THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

1. Each State Party shall provide a hierarchical data listing of all its land forces' and air and air defence aviation forces' organisations reported pursuant to Section III, paragraph 1, of the Protocol, formations and units reported pursuant to Section III, paragraph 2, of the Protocol and installations at which conventional armaments and equipment are held as specified in Section III, paragraph 3, of the Protocol.

2. For each organisation and installation, the information shall reflect:

(A) The formation or unit record number (column b) and designation of the organisation (column c) reported in Chart I. Separately located battalions/squadrons specified pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section, formations and units reported pursuant to Section III, paragraph 2, of the Protocol and installations listed in accordance with Section III, paragraph 3, of the Protocol shall also be given a unique formation or unit record number (column b), and their national designation (i.e., name) (column c) shall be provided. Their position on the listing shall reflect their subordination with the exception of formations and units reported pursuant to Section III, paragraph 2, of the Protocol, which shall be specified together at the conclusion of the listing:

(1) Designated permanent storage sites shall be identified with the notation "DPSS" following the national designation; and

(2) Reduction sites shall be identified with the notation "reduction" following the national designation;

(B) Location (column d), including the State Party and territory with a subceiling, geographic name and coordinates accurate to the nearest 10 seconds;

- (C) For each level of command from the highest down to the division/air division level, the overall total of conventional armaments and equipment in each category (columns f to m/1). For example, the overall total held by a division would be the sum of the holdings of all its subordinate organisations; and
- (D) For each level of command at the division level and below as specified in paragraph 1 of this Section, the number of conventional armaments and equipment by type under the headings specified in Charts IIIA and IIIB (columns f to m/n). In the armoured combat vehicle column in Chart IIIA (column g), the sub-categories (i.e., armoured personnel carriers, armoured infantry fighting vehicles, heavy armament combat vehicles) shall be presented separately. In the attack helicopter column (column k/i), the sub-categories (i.e., specialised attack, multi-purpose attack) shall be presented separately. The column (1) labelled "other" in Chart IIIB shall include battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes, and armoured vehicle launched bridges, if any, in service with the air and air defence aviation forces.

CHART IIIA. INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION III OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

CHART IIIB: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION III OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

SECTION IV. INFORMATION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT NOT IN SERVICE WITH THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION IV OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE

- 1. Pursuant to Section IV of the Protocol, each State Party shall provide information on the location, number and type of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters within the area of application but not in service with its conventional armed forces.
- 2. For each location, the information shall reflect:
 - (A) The provision of Section IV of the Protocol pursuant to which the information is being provided (column b);
 - (B) The location (column c):
 - (1) In respect of conventional armaments and equipment reported pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), sub-subparagraphs (1), (3) and (5), of the Protocol, the geographic name and coordinates

accurate to the nearest 10 seconds of sites containing such armaments and equipment; and

- (2) In respect of conventional armaments and equipment reported pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), sub-subparagraph (2), of the Protocol, and the national designation of the administrative region or division containing such armaments and equipment;
- (C) In respect of conventional armaments and equipment reported pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), sub-subparagraphs (1) and (2), of the Protocol, the national-level designation of organisations holding the armaments and equipment specified (column c); and
- (D) For each location, the number by type under the headings specified in Chart IV (columns d to i), except as follows:

In respect of conventional armaments and equipment reported pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), sub-subparagraph (2), of the Protocol, only the numbers in each category shall be provided solely for the administrative region or division specified (column c).

CHART IV: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION IV OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

SECTION V. INFORMATION ON OBJECTS OF VERIFICATION AND DECLARED SITES

1. Pursuant to Section V of the Protocol, each State Party shall provide a listing of its objects of verification and declared sites, as defined in Section I of the Protocol on Inspection. Declared sites (Chart V) shall be listed in alphabetical order and by State Party and, where applicable, by territory with a subceiling.
2. Information about each declared site shall include:
 - (A) A unique designator (i.e., declared site record number) (column b) which shall be used with that site for all subsequent information exchanges;
 - (B) The site's name and location using geographic name and coordinates accurate to the nearest 10 seconds (column c);
 - (C) The point(s) of entry/exit associated with the declared site (column d);
 - (D) A unique sequential number and the designation and formation or unit record number of all objects of verification stationed at the declared site as specified in Section III of this Annex (column e). Unique sequential numbers shall be assigned such that the number assigned to the last object of verification appearing in the listing shall equal the State Party's total number of objects of verification; and

- (E) The overall number of conventional armaments and equipment in each category specified in Section III of the Protocol held at the declared site and by each object of verification (columns f to p) and specifying, in addition:
- (1) Conventional armaments and equipment held in each category on the declared site belonging to an object of verification located at another declared site, specifying the designation and formation or unit record number of each such object of verification (column e); and
 - (2) Conventional armaments and equipment not belonging to an object of verification shall be identified with the following notations immediately following/below each such entry in columns f to p:
 - (a) Armaments and equipment held by organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions, with the notation “security”;
 - (b) Decommissioned armaments and equipment, with the notation “decommissioned”;
 - (c) Armaments and equipment awaiting or being refurbished for export or re-export, with the notation “export”;
 - (d) Reduced armaments and equipment awaiting conversion, with the notation “reduced”; and
 - (e) Armaments and equipment used exclusively for research and development, with the notation “research.”

3. The last entry in Chart V shall indicate the passive declared sites inspection quota of the State Party for the following Treaty year.

CHART V: INFORMATION ON OBJECTS OF VERIFICATION AND DECLARED SITES OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

4. Each State Party shall provide a listing of points of entry/exit (Chart VI). The listing shall assign a unique sequential numerical designator (column b) which shall be used to indicate the point(s) of entry/exit for each site provided pursuant to paragraph 2, subparagraph (C), of this Section. The location shall include the geographic name (column c) and coordinates accurate to the nearest 10 seconds (column d). The type(s) of transportation acceptable - “air,” “sea,” “ground” - for each point of entry/exit also shall be specified (column e).

CHART VI: POINTS OF ENTRY/EXIT (POE) OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

CHART I: COMMAND ORGANISATION OF THE LAND FORCES AND AIR AND AIR DEFENCE AVIATION FORCES OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

Line Number	Formation or Unit Record Number	Designation of Formation or Unit	Subordination		Peacetime Location*	Number of Personnel*
			1st Higher Echelon	2nd Higher Echelon		
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)

* Pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1 of the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

CHART IIA: OVERALL HOLDINGS OF BATTLE TANKS, ARMoured COMBAT VEHICLES AND ARTILLERY SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

Line Number	Territory of a State Party and Territory with a Subceiling if Applicable	Category	Sub-category	Type	Overall Number (including in DPSSs)	Number in DPSSs
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)

CHART IIB: OVERALL HOLDINGS OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND ATTACK HELICOPTERS SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

Line Number	Territory	Category	Sub-category	Type	Overall Number
(a)		(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)

CHART IIC: OVERALL HOLDINGS OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT SUBJECT TO THE TREATY OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

Line Number	Category	Type	Overall Number
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)

CHART IID: INFORMATION ON AGGREGATE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL PROVIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION IV, PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE CONCLUDING ACT OF THE NEGOTIATION ON PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

Line Number	Category	Sub-category	Overall Number
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)

CHART IIIA: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION III OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

Line Number	Formation or Unit Record Number	Designation of Formation or Unit	Peace-time Location	Number of Personnel*	Battle Tanks	Armoured Combat Vehicles	APC & AIFV Look-alikes	Artillery	AVLBs	Attack Helicopters	Combat Support Helicopters	Unarmed Transport Helicopters	Equipment Type
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)

* Pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1 of the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

CHART IIIB: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION III OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

Line Number	Formation or Unit Record Number	Designation of Formation or Unit	Peacetime Location	Number of Personnel*	Combat Aircraft	Reclassified CCT Aircraft	Primary Trainer Aircraft	Attack Helicopters	Combat Support Helicopters	Unarmed Transport Helicopters	Other	Equipment Type
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)

* Pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1 of the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

CHART IV: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION IV OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

Line Number	Protocol Reference	Location	Battle Tanks	Armoured Combat Vehicles	Artillery	Attack Helicopters	Combat Aircraft	Equipment Type	Number of Personnel*
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)

* Pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1 of the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

CHART V: INFORMATION ON OBJECTS OF VERIFICATION AND DECLARED SITES OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

Line Number	Record Number	Location of Declared Site	Point of Entry/ Exit	Object of Verification	Battle Tanks	Armoured Combat Vehicles	APC & AIFV Look-alikes	Artillery	AVLBs	Attack Helicopters	Combat Support Helicopters	Unarmed Transport Helicopters	Combat Aircraft	Reclassified CCT Aircraft	Primary Trainer Aircraft	Equipment Type
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)	(q)

CHART VI: POINTS OF ENTRY/EXIT (POE) OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

Line Number	POE Record Number	Name of POE	Location	Type(s)
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)

”

Article 27

The Protocol on Inspection shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“PROTOCOL ON INSPECTION

The States Parties hereby agree on procedures and other provisions governing the conduct of inspections as provided for in Article XIV of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

SECTION I. DEFINITIONS

1. For the purposes of the Treaty:
 - (A) The term “inspected State Party” means a State Party on whose territory an inspection is carried out in compliance with Article XIV of the Treaty:
 - (1) In the case of inspection sites where conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of only one State Party are present, that State Party shall exercise, in compliance with the provisions of this Protocol, the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party as set forth in this Protocol for the duration of the inspection within that inspection site where its conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are located; and
 - (2) In the case of inspection sites containing conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of more than one State Party, each such State Party shall exercise, in compliance with the provisions of this Protocol, each in respect of its own conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party as set forth in this Protocol for the duration of the inspection within that inspection site where its conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are located;
 - (B) The term “host State Party” means a State Party receiving on its territory within the area of application conventional armaments and equipment in service with the conventional armed forces of another State Party;
 - (C) The term “inspecting State Party” means a State Party which requests and is therefore responsible for carrying out an inspection;
 - (D) The term “inspector” means an individual designated by one of the States Parties to carry out an inspection and who is included on that State Party’s accepted list of inspectors in accordance with the provisions of Section III of this Protocol;
 - (E) The term “transport crew member” means an individual who performs duties related to the operation of a transportation means and who is included on a State Party’s accepted list of transport crew members in accordance with the provisions of Section III of this Protocol;

- (F) The term “inspection team” means a group of inspectors from one or more States Parties led by a representative of the inspecting State Party to conduct a particular inspection;
- (G) The term “escort team” means a group of individuals assigned by an inspected State Party to accompany and to assist inspectors conducting a particular inspection, as well as to assume other responsibilities as set forth in this Protocol. In the case of an inspection of the conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of one State Party that is on the territory of another State Party, each of the two States Parties shall designate individuals that shall be included in the escort team, unless otherwise agreed between them;
- (H) The term “inspection site” means an area, location or facility where an inspection is carried out;
- (I) The term “object of verification” means:
 - (1) Any formation or unit at the organisational level of brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment, independent battalion/artillery battalion, independent squadron or equivalent as well as any separately located battalion/squadron or equivalent unit at the next level of command below the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment level holding conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty at a location notified pursuant to Section III, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), of the Protocol on Information Exchange;
 - (2) Any designated permanent storage site, military storage site not organic to formations and units referred to in sub-subparagraph (1) of this subparagraph, independent repair or maintenance unit, military training establishment or military airfield at which conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are notified pursuant to Section III, paragraph 3, subparagraphs (A) and (B), of the Protocol on Information Exchange as being permanently or routinely present;
 - (3) A reduction site for conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty as notified pursuant to Section III, paragraph 3, subparagraph (C), of the Protocol on Information Exchange;
 - (4) In the case of units below the level of battalion holding conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty that are directly subordinate to a unit or formation above the level of brigade/regiment or equivalent, that unit or formation to which the units below the level of battalion are subordinated shall be considered an object of verification, if it has no subordinate unit or formation at the level of brigade/regiment or equivalent; and
 - (5) A formation or unit holding conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty, but not in service with the conventional armed forces of a State Party shall not be considered an object of verification;

- (J) The term “military airfield” means a permanent military complex, not otherwise containing an object of verification, at which the frequent operation, i.e., launch and recovery, of at least six combat aircraft or combat helicopters limited by the Treaty or subject to internal inspection is routinely performed;
- (K) The term “military training establishment” means a facility, not otherwise containing an object of verification, at which a military unit or subunit using at least 30 conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty or more than 12 of any single category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty is organised to train military personnel;
- (L) The term “military storage site” not organic to formations and units identified as objects of verification means any storage site, other than designated permanent storage sites or sites subordinate to organisations designed and structured for internal security purposes, holding conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty without respect to organisational or operational status. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty contained in such sites shall constitute a portion of the permitted holdings counted in active units pursuant to the Protocol on National Ceilings;
- (M) The term “declared site” means a facility or precisely delineated geographic location which contains one or more objects of verification. A declared site shall consist of all territory within its man-made or natural outer boundary or boundaries as well as associated territory comprising firing ranges, training areas, maintenance and storage areas, helicopter airfields and railroad loading facilities at which battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges are permanently or routinely present;
- (N) The term “specified area” means an area anywhere on the territory of a State Party within the area of application other than a site inspected pursuant to Section VII, X or XI of this Protocol within which a challenge inspection is conducted pursuant to Section VIII of this Protocol. A specified area shall not exceed 65 square kilometres. No straight line between any two points in that area shall exceed 16 kilometres;
- (O) The term “designated area” means a single area on the territory of a State Party within the area of application within which an inspection pursuant to Section IX of this Protocol is conducted.

In the case of an inspection pursuant to Section IX, paragraph 3, of this Protocol, the size of a designated area shall not exceed either twice the area notified pursuant to Section XVIII, paragraph 3, of the Protocol on Information Exchange or 10,000 square kilometres, whichever is smaller, but shall not be smaller than 1,000 square kilometres. If the size of the notified area is less than or equal to 5,000 square kilometres, the designated area shall include the entire notified area. If the size of the notified area is greater than 5,000 square kilometres, at least half of the designated area shall overlap with the notified area. The designated area shall be configured so that no straight line between any two points within the area exceeds 350 kilometres unless the

configuration of the area notified pursuant to Section XVIII, paragraph 3, of the Protocol on Information Exchange permits a straight line of maximum length between any two points within the notified area to exceed 350 kilometres, in which case the designated area may be configured to contain a straight line that falls along the maximum length straight line in the notified area and shall be of no greater length;

In the case of an inspection pursuant to Section IX, paragraphs 4 and 5, of this Protocol the size of a designated area shall not exceed 10,000 square kilometres. At least 25 percent of the designated area shall overlap with the notified area. The designated area shall be configured so that no straight line between any two points within the area exceeds 350 kilometres unless the configuration of the area notified pursuant to Section XVIII, paragraph 4, of the Protocol on Information Exchange permits a straight line of maximum length between any two points within the notified area to exceed 350 kilometres, in which case the designated area may be configured to contain a straight line that falls along the maximum length straight line in the notified area and shall be of no greater length;

- (P) The term “sensitive point” means any equipment, structure or location which has been designated to be sensitive by the inspected State Party or the State Party exercising the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party through the escort team and to which access or overflight may be delayed, limited or refused;
- (Q) The term “point of entry/exit” means a point designated by a State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried out, through which inspection teams and transport crews arrive on the territory of that State Party and through which they depart from the territory of that State Party;
- (R) The term “in-country period” means the total time spent continuously on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is carried out by an inspection team for inspections pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol from arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry/exit until the return of the inspection team to a point of entry/exit after completion of that inspection team’s last inspection;
- (S) The term “passive declared site inspection quota” means the total number of inspections of objects of verification pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol that each State Party shall be obliged to receive within a Treaty year at inspection sites where its objects of verification are located;
- (T) The term “passive challenge inspection quota” means the maximum number of challenge inspections within specified areas pursuant to Section VIII of this Protocol that each State Party with territory within the area of application shall be obliged to receive within a Treaty year;
- (U) The term “active inspection quota” means the total number of inspections pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol that each State Party shall be entitled to conduct within a Treaty year;

- (V) The term “certification site” means a clearly designated location where the certification of recategorised multi-purpose attack helicopters and reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft in accordance with the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation and the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification takes place;
- (W) The term “calendar reporting period” means a period of time defined in days during which the intended reduction of the planned number of items of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in accordance with Article VIII of the Treaty is to be carried out.

SECTION II. GENERAL OBLIGATIONS

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, each State Party shall facilitate inspections pursuant to this Protocol.
2. In the case of conventional armaments and equipment in service with the conventional armed forces of a State Party in the area of application on the territory of another State Party, such States Parties shall, in fulfilment of their respective responsibilities, cooperatively ensure compliance with the relevant provisions of this Protocol. Each State Party shall be fully responsible for compliance with the Treaty obligations in respect of its conventional armaments and equipment in service with its conventional armed forces on the territory of another State Party.
3. The escort team shall be placed under the responsibility of the inspected State Party:
 - (A) In the case of inspection sites at which conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty only of a State Party other than the State Party on whose territory the inspection is being carried out are present, and are under the command of that State Party only, the escort team shall be placed under the responsibility of a representative of that State Party for the duration of the inspection within that inspection site where the State Party’s conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are located;
 - (B) In the case of inspection sites containing conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of both the State Party on whose territory the inspection is being carried out and another State Party, the escort team shall be composed of representatives from both States Parties when conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of the other State Party are actually inspected. During the inspection within that inspection site, the State Party on whose territory the inspection is being carried out shall exercise the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party with the exception of those rights and obligations related to the inspection of the conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of the other State Party, which shall be exercised by that State Party;
 - (C) With the agreement of the State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried out in respect of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of another State Party, that State Party shall assist the host State Party in the provision of security protection to both the inspection team and the escort team for the duration of the inspection.

4. If an inspection team requests access to a structure or premises utilised by another State Party by agreement with the inspected State Party, such other State Party shall, in cooperation with the inspected State Party and to the extent consistent with the agreement on utilisation, exercise the rights and obligations set forth in this Protocol with respect to inspections involving equipment or materiel of the State Party utilising the structure or premises.
5. Structures or premises utilised by another State Party by agreement with the inspected State Party shall be subject to inspection only when that other State Party's representative is on the escort team.
6. Inspection teams and sub-teams shall be under the control and responsibility of the inspecting State Party.
7. No more than one inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol may be present at the same time at any one inspection site.
8. Subject to the other provisions of this Protocol, the inspecting State Party shall decide for how long each inspection team will stay on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out, and at how many and at which inspection sites it will conduct inspections during the in-country period.
9. Travel expenses of an inspection team to the point of entry/exit prior to conducting an inspection and from the point of entry/exit after completion of the last inspection shall be borne by the inspecting State Party.
10. Each Treaty year each State Party shall be obliged to receive a number of inspections pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol not to exceed its passive declared site inspection quota. The passive declared site inspection quota shall be equal to 20 percent, rounded to the nearest whole number, of that State Party's objects of verification notified pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange.
11. Each State Party with territory within the area of application shall be obliged to accept a number of challenge inspections up to 23 percent, rounded to the nearest whole number, of the number of inspections of declared sites which that State Party is obliged to receive on its territory of its own objects of verification and of objects of verification belonging to other States Parties.
12. Notwithstanding any other limitations in this Section, each State Party shall be obliged to accept a minimum of one inspection each Treaty year of its objects of verification pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol, and each State Party with territory within the area of application shall be obliged to accept a minimum of one inspection each Treaty year within a specified area pursuant to Section VIII of this Protocol.
13. The cost of inspections conducted pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol shall be covered as follows:
 - (A) A number of inspections equal to 75 percent of the passive declared site inspection quota, rounded to the nearest whole number but not less than one

inspection pursuant to Section VII and one inspection pursuant to Section VIII of this Protocol shall be conducted at the expense of the inspected State Party; and

- (B) A number of inspections equal to 25 percent of the passive declared site inspection quota, rounded to the nearest whole number, shall be conducted at the expense of the inspecting States Parties. The modalities for such payment shall be decided by the Joint Consultative Group.

14. The inspections pursuant to Section IX shall be conducted at the expense of the inspected State Party.

15. Each Treaty year the Russian Federation shall accept in addition to its passive declared site inspection quota calculated pursuant to paragraph 10 of this Section, up to a total of 10 supplementary declared site inspections conducted at the expense of the inspecting States Parties, allocated as follows:

- (A) Up to four inspections to the area consisting of the Pskov oblast; the Volgograd oblast; the Astrakhan oblast; that part of the Rostov oblast east of the line extending from Kushchevskaya to Volgodonsk to the Volgograd oblast border, including Volgodonsk; and Kushchevskaya and a narrow corridor in Krasnodar kray leading to Kushchevskaya;
- (B) Up to six inspections to the area consisting of the Leningrad Military District and North Caucasus Military District, excluding the area described in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph.

16. Each Treaty year Ukraine shall accept in addition to its passive declared site inspection quota calculated pursuant to paragraph 10 of this Section, up to one supplementary declared site inspection in the Odessa oblast conducted at the expense of the inspecting State Party.

17. The number of supplementary declared site inspections conducted at declared sites pursuant to paragraph 15 or 16 of this Section shall not exceed the number of declared site passive quota inspections conducted at declared sites located in the areas specified in paragraphs 15 and 16 of this Section in the course of the same Treaty year.

18. Inspection pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol of one object of verification at an inspection site shall count as one inspection against the passive declared site inspection quota of that State Party whose object of verification is inspected.

19. The proportion of inspections pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol on the territory of a State Party used to inspect objects of verification belonging to another State Party shall be no greater than the proportion which that State Party's objects of verification constitute of the total number of objects of verification located on the territory of that host State Party.

20. The number of inspections pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol of objects of verification on any State Party's territory shall be calculated as a percentage of the total number of objects of verification present on that State Party's territory.

21. Inspection pursuant to Section VIII of this Protocol within one specified area shall count as one inspection against the passive challenge inspection quota and one inspection against the passive declared site inspection quota of the State Party on whose territory the inspection is conducted.
22. Unless otherwise agreed between the escort team and the inspection team, an inspection team's in-country period shall, up to a total of 10 days, not exceed the total number of hours calculated according to the following formula:
 - (A) 48 hours for the first inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area; plus
 - (B) 36 hours for each sequential inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area.
23. Subject to the limitations in paragraph 22 of this Section, an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol shall spend no more than 48 hours at a declared site and no more than 24 hours in inspection within a specified area.
24. The inspected State Party shall ensure that the inspection team travels to a sequential inspection site by the most expeditious means available. If the time between completion of one inspection and arrival of the inspection team at a sequential inspection site exceeds nine hours, or if the time between completion of the last inspection conducted by an inspection team on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is carried out and the arrival of that inspection team at the point of entry/exit exceeds nine hours, such excess time shall not count against that inspection team's in-country period.
25. Each State Party shall be obliged to accept on its territory within the area of application simultaneously no more than two inspection teams conducting inspections pursuant to Sections VII, VIII and IX of this Protocol.
26. Each State Party shall be obliged to accept simultaneously no more than two inspection teams conducting inspections of its conventional armed forces pursuant to Sections VII, VIII and IX of this Protocol.
27. No State Party shall be obliged to accept inspections pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol representing more than 50 percent of its passive declared site inspection quota in a Treaty year from the same State Party.
28. Each State Party shall have the right to conduct inspections within the area of application on the territory of other States Parties. Each State Party shall notify to all other States Parties its active inspection quota for each Treaty year, no later than 15th day of January.
29. Without prejudice to the right to conduct inspections and to the principle that the verification of compliance is a national prerogative, as a general practice inspections may be multinational in character. The States Parties may coordinate their inspection activities as they deem appropriate. The States Parties shall ensure equal treatment of the inspectors regardless of their nationality and gender.

30. Each State Party shall provide all other States Parties no later than the 15th day of December each year with a list of its officially recognised holidays for the subsequent calendar year.

SECTION III. PRE-INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS

1. Inspections conducted pursuant to the Treaty shall be carried out by inspectors designated in accordance with paragraphs 3 to 7 of this Section.

2. Inspectors shall be nationals of the inspecting State Party or other States Parties.

3. Within 90 days after signature of the Treaty, each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties a list of its proposed inspectors and a list of its proposed transport crew members, containing the full names of inspectors and transport crew members, their gender, date of birth, place of birth and passport number. No list of proposed inspectors provided by a State Party shall contain at any time more than 400 individuals, and no list of proposed transport crew members provided by a State Party shall contain at any time more than 600 individuals.

4. Each State Party shall review the lists of inspectors and transport crew members provided to it by other States Parties and, within 30 days after receipt of each list, shall provide notification to the State Party providing that list of any individual whose name it wishes to be deleted from that list.

5. Subject to paragraph 7 of this Section, inspectors and transport crew members for whom deletion has not been requested within the time interval specified in paragraph 4 of this Section shall be considered as accepted for the purposes of issuing visas and any other documents in accordance with paragraph 8 of this Section.

6. Each State Party shall have the right to amend its lists within one month after entry into force of the Treaty. Thereafter, twice every year, if possible by the first day of April and the first day of October, each State Party may propose additions to or deletions from its lists of inspectors and transport crew members provided that such amended lists do not exceed the numbers specified in paragraph 3 of this Section. Proposed additions shall be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Section. Each State Party shall provide all other States Parties annually, no later than the 15th day of December, with a consolidated list of inspectors and transport crew members, which shall include all changes highlighted that have been notified and accepted since the submission of the previous consolidated list. Notifications to correct typing errors may be provided at any time.

7. A State Party may request, without right of refusal, deletion of any individual it wishes from lists of inspectors and transport crew members provided by any other State Party.

8. The State Party on whose territory an inspection is conducted shall provide to the inspectors and transport crew members accepted in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Section visas and any other documents as required to ensure that these inspectors and transport crew members may enter and remain in the territory of that State Party for the purpose of carrying out inspection activities in accordance with the

provisions of this Protocol. Such visas and any other necessary documents shall be provided either:

- (A) Within 30 days after the acceptance of the lists or subsequent changes in such lists, in which case the visa shall be valid for a period of no less than 24 months; or
- (B) Within one hour after the arrival of the inspection team and transport crew members at the point of entry/exit, in which case the visa shall be valid for the duration of their inspection activities.

9. Each year no later than 15th day of December, each State Party shall provide notification to all other States Parties of the standing diplomatic clearance numbers for their transportation means of transporting inspectors and equipment necessary for an inspection into and out of the territory of the State Party in which such an inspection is conducted. Routings to and from the designated point(s) of entry/exit shall be along established international airways or other routes that are agreed upon by the States Parties concerned as the basis for such diplomatic clearance. Inspectors may use commercial flights for travel to those points of entry/exit that are served by airlines. The provisions of this paragraph relating to diplomatic clearance numbers shall not apply to such flights.

10. Each State Party shall indicate in the notification provided pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange a point or points of entry/exit in respect of each declared site with its objects of verification. Such points of entry/exit may be ground border crossing points, airports or seaports which must have the capacity to receive the transportation means of the inspecting State Party. At least one commercial airport, if possible operating international flights, shall be notified as a point of entry/exit associated with each declared site. The location of any point of entry/exit notified as associated with a declared site shall be such as to allow access to that declared site within the time specified in Section VII, paragraph 8, of this Protocol. Each State Party may designate additional points of entry/exit to facilitate the conduct of inspections.

11. Each State Party shall have the right to change the point or points of entry/exit to its territory by notifying all other States Parties no less than 90 days before such a change becomes effective.

12. Within 90 days after signature of the Treaty, each State Party shall provide notification to all other States Parties of the official language or languages of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to be used by inspection teams conducting inspections of its conventional armed forces.

SECTION IV. NOTIFICATION OF INTENT TO INSPECT

1. The inspecting State Party shall notify the inspected State Party of its intention to carry out an inspection provided for in Article XIV of the Treaty.

In the case of inspection pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol of conventional armed forces of a State Party other than the State Party on whose territory the inspection is to be carried out, that State Party shall also be notified, regardless of whether it will be the first or a sequential inspection.

In the case of inspection pursuant to Section IX of this Protocol, the inspecting State Party shall notify the host State Party.

In the case of inspection of certification or reduction procedures carried out by a State Party on the territory of another State Party, the inspecting State Party shall simultaneously notify the host State Party and the other State Party.

2. For inspections conducted pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol, such notifications shall be made in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty no less than 36 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry/exit on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out and shall include:

- (A) The point of entry/exit to be used;
- (B) The estimated time of arrival at the point of entry/exit;
- (C) The means of arrival at the point of entry/exit;
- (D) A statement of whether the first inspection shall be conducted pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol and whether the inspection will be conducted on foot, by cross-country vehicle, by helicopter or by any combination of these;
- (E) The time interval between the arrival at the point of entry/exit and the designation of the first inspection site;
- (F) The language to be used by the inspection team, which shall be a language designated in accordance with Section III, paragraph 12, of this Protocol;
- (G) The language to be used for the inspection report prepared in accordance with Section XIV of this Protocol;
- (H) The full names of inspectors and transport crew members, their gender, date of birth, place of birth, nationality and passport number;
- (I) The likely number of sequential inspections; and
- (J) Whether the inspection is to be at the expense of the inspected State Party.

3. For inspections conducted pursuant to Section IX of this Protocol, such notifications shall be made in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty no less than 36 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry/exit on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out and shall include:

- (A) The designated point of entry/exit nearest to or within the designated area capable of receiving the inspecting State Party's chosen means of transportation;
- (B) The estimated time of arrival at the point of entry/exit;

- (C) The means of arrival at the point of entry/exit;
- (D) A statement of whether the inspection will be conducted on foot, by cross-country vehicle, by helicopter or by any combination of these;
- (E) The time interval between the arrival at the point of entry/exit and the designation of the designated area;
- (F) The language to be used by the inspection team, which shall be a language designated in accordance with Section III, paragraph 12, of this Protocol;
- (G) The language to be used for the inspection report prepared in accordance with Section XIV of this Protocol;
- (H) The full names of inspectors and transport crew members, their gender, date of birth, place of birth, nationality and passport number.

4. For inspections conducted pursuant to Sections X and XI of this Protocol, such notifications shall be made in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty no less than 96 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the designated point of entry/exit on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out and shall include:

- (A) The point of entry/exit to be used;
- (B) The estimated time of arrival at the point of entry/exit;
- (C) The means of arrival at the point of entry/exit;
- (D) For each inspection at a reduction or certification site, reference to the notification provided pursuant to Section X, paragraph 3, or Section XI, paragraph 5, of this Protocol;
- (E) The language to be used by the inspection team, which shall be a language designated in accordance with Section III, paragraph 12, of this Protocol;
- (F) The language to be used for the inspection report prepared in accordance with Section XIV of this Protocol; and
- (G) The full names of inspectors and transport crew members; their gender, date of birth, place of birth, nationality and passport number.

5. The States Parties notified pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section shall acknowledge in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty receipt of notification within three hours. Subject to the provisions set forth in this Section, the inspection team shall be permitted to arrive at the point of entry/exit at the estimated time of arrival notified pursuant to paragraph 2, subparagraph (B), or paragraph 3, subparagraph (B), of this Section.

6. An inspected State Party receiving a notification of intent to inspect shall immediately upon its receipt notify all other States Parties in accordance with

Article XVII of the Treaty of the type of the inspection requested and the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry/exit. In the case of inspection pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol the available passive declared site inspection quota, the likely number of sequential inspections and the State Party covering the cost of each inspection shall be included.

7. If the State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried out is unable to allow the entry of the inspection team at the estimated time of arrival, the inspection team shall be permitted to enter the territory of that State Party within two hours before or after the notified estimated time of arrival. In such a case, the State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried out shall notify the inspecting State Party of the new time of arrival no later than 24 hours following the issuance of the original notification.

8. If the inspection team finds itself delayed more than two hours beyond the notified estimated time of arrival or beyond the new time of arrival communicated pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Section, the inspecting State Party shall inform the States Parties notified pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section of:

- (A) A new estimated time of arrival, which in no case shall be more than six hours beyond the initial estimated time of arrival or beyond the new time of arrival communicated pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Section; and
- (B) If the inspecting State Party desires, a new time interval between arrival at the point of entry/exit and the designation of the inspection site.

9. In the event non-commercial flights are used to transport the inspection team to the point of entry/exit, no less than 10 hours before the planned time of entry into the air space of the State Party on whose territory the inspection is to be carried out, the inspecting State Party shall provide that State Party with a flight plan in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty. The International Civil Aviation Organization regulated Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network shall be considered one of the official channels for submission of the flight plans. The flight plan shall be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization applicable to civil aircraft. The inspecting State Party shall include in the remarks Section of each flight plan the standing diplomatic clearance number and the notation: "CFE inspection aircraft. Priority clearance processing required".

10. No more than three hours following the receipt of a flight plan that has been filed in accordance with paragraph 9 of this Section, the State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried out shall ensure that the flight plan is approved so that the inspection team may arrive at the point of entry/exit at the estimated time of arrival.

11. If an inspection team travelling by means of ground transportation to or from the territory of the inspected State Party intends to transit through the territory of another State Party, the transited State Party shall be provided well in advance with the information relevant to its obligations pursuant to paragraph 5, subparagraph (A), of Section XV of this Protocol. As a minimum, such information should include the cross-border points, the estimated time of crossing each border, the means of

transportation to be used by the inspection team, the names of the inspectors and drivers, their nationalities and passport numbers.

SECTION V. PROCEDURES UPON ARRIVAL AT POINT OF ENTRY/EXIT

1. The escort team shall meet the inspection team and transport crew members at the point of entry/exit upon their arrival.
2. A State Party which utilises structures or premises by agreement with the inspected State Party will designate a liaison officer to the escort team who will be available as needed at the point of entry/exit to accompany the inspection team at any time as agreed with the escort team.
3. Times of arrival at and return to a point of entry/exit shall be agreed and recorded by both the inspection team and the escort team.
4. The State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried out shall ensure that luggage, equipment and supplies of the inspection team are exempt from all customs duties and are expeditiously processed at the point of entry/exit.
5. Equipment and supplies that the inspecting State Party brings into the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out shall be subject to examination each time they are brought into that territory. This examination shall be completed prior to the departure of the inspection team from the point of entry/exit to the inspection site. Such equipment and supplies shall be examined by the escort team in the presence of the inspection team members.
6. If the escort team determines upon examination that an item of equipment or supplies brought by inspectors is capable of performing functions inconsistent with the inspection requirements of this Protocol or does not meet the requirements set forth in Section VI, paragraph 18 of this Protocol, then the escort team shall have the right to deny permission to use that item and to impound it at the point of entry/exit. The inspecting State Party shall remove such impounded equipment or supplies from the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out at the earliest opportunity at its own discretion, but no later than the time when the inspection team which brought that impounded equipment or supplies leaves the country.
7. If a State Party has not participated during examination of equipment of an inspection team at the point of entry/exit, that State Party shall be entitled to exercise the rights of the escort team pursuant to paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Section prior to inspection at a declared site at which its conventional armed forces are present or of a structure or premises it utilises by agreement with the inspected State Party.
8. Throughout the period in which the inspection team and transport crew remain on the territory of the State Party where the inspection site is located, the inspected State Party shall provide or arrange for the provision of meals, lodging, work space, transportation and, as necessary, medical care or any other emergency assistance.
9. The State Party on whose territory an inspection is carried out shall provide accommodation, security protection, servicing and fuel for the transportation means of the inspecting State Party at the point of entry/exit.

SECTION VI. GENERAL RULES FOR CONDUCTING INSPECTIONS

1. Inspections may be delayed in cases of force majeure. In case the inspected State Party or the State Party exercising the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party delays an inspection on grounds of force majeure, it shall, in written form, explain the reasons for this delay in detail and the estimated duration of the delay, as follows:
 - (A) If force majeure is declared prior to the arrival of the inspection team, through the answer to the relevant notification of intent to inspect;
 - (B) If force majeure is declared after the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry/exit, the explanation should be presented to the inspection team and as soon as possible through diplomatic channels or other official channels to all States Parties.
2. In case of a delay due to force majeure, the provisions of Section XIII, paragraph 2, of this Protocol shall apply.
3. An inspection team may include inspectors from States Parties other than the inspecting State Party.
4. For inspections conducted in accordance with Sections VII, VIII, X and XI of this Protocol, an inspection team shall consist of up to nine inspectors and may divide itself into up to three sub-teams.
5. For inspections conducted in accordance with Section IX of this Protocol, an inspection team shall consist of up to 20 inspectors or of five inspectors from the inspecting State Party plus one inspector from each of the remaining States Parties interested in participating in such inspection, whichever is greater. No State Party shall have more than nine inspectors in an inspection team. An inspection team may divide itself into up to four sub-teams.
6. Inspectors and escort team members shall wear some clear identification of their respective roles.
7. An inspector shall be deemed to have assumed his or her duties upon arrival at the point of entry/exit on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out and shall be deemed to have ceased performing those duties after leaving the territory of that State Party through the point of entry/exit.
8. The number of transport crew members shall not exceed 10.
9. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, inspectors and transport crew members shall respect the laws and regulations of the State Party on whose territory an inspection is carried out and shall not interfere in the internal affairs of that State Party. Inspectors and transport crew members shall also respect regulations at an inspection site, including safety and administrative procedures. In the event that the inspected State Party determines that an inspector or transport crew member has violated such laws and regulations or other conditions governing the inspection activities set forth in this Protocol, it shall so notify the inspecting State Party, which

upon the request of the inspected State Party shall immediately delete the name of the individual from the list of inspectors or transport crew members. If the individual is on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is carried out, the inspecting State Party shall promptly remove that individual from that territory.

10. The inspected State Party shall be responsible for ensuring the safety of the inspection team and transport crew members from the time they arrive at the point of entry/exit until the time they leave the point of entry/exit to depart the territory of that State Party.

11. The escort team shall assist the inspection team in carrying out its functions. At its discretion, the escort team may exercise its right to accompany the inspection team from the time it enters the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out until the time it departs that territory.

12. The inspecting State Party shall ensure that the inspection team and each sub-team have the necessary linguistic ability to communicate freely with the escort team in the language notified in accordance with Section IV, paragraph 2, subparagraph (F), paragraph 3, subparagraph (F), and paragraph 4, subparagraph (E), of this Protocol. The inspected State Party shall ensure that the escort team has the necessary linguistic ability to communicate freely in this language with the inspection team and each sub-team. Inspectors and members of the escort team may also communicate in other languages.

13. No information obtained during inspections shall be publicly disclosed without the express consent of the inspecting State Party.

14. Throughout their presence on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out, inspectors shall have the right to communicate with the embassy or consulate of the inspecting State Party located on that territory, using appropriate telecommunications means provided by the inspected State Party. The inspected State Party shall also provide means of communication between the sub-teams of an inspection team.

15. The inspected State Party shall transport the inspection team to, from and between inspection sites by a means and route selected by the inspected State Party. The inspecting State Party may request a variation in the selected route. The inspected State Party shall if possible grant such a request. Whenever mutually agreed, the inspecting State Party will be permitted to use its own land vehicles.

16. If an emergency arises that necessitates travel of inspectors from an inspection site to a point of entry/exit or to the embassy or consulate of the inspecting State Party on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is carried out, the inspection team shall so notify the escort team, which shall promptly arrange such travel, and if necessary, shall provide appropriate means of transportation.

17. The inspected State Party shall provide for the exclusive use by the inspection team at the inspection site an administrative area for storage of equipment and supplies, report writing, rest breaks and meals.

18. The inspection team shall be permitted to bring such documents as needed to conduct the inspection, in particular its own maps and charts. Inspectors shall be

permitted to bring and use portable passive night vision devices, binoculars, video and still cameras, dictaphones, tape measures, flashlights, magnetic compasses and lap-top computers. The inspectors shall be permitted to use other equipment, subject to the approval of the inspected State Party. Throughout the in-country period, the escort team shall have the right to observe the equipment brought by inspectors, but shall not interfere with the use of equipment that has been approved by the escort team in accordance with Section V, paragraphs 5 to 7, of this Protocol.

19. In the case of an inspection conducted pursuant to Section VII, VIII or IX of this Protocol, the inspection team shall specify on each occasion it designates the inspection site to be inspected whether the inspection will be conducted on foot, by cross-country vehicle, by helicopter or by any combination of these. Unless otherwise agreed, the inspected State Party shall provide and operate the appropriate cross-country vehicles at the inspection site for each sub-team.

20. Whenever possible, subject to the safety requirements and flight regulations of the inspected State Party and subject to the provisions of paragraphs 18 to 21 of this Section, the inspection team shall have the right to conduct helicopter overflights of the inspection site, using a helicopter provided and operated by the inspected State Party, during inspections conducted pursuant to Section VII, VIII or IX of this Protocol.

21. The inspected State Party shall not be obliged to provide a helicopter at any inspection site that is less than 20 square kilometres in area.

22. The inspected State Party shall have the right to delay, limit or refuse helicopter overflights above sensitive points, but the presence of sensitive points shall not prevent helicopter overflight of the remaining areas of the inspection site. Photography of or above sensitive points during helicopter overflights shall be permitted only with the approval of the escort team.

23. The duration of such helicopter overflights at an inspection site shall not exceed a cumulative total of one hour in the case of an inspection pursuant to Section VII or VIII and seven hours in the case of an inspection pursuant to Section IX of this Protocol, unless otherwise agreed between the inspection team and the escort team.

24. Any helicopter provided by the inspected State Party shall be large enough to carry at least two members of the inspection team and at least one member of the escort team. Inspectors shall be allowed to take and use on overflights of the inspection site any of the equipment specified in paragraph 18 of this Section. The inspection team shall advise the escort team during inspection flights whenever it intends to take photographs. A helicopter shall afford the inspectors a constant and unobstructed view of the ground.

25. In discharging their functions, inspectors shall not interfere directly with ongoing activities at the inspection site and shall avoid unnecessarily hampering or delaying operations at the inspection site or taking actions affecting safe operation.

26. Except as provided for in paragraphs 27 to 32 of this Section, during an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area or within a designated area, inspectors shall be permitted access, entry and unobstructed inspection:

- (A) In the case of a specified area, within the entire area excluding declared sites within the boundary of the area, if any; or
- (B) In the case of a designated area, within the entire area including declared sites within the boundary of the area; or
- (C) In the case of an object of verification, within the entire territory of the declared site except within those areas delineated on the site diagram as belonging exclusively to another object of verification which the inspection team has not designated for inspection.

27. During an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area or within a designated area pursuant to Section VII, VIII or IX of this Protocol and subject to the provisions of paragraph 28 of this Section, inspectors shall have the right, within the areas cited in paragraph 26 of this Section, to enter any location, structure or area within a structure in which battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges are permanently or routinely present. Inspectors shall not have the right to enter other structures or areas within structures the entry points to which are physically accessible only by personnel doors not exceeding two metres in width and to which access is denied by the escort team.

28. During an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area or a designated area pursuant to Section VII, VIII or IX of this Protocol, inspectors shall have the right to look into a hardened aircraft shelter to confirm visually whether any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges are present and, if so, their number and type, model or version. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 27 of this Section, inspectors shall enter the interior of such hardened aircraft shelters only with the approval of the escort team. If such approval is denied and if the inspectors so request, any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges in such hardened aircraft shelters shall be displayed outside.

29. During an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area or a designated area pursuant to Section VII, VIII or IX of this Protocol, except as provided in paragraphs 30 to 36 of this Section, inspectors shall have the right to have access to conventional armaments and equipment only in so far as is necessary to confirm visually their number and type, model or version.

30. The inspected State Party shall have the right to shroud individual sensitive items of equipment.

31. The escort team shall have the right to deny access to sensitive points, the number and extent of which should be as limited as possible, to shrouded objects and to containers any dimension (width, height, length or diameter) of which is less than two metres. Whenever a sensitive point is designated, or shrouded objects or

containers are present, the escort team shall declare whether the sensitive point, shrouded object or container holds any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges and, if so, their number and type, model or version.

32. If the escort team declares that a sensitive point, shrouded object or container does contain any of the conventional armaments and equipment specified in paragraph 31 of this Section, then the escort team shall display or declare such conventional armaments and equipment to the inspection team and shall take steps to satisfy the inspection team that no more than the declared number of such conventional armaments and equipment are present.

33. If, during an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, a helicopter of a type that is or has been on the multi-purpose attack helicopter list in the Protocol on Existing Types is present at an inspection site and is declared by the escort team to be a combat support helicopter, or if an Mi-24R or Mi-24K helicopter is present at an inspection site and is declared by the escort team to be limited pursuant to Section I, paragraph 3, of the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation, such a helicopter shall be subject to internal inspection in accordance with Section X, paragraphs 4 to 6, of this Protocol.

34. If, during an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, an aircraft of a specific model or version of combat-capable trainer aircraft listed in Section II of the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification is present at an inspection site and is declared by the escort team to have been certified as unarmed in accordance with the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification, such an aircraft shall be subject to internal inspection in accordance with Section X, paragraphs 4 and 5, of this Protocol.

35. If, during an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area or within a designated area pursuant to Section VII, VIII or IX of this Protocol, an armoured vehicle declared by the escort team to be an armoured personnel carrier look-alike or an armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alike is present at an inspection site, the inspection team shall have the right to determine that such vehicle cannot permit the transport of a combat infantry squad. Inspectors shall have the right to require the doors and/or hatches of the vehicle to be opened so that the interior can be visually inspected from outside the vehicle. Sensitive equipment in or on the vehicle may be shrouded.

36. If, during an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, armaments and equipment declared by the escort team to have been reduced in accordance with the provisions in the Protocol on Reduction are present at an inspection site, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect such armaments and equipment to confirm that they have been reduced in accordance with the procedures specified in Sections III to XII of the Protocol on Reduction. If, during an inspection within a designated area pursuant to Section IX of this Protocol, battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery declared by the escort team to have been reduced in accordance with the provisions in the Protocol on Reduction are present at an inspection site, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect such battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery to

confirm that they have been reduced in accordance with the procedures specified in Sections III to XII of the Protocol on Reduction.

37. Inspectors shall have the right to take photographs, including video, for the purpose of recording the presence of conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty, including within designated permanent storage sites, or other storage sites containing more than 50 such conventional armaments and equipment. Still cameras shall be limited to 35 mm cameras and to cameras capable of producing instantly developed photographic prints. The inspection team shall advise the escort team in advance whether it plans to take photographs. The escort team shall cooperate with the inspection team's taking of photographs.

38. Photography of sensitive points shall be permitted only with the approval of the escort team.

39. Except as provided for in paragraph 41 of this Section, photography of interiors of structures other than storage sites specified in paragraph 37 of this Section shall be permitted only with the approval of the escort team.

40. Inspectors shall have the right to take measurements to resolve ambiguities that might arise during inspections. Such measurements recorded during inspections shall be confirmed by a member of the inspection team and a member of the escort team immediately after they are taken. Such confirmed data shall be included in the inspection report.

41. States Parties shall, whenever possible, resolve during an inspection any ambiguities that arise regarding factual information. Whenever inspectors request the escort team to clarify such an ambiguity, the escort team shall promptly provide the inspection team with clarifications. If inspectors decide to document an unresolved ambiguity with photographs, the escort team shall, subject to the provision in paragraph 38 of this Section, cooperate with the inspection team's taking of appropriate photographs using a camera capable of producing instantly developed photographic prints. If an ambiguity cannot be resolved during the inspection, then the question, relevant clarifications and any pertinent photographs shall be included in the inspection report in accordance with Section XIV of this Protocol.

42. For inspections conducted pursuant to Sections VII, VIII and IX of this Protocol, the inspection shall be deemed to have been completed once the inspection report has been signed and countersigned.

43. No later than completion of an inspection at a declared site or within a specified area, the inspection team shall inform the escort team whether the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential inspection. If the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential inspection, the inspection team shall designate at that time the next inspection site. In such cases, subject to the provisions in Section VII, paragraphs 6 and 20, and Section VIII, paragraph 6, subparagraph (A), of this Protocol, the inspected State Party shall ensure that the inspection team arrives at the sequential inspection site as soon as possible after completion of the previous inspection. The time-limits specified in Section VII, paragraph 8, or Section VIII, paragraph 6, subparagraph (B), of this Protocol, whichever is applicable, shall apply. If the inspection team does not intend to conduct a sequential inspection, then the provisions in paragraphs 45 and 46 of this Section shall apply.

44. An inspection team shall have the right to conduct a sequential inspection, subject to the provisions of Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol, on the territory of the State Party on which that inspection team has conducted the preceding inspection:

- (A) At any declared site associated with the same point of entry/exit as the preceding inspection site or the same point of entry/exit at which the inspection team arrived; or
- (B) Within any specified area for which the point of entry/exit at which the inspection team arrived is the nearest point of entry/exit notified pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange; or
- (C) At any location within 200 kilometres of the preceding inspection site within the same military district; or
- (D) At the location which the inspected State Party claims, pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 12, subparagraph (A), of this Protocol, is the temporary location of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters or combat aircraft which were absent during inspection of an object of verification at the preceding inspection site, if such conventional armaments and equipment constitute more than 15 percent of the number of such conventional armaments and equipment notified in the most recent notification pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange; or
- (E) At the declared site which the inspected State Party claims, pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 12, subparagraph (B), of this Protocol, is the site of origin for battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters or combat aircraft at the preceding inspection site which are in excess of the number provided in the most recent notification pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange as being present at that preceding inspection site, if such conventional armaments and equipment exceed by 15 percent the number of such conventional armaments and equipment so notified.

45. After completion of an inspection at a declared site or within a specified area, if no sequential inspection has been declared, or after completion of an inspection within a designated area, the inspection team shall be transported to the appropriate point of entry/exit as soon as possible and shall depart the territory of the State Party where the inspection was carried out within 24 hours.

46. The inspection team shall leave the territory of the State Party where it has been conducting inspections from the same point of entry/exit at which it entered, unless otherwise agreed. If an inspection team chooses to proceed to a point of entry/exit on the territory of another State Party for the purpose of conducting inspections, it shall have the right to do so provided that the inspecting State Party has provided the necessary notification in accordance with Section IV, paragraph 1, of this Protocol.

47. In the case of inspections conducted pursuant to Section VII and/or VIII of this Protocol, the inspected State Party shall, not later than 72 hours after the departure of the inspection team upon completion of the inspection or inspections, notify all other States Parties of the number of inspections conducted, of the declared

sites and objects of verification or specified areas that have been inspected, the State Party covering the cost of each inspection, its remaining passive declared site inspection quota as a total number and the number of inspections to be conducted at the expense of the inspecting State Party.

In the case of an inspection conducted pursuant to Section IX, the State Party on whose territory the inspection was conducted shall notify all other States Parties not later than 72 hours after the departure of the inspection team of the designated area that has been inspected.

SECTION VII. DECLARED SITE INSPECTION

1. Inspection of a declared site pursuant to this Protocol shall not be refused. Such inspections may be delayed only in cases of force majeure or in accordance with Section II, paragraphs 7, 25 and 26, of this Protocol. In the case of force majeure the provisions of Section VI, paragraph 1, of this Protocol shall apply.

2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3 of this Section, an inspection team shall arrive on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out through a point of entry/exit associated under Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange with the declared site it plans to designate as the first inspection site pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Section.

3. If an inspecting State Party desires to use a ground border crossing point or seaport as a point of entry/exit and the inspected State Party has not previously notified a ground border crossing point or seaport as a point of entry/exit pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange as associated with the declared site the inspecting State Party desires to designate as the first inspection site pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Section, the inspecting State Party shall indicate in the notification provided pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 2, of this Protocol the desired ground border crossing point or seaport as point of entry/exit. The inspected State Party shall indicate in its acknowledgement of receipt of notification, as provided for in Section IV, paragraph 5, of this Protocol, whether this point of entry/exit is acceptable or not. In the latter case, the inspected State Party shall notify the inspecting State Party of another point of entry/exit which shall be as near as possible to the desired point of entry/exit and which may be an airport notified pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange, a seaport or a ground border crossing point through which the inspection team and transport crew members may arrive on its territory.

4. If an inspecting State Party notifies its desire to use a ground border crossing point or seaport as a point of entry/exit pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Section, it shall determine prior to such notification that there is reasonable certainty that its inspection team can reach the first declared site where that State Party desires to carry out an inspection within the time specified in paragraph 8 of this Section using ground transportation means.

5. If an inspection team and transport crew arrive pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Section on the territory of the State Party on which an inspection is to be carried out through a point of entry/exit other than a point of entry/exit that was notified pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange as being associated with the declared site it desires to designate as the first inspection site, the inspected State

Party shall facilitate access to this declared site as expeditiously as possible, but shall be permitted to exceed, if necessary, the time limit specified in paragraph 8 of this Section.

6. The inspected State Party shall have the right to utilise up to six hours after designation of a declared site to prepare for the arrival of the inspection team at that site.

7. At the number of hours after arrival at the point of entry/exit notified pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 2, subparagraph (E), of this Protocol, which shall be no less than one hour and no more than 16 hours after arrival at the point of entry/exit, the inspection team shall designate the first declared site to be inspected.

8. The inspected State Party shall ensure that the inspection team travels to the first declared site by the most expeditious means available and arrives as soon as possible but no later than nine hours after the designation of the site to be inspected, unless otherwise agreed between the inspection team and the escort team, or unless the inspection site is located in mountainous terrain or terrain to which access is difficult. In such case, the inspection team shall be transported to the inspection site no later than 15 hours after designation of that inspection site. Travel time in excess of nine hours shall not count against that inspection team's in-country period.

9. Immediately upon arrival at the declared site, as defined in Section I, paragraph 1, subparagraph (M), of this Protocol the inspection team shall be escorted to a briefing facility where it shall be provided with a diagram of the declared site. The diagram of the declared site, provided upon arrival at the declared site, in addition to the elements described in the definition of the declared site, shall contain an accurate depiction of:

- (A) A reference point within the boundary of the declared site which is accessible within the inspection site, showing its geographic coordinates, rounded up to the nearest 10 seconds, with an indication of true north;
- (B) The scale used in the site diagram, which should be large enough to allow an accurate depiction of its elements listed in this Section;
- (C) A clear indication of the perimeter of the declared site and its area in square kilometres;
- (D) Precisely delineated boundaries of those areas belonging exclusively to each object of verification at the declared site, indicating also the relevant formation or unit record number of each object of verification to which each such area belongs and including those separately located areas where battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, combat helicopters, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges belonging to each object of verification are permanently assigned;
- (E) The major buildings and roads on the declared site;
- (F) The entrances to the declared site;

- (G) The location of the administrative area, medical and mess facilities, and helicopter landing site, if applicable, to be used by the inspection team; and
- (H) Any additional information deemed useful by the inspected State Party.

10. Within one half-hour after receiving the diagram of the declared site, the inspection team shall designate the object of verification to be inspected. The inspection team shall then be given a pre-inspection briefing which shall last no more than one hour and shall include the following elements:

- (A) Safety and administrative procedures at the inspection site;
- (B) Modalities of transportation and communication for inspectors at the inspection site;
- (C) Holdings and locations at the inspection site, including within the common areas of the declared site, of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, combat helicopters, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes and armoured vehicle launched bridges, including those belonging to separately located subordinate elements belonging to the same object of verification to be inspected; and
- (D) Information pursuant to Section VI, paragraph 2, of the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

11. At the discretion of the inspected State Party the pre-inspection briefing may allow for a separate diagram of the area of the object of verification subject to inspection or an elaboration of the declared site diagram to be provided to the inspection team. That diagram shall depict the following elements:

- (A) All the territory belonging to the declared site with an outline clearly indicating the boundaries of those areas belonging exclusively to the object of verification subject to inspection, including all separately located territory where battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, combat helicopters, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes and armoured vehicle launched bridges belonging to it and present at the inspection site are located;
- (B) True north;
- (C) The scale used, which should be large enough to allow an accurate depiction of the elements listed in this Section;
- (D) All roads and major buildings, highlighting also:
 - (1) The location of all conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty present at the inspection site;
 - (2) Those buildings with doors wider than two metres; and

- (3) The barracks and mess facilities used by personnel of the object of verification subject to inspection and by all other units located in common areas of the declared site;
- (E) All entrances to the object of verification subject to inspection, including those permanently or temporarily inaccessible; and
- (F) Any additional information deemed useful by the inspected State Party.

12. The pre-inspection briefing shall include an explanation of any differences between the numbers of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft or combat helicopters present at the inspection site and the corresponding numbers provided in the most recent notification pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange, in accordance with the following provisions:

- (A) If the numbers of such conventional armaments and equipment present at the inspection site are less than the numbers provided in that most recent notification, such explanation shall include the temporary location, the date of departure and the expected date of return of such conventional armaments and equipment; and
- (B) If the numbers of such armaments and equipment present at the inspection site exceed the numbers provided in that most recent notification, such explanation shall include specific information on the origin, departure times from origin, time of arrival and projected stay at the inspection site of such additional conventional armaments and equipment.

13. In addition, the pre-inspection briefing shall include information on the total number of armoured personnel carrier ambulances present at the inspection site.

14. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section VI, paragraph 44, subparagraph (D), of this Protocol, if the conventional armaments and equipment reported under paragraph 12, subparagraph (A) above, absent from the object of verification constitute more than 30 conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty or more than 12 of any single category, the inspection team shall have the right, as part of the same inspection of that object of verification, to visit one of the locations within the territory of the inspected State Party which the inspected State Party claims is the temporary location of such battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters or combat aircraft in order to inspect the armaments and equipment if that location is within 60 kilometres of the inspection site. The travel time shall not count against that inspection team's in-country period.

The provision of this paragraph shall not apply when a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling has been exceeded as a result of a military exercise or a temporary deployment when such a location is either in an area notified pursuant to Section XVIII, paragraph 3 or 4, of the Protocol on Information Exchange or in a designated area declared pursuant to Section IX, paragraph 12, of this Protocol.

15. When an inspection team designates an object of verification to be inspected, the inspection team shall have the right, as part of the same inspection of that object of verification, to inspect all territory delineated on the site diagram as belonging to

that object of verification, including those separately located areas on the territory of the same State Party where conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty belonging to that object of verification are permanently assigned.

16. The inspection of one object of verification at a declared site shall permit the inspection team access, entry and unobstructed inspection within the entire territory of the declared site except within those areas delineated on the site diagram as belonging exclusively to another object of verification which the inspection team has not designated for inspection. During such inspections, the provisions of Section VI of this Protocol shall apply.

17. If the escort team informs the inspection team that battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges that have been notified as being held by one object of verification at a declared site are present within an area delineated on the site diagram as belonging exclusively to another object of verification, then the escort team shall ensure that the inspection team, as part of the same inspection, has access to such conventional armaments and equipment.

18. If conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are present within areas of a declared site not delineated on the site diagram as belonging exclusively to one object of verification, the escort team shall inform the inspection team to which object of verification such conventional armaments and equipment belong.

19. Each State Party shall be obliged to account for the aggregate total of any category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty notified pursuant to Section III of the Protocol on Information Exchange, at the organisational level above brigade/regiment or equivalent, if such an accounting is requested by another State Party.

20. If, during an inspection at a declared site, the inspection team decides to conduct at the same declared site an inspection of an object of verification that had not been previously designated, the inspection team shall have the right to commence such inspection within three hours of that designation. In such case, the inspection team shall be given a briefing on the object of verification designated for the next inspection in accordance with paragraphs 10 and 12 of this Section.

SECTION VIII. CHALLENGE INSPECTION WITHIN A SPECIFIED AREA

1. Each State Party shall have the right to conduct challenge inspections within specified areas in accordance with this Protocol.

2. If the inspecting State Party intends to conduct a challenge inspection within a specified area as the first inspection after arrival at a point of entry/exit:

(A) It shall include in its notification pursuant to Section IV of this Protocol the designated point of entry/exit nearest to or within that specified area capable of receiving the inspecting State Party's chosen means of transportation; and

- (B) At the number of hours after arrival at the point of entry/exit notified pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 2, subparagraph (E), of this Protocol, which shall be no less than one hour and no more than 16 hours after arrival at the point of entry/exit, the inspection team shall designate the first specified area it wishes to inspect. Declared sites located within the boundaries of a specified area shall not be subject to inspection in accordance with this Section. Whenever a specified area is designated, the inspection team shall, as part of its inspection request, provide to the escort team a geographic description delineating the outer boundaries of area. The inspection team shall have the right, as part of that request, to identify any structure or facility it wishes to inspect.
3. The State Party on whose territory a challenge inspection is requested shall, immediately upon receiving a designation of a specified area, inform other States Parties which utilise structures or premises by agreement with the inspected State Party of that specified area, including its geographic description delineating the outer boundaries.
4. The inspected State Party shall have the right to refuse challenge inspections within specified areas.
5. The inspected State Party shall inform the inspection team within two hours after the designation of a specified area whether the inspection request will be granted.
6. If access to a specified area is granted:
- (A) The inspected State Party shall have the right to use up to six hours after it accepts the inspection to prepare for the arrival of the inspection team at the specified area;
- (B) The inspected State Party shall ensure that the inspection team travels to the first specified area by the most expeditious means available and arrives as soon as possible after the designation of the site to be inspected, but no later than nine hours from the time such an inspection is accepted, unless otherwise agreed between the inspection team and the escort team, or unless the inspection site is located in mountainous terrain or terrain to which access is difficult. In such case, the inspection team shall be transported to the inspection site no later than 15 hours after such an inspection is accepted. Travel time in excess of nine hours shall not count against that inspection team's in-country period; and
- (C) The provisions of Section VI of this Protocol shall apply. Within such specified area the escort team may delay access to or overflight of particular parts of that specified area. If the delay exceeds more than four hours the inspection team shall have the right to cancel the inspection. The period of delay shall not count against the in-country period or the maximum time allowed within a specified area.
7. If an inspection team requests access to a structure or premises which another State Party utilises by agreement with the inspected State Party, the inspected State Party shall immediately inform that State Party of such a request. The escort team shall inform the inspection team that the other State Party, by agreement with the

inspected State Party, shall, in cooperation with the inspected State Party and to the extent consistent with the agreement on utilisation, exercise the rights and obligations set forth in this Protocol with respect to inspections involving equipment or materiel of the State Party utilising the structure or premises.

8. If the inspected State Party so wishes, the inspection team may be briefed on arrival at the specified area. This briefing is to last no more than one hour. Safety procedures and administrative arrangements may also be covered in this briefing.

9. If access to a specified area is denied:

- (A) The inspected State Party or the State Party exercising the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party shall provide all reasonable assurance that the specified area does not contain conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. If such armaments and equipment are present and assigned to organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions, the inspected State Party or the State Party exercising the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party shall allow visual confirmation of their presence, unless precluded from so doing by force majeure, in which case visual confirmation shall be allowed as soon as practicable; and
- (B) No inspection quota shall be counted, and the time between the designation of the specified area and its subsequent refusal shall not count against the in-country period. The inspection team shall have the right to designate another specified area or declared site for inspection or to declare the inspection concluded.

SECTION IX. INSPECTION WITHIN A DESIGNATED AREA

1. An inspection in a designated area shall be in response to the notification of an exceeded territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling as a result of a military exercise or a temporary deployment. Thus, notwithstanding the provisions of Section VI, paragraphs 27, 28 and 29, of this Protocol, battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery shall be the subject of this inspection; but observation of combat aircraft and attack helicopters shall be permitted.

2. An inspection within a designated area shall not be refused. Such inspection shall have priority over any inspection notified subsequently to be conducted in the same area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, which shall be carried out after the completion of the inspection within the designated area. In cases of force majeure, the provisions of Section VI, paragraph 1, of this Protocol shall apply.

3. When, as a result of a military exercise:

- (A) A territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling of a State Party is exceeded on a temporary basis for more than 21 days, that State Party shall accept one inspection within a designated area. The inspection may take place no earlier than seven days after a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling was notified to be exceeded and may be conducted no later than seven days following the notification provided pursuant to Section XVIII, paragraph 5, of the Protocol on Information Exchange; and

(B) A territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling of a State Party continues to be exceeded on a temporary basis for more than 42 days, that exercise shall be considered a temporary deployment and shall be subject to an additional inspection no earlier than 60 days after a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling was notified to be exceeded. Any subsequent inspections shall take place not earlier than day 150 of the exceeding of a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling and thereafter every 90 days.

4. When a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling of a State Party has been temporarily exceeded as a result of temporarily deployed battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery at or below the level of 153 battle tanks, 241 armoured combat vehicles or 140 pieces of artillery:

(A) That State Party shall accept one inspection within a designated area not earlier than day 30 of the exceeding of a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling;

(B) If the exceeding of a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling continues, that State Party shall accept a second inspection within a designated area no earlier than day 90 of the exceeding of a territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling; and

(C) If the exceeding of a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling continues, that State Party shall accept a third inspection within a designated area no earlier than day 180 of the exceeding of a territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling, and thereafter one additional inspection within a designated area after every 90 days.

5. When a territorial ceiling of a State Party has been temporarily exceeded as a result of temporarily deployed battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery above the level of 153 battle tanks, 241 armoured combat vehicles or 140 pieces of artillery:

(A) That State Party shall accept one inspection within a designated area not earlier than day 27 of the exceeding of a territorial ceiling;

(B) If the exceeding of the territorial ceiling continues, that State Party shall accept a second inspection within a designated area no earlier than day 75 of the exceeding of the territorial ceiling; and

(C) If the exceeding of the territorial ceiling continues, that State Party shall accept a third inspection within a designated area no earlier than day 180 of the exceeding of the territorial ceiling and thereafter one additional inspection within a designated area after every 90 days.

6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 4 above, if a territorial ceiling is exceeded at or below the levels of 153 battle tanks, 241 armoured combat vehicles or 140 pieces of artillery the armaments and equipment shall not create an inspection obligation pursuant to this Section, if all of these armaments and equipment are properly declared at their actual temporary location on the territory of another State Party in the information exchange pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1,

subparagraph (A), of the Protocol on Information Exchange and thereafter in each annual information exchange.

7. Each State Party shall have the right to participate in an inspection within a designated area except the State Party whose territorial ceiling or subceiling is temporarily exceeded and the States Parties having conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty on the territory of that State Party. As a general rule, the inspection team shall be multinational. One of the States Parties participating in the inspection team shall assume the responsibilities of the inspecting State Party in accordance with this Protocol.

8. The States Parties intending to participate in an inspection within a designated area shall cooperate in its planning.

9. In the case of inspection pursuant to paragraph 3, subparagraph (A), of this Section the following procedure shall apply:

(A) Each State Party interested in participating in an inspection shall notify all other States Parties no later than one day after the date of the exceeding of a territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling as notified pursuant to Section XVIII, paragraph 3, subparagraph (A) or (C), of the Protocol on Information Exchange. If a State Party is interested in assuming the obligations of the inspecting State Party this should be indicated in its notification. Copies of this notification shall be provided simultaneously to all delegations to the Joint Consultative Group and to the Chairman of the Joint Consultative Group;

(B) Thereafter, the States Parties which have given notification of their interest in participating in an inspection shall consult within one day in the framework of the Joint Consultative Group, unless they decide otherwise, to determine:

(1) The inspecting State Party;

(2) The composition of the inspection team, taking into consideration the provisions of Section VI, paragraph 5, of this Protocol; and

(3) Any other modalities of the inspection which they deem appropriate.

10. In the case of inspection pursuant to paragraph 4 or 5 of this Section the following procedure shall apply:

(A) Each State Party interested in participating in an inspection pursuant to paragraph 4, subparagraph (A), or paragraph 5, subparagraph (A), of this Section shall notify all other States Parties no later than nine days after the date of the exceeding of a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling as notified pursuant to Section XVIII, paragraph 4, subparagraph (A), of the Protocol on Information Exchange. If a State Party is interested in assuming the obligations of the inspecting State Party this should be indicated in its notification. Copies of this notification shall be provided simultaneously to all delegations to the Joint Consultative Group and to the Chairman of the Joint Consultative Group;

- (B) In the event of consequent inspection pursuant to paragraph 4, subparagraph (B) or (C), or to paragraph 5, subparagraph (B) or (C), or to paragraph 3, subparagraph (B), of this Section, each State Party interested in participating in such an inspection shall notify all other States Parties no later than the nine days prior to the date when the obligation to accept such a consequent inspection is effective;
 - (C) Thereafter, the States Parties which have given notification, pursuant to paragraph (A) or (B) above, of their interest in participating in an inspection shall consult within three days in the framework of the Joint Consultative Group, unless they decide otherwise, to determine:
 - (1) The inspecting State Party;
 - (2) The composition of the inspection team, taking into consideration the provisions of Section VI, paragraph 5, of this Protocol; and
 - (3) Any other modalities of the inspection which they deem appropriate.
11. An inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to this Section shall spend no more than 72 hours within the designated area.
12. At the number of hours after arrival at the point of entry/exit notified pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 3, subparagraph (E), of this Protocol, which shall be no less than one hour and no more than 16 hours after arrival at the point of entry/exit, the inspection team shall designate a designated area it wishes to inspect. Whenever a designated area is designated, the inspection team shall, as part of its inspection request, provide the escort team with a geographic description delineating the outer boundaries of the area. The inspection team shall have the right, as part of that request, to identify any structure or facility it wishes to inspect.
13. The State Party on whose territory an inspection within a designated area is requested shall, immediately upon receiving a designation of a designated area, inform all other States Parties which have forces or utilise structures or premises by agreement with the inspected State Party of that designated area, including its geographic description delineating the outer boundaries.
- (A) The inspected State Party shall have the right to use up to six hours after the designation of the designated area to prepare for the inspection;
 - (B) The inspected State Party shall ensure that the inspection team travels to the designated area by the most expeditious means available and arrives as soon as possible after the designation of the site to be inspected, but no later than nine hours after the designation of the designated area, unless otherwise agreed between the inspection team and the escort team, or unless the inspection site is located in mountainous terrain or terrain to which access is difficult. In such cases, the inspection team shall be transported to the inspection site no later than 15 hours after the designation of the site to be inspected.
14. On arrival at the designated area the inspection team shall be escorted to a briefing facility and shall be provided with a map (scale no larger than 1:250,000) and a geographic description of the designated area, to include declared site locations,

areas in which conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty and subject to this inspection are deployed and their estimated numbers, helicopter landing sites and the location of the briefing facility and the administrative area for the inspectors.

15. Within one half-hour after arrival at the briefing facility in the designated area the inspection team shall be given a pre-inspection briefing which shall last no more than one hour and shall include the following elements:

- (A) Safety and administrative procedures at the inspection site;
- (B) Modalities of transportation, helicopter landing sites and communication for inspectors at the inspection site;
- (C) The latest available information on the total numbers, by States Parties, of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery actually present on the territory of the inspected State Party or a territory with a subceiling, as follows:

- (1) Declared in the annual information exchange at locations on the territory of the inspected State Party or its territory with a subceiling and actually present;
- (2) Not declared in the annual information exchange at locations on the territory of the inspected State Party or its territory with a subceiling, but actually present and within the corresponding territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling;
- (3) Not declared in the annual information exchange at locations on the territory of the inspected State Party or territory with a subceiling but actually present in excess of the corresponding territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling.

The pre-inspection briefing shall include an explanation of any differences between the numbers of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or pieces of artillery actually present in excess of a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling and the corresponding numbers provided pursuant to Section XVIII, paragraphs 3 or 4, of the Protocol on Information Exchange;

- (D) The latest available information on the total numbers, by States Parties, of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery actually present in the designated area, as follows:
 - (1) Declared in the annual information exchange at locations within the designated area and actually present in the designated area;
 - (2) Declared in the annual information exchange at locations on the territory of the inspected State Party that are not within the designated area, but actually present in the designated area;

- (3) Not declared in the annual information exchange at locations on the territory of the inspected State Party but actually present in the designated area;
 - (E) The latest available information on the holdings at each declared site within the designated area of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery notified as of 1 January, reflecting any updating notification, and actually present; and
 - (F) Additional information that might facilitate the inspection team to conduct the inspection.
16. After the pre-inspection briefing, the inspection team shall declare the plan for the conduct of the inspection. This is without prejudice to the right of the inspection team to alter the initially declared plan in the course of the inspection.
17. During the inspection the inspection team may be provided with additional information to include briefings, charts and maps in order to facilitate the conduct of the inspection.
18. In the event that the inspection team wishes to inspect a declared site, the escort team shall, at the request of the inspection team, provide for a briefing about that declared site.
19. Within the designated area the escort team may delay access to or overflight of particular parts of that designated area. If the delay exceeds more than four hours, the time of delay in excess of four hours shall not count against the maximum time allowed within the designated area.
20. If an inspection team requests access to a structure or premises which another State Party utilises by agreement with the inspected State Party, the inspected State Party shall immediately inform that State Party of such a request. The escort team shall inform the inspection team that the other State Party, by agreement with the inspected State Party, shall, in cooperation with the inspected State Party and to the extent consistent with the agreement on utilisation, exercise the rights and obligations set forth in this Protocol with respect to inspections involving equipment or materiel of the State Party utilising the structure or premises.

SECTION X. INSPECTION OF CERTIFICATION

1. Each State Party shall have the right to inspect, without right of refusal, the certification of recategorised multi-purpose attack helicopters and reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft in accordance with the provisions of this Section, the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation and the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification. Such inspections shall not count against the quotas established in Section II of this Protocol. Inspection teams conducting such inspections may be composed of representatives of different States Parties. The inspected State Party shall not be obliged to accept more than one inspection team at a time at each certification site.
2. In conducting an inspection of certification in accordance with this Section, an inspection team shall have the right to spend up to two days at a certification site, unless otherwise agreed.

3. No less than 15 days before the certification of recategorised multi-purpose attack helicopters or reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, the State Party conducting the certification shall provide to all other States Parties notification of:

- (A) The site at which the certification is to take place, including geographic coordinates;
- (B) The scheduled dates of the certification process;
- (C) The estimated number and type, model or version of helicopters or aircraft to be certified;
- (D) The manufacturer's serial number for each helicopter or aircraft;
- (E) The unit or location to which the helicopters or aircraft were previously assigned;
- (F) The unit or location to which the certified helicopters or aircraft will be assigned in the future;
- (G) The point of entry/exit to be used by an inspection team; and
- (H) The date and time by which an inspection team shall arrive at the point of entry/exit in order to inspect the certification.

4. Inspectors shall have the right to enter and inspect visually the helicopter or aircraft cockpit and interior to include checking the manufacturer's serial number, without right of refusal on the part of the State Party conducting the certification.

5. If requested by the inspection team, the escort team shall remove, without right of refusal, any access panels covering the position from which components and wiring were removed in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation or the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification.

6. Inspectors shall have the right to request and observe, with the right of refusal on the part of the State Party conducting the certification, the activation of any weapon system component in multi-purpose attack helicopters being certified or declared to have been recategorised.

7. At the conclusion of each inspection of certification, the inspection team shall complete an inspection report in accordance with the provisions of Section XIV of this Protocol.

8. Upon completion of an inspection at a certification site, the inspection team shall have the right to depart the territory of the inspected State Party or to conduct a sequential inspection at another certification site or at a reduction site if the appropriate notification has been provided by the inspection team in accordance with Section IV, paragraph 3, of this Protocol. The inspection team shall notify the escort team of its intended departure from the certification site and, if appropriate, of its intention to proceed to another certification site or to a reduction site at least 24 hours before the intended departure time.

9. Within seven days after completion of the certification, the State Party responsible for the certification shall notify all other States Parties of the completion of the certification. Such notification shall specify the number, types, models or versions and manufacturer's serial numbers of certified helicopters or aircraft, the certification site involved, the actual dates of the certification, and the units or locations to which the recategorised helicopters or reclassified aircraft will be assigned.

SECTION XI. INSPECTION OF REDUCTION

1. Each State Party shall have the right to conduct inspections, without the right of refusal by the inspected State Party, of the process of reduction carried out pursuant to Sections I to VIII and X to XII of the Protocol on Reduction in accordance with the provisions of this Section. Such inspections shall not count against the quotas established in Section II of this Protocol. Inspection teams conducting such inspections may be composed of representatives of different States Parties. The inspected State Party shall not be obliged to accept more than one inspection team at a time at each reduction site.

2. The inspected State Party shall have the right to organise and implement the process of reduction subject only to the provisions set forth in Article VIII of the Treaty and in the Protocol on Reduction. Inspections of the process of reduction shall be conducted in a manner that does not interfere with the ongoing activities at the reduction site or unnecessarily hamper, delay or complicate the implementation of the process of reduction.

3. If a reduction site notified pursuant to Section III of the Protocol on Information Exchange is used by more than one State Party, inspections of the reduction process shall be conducted in accordance with schedules of such use provided by each State Party using the reduction site.

4. Each State Party that intends to reduce conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall notify all other States Parties which conventional armaments and equipment are to be reduced at each reduction site during a calendar reporting period. Each such calendar reporting period shall have a duration of no more than 90 days and no less than 30 days. This provision shall apply whenever reduction is carried out at a reduction site, without regard to whether the reduction process is to be carried out on a continuous or intermittent basis.

5. No less than 15 days before the initiation of reduction for a calendar reporting period, the State Party intending to implement reduction procedures shall provide to all other States Parties the calendar reporting period notification. Such notification shall include the designation of the reduction site with geographic coordinates, the scheduled date for initiation of reduction and the scheduled date for completion of the reduction of conventional armaments and equipment identified for reduction during the calendar reporting period. In addition, the notification shall identify:

(A) The estimated number and type of conventional armaments and equipment to be reduced;

- (B) The object or objects of verification from which the items to be reduced have been withdrawn;
- (C) The reduction procedures to be used, pursuant to Sections III to VIII and Sections X to XII of the Protocol on Reduction, for each type of conventional armaments and equipment to be reduced;
- (D) The point of entry/exit to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection of reduction notified for that calendar reporting period; and
- (E) The date and time by which an inspection team must arrive at the point of entry/exit in order to inspect the conventional armaments and equipment before the initiation of their reduction.

6. Except as specified in paragraph 11 of this Section, an inspection team shall have the right to arrive at or depart from a reduction site at any time during the calendar reporting period, including three days beyond the end of a notified calendar reporting period. In addition, the inspection team shall have the right to remain at the reduction site throughout one or more calendar reporting periods provided that these periods are not separated by more than three days. Throughout the period that the inspection team remains at the reduction site, it shall have the right to observe all the reduction procedures carried out in accordance with the Protocol on Reduction.

7. In accordance with the provisions set forth in this Section, the inspection team shall have the right to freely record factory serial numbers from the conventional armaments and equipment to be reduced or to place special marks on such equipment before reduction and to record subsequently such numbers or marks at the completion of the reduction process. Parts and elements of reduced conventional armaments and equipment as specified in Section II, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Protocol on Reduction or, in the case of conversion, the vehicles converted for non-military purposes shall be available for inspection for at least three days after the end of the notified calendar reporting period, unless inspection of those reduced elements has been completed earlier.

8. The State Party engaged in the process of reducing conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall establish at each reduction site a working register in which it shall record the factory serial numbers of each item undergoing reduction as well as the dates on which the reduction procedures were initiated and completed. This register shall also include aggregate data for each calendar reporting period. The register shall be made available to the inspection team for the period of inspection.

9. At the conclusion of each inspection of the reduction process, the inspection team shall complete a standardised report which shall be signed by the inspection team leader and a representative of the inspected State Party. The provisions of Section XIV of this Protocol shall apply.

10. Upon completion of an inspection at a reduction site, the inspection team shall have the right to depart the territory of the inspected State Party or to conduct a sequential inspection at another reduction site or at a certification site if the appropriate notification has been provided in accordance with Section IV, paragraph 4, of this Protocol. The inspection team shall notify the escort team of its

intended departure from the reduction site and, if appropriate, of its intention to proceed to another reduction site or to a certification site at least 24 hours before the intended departure time.

11. Each State Party shall be obliged to accept up to 10 inspections each year to validate the completion of conversion of conventional armaments and equipment into vehicles for non-military purposes pursuant to Section VIII of the Protocol on Reduction. Such inspections shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Section with the following exceptions:

- (A) The notification pursuant to paragraph 5, subparagraph (E), of this Section shall identify only the date and time by which an inspection team must arrive at the point of entry/exit in order to inspect the armaments and equipment at the completion of their conversion into vehicles for non-military purposes; and
- (B) The inspection team shall have the right to arrive at or depart from the reduction site only during the three days beyond the end of the notified completion date of conversion.

12. Within seven days after the completion of the process of reduction for a calendar reporting period, the State Party responsible for reductions shall notify all other States Parties of the completion of reduction for that period. Such notification shall specify the number and types of conventional armaments and equipment reduced, the reduction site involved, the reduction procedures employed and the actual dates of the initiation and completion of the reduction process for that calendar reporting period. For conventional armaments and equipment reduced pursuant to Sections X, XI and XII of the Protocol on Reduction, the notification shall also specify the location at which such conventional armaments and equipment will be permanently located. For conventional armaments and equipment reduced pursuant to Section VIII of the Protocol on Reduction, the notification shall specify the reduction site at which final conversion will be carried out or the storage site to which each item designated for conversion will be transferred.

SECTION XII. DISPOSAL OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY IN EXCESS OF REDUCTION LIABILITIES THROUGH DESTRUCTION/MODIFICATION

1. Each State Party intending to carry out disposal of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft or attack helicopters in excess of reduction liabilities through destruction/modification shall provide notification to all other States Parties no later than 15 days before the initiation of disposal. Such notification shall include information on the designation of the disposal site with geographic coordinates, the scheduled dates for initiation and for completion of the disposal, the estimated number and type of each item of equipment to be destroyed/modified, the method of destruction/modification, the suggested way of confirming the results of the process of destruction/modification as specified in paragraphs 4 and 11 of this Section.

2. The State Party which carried out a disposal through destruction/modification shall provide notification to all other States Parties no later than seven days after the completion of the disposal. Such notification shall specify the designation of the

disposal site with geographic coordinates, the actual dates of the initiation and completion of the disposal process, the number of armaments and equipment disposed of, including the type and factory serial numbers of each item of equipment disposed of, and the method of destruction/modification.

3. Each State Party which carries out disposal shall provide for the confirmation of the results of the disposal, either by:

- (A) Inviting an observation team in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4 of this Section, or
- (B) The use of cooperative measures in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 11 of this Section for the destruction of conventional armaments and equipment under procedures that provide sufficient visible evidence which confirms that they have been destroyed or rendered militarily unusable.

4. Each State Party which carries out a disposal shall have the right to choose one of the following modalities for an observation visit in the case of disposal of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft or attack helicopters in excess of reduction liabilities through destruction/modification:

- (A) An immediate observation visit at the time of completion of each disposal process;
- (B) Postponed observation visit to cover two or more disposal processes which took place within 90 days after a notification pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Section has been issued. In this case the State Party which carried out disposal through destruction/modification shall retain the destroyed/modified armaments and equipment from all disposal processes until the date of the observation visit;
- (C) Invitation of an observation team to conduct an inspection to observe the disposal. Such an inspection shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, except as provided for in this Section, and shall not count as an inspection under any of the quotas established under Section II of this Protocol. Only the disposed armaments and equipment notified pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Section shall be subject to such an inspection.

5. In the case of an observation visit the specified time for the observation visit and the point of entry/exit to be used by the observation team shall be included in the notification pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section. The observation team shall arrive at or depart from a disposal site during the period of time specified by the inviting State Party.

6. The State Party that intends to conduct an observation visit shall notify the inviting State Party no less than seven days in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the observation team at the suggested point of entry/exit. Such notification shall include:

- (A) The point of entry/exit to be used;

- (B) The estimated time of arrival at the point of entry/exit;
- (C) The means of arrival at the point of entry/exit;
- (D) The language to be used by the observation team, which shall be a language designated in accordance with Section III, paragraph 12, of this Protocol;
- (E) The full names of observers and transport crew members, their gender, date of birth, place of birth, nationality and passport number. Unless otherwise agreed the observers and transport crew members shall be drawn from the lists of inspectors and transport crew members, provided pursuant to Section III, paragraph 6, of this Protocol.

7. The State Party receiving the notification of an intended observation visit will, upon its receipt, send copies of such notification to all other States Parties.

8. The State Party which carries out disposal will provide an opportunity for observation of the final results of the process of disposal through destruction/modification by the observation team. During the observation visit, the observation team shall have the right to record the factory serial numbers of each item of equipment that has been destroyed/modified.

9. An observation visit and inspections pursuant to paragraph 4, subparagraph (C), of this Section shall be conducted at the expense of the observing State Party. The modalities for such payment will be decided on by the Joint Consultative Group.

10. Without delay the observing State Party shall inform all other States Parties about the results of the visit.

11. In the case of cooperative measures for the provision of sufficient visible evidence of the destruction of conventional armaments and equipment, the following procedures shall apply:

- (A) Each item of equipment to be disposed of shall be displayed in complete assembly in a clearly delineated area where the disposal is to take place, no later than 14 days before the initiation of the actual destruction; and
- (B) After destruction, the parts of each complete assembly shall be displayed in the same delineated area for a period of 14 days after the completion of the actual destruction.

SECTION XIII. CANCELLATION OF INSPECTIONS

1. If an inspection team finds itself unable to arrive at the point of entry/exit within six hours after the initial estimated time of arrival or after the new time of arrival communicated pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 7, of this Protocol, the inspecting State Party shall so inform the States Parties notified pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1, of this Protocol. In such a case, the notification of intent to inspect shall lapse and the inspection shall be cancelled.

2. In the case of delay, due to circumstances beyond the control of the inspecting State Party, occurring after the inspection team has arrived at the point of entry/exit and which has prevented the inspection team from arriving at the designated inspection site within the time specified in Section VI, paragraph 43, or Section VII, paragraph 8, or Section VIII, paragraph 6, subparagraph (B), or Section IX, paragraph 12, of this Protocol, the inspecting State Party shall have the right to cancel the inspection. If an inspection pursuant to Section VII or VIII is cancelled under such circumstances, it shall not be counted against any quotas provided for in the Treaty.

SECTION XIV. INSPECTION REPORTS

1. In order to complete an inspection carried out in accordance with Section VII, VIII, IX, X or XI of this Protocol, and before leaving the inspection site:

- (A) The inspection team shall provide the escort team with a written report; and
- (B) The escort team shall have the right to include its written comments in the inspection report and shall countersign the report within one hour after having received the report from the inspection team, unless an extension has been agreed between the inspection team and the escort team.

2. The report shall be signed by the inspection team leader and receipt acknowledged in writing by the leader of the escort team.

3. The report shall be factual and standardised. Formats for each type of inspection shall be agreed by the Joint Consultative Group.

4. Reports of inspections conducted pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol shall include:

- (A) The inspection site;
- (B) The date and time of arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site;
- (C) The date and time of departure of the inspection team from the inspection site; and
- (D) The number and type, model or version of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, combat helicopters, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges that were observed during the inspection, including, if appropriate, an indication of the object of verification to which they belonged.

5. Reports of inspections conducted pursuant to Section IX of this Protocol shall include:

- (A) The designated area defined by geographic coordinates;
- (B) The date and time of arrival of the inspection team at the designated area;

- (C) The date and time of departure of the inspection team from the designated area;
- (D) The number and type, model or version of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery that were observed during the inspection as a total and by States Parties.

6. Reports of inspections conducted pursuant to Sections X and XI of this Protocol shall include:

- (A) The reduction or certification site at which the reduction or certification procedures were carried out;
- (B) The dates the inspection team was present at the site;
- (C) The number and type, model or version of conventional armaments and equipment for which the reduction or certification procedures were observed;
- (D) A list of any serial numbers recorded during the inspections;
- (E) In the case of reductions, the particular reduction procedures applied or observed; and
- (F) In the case of reductions, if an inspection team was present at the reduction site throughout the calendar reporting period, the actual dates on which the reduction procedures were initiated and completed.

7. The inspection report shall be written in the official language of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe designated by the inspecting State Party in accordance with Section IV, paragraph 2, subparagraph (G), or paragraph 3, subparagraph (F), of this Protocol.

8. The inspecting State Party and the inspected State Party shall each retain one copy of the report. The inspecting State Party shall make the inspection report available to each State Party upon request.

9. Any State Party whose conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty have been inspected shall in particular:

- (A) Have the right to include written comments related to the inspection of its conventional armed forces; and
- (B) Retain one copy of the inspection report in the case of inspection of its conventional armed forces.

SECTION XV. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF INSPECTORS AND TRANSPORT CREW MEMBERS

1. To exercise their functions effectively, for the purpose of implementing the Treaty and not for their personal benefit, inspectors and transport crew members shall be accorded the privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to

Article 29; Article 30, paragraph 2; Article 31, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3; and Articles 34 and 35 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961.

2. In addition, inspectors and transport crew members shall be accorded the privileges enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961. They shall not be permitted to bring into the territory of the State Party where the inspection is to be carried out articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations of that State Party.

3. The transportation means of the inspection team shall be inviolable, except as otherwise provided for in the Treaty.

4. The inspecting State Party may waive the immunity from jurisdiction of any of its inspectors or transport crew members in those cases when it is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. The immunity of inspectors and transport crew members who are not nationals of the inspecting State Party may be waived only by the States Parties of which those inspectors are nationals. Waiver must always be express.

5. The privileges and immunities provided for in this Section shall be accorded to inspectors and transport crew members:

(A) While transiting through the territory of any State Party for the purpose of conducting an inspection on the territory of another State Party;

(B) Throughout their presence on the territory of the State Party where the inspection is carried out; and

(C) Thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of official functions as an inspector or transport crew member.

6. If the inspected State Party considers that an inspector or transport crew member has abused his or her privileges and immunities, then the provisions set forth in Section VI, paragraph 9 of this Protocol shall apply. At the request of any of the States Parties concerned, consultations shall be held between them in order to prevent a repetition of such an abuse.”

Article 28

1. In the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group, paragraph 3 shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“3. The Joint Consultative Group shall meet for regular sessions to be held two times per year, unless it decides otherwise.”

2. In the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group, paragraph 11 shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“11. The scale of distribution for the common expenses associated with the operation of the Joint Consultative Group shall be applied, unless otherwise decided by the Joint Consultative Group, as follows:

10.73%	for the French Republic, for the Federal Republic of Germany, for the Italian Republic, for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and for the United States of America;
9.00%	for the Russian Federation;
6.49%	for Canada;
5.15%	for the Kingdom of Spain;
4.23%	for the Kingdom of Belgium and for the Kingdom of the Netherlands;
2.47%	for the Kingdom of Denmark and for the Kingdom of Norway;
1.75%	for Ukraine;
1.72%	for the Republic of Poland;
1.20%	for the Republic of Turkey;
0.84%	for the Hellenic Republic, for the Republic of Hungary and for Romania;
0.81%	for the Czech Republic;
0.70%	for the Republic of Belarus;
0.67%	for the Republic of Bulgaria, for the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and for the Portuguese Republic;
0.40%	for the Slovak Republic;
0.20%	for the Republic of Armenia, for the Republic of Azerbaijan, for Georgia, for the Republic of Iceland, for the Republic of Kazakhstan and for the Republic of Moldova.”

3. In the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group, paragraph 12 shall be deleted.

Article 29

The Protocol on the Provisional Application of Certain Provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe shall be repealed.

Article 30

1. Changes to maximum levels for holdings, notified under the provisions of the Treaty during the period between signature and entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter referred to as the Agreement on Adaptation, shall also be considered changes to the levels specified in the Protocol on National Ceilings and, if the State Party concerned so requests, to the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings, provided that:

- (A) Such changes are consistent with the limitations set forth in Article IV, paragraphs 3 and 4, and Article V, paragraphs 4 and 5, of the Treaty, and
- (B) The numerical limits set forth in Article IV, paragraph 4, and Article V, paragraph 5, of the Treaty are applied in proportion to the time that has elapsed between signature and entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation.

2. In the case where such changes would require the consent of all other States Parties as set forth in Article IV, paragraph 4, and Article V, paragraph 5, of the Treaty, such changes shall be considered changes to the levels specified in the Protocol on National Ceilings, provided that no State Party provides a written objection to such changes within 60 days of entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation.

3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 and 2 of this Article, notified changes shall not be considered changes to the Protocol on National Ceilings and the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings where a State Party is notifying a unilateral decrease in its maximum levels for holdings, unless that State Party so requests.

Article 31

1. This Agreement on Adaptation shall be subject to ratification by each State Party in accordance with its constitutional procedures.

2. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Depositary.

3. This Agreement on Adaptation shall enter into force 10 days after instruments of ratification have been deposited by all States Parties listed in the Preamble, after which time the Treaty shall exist only in its amended form.

4. Upon entry into force of this Agreement on Adaptation, the numerical levels set forth in Article IV, paragraph 4, and Article V, paragraph 5, of the Treaty shall be reduced in proportion to the time remaining between the date of entry into force and the next review conference pursuant to Article XXI, paragraph 1.

5. The original of this Agreement on Adaptation, of which the English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary. Duly certified copies of this Agreement on Adaptation shall be transmitted by the Depositary to all States Parties.

6. This Agreement on Adaptation shall be registered by the Depositary pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ZU URKUND DESSEN haben die hierzu gehörig befugten Unterzeichneten diesen Vertrag unterschrieben.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

EN FE DE LO CUAL, los abajo firmantes, debidamente autorizados, han firmado el presente Tratado.

EN FOI DE QUOI, les soussignés, dûment habilités, ont signé le présent Traité.

IN FEDE DI CHE i sottoscritti, debitamente autorizzati, hanno firmato il presente Trattato.

В УДОСТОВЕРЕНИЕ ЧЕГО нижеподписавшиеся, должным образом на то уполномоченные, подписали настоящий Договор.

GESCHEHEN zu Istanbul am 19. November 1999.

DONE at Istanbul, this nineteenth day of November, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine.

HECHO en Estambul, el diecinueve de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve.

FAIT à Istanbul, le dix-neuf novembre mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-dix neuf.

FATTO a Istanbul, addì diciannove novembre millenovecentonovantanove.

СОВЕРШЕНО в Стамбуле ноября девятнадцатого дня, одна тысяча девятьсот девяносто девятого года.


FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
POR LA REPÚBLICA FEDERAL DE ALEMANIA
POUR LA REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNE
PER LA REPUBBLICA FEDERALE DI GERMANIA
ЗА ФЕДЕРАТИВНУЮ РЕСПУБЛИКУ ГЕРМАНИЮ



FÜR DIE VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON AMERIKA
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
POR LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA
POUR LES ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE
PER GLI STATI UNITI D'AMERICA
ЗА СОЕДИНЕННЫЕ ШТАТЫ АМЕРИКИ



FÜR DIE REPUBLIK ARMENIEN
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA
POR LA REPÚBLICA DE ARMENIA
POUR LA RÉPUBLIQUE D'ARMÉNIE
PER LA REPUBBLICA DI ARMENIA
ЗА РЕСПУБЛІКУ АРМЭНІЮ



FÜR DIE ASERBAIDSCHANISCHE REPUBLIK
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN
POR LA REPÚBLICA DE AZERBAIYÁN
POUR LA RÉPUBLIQUE AZERBAÏDJANAISE
PER LA REPUBBLICA DI AZERBAIGIAN
ЗА АЗЕРБАЙДЖАНСКУЮ РЕСПУБЛІКУ




FÜR DIE REPUBLIK BELARUS
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS
POR LA REPÚBLICA DE BELARÚS
POUR LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU BELARUS
PER LA REPUBBLICA DI BELARUS
ЗА РЕСПУБЛІКУ БЕЛАРУСЬ



FÜR DAS KÖNIGREICH BELGIEN
FOR THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM
POR EL REINO DE BÉLGICA
POUR LE ROYAUME DE BELGIQUE
PER IL REGNO DEL BELGIO
ЗА КОРОЛЕВСТВО БЕЛЪГИЮ

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a large, stylized initial 'A' followed by a horizontal line that curves downwards at the end.


FÜR DIE REPUBLIK BULGARIEN
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA
POR LA REPÚBLICA DE BULGARIA
POUR LA REPUBLIQUE DE BULGARIE
PER LA REPUBBLICA DI BULGARIA
ЗА РЕСПУБЛИКУ БОЛГАРИЮ

A long, flowing handwritten signature in black ink, starting with a large, stylized initial 'S' and ending with a series of wavy, horizontal strokes.


FÜR KANADA
FOR CANADA
POR CANADÁ
POUR LE CANADA
PER IL CANADA
ЗА КАНАДУ

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Jean Chrétien" in a cursive, flowing script.


FÜR DAS KÖNIGREICH DÄNEMARK
FOR THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK
POR EL REINO DE DINAMARCA
POUR LE ROYAUME DU DANEMARK
PER IL REGNO DI DANIMARCA
ЗА КОРОЛЕВСТВО ДАНИЮ

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Paul Nguj", followed by a long horizontal line extending to the right.

FÜR DAS KÖNIGREICH SPANIEN
FOR THE KINGDOM OF SPAIN
POR EL REINO DE ESPAÑA
POUR LE ROYAUME D'ESPAGNE
PER IL REGNO DI SPAGNA
ЗА КОРОЛЕВСТВО ИСПАНИЮ

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "M. Belkiss", followed by a long horizontal line extending to the right.

FÜR DIE FRANZÖSISCHE REPUBLIK
FOR THE FRENCH REPUBLIC
POR LA REPÚBLICA FRANCESA
POUR LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
PER LA REPUBBLICA FRANCESE
ЗА ФРАНЦУЗСКУЮ РЕСПУБЛИКУ

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Mina", followed by a long horizontal line extending to the right.

FÜR GEORGIEN
FOR GEORGIA
POR GEORGIA
POUR LA GEORGIE
PER LA GEORGIA
ЗА ГРУЗИЮ

107th 33rd 33rd 33rd


FÜR DAS VEREINIGTE KÖNIGREICH GROSSBRITANNIEN UND NORDIRLAND
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
POR EL REINO UNIDO DE GRAN BRETAÑA E IRLANDA DEL NORTE
POUR LE ROYAUME-UNI DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE ET D'IRLANDE DU NORD
PER IL REGNO UNITO DI GRAN BRETAGNA E IRLANDA DEL NORD
ЗА СОЕДИНЕННОЕ КОРОЛЕВСТВО ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИИ И СЕВЕРНОЙ ИРЛАНДИИ

Robin Cook

FÜR DIE GRIECHISCHE REPUBLIK
FOR THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC
POR LA REPÚBLICA HELÉNICA
POUR LA REPUBLIQUE HELLENIQUE
PER LA REPUBBLICA ELLENICA
ЗА ГРЕЧЕСКУЮ РЕСПУБЛИКУ

K. Simitis


FÜR DIE REPUBLIK UNGARN
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY
POR LA REPÚBLICA DE HUNGRÍA
POUR LA REPUBLIQUE DE HONGRIE
PER LA REPUBBLICA D'UNGHERIA
ЗА ВЕНГЕРСКУЮ РЕСПУБЛИКУ

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a series of loops and a long horizontal stroke at the end.

FÜR DIE REPUBLIK ISLAND
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF ICELAND
POR LA REPÚBLICA DE ISLANDIA
POUR LA REPUBLIQUE D'ISLANDE
PER LA REPUBBLICA D'ISLANDA
ЗА РЕСПУБЛИКУ ИСЛАНДИЮ

A handwritten signature in black ink, featuring a large, sweeping initial 'S' followed by several smaller loops and a long horizontal stroke.


FÜR DIE ITALIENISCHE REPUBLIK
FOR THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC
POR LA REPÚBLICA ITALIANA
POUR LA REPUBLIQUE ITALIENNE
PER LA REPUBBLICA ITALIANA
ЗА ИТАЛЬЯНСКУЮ РЕСПУБЛИКУ

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Nominis / Alessi' with a horizontal line underneath.


FÜR DIE REPUBLIK KASACHSTAN
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN
POR LA REPÚBLICA DE KAZAKSTÁN
POUR LA REPUBLIQUE DU KAZAKHSTAN
PER LA REPUBBLICA DEL KAZAKISTAN
ЗА РЕСПУБЛИКУ КАЗАХСТАН

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be a stylized name.

FÜR DAS GROSSHERZOGTUM LUXEMBURG
FOR THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG
POR EL GRAN DUCADO DE LUXEMBURGO
POUR LE GRAND-DUCHE DE LUXEMBOURG
PER IL GRANDUCATO DEL LUSSEMBURGO
ЗА ВЕЛИКОЕ ГЕРЦОГСТВО ЛЮКСЕМБУРГ

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a horizontal line with a downward-pointing arrowhead on the left side.


FÜR DIE REPUBLIK MOLDAU
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
POR LA REPÚBLICA DE MOLDOVA
POUR LA REPUBLIQUE DE MOLDAVIE
PER LA REPUBBLICA DI MOLDOVA
ЗА РЕСПУБЛИКУ МОЛДОВА

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be a stylized name.

FÜR DAS KÖNIGREICH NORWEGEN
FOR THE KINGDOM OF NORWAY
POR EL REINO DE NORUEGA
POUR LE ROYAUME DE NORVEGE
PER IL REGNO DI NORVEGIA
ЗА КОРОЛЕВСТВО НОРВЕГИЮ

Kjell Magne Bondevik

FÜR DAS KÖNIGREICH DER NIEDERLANDE
FOR THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS
POR EL REINO DE LOS PAÍSES BAJOS
POUR LE ROYAUME DES PAYS-BAS
PER IL REGNO DEI PAESI BASSI
ЗА КОРОЛЕВСТВО НИДЕРЛАНДОВ

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Jan' followed by a large, stylized flourish that loops around and ends in a vertical stroke.


FÜR DIE REPUBLIK POLEN
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND
POR LA REPÚBLICA DE POLONIA
POUR LA REPUBLIQUE DE POLOGNE
PER LA REPUBBLICA DI POLONIA
ЗА РЕСПУБЛІКУ ПОЛЬША

Aleksander Kwasniewski

FÜR DIE PORTUGIESISCHE REPUBLIK
FOR THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC
POR LA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA
POUR LA REPUBLIQUE PORTUGAISE
PER LA REPUBBLICA PORTOGHESE
ЗА ПОРТУГАЛЬСКУЮ РЕСПУБЛИКУ

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Antonio Costa', written in a cursive style.

FÜR RUMÄNIEN
FOR ROMANIA
POR RUMANIA
POUR LA ROUMANIE
PER LA ROMANIA
ЗА РУМЪНИЮ

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Gheorghe Arutin', written in a cursive style.

FÜR DIE RUSSISCHE FÖDERATION
FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
POR LA FEDERACIÓN RUSA
POUR LA FEDERATION DE RUSSIE
PER LA FEDERAZIONE RUSSA
ЗА РОССИЙСКУЮ ФЕДЕРАЦИЮ

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Vladimir Putin', written in a cursive style.

FÜR DIE SLOWAKISCHE REPUBLIK
FOR THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC
POR LA REPÚBLICA ESLOVACA
POUR LA REPUBLIQUE SLOVAQUE
PER LA REPUBBLICA SLOVACCA
ЗА СЛОВАЦКУЮ РЕСПУБЛИКУ

Rudolf Schuster

FÜR DIE TSCHECHISCHE REPUBLIK
FOR THE CZECH REPUBLIC
POR LA REPÚBLICA CHECA
POUR LA REPUBLIQUE TCHEQUE
PER LA REPUBBLICA CESA
ЗА ЧЕШСКУЮ РЕСПУБЛИКУ

Václav Havel

FÜR DIE REPUBLIK TÜRKEI
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
POR LA REPÚBLICA DE TURQUÍA
POUR LA REPUBLIQUE TURQUE
PER LA REPUBBLICA DI TURCHIA
ЗА ТУРЕЦКУЮ РЕСПУБЛИКУ

S. Demirel

FÜR DIE UKRAINE
FOR UKRAINE
POR UCRAINA
POUR L'UKRAINE
PER L'UCRAINA
ЗА УКРАЇНУ

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be the name 'Ljornny' or similar, written in a cursive style.

FINAL ACT
OF THE CONFERENCE
OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY
ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 19 November 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Having met in Istanbul from 17 to 19 November 1999,

Guided by Section III of the Final Document of the First Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength, of May 1996,

Guided by the Document on the Scope and Parameters of the Process Commissioned in Paragraph 19 of the Final Document of the First CFE Treaty Review Conference adopted in Lisbon on 1 December 1996,

Taking into account the Decision of the Joint Consultative Group No. 8/97 of 23 July 1997, concerning Certain Basic Elements for Treaty Adaptation,

Recalling their commitment at the OSCE Oslo Ministerial Meeting in December 1998 to complete the process of adaptation of the Treaty by the time of the OSCE Summit in 1999,

Taking into account the Decision of the Joint Consultative Group No. 3/99 of 30 March 1999,

Recalling the Decision of the Joint Consultative Group No. 8/99 of 11 November 1999 on the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter referred to as the Agreement on Adaptation,

Have taken note of the Statement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe issued by the North Atlantic Council and the Representatives of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Poland at the Ministerial Meeting held in Brussels on 8 December 1998, and have taken note of the commitments contained therein;

Have taken note of the statement by the Russian Federation, which is attached to this Final Act, concerning its commitments on restraint and the use of Treaty flexibilities in the region which includes the Kaliningrad oblast and the Pskov oblast;

Have noted with appreciation that in the course of the adaptation negotiations several States Parties have committed themselves to reducing their permitted levels of armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, thus reflecting the fundamental changes in the European security environment since the signing of the Treaty in November 1990;

Have further taken note of the statements by the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic, which are attached to this Final Act, concerning their commitments regarding the future adjustment of their territorial ceilings, and the relevant conditions;

Have taken note of the statements by the Republic of Belarus, the Czech Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland, the Slovak Republic and Ukraine, which are attached to this Final Act, concerning their commitments regarding their future use of the provisions on increasing territorial ceilings set forth in the Agreement on Adaptation, and the relevant conditions;

Have undertaken to move forward expeditiously to facilitate completion of national ratification procedures, so that the Agreement on Adaptation can enter into force as soon as possible, taking into account their common commitment to, and the central importance of, full and continued implementation of the Treaty and its associated documents until and following entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation; and, in this context, have taken note of the statement by the Government of the Russian Federation on 1 November 1999, including its commitment, contained therein, to all obligations under the Treaty and, in particular, to agreed levels of armaments and equipment;

Have welcomed the joint statement by Georgia and the Russian Federation of 17 November 1999, which is attached to this Final Act;

Have taken note of the statement by the Republic of Moldova, which is attached to this Final Act, concerning its renunciation of the right to receive a temporary deployment on its territory and have welcomed the commitment of the Russian Federation to withdraw and/or destroy Russian conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty by the end of 2001, in the context of its commitment referred to in paragraph 19 of the Istanbul Summit Declaration;

Have expressed their intention to review the above elements, as appropriate, at the Second Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty, which will take place in May 2001;

Have noted that, following entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation, other participating States of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe with territory in the geographic area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains will have the possibility to apply for accession to the Treaty;

Have noted that a consolidated version of the Treaty as amended by the Agreement on Adaptation is being produced for information and to facilitate implementation;

Have adopted this Final Act at the time of signature of the Agreement on Adaptation.

This Final Act, in all six official languages of the Treaty, shall be deposited with the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as the designated Depositary for the Treaty, which shall circulate copies of this Final Act to all States Parties.

ANNEX 1

Original: ENGLISH

Statement on behalf of the Czech Republic

“Upon the signature of the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty the Czech Republic establishes its territorial and national ceiling at the level of its currently notified maximum national levels for holdings.

The Czech Republic will reduce its territorial ceiling in all three ground categories of TLE by conversion of its DPSS entitlements not later than by the end of the year 2002. This means that the Czech territorial and national ceiling will then be:

- battle tanks 795
- armoured combat vehicles 1,252
- artillery pieces 657

The reduced TC and NC in the three ground categories of TLE, will only take effect upon successful and satisfactory conclusion of the adaptation process. In deciding to exercise the above unilateral restraint, the Czech Republic reserves the right to receive on its territory exceptional temporary deployments up to 459 battle tanks, 723 armoured combat vehicles and 420 artillery pieces in excess of the country’s territorial ceiling.”

ANNEX 2

Original: ENGLISH

Statement on behalf of the Republic of Hungary

“Upon signature of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Republic of Hungary intends to establish its national and territorial ceiling at the level of its present Maximum National Levels for Holdings.

However, in the current and foreseeable security environment, defence plans of the country make possible significant reductions in Treaty-Limited Equipment. The Republic of Hungary is ready to reduce its territorial ceiling in the three ground categories of TLE by conversion of the country’s DPSS entitlements by no later than the end of the year 2002. This means that the Hungarian national and territorial ceiling will be at that time:

- battle tanks 710
- armoured combat vehicles 1,560
- artillery pieces 750

The reduced Hungarian NC and TC will take effect only upon successful and satisfactory conclusion of the adaptation process. In undertaking the above unilateral restraint, the Republic of Hungary reserves the right to receive on its territory exceptional temporary deployments up to 459 battle tanks, 723 armoured combat vehicles and 420 artillery pieces in excess of the country’s territorial ceiling.”

ANNEX 3

Original: ENGLISH

Statement on behalf of the Republic of Poland

“The Republic of Poland commits herself politically to the following:

At signature of the adapted CFE Treaty, Polish territorial ceilings equal our currently notified maximum national levels for holdings.

In light of the on-going restructurization of the Polish armed forces, Polish actual holdings in the Treaty-limited ground categories of armament and equipment not later than the end of 2001 will not exceed:

- battle tanks 1,577
- armoured combat vehicles 1,780

and not later than the end of 2002 will not exceed:

- artillery pieces 1,370

Subject to reciprocal good will and restraint in the immediate neighbourhood of Poland, Polish territorial ceilings not later than the end of 2003 will be adjusted to match the above numbers for actual holdings, through the partial conversion of the DPSS, in accordance with the mechanisms envisaged in the adapted CFE Treaty.

It is understood that during this period of time, Poland in accordance with her immediate and full access to Exceptional Temporary Deployments rights may host on its territory up to:

- battle tanks 459
- armoured combat vehicles 723
- artillery pieces 420.”

ANNEX 4

Original: ENGLISH

Statement on behalf of the Slovak Republic

“Upon the signature of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe the Slovak Republic establishes its Territorial and National Ceilings at the level of its currently notified Maximum National Levels for Holdings.

The Slovak Republic undertakes a political commitment to reduce its territorial ceiling in the ground categories of the armament and equipment limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, through the partial conversion of the Designated Permanent Storage Site entitlements, in accordance with the mechanism provided for in the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Not later than by the end of the year 2003, the Territorial Ceiling of the Slovak Republic will be:

- battle tanks 323,
- armoured combat vehicles 643,
- artillery pieces 383.

The Slovak Republic reserves the right to host on its territory Temporary Deployments in excess of the Territorial Ceiling established in the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings up to 459 battle tanks, 723 armoured combat vehicles and 420 artillery pieces.”

ANNEX 5

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

Statement on behalf of the Russian Federation

“In the context of the political commitments and efforts of other States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), in particular those aimed at further strengthening stability in Central Europe, the Russian Federation will show due restraint with regard to ground TLE levels and deployments in the region which includes the Kaliningrad oblast and the Pskov oblast. In the present politico-military situation, it has no reasons, plans or intentions to station substantial additional combat forces, whether air or ground forces, in that region on a permanent basis.

If necessary, the Russian Federation will rely on the possibilities for operational reinforcement, including temporary deployments, in a manner compatible with the CFE Treaty mechanisms.”

ANNEX 6

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

Statement on behalf of the Republic of Belarus

“The Republic of Belarus undertakes the following political commitments:

Taking into account the statements of other States Parties with regard to the reduction of their territorial ceilings (TCs), the Republic of Belarus will be prepared, upon signing of the adapted CFE Treaty, to make its national ceilings (NCs) equal to the existing maximum national levels for holdings (MNLHs) of Treaty-limited conventional armaments and equipment (TLE).

The TCs of the Republic of Belarus for ground categories of TLE will thus be equal to its NCs.

In addition, in current and foreseeable security circumstances and in the context of similar restraint by other States Parties, including those in the immediate vicinity of its borders, the Republic of Belarus will not make use of the general mechanism foreseen in the adapted Treaty for upward revision of its TCs.”

ANNEX 7

Original: ENGLISH

Statement on behalf of the Czech Republic

“In the current and foreseeable security circumstances, and in the context of comparable commitments by other States Parties, the Czech Republic undertakes not to make use of the general mechanisms of the adapted CFE Treaty for upward revision of the territorial ceilings.”

ANNEX 8

ENGLISH

Original: GERMAN

Statement on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany

Mr. Chairman,

Under the agenda item "Statements on unilateral political commitments" I am authorized on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany to state the following:

"The Federal Republic of Germany commits itself, in the current and foreseeable security circumstances and in the context of comparable commitments by other States Parties, not to make use of the general mechanisms provided for in an adapted CFE Treaty for upward revision of territorial ceilings."

ANNEX 9

Original: ENGLISH

Statement on behalf of the Republic of Hungary

“The Republic of Hungary declares that, in the current and foreseeable security circumstances and in the context of comparable commitments by other States Parties, the Republic of Hungary undertakes not to make use of the general mechanism provided in the adapted CFE Treaty for upward revision of territorial ceilings.”

ANNEX 10

Original: ENGLISH

Statement on behalf of the Republic of Poland

“The Republic of Poland commits herself politically to the following:

Under current and foreseeable security circumstances and depending on reciprocal measures of restraint in her immediate vicinity, including, in particular, the Russian Federation with regard to its current force levels in Kaliningrad, and Belarus with regard to its territorial ceilings at least not exceeding current MNLHs, Poland will not make use of her right for upward revision of her both current and future territorial ceilings, as envisaged in the adapted CFE Treaty.”

ANNEX 11

Original: ENGLISH

Statement on behalf of the Slovak Republic

“In the current and foreseeable security circumstances and in the context of similar restraints by other States Parties, the Slovak Republic undertakes a political commitment not to make use of general mechanism provided for in the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe for upward revision of Territorial Ceilings.”

ANNEX 12

Original: ENGLISH

Statement on behalf of Ukraine

“Ukraine commits itself, in the current and foreseeable security circumstances and in the context of comparable commitments by other States Parties, not to make use of the general mechanism provided for in the adapted CFE Treaty for upward revision of territorial ceilings.”

ANNEX 13

Original: ENGLISH

Statement on behalf of the Republic of Moldova

“The Republic of Moldova renounces the right to receive a temporary deployment on its territory due to its Constitutional provisions which control and prohibit any presence of foreign military forces on the territory of Moldova.”

ANNEX 14

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and Georgia

Istanbul, 17 November 1999

The Russian Federation and Georgia,

guided by paragraphs 14.2.3 and 14.2.7 of the Decision of the Joint Consultative Group of 30 March 1999 concerning adaptation of the CFE Treaty,

confirming their intention to properly implement the adapted CFE Treaty as adopted,

wishing to promote the development and strengthening of co-operative relations between the Russian Federation and Georgia,

have agreed as follows.

1. The Russian Side undertakes to reduce, by no later than 31 December 2000, the levels of its TLE located within the territory of Georgia in such a way that they will not exceed 153 tanks, 241 ACVs and 140 artillery systems.

2. No later than 31 December 2000, the Russian Side will withdraw (dispose of) the TLE located at the Russian military bases at Vaziani and Gudauta and at the repair facilities in Tbilisi.

The Russian military bases at Gudauta and Vaziani will be disbanded and withdrawn by 1 July 2001.

The issue of the utilization, including the joint utilization, of the military facilities and infrastructure of the disbanded Russian military bases remaining at those locations will be resolved within the same time-frame.

3. The Georgian Side undertakes to grant to the Russian Side the right to basic temporary deployment of its TLE at facilities of the Russian military bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki.

4. The Georgian Side will facilitate the creation of the conditions necessary for reducing and withdrawing the Russian forces. In this connection, the two Sides note the readiness of OSCE participating States to provide financial support for this process.

5. During the year 2000 the two Sides will complete negotiations regarding the duration and modalities of the functioning of the Russian military bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki and the Russian military facilities within the territory of Georgia.