{"id":9631,"date":"2015-05-04T09:52:00","date_gmt":"2015-05-04T07:52:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.redanalysis.org\/?p=9631"},"modified":"2021-10-08T12:27:49","modified_gmt":"2021-10-08T10:27:49","slug":"comprendre-les-systemes-islamiques-system-structure-et-wilayat","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/redanalysis.org\/fr\/2015\/05\/04\/understanding-the-islamic-states-system-structure-and-wilayat\/","title":{"rendered":"Comprendre le syst\u00e8me de l'\u00c9tat islamique - Structure et Wilayat"},"content":{"rendered":"

Conflicting information regarding the Islamic State and the evolution of the war\u00a0emerge\u00a0everyday from\u00a0the media, while analysts, commentators and official statements are no less swaying. For example, on 13 April 2015, “Army Col. Steve Warren, a Pentagon spokesman” stressed that the Islamic State had\u00a0“ceded 5,000 to 6,000 square miles of territory”, painting a “rosier portrait” as reported by\u00a0Mitchell Prothero and James Rosen for McClatchy DC (15 April 2015<\/a>). A mere two days later, the same spokesman\u00a0was describing battles in Ramadi and Baiji\u00a0in a sobering way, even though Prothero and Rosen also underline that “U.S. officials\u00a0have been cautious about overstating Iraqi successes against the Islamic State” (Ibid.) – since then Baiji is again under Iraqi government control, while fighting continues in\u00a0Ramadi and more generally Anbar, see Rudaw<\/em>, 22 April 2015<\/a>; 29 April 2015<\/a>; 26 April 2015<\/a>.<\/p>\n

As another example,\u00a0if the Islamic State has lost ground and the city of Tikrit and if the situation in Anbar remains contested (e.g. Bill Roggio & Caleb Weiss, The Long War Journal<\/a><\/em>, 26 April 2015), on the other hand, a first psyops video from Yemen, \u201cSoldiers of the Caliphate in the Land of Yemen \u2013 Wil\u0101yat \u1e62ana\u2019\u0101’\u201d was also \"\u201cSoldiers<\/a>published on 24 April 2015 (see Jihadology.net<\/a>*), after the 20 March 2015 first\u00a0statement “Adopting the Martyrdom Operations Against the Dens of the \u1e24\u016bth\u012bs \u2013 Wil\u0101yat \u1e62ana\u2019\u0101’\u201d (Jihadology.net<\/a>). This could signal the start of real\u00a0activities there. Indeed, Yemen was declared a Wilayat in November 2014 (Aaron Zelin, “The Islamic State\u2019s model<\/a>“, The Washington Post<\/em>, 28 January 2015,\u00a0Ludovico Carlino, IHS Jane’s<\/a><\/em>,\u00a025 March 2015), but, according to Zelin (Ibid.), hardly activity had been seen by the end of January.\u00a0We would thus have both attrition and expansion.<\/p>\n

Psyops and propaganda, the fog of war,\u00a0as well as the difficulty to obtain reliable information on the Islamic State, all interacting, contribute to this \u00a0complicated situation.<\/p>\n

The scope, intensity and evolution of the threat constituted by the Islamic State, its Khilafah and the worldview and system they seek to establish (see the Psyops series<\/a>), as well as the length of the war and the prospects for its fate, fundamentally depend upon the Islamic State’s ability to be successful in meeting aims located along three interacting\u00a0dimensions:\u00a0\"Wilayat<\/a>consolidating and developing the Islamic State and its Khilafah as a polity in all its facets, asserting supremacy over actual\u00a0or potential competing groups and fighting victoriously against attacking foes (see H.\u00a0Lavoix, “The Islamic State Psyops – Worlds War”<\/a>, The Red Team Analysis Society<\/em>, 16 January 2015). As a result, defeating\u00a0the Islamic State implies\u00a0attacking along these three dimensions, permanently hindering each aim.<\/p>\n

Previously, we focused on the Islamic State’s psyops as a way to understand better its belief-system, way of thinking, worldview and objectives. We notably underlined that its\u00a0current and potential influence, as well as the related power of its approach, are grounded in its ability to promote a specific coherent ideology anchored in a real material territorial state-like power, thus\u00a0synthesising idealism and materialism (see for the detail H. Lavoix, “Worlds War<\/a>“, Ibid.). Now, we shall address\u00a0the material or concrete side of the Islamic State, although not forgetting the socio-ideological model which is at its foundation, focusing on the Islamic State’s\u00a0ability to indeed create\u00a0a real polity. We shall seek to improve our understanding of the type of polity, with its specificities, that is being\u00a0formed. Our ultimate aim is to be able to contribute to a\u00a0foresight\u00a0assessment of the sustainability of the Islamic State, in other words to answer to questions such as: Is the Islamic State\u00a0about to collapse? Is it reinforcing? Will it last one, two, or ten years?<\/p>\n

We shall here focus on the overall structure of the Islamic State and its Khilafah and identify a meaningful unit of analysis, with specificities that can then be monitored to foresee and warn about the overall developments of the Islamic State.<\/p>\n

[Check also the 22 February 2016 detailed analysis for the Islamic State structure and wilayat in Yemen using the framework\u00a0explained here: “Understanding the Islamic State\u2019s System \u2013 Wilayat and Wali in Yemen<\/a>“]<\/em><\/p>\n

Internal governance and external wilayat?<\/h1>\n

The first difficulty when describing a polity is not to introduce unwillingly biases, notably by projecting unconscious models we may have of the way a political entity functions onto another. Keeping in mind the diversity of political organisations over time and space, from, for example, the southeast Asian pre-modern “galactic polity” system (Tambiah, 1976) to the modern nation-state through the European feudal system, on the one hand, and the originality of the Islamic State system merging Salafism thus old Islamic texts\u00a0with materialism and use of twenty-first century techniques and approach, it is most probable that we shall often or to the least sometimes be faced with political units and dynamics that will not correspond to our usual, implicit, modern-state model. We are likely to also find hybrid, novel, or different political practices and organisations.<\/p>\n

The first differentiation that most analysts of the Islamic State’s organisation, relying on scant sources, seem to make is to distinguish between “external and internal governance”, thus reproducing more or less the usual differentiation between domestic political organisation (the state and its administrative divisions) \"wilayat,<\/a>and external one (from client states, to allies through colonies). We thus find studies of what seems to be conceptualised as focusing on the “Islamic State proper” – i.e. what territory has been captured in Syria and Iraq and is ruled, apparently directly – on the one hand and, on the other, analyses of areas which are declared by the Islamic State as wilayat<\/em>, often following a pledge of allegiance done by a group that is a would-be state actor and its acceptance by the Khalif.<\/p>\n

The first case is exemplified by Barrett’s\u00a0The Islamic State<\/a><\/em>\u00a0(The Soufan Group<\/em>, November 2014). The author relies mainly, for the part regarding leadership and “governance structure”, on an analysis published by The Telegraph<\/em>\u00a0(Ruth Sherlock,\u00a09 Jul 2014<\/a>; see for a use of apparently the same source, CNN<\/a><\/em> and TRAC, 14 January 2015), using “information, which was found on memory sticks taken from the home of Abu Abdul Rahman al-Bilawi, al-Baghdadi’s military chief of staff for Iraqi territory” to which the analyst Hashimi al Hashimi “had access”.<\/p>\n

According to Hashimi, Sherlock, and Barrett, we thus have a highly centralised structure (Barrett: 28) headed by the Khalifah<\/em> (Caliph, the person who is the stewart for the Khilafah, the political organisation), advised and legitimated (knowing that legitimacy may also be questioned) by two councils, the Shura council and the Sharia council,\u00a0seconded by\u00a0two deputies,\u00a0one being responsible for Iraq and the other for Syria, then by various councils (we shall come back to this more in detail with the next post, see “Understanding the Islamic State\u2019s System \u2013 The Calif and Legitimacy<\/a>“).\u00a0The Islamic State was\u00a0then divided into 18 wilayat, eight\u00a0in Iraq, nine in Syria and one, Wilayat Al-Furat, on the border between Syria and Iraq (Ibid.: 33). Still using this approach, but updating it, by March 2015, according to Dabiq<\/em> #8\u00a0(p.27) we have 20 wilayat: ten in Iraq, nine in Syria and Al-Furat.<\/p>\n

\"Islamic<\/a>
The Islamic State wilayat in Mesopotamia by H Lavoix, Red (Team) Analysis – background map: Military situation as of 28 April 2015 by Haghal Jagul – Public Domain via Wikimedia Commons – Click to access larger image<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

A wilayat<\/em> is translated variously according to dictionaries. For\u00a0Lewis (The Political Language of Islam<\/em>, 1988: 123), it means governorship or province. As these terms may have different political\u00a0\u00a0meanings, it is better to keep initially the original meaning and then to explain it through the Islamic State system itself. We shall thus use Lewis explanation according to which the “vali and vilayat are the Turkish pronunciation of the active participle and verbal noun of the Arabic root w-l-y, \u2018to be near\u2019 and hence \u2018to take charge of\u2019 (Ibid.). By extension wilayat will be “what is taken charge of”, “what is ruled”.<\/p>\n

In the second case, we have analyses focusing rather on external wilayat, such as Aaron Zelin’s (ibid., see also a\u00a0monthly power ranking AQ vs IS<\/a>\u00a0and the categories used), actually aiming first at comparing and contrasting the Islamic State wilayat system and Al-Qaeda franchises.<\/p>\n

\"Khorasan<\/a>
Official presentation for the 28 April Video “Targeting apostasy Pakistani army mortar in the Khyber region” Wilayat Khorasan<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n
\"wilayat<\/a>
Still from the video<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Here,\u00a0we thus have, connected to the Islamic State,\u00a0“Algeria (Wilayat al-Jazair), Libya (Wilayat al-Barqah, Wilayat al-Tarabulus and Wilayat al-Fizan), Sinai (Wilayat Sinai), Saudi Arabia (Wilayat al-Haramayn) and Yemen (Wilayat al-Yaman)”, to which must be added Wilayat Khorasan, i.e. Pakistan and Afghanistan\u00a0(Ibid.). More recently,\u00a0Boko Haram would have been renamed the\u00a0Islamic State’s West Africa province or ISWAP (Adam Whitnall, The Independent<\/a><\/em>, 26 April 2015), which would have become\u00a0Wil\u0101yat Gharb Ifr\u012bq\u012byyah\u00a0(see Jihadology.net<\/em>, 31 March 2015<\/a>).<\/p>\n

According to Zelin, “it [The Islamic State]\u00a0has had a relatively clear agenda and model: fighting locally, instituting limited governance and conducting outreach.” Zelin, however, emphasises that Libya and Sinai\u00a0are “following the same methodology on the ground and in the media as the Islamic State\u2019s wilayat have in Iraq and Syria” and that “its [The Islamic State] media apparatus took over the media departments of all the local wilayat outside of Mesopotamia”. He \"lybian<\/a>then points out that Libya – as is clear also from the attention given to it in Dabiq,<\/em> see #5,\u00a0#6, #7, #8\u00a0– has “the\u00a0most potential to replicate the Islamic State\u2019s model in Mesopotamia if things go right for it,” with three wilayat<\/em> having been created. Zelin then\u00a0further underlines similarities that are developed in the governance of these wilayat<\/em>,\u00a0while pledges are demanded to be made to the Caliph. As a result, the author brings these wilayat<\/em> further away from an\u00a0implicit initial categorisation (external versus internal), on the contrary showing that they are progressively dragged\u00a0closer to the center. The search for a new framework for analysis may be signaled here by the use of the term Mesopotamia, to break away analytically from the existing international order.<\/p>\n

\"wilayat<\/a>
Official image for the video \u201cLion of the Battlefield #2 \u2013 Wil\u0101yat al-Barakah\u201d, 16 April 2015, watch on Jihadology.net<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

If the approach of separating external wilayat from internal ones is convenient, easy to understand and clear,\u00a0we may also wonder if it is not potentially\u00a0unwillingly misleading because failing to fully represent reality. Indeed, if\u00a0we had two such categories, then why would the Islamic State use the same label for both, i.e. wilayat<\/em>. Furthermore, if we consider the relatively a-local and a-geographical idea that is included in the notion of ribat<\/em>, which led us to revise our understanding of what is foreign and what is domestic, from the point of view of the Islamic State (H. Lavoix “Ultimate War<\/a>“), as well as the aim to establish a Khilafah, thus a unique entity over the whole world, then are we sure we can truly fully categorize differently wilayat<\/em> located within the Islamic State and those “outside” it?<\/p>\n

On the other hand, the Islamic State and its leaders have shown their pragmatism, which was emphasised again by Der Spiegel’s\u00a0<\/em>Christoph Reuter “The Terror Strategist: Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State<\/a>” (18 April 2015). In this thorough analysis of documents originating\u00a0from\u00a0Samir Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi aka Haji Bakr,\u00a0former colonel in the intelligence service of Saddam Hussein’s air defense force, and mastermind behind the Islamic State’s “subjugation” of part of Syria, Reuter explains the dynamics of infiltration and domination used by the Islamic State leadership, as well as the security apparatus of the \"wilayat<\/a>Islamic State. Among others, this underlines that the initial step towards expansion, for the Islamic State, is not only military but also, and maybe foremost, religious. This aspect of underground taking over was also confirmed as far as the city of Mosul is concerned\u00a0by Al-Tamimi analysis (“Aspects of Islamic State (IS) Administration in Ninawa Province: Part III<\/a>“,\u00a0January 23, 2015).<\/p>\n

Considering the Islamic State leadership’s pragmatism, it is most likely that real distance from the Khilafah’s center, as well as the position of an external group within\u00a0the dynamics of revolt against the existing order play a role in the type of organisation and relation to the center for each wilayat.\u00a0<\/em>This\u00a0is\u00a0what\u00a0can be deduced from Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi fascinating analysis “The Islamic State and its ‘Sinai Province’<\/a>” (26 March 2015) to which we shall now turn as he\u00a0gives us the key to a most probably more adequate\u00a0understanding of the Islamic State system, as already implicitly present in Zelin’s work.<\/p>\n

A global wilayat system articulated around\u00a0administrative and military strength?<\/h1>\n

Comparing three pledges of allegiance and the response to them made by the Islamic State,\u00a0Al-Tamimi explains in each case the answer, and how it is translated in administrative and political terms. If we generalise Al-Tamimi’s understanding, which is also congruent with what Zelin explains, it would come that, in the case of further away (in all understandings of the word) and relatively weak groups considering the area where they\u00a0operated,\u00a0such as “Indian jihadi group Tan\u1e93im Ansar al-Tawheed” (pledge made in May 2014), there is no official answer from the Islamic State. The group is thus merely used “for propaganda work” (Ibid.).<\/p>\n

Actually, and this point does not question Al-Tamimi reasoning and explanation, if we follow the explanation by\u00a0the Islamic State as given in Dabiq #5: 24, acceptation of pledges would have been done for all groups (Dabiq<\/em>‘s list, unfortunately, is generic, ending a list of groups by “and elsewhere”), but declarations of wilayat<\/em> would be delayed. Only how this delay will end is then explained: case 1 – “appointment or recognition of leadership by the Khalifah\u00a0for those lands where multiple groups have given bay’at\u00a0and merged” and case 2 – “establishment of a direct line of communication between the Khilafah and the mujahid leadership of lands who have yet to contact the Islamic State and thus receive information and directives from the Khalifah” (Ibid.).<\/p>\n

\"wilayat<\/a>
\u201cHarvest of the Military Operations for the Month of March-April 2015 \u2013 Wil\u0101yat S\u012bn\u0101\u2019 (Sinai)\u201d – 26 April 2015 – See on Jihadology.net<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Then, for groups such as the Gaza-Sinai Jama\u02bfat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (pledge: November 2014), the Islamic State’s official answer is translated as\u00a0the creation of a new wilayat, here Wilayat Sinai (now Wil\u0101yat Sayn\u0101<\/em>\u2019, according to various psyops products – updated 16 Feb 2016). Thus, these groups\u00a0are estimated by the Islamic State’s leadership, according to Al-Tamimi,\u00a0as being able to\u00a0“give the IS brand a viable military presence and ultimately a state-like representation in the area in question” with a strong media arm. They are thus transformed into wali<\/em> as the territory where they\u00a0operate and ultimately more or less rule becomes a\u00a0wilayat<\/em>.\u00a0The extent to which they will be or remain wali<\/em> remain to be explored. However, if we refer to Dabiq’s explanation, the wali<\/em> is specifically considered as “appointed by us [the Islamic State] for it [the declared wilayat<\/em>]” (Dabiq #5: 25). This, thus, further supports Al-Tamimi thesis according to which the Islamic State must be sure enough of the strength of the main group when declaring a wilayat<\/em>.<\/p>\n

\"Damascus<\/p>\n

For these specific cases of wilayat<\/em>, Al-Tamimi also points out that there are not yet there any “significative Islamic State administrative division” or even “proto-state bodies”; what can be found, besides military operations and media is only “‘proto-Hisbah’ (Shari\u02bea law enforcement)” (Ibid.).\u00a0Note, as detailed by Al-Tamimi in the case of Sinai, that the challenge\u00a0for each wilayat, notably at this turning point or early stage, is similar to the triple aim\u00a0that\u00a0exists at the larger Islamic State level, and involves notably leading other groups, tribes and factions to pledge allegiance to the Khalif as well as\u00a0uniting\u00a0these actors.<\/p>\n

Finally, the third case identified by Al-Tamimi is represented by Wilayat al-Barqah (centered around Derna in Libya), where “Islamic State state-like institutions” have been set up, such as “a\u00a0Diwan al-Hisbah<\/i> (enforcing Islamic morality),\u00a0a Diwan al-Ta\u02bealeem<\/i> (education) and a Diwan al-Awqaf wa al-Masajid<\/i> (religious outreach and control of mosques),” while military control appears stronger (Ibid.)<\/p>\n

To understand at best the Islamic State polity it would thus make sense\u00a0to take the wilayat<\/em> as main unit of analysis and then to consider as main characteristics not its geographical location compared with Iraq and Syria, but the degree of Islamic State-like administrative and military control over the population and the territory, while media control would start being implemented as soon as possible,\u00a0even for the least advanced groups. A tentative map using this system is presented below. Dynamically, it is also interesting to point out that we move from a group and its pledge to a territory with its administrative system, which is, ironically, not without presenting similarities with the move from ruling over followers as in pre-modern systems to the territorially bounded state as in the modern state one. This similarity should, however, not be overstated considering the most probably crucial role of religion, as we shall see\u00a0more in detail in forthcoming posts.<\/p>\n

\"Islamic<\/a>
The wilayat of the Islamic State – 29 April 2015, by H Lavoix for Red (Team) Analysis. In white surrounded by black the most inactive wilayat. In grey those wilayat where fighting is preeminent and only extremely sparse administrative\/Sharia’h activity takes place. In black the most administratively advanced wilayat. The classification for Mesopotamia is tentative. Add to the map, wilayat Qawqaz (Caucasus), created on 23 June 2015 on part of the Russian Federation territory (ref: Harleen Gambhir, \u201cISIS Declares Governorate in Russia\u2019s North Caucasus Region\u201c, ISW, 23 June 2015) – Click to access large image.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Would this approach be also coherent for wilayat<\/em> that are located within Syria and Iraq? If we turn to\u00a0Caris and Reynolds who analysed ISIS governance in Syria<\/a><\/em> (ISW<\/em>, July 2014), they also emphasise the dynamics of first establishing military control then moving to political control through the establishment of governance and state structure, articulated around “administration and Muslim services” (Ibid: 14).\u00a0Comparing Wilayat al-Khayr (Deir ez-Zour, where military operations are still ongoing, e.g. Ara News<\/a><\/em>, 28 March 2015) to Wilayat al-Raqqa (where the Islamic State’s is seen as strongest and most established), \"dewan<\/a>they further specifically underline that the level of sophistication of governance and services implemented is proportional to the degree of military control, as identified by Al-Tamimi in the cases of Wilayat Barqa and Wilayat Sinai. Thus the model outlined would also fit wilayat<\/em> located within Iraq and Syria.<\/p>\n

We should underline, however, that some wilayat<\/em>, notably in Syria (namely wilayat\u00a0al-L\u0101dhiq\u012byah and wilayat Idlib), do not present any activity since the Islamic State withdrew in March 2014 (Caris and Reynolds, Ibid: 8,\u00a013), but remain, nevertheless, wilayat, probably in prevision of potential future operations. This stresses first the importance\u00a0of considering the fluidity\u00a0of war and second\u00a0\u00a0the need to apply this framework, as all models, more as guideline than as rules\u00a0set in stone.<\/p>\n

Although we would ideally need a detailed assessment of each wilayat, furthermore monitored over time to fully confirm the validity of our wilayat-<\/em>based model, as such it is\u00a0most likely to be sufficiently representative of the reality of the Islamic State to be used as ideal-type\u00a0framework for understanding how the Islamic State polity functions and to assess the odds of its survival and expansion or, on the contrary decay and disappearance.<\/p>\n

With the next posts, we shall further detail the political dynamics, processes and structures of the wilayat system within the Islamic State.<\/p>\n

Helene Lavoix, PhD Lond (International Relations), is the Director of The Red (Team) Analysis Society. She is specialised in strategic foresight and warning for national and international security issues.<\/em><\/p>\n

——-<\/p>\n

* A special thanks should be given\u00a0by all researchers and analysts of the Islamic State to Aaron Zelin for maintaining Jihadology.net, as this allows us all to access Jihadis videos and documents, not only in a single place but also easily, as increasingly access to Islamic State documents seems to be forbidden from some countries.<\/p>\n

Similarly the translation work and primary research done by Aymenn Al-Tamimi are immensely useful.<\/p>\n

Of course, these thanks do not diminish in any way\u00a0the interest of both scholars’ analyses.<\/p>\n

——-<\/p>\n

Bibliography<\/h3>\n

Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad,\u00a0“Aspects of Islamic State (IS) Administration in Ninawa Province: Part III”,\u00a0Iraq Insurgent Profiles (aymennjawad.org),\u00a0January 23, 2015.<\/p>\n

Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad, “The Islamic State and its ‘Sinai Province'”,Tel Aviv Notes: Moshe Dayan Center,\u00a026 March 2015.<\/p>\n

Barrett, Richard,\u00a0The Islamic State,\u00a0The Soufan Group, November 2014.<\/p>\n

Caris, Charles C., & Samuel Reynolds,\u00a0ISIS governance in Syria,\u00a0ISW, July 2014.<\/p>\n

Lavoix, Helene,\u00a0“The Islamic State\u2019s Psyops \u2013 Ultimate War”,\u00a0Red (Team) Analysis, 9 February 2015.<\/p>\n

Lavoix, Helene,\u00a0“The Islamic State Psyops \u2013 Worlds War”,\u00a0Red (Team) Analysis,\u00a019 January 2015.<\/p>\n

Lewis, Bernard,\u00a0The Political Language of Islam, The University of Chicago Press, 1988, no. 22, p. 123.<\/p>\n

Reuter, Christoph, “The Terror Strategist: Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State”,\u00a0Der Spiegel,\u00a018 April 2015.<\/p>\n

Roggio, Bill, & Caleb Weiss, “Islamic State captures dam, overruns base in western Iraq”,\u00a0The Long War Journal, 26 April 2015.<\/p>\n

Sherlock, Ruth, “Inside the leadership of Islamic State: how the new ‘caliphate’ is run”,\u00a0The Telegraph,\u00a09 Jul 2014.<\/p>\n

Tambiah, Stanley, World Conqueror and World Renouncer: a Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand against a Historical Background<\/em> (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).<\/p>\n

Zelin, Aaron, “The Islamic State\u2019s model”,\u00a0The Washington Post<\/em>, 28 January 2015.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Des informations contradictoires concernant l'\u00c9tat islamique et l'\u00e9volution de la guerre \u00e9mergent chaque jour des m\u00e9dias, tandis que les analystes, les commentateurs et les d\u00e9clarations officielles ne sont pas moins balanc\u00e9s. Par exemple, le 13 avril 2015, le \"Army Col. Steve Warren, un porte-parole du Pentagone\" soulignait que l'\u00c9tat islamique avait \"c\u00e9d\u00e9 5 000 \u00e0 6 000 miles carr\u00e9s de territoire\", dressant un \"portrait plus rose\" alors que .... <\/p>\n

Continuer la lecture \" Comprendre le syst\u00e8me de l'\u00c9tat islamique - Structure et Wilayat \"<\/span><\/a><\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":9644,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1947],"tags":[307,2010,1970,1789,1620,1908,1650,1628,2060,302,2560,306,1634,1433,2008,2009,2058,2007,1295],"class_list":["post-9631","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-the-islamic-state","tag-afghanistan","tag-algeria","tag-daesh","tag-featured","tag-iraq","tag-is","tag-isis","tag-islamic-state","tag-libyan-war","tag-nigeria","tag-open-access","tag-pakistan","tag-salafism","tag-sinai","tag-state-building","tag-state-formation","tag-syria-issues","tag-wilayat","tag-yemen","entry"],"yoast_head":"\nUnderstanding the Islamic State's System - Structure and Wilayat • The Red Team Analysis Society<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"What is the overall structure of the Islamic State? 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