{"id":8185,"date":"2014-10-13T10:08:04","date_gmt":"2014-10-13T08:08:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.redanalysis.org\/?p=8185"},"modified":"2017-10-31T17:19:50","modified_gmt":"2017-10-31T16:19:50","slug":"potential-futures-libya","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/redanalysis.org\/fr\/2014\/10\/13\/potential-futures-libya\/","title":{"rendered":"S\u00e9rie \"Futurs potentiels pour la Libye\" - Caract\u00e9ristiques d'une guerre"},"content":{"rendered":"

The fall of Muammar Gaddafi and his revolutionary regime in 2011 has ushered in an era of factional violence between city militias, military units, and Islamic and nationalist brigades. According to LibyaBodyCount.org<\/a>\u00a0(see detailed\u00a0bibliographic reference below), 1,741 Libyans have been killed in violent clashes or assassinations from January to September 2014 alone. Although the site\u2019s body count statistics cannot be taken as official numbers since they are based on media reports, it offers the best estimation.<\/p>\n

The conflict has created 250,000 refugees<\/a> with, in August 2014, a peak rate of 5,000-6,000<\/a> crossing the Tunisian border each day, forcing Tunisia to close its border. Egypt and Algeria<\/a> have also closed their borders, forcing Libyans to either stay in the country as displaced persons, or attempt to cross the Mediterranean Sea as refugees. Libya’s post-Gaddafi era has brought about a failed state that is increasingly plagued by civil war and all the associated negative effects.<\/p>\n

A continuing and strengthening Libyan civil war poses a significant challenge in the North African and Middle Eastern regions, and even beyond. Besides the direct domestic disaster resulting from civil war, the involvement of five foreign regional governments <\/a>(each with their own political or security stake in Libya) backing the fighting domestic actors could be a powder-keg, further destabilizing the region.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, radical Libyan Islamist groups, such as Ansar al-Sharia, may be tempting opportunities for outside terrorist organizations; therefore, a continuing civil war between Islamic and nationalist forces in an oil-rich region could potentially invite foreign extremist groups that would ensure the continuance and likely spread of instability, as suggested by Egypt<\/a>. According to Christopher Chivvis and Jeffrey Martini from the RAND Corporation, jihadist groups in Libya are certainly a minority, but are still very deadly and a potential \u201cfuture threat<\/a>\u201d (2014).<\/p>\n

Hence, this post begins a series on the Libyan crisis and post-Gaddafi civil war. The objective of this series is to provide analysis and strategic foresight for the next five years in Libya, which is crucial to conduct considering the potential strategic impact of the war and related uncertainties.<\/p>\n

Due to the sheer number of armed groups, the increasing involvement of regional actors, and the constant change in territorial control, we must analyze the crisis and make strategic foresight conclusions through adaptable lenses. With this in mind, we shall\u00a0present throughout the series the state of play for each actor in the Nationalist and Dawn of Libya coalitions, the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries, Mujahideen Shura Council, and the involved regional actors, while emphasizing their goals and beliefs as much as possible before pursuing scenarios. In this opening post, we shall present the current situation and underline its main features, including using metrics to evaluate the severity of the Libyan “crisis”.<\/p>\n

Brief outlook of the situation (October 2014)<\/h1>\n

Libya\u2019s descent into chaos can be attributed to many variables. However, the primary variable involves the interim government\u2019s failure to make visible progress (in the form of stable governance, justice, finance, and security<\/a> in the post-conflict phase) \u2013 and particularly its inability to control the armed groups that were once integrated<\/a> under the transitional government. It will be vital to keep those elements in mind once a peace process is in sight.<\/p>\n

Libya is currently split between two rival governments<\/a> \u2013 the elected Council of Representatives currently located in Tobruk (the newly elected parliament that replaced the GNC) and the General National Congress in Tripoli (Libya\u2019s former legislative authority during the interim phase). Furthermore, most of Libya\u2019s major armed groups have merged into warring coalitions<\/a>: the Dawn of Libya \u2013 composed of Misrata brigades and Islamist groups \u2013 on the one hand, and General Haftar and his nationalist allies<\/a>, on the other. A third alliance, called the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries, is an umbrella group comprised of Ansar al-Sharia, Libya Shield One, the Rafallah al-Sahati Companies, and 17 February Revolutionary Martyr’s Brigade (Ending Libya’s Civil War, 2014<\/a>), while a Derna-based alliance called the Mujahideen Shura Council is comprised of Salafi-jihadists (see Islamist Forces Part I) The more radical Islamist umbrella groups oppose the Nationalist Coalition – similar to the Dawn of Libya – however, they have not ideologically aligned themselves with Dawn of Libya<\/a>. General Haftar faces two fronts of Salafi-jihadist alliances and the primarily-Islamist yet pro-revolutionary Dawn of Libya. Dawn of Libya controls Tripoli and Misrata, the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries is currently battling Haftar in Benghazi<\/a>, and the Mujahideen Shura Council is operating in Derna.<\/p>\n

Khalifa Haftar<\/a> is a renegade general who established his own National Army and seeks to remove Islamist factions<\/a> and influence from Libya. The Dawn of Libya announced its support for the General National \"VOA,<\/a>Congress, while General Haftar has allied with the Council of Representatives in Tobruk. Haftar had called for a new government to replace the GNC either to minimize the influence of Islamist politicians or as a strategic \u201ccoup attempt<\/a>\u201d to consolidate political power and influence<\/a>, or both. Haftar prefers the newly elected Council of Representatives to the Islamic-dominated GNC, thus making him a strong ally to the government in Tobruk.<\/p>\n

During the interim phase, armed groups \u2013 whether affiliated or not with the state \u2013 fought for regional control and influence, or were tasked by government ministries to handle specific security operations<\/a>. However, the launch of Haftar\u2019s \u201cOperation Dignity<\/a>\u201d (with the goal of eliminating Islamist militias and terrorism) forced many prominent groups to form alliances. As a result, the western-based Islamist groups and the Misratan brigades have joined forces against General Haftar and his allies, while the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries and Mujahideen Shura Council clash with Haftar in the east. The Dawn of Libya controls the major cities of Tripoli and Misrata, the Shura Council is battling Haftar to retain control of Benghazi, the Mujahideen Shura Council controls Derna, and the Nationalist coalition controls Al-Zintan in the west with Al-Bayda and Tobruk in the east.<\/p>\n

\"Libya,<\/a>
Libyan Actors Main Positions. Google Maps, map data: Basarsoft, Google, ORION-ME 2014. Blue Circle: General National Congress. Blue Balloons: Dawn of Libya (Islamist\/Misrata Coalition). Red Balloons: Ansar al-Sharia. Orange Balloons: Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries. Green Circle: Council of Representatives. Green Balloons: General Haftar and Nationalist Coalition. Black Balloon: Mujahideen Shura Council. Black Star: Islamic State. Blue Diamonds: Regional Supporter of Operation Dawn. Green Diamonds: Regional Supporter of Operation Dignity.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Characterizing the Libyan\u00a0conflict<\/h1>\n

Most of the fighting occurs in the Tripolitania and Cirenaica regions with epicenters in Tripoli and Benghazi, both currently under Islamist control; however, Libya\u2019s conflict cannot be classified as a simple rivalry between Islamists and secularists \u2013 a notion iterated by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy<\/a> (Barak Barfi, “Khalifa Haftar: Rebuilding Libya from the Top Down,<\/a>” August 2014). Both loose coalitions contain tribal, regional, religious, and ideological fracture lines, with differences existing between the individual Islamic groups as well. Tensions and divisions exist between Salafist-jihadist groups, like Ansar al-Sharia, and the more democratic Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated groups. Divisions in Libyan armed groups and society include, but are not limited to:<\/p>\n