France faces an escalating protest movement. This movement is called the “Yellow Vests” or “Yellow Vest”. The French government appears to be always late in the way it answers it; political analysts appear to be surprised by what is happening and to struggle to understand. Meanwhile, violence increases.

文章的第二部分。 法国黄背心运动的稳定化还是升级?

To contribute to the explanation of the French Yellow Vest movement, we re-publish this article, which foresees and explains how a contest movement starts with a triggering demand, then spreads and grows in terms of scope and intensity, pointing out similarities – everything being equal – with the French situation.* In the winter 2018 French case, the rising loss of legitimacy not only of the government, but also of the state, dramatizes the situation and makes the matter worse.

早在2011年,我们就预见到了 新的政治反对派运动的崛起.事实上,地理-时间的传播也必须被理解为跨国家的传播,在世界网络和互联社会和团体的时代更是如此。

Since December 2010 with the “Arab Spring,” protests and demonstrations have so much flared successively in so many countries that all should be aware, at least, that something is going on.Among others, this allowed for the feared rise of “populism”, we explained in other 文章.  Furthermore, earlier (weak?) signals could be found with the French 2005 riots and 2006 students’ protests, with the 2007-2008 food riots, as well as with violence in Greece during the winter 2008-2009. In 2007-2008, 十五国, mainly in Asia and Africa were hit by the food riots. Since then at least 25 countries (Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Egypt, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, Thailand, Ukraine, Turkey, the U.S., UK, Yemen) have been the theatres of various types of protests with different kinds of escalations up to civil war, while sporadic demonstrations also occurred elsewhere in the MENA countries, with the Arab Spring, in Latin America and Asia, following the Spanish Indignados and then Occupy movements back in the years 2011-2012.

The recurrence and spread of those movements, their links (either direct – notably since the Arab Spring, people on social networks know and help each other – or in the world of ideas, as people have learned from other movements they witnessed), even if each mobilisation has its own dynamics and challenges, show that, in general, stabilisation is not at work. Could a case from the past help shed some light on what is happening or not happening?

1915-1916年,柬埔寨的农民运动涉及多达10万人,约占总人口的20%。 5%的人口 其中30,000人到达金边(即1,8%),进行和平示威。[1] To give a better idea of what such mobilization represents, nowadays, for a country like the U.K. or France, 5% demonstrators would imply approximately 3 million people; for the US, 15 million people. In France, according to Government’s figure which are believed 被大大地低估了在2018年11月17日,"黄背心 "有283.000人(一个警察联盟给了100多万人)。 11月24日106.00012月1日为75.000 (即在6712万居民中,世界银行分别有0.4%、0.15%和0.11%)作为比较,2012年,在 突尼斯, on 19 and 20 February, 40,000 protesters were in the streets, and on 25 February, 100.000, i.e. respectively 0,37% and 0,9% of the 2012年估计人口.

The  French global figures for 17 November 2018, however, hide a different reality if we look at local figures, as shown by the map below as reconstructed from the original map made by demographer Hervé Le Bras (see original article and map 这里)


by MrAlex19 [CC BY-SA 4.0 (], via Wikimedia Commons copied from 17 November Map by Demographer Hervé le Bras – Click on map to access the original map on France 3.





柬埔寨农民抗议的主要原因是不平等现象的加剧,而这些不平等现象并没有被认为是这样,因此政治当局也没有解决这些问题(法国保护国和柬埔寨王国的双重管理)。[2] 农民的怨恨围绕着从烟草税到征收的各种问题逐渐积累起来,而后者和潜在的 预备役 或付费 徭役 制度是不公平的缩影。我们在法国有完全相同的情况,黄马甲谴责在过去30年中,特别是2007-2008年金融危机以来不断加剧的不平等现象(例如,法国电视台的各种采访。 BBC新闻),以及在法国的情况下,法国政府,特别是法国总统马克龙对人们的鄙视(如 彭博社 2018年12月2日).

Actually, in the Cambodian case, weak signals of discontent had previously existed, witness the multiplying peasants’ petitions brought to governors or residents from 1907 to 1913. Yet, as these signals were spread over time and space, they were insufficient to bring the awareness that would have allowed for reforms. Since the turn of the millennium, France has known a similar situation with a multiplication of 多年来不成功的抗议活动.

Thus, when the Cambodian peasant movement started and spread, the authorities perceived it as sudden and massive, because of their lack of awareness. Early explanations for the causes of the protest included references to an uprising synchronous with event happening in Cochinchina and the possibility of a German-sponsored plot, maybe involving exiled Prince Yukanthor, his wife and Phya Kathatorn. With hindsight, such a plot, as all conspiracy theory, was far-fetched. Yet, for some of the actors (e.g. the Prey Veng Resident, The Gouverneur Général Roume and his Director of Indigenous Political affairs), it was a reality when the demonstrations exploded.





当磅湛居民派人召见 预备役 1915年11月,在道路工程的准备工作中,他们向克萨奇-干丹提供劳动力,尽管农民们已经完成了他们的工作。 预备役 for the year, the villagers used the traditional form of protest to express their discontent. They went to the King to ask for redress. As these specific demands were met, they went back to their villages, but, considering their other motives of discontent, the matter was not closed as the authorities expected.

相反,村民们计划回来争取更多的东西,即买回1916年的可能性。 尊敬的各位领导.这是在法律上提供给他们的,但很少使用,因为柬埔寨人口少,意味着缺乏人力,因此导致了转型。 尊敬的各位领导 变成请愿书,看到公共工作的完成。

在法国,导火索是石油的补充税,和我们过去的案例一样,其他的不满动机,加上政治当局在时间上的差异,使得运动无法停止,尽管法国政府最终接受了推迟征税(如 BBC新闻).此外,在法国的情况下,推迟而不是取消增加了人民与政府和国家之间日益增加的不信任。


The villagers spread the words of their earlier protests’ success to neighbouring villages, demanding others to follow the movement. Messages were transmitted orally by travelling leaders and via letters originally sent by the inhabitants of Kompong Cham. The letters’ contents show not only the easy use of threat and the commonality of violence, but also the way the letters were circularised to obtain mobilisation as they were transmitted from villages to villages.

Anonymous letters circulating in the villages of Prey Veng and Svay Rieng (translation 1916) – The inhabitants of Khet Kompong Cham mobilize those of Khet Prey-Veng by using threat:


“All the village of Kas-Kos must leave on 20/01. If someone does not leave on this date, we shall come in group to hit him with knives without fault. We shall also hit with knives his children and grand-children. Moreover, we shall burn his house – beware to the one who does not leave. Because we are all very discontented.”




在每个Khum中,Mékhum将不得不在背面写上 "看到 "的字样"。


We need little imagination to see that the processes that are currently at work through Facebook and Twitter are very similar, with “only” different means of communication. Those new media allow for quicker spread, and abolished distances, as pointed out by 彭博社.就目前的信息内容而言,威胁也是存在的,请看黄马甲中最温和的人受到的威胁(如 BFMTV).



  1. 原本农民的不满情绪和随之而来的示威。
  2. 年轻的村民希望达到领袖地位,从而推动运动的继续和传播。
  3. 强盗、千禧年领导人或利用所制造的混乱进行报复的人。

Each phase implied escalation in violence. Thus, the further away the villages reached, the closer they would be in terms of time to the more violent phase for the initial villages. Yet, because the authorities, once they started understanding what was happening – even if full awareness had not taken place – were also taking stabilising actions, the further away the villages, the more likely stabilising actions were operative and thus the more likely the initial mobilisation was deflected.

这就解释了一些地区明显突然爆发的暴力事件,例如波萝勉,那里有2000名示威者袭击了皮朗。 沙拉赫特 (provincial tribunal) to free arrested leaders, and where the Indigenous Guard fired on the crowd killing eight individuals. These areas were far away enough to be reached during the third phase of escalation, but close enough not to feel the effects of stabilising measures. This also explains the quasi or total absence of demonstration in areas located further away, such as Kampot, Takeo, Pursat or Battambang.

The communication speed-rate explains the space-time pattern of the demonstrations. The first demonstrators of Ksach-Kandal reached Phnom Penh on 3 January 1916, the bulk on 7 and 8 January. By 20 January, the inhabitants of various Prey Veng villages had left for Phnom Penh, while the inhabitants of Thbong Khmum in Kompong Cham were about to depart. For Kompong Chhnang, the movement had spread from Choeung Prey to Mukompul in Kompong Cham to Lovek to Anlong Reach in Kompong Chhnang, but could not go further.


相反,正如在法国发生的那样,技术的先进性允许速度、阶段的崩溃、准瞬时的地理传播,并有助于混淆理解。除了其他偏见,这也有利于 事实上 escalation in the movement. This escalation in terms of violence is enhanced by the fact that the “cognitive system” of administrative apparatuses does not efficiently incorporate technological changes. Even if, in the case of 2018 France, digital change is integrated, administrative and usual political – or rather politician – processes and practices cannot accommodate the digital instantaneous spread in-built within the movement. The resulting incapacity to understand of the political authorities and elite groups around them forbids awareness, which, in turn, further leads to escalating actions, which, again,  contributes to an overall escalating phase.


关于作者:博士 Helene Lavoix伦德博士(国际关系),是红色(团队)分析协会的主任。她专门从事国家和国际安全问题的战略预测和预警。她目前的重点是人工智能和安全。

*The original title was “Protest Movements, Mobilisation, Geo-Temporal Spread: Some Lessons from History (1)”

[1] This post is a shortened and revised version of pp.114-125, Lavoix, Helene, 民族主义 "和 "种族灭绝":民族性、权威和反对的构建--柬埔寨的案例(1861-1979)--博士论文--东方和非洲研究学院(伦敦大学),2005年, where new available evidences allowed to further the analyses by Milton Osborne “Peasant Politics in Cambodia: the 1916 Affair” 现代亚洲研究, 12, 2 (1978), pp.217-243; Forest, 康博奇, pp.412-431. The interested reader will be able to refer to the original text to find detail and full references fo archives. Figures for the mobilization are from A. Pannetier, 柬埔寨笔记。Au Coeur du Pays Khmer;(巴黎:塞多雷克,1983[1921]);第46-47页CAOM/RSC/693/249c/mouv1916IAPI/24/10/1916。阿兰-弗雷斯特估计1911年柬埔寨的总人口为16.84亿。1921年的人口普查发现有23.95亿居民。

[2] For a schematic representation, see Lavoix, Ibid, appendix 4.2. p.321, for detailed explanations on the dual authority in Cambodia, see, notably, David P. Chandler, 柬埔寨的历史, (Boulder: Westview Press, [1992, 2d ed.]); Alain Forest, 柬埔寨和法国的殖民化。无人问津的殖民史(1897-1920), (Paris  L’Harmattan, 1980); Milton Osborne, 法国在科钦纳州和柬埔寨的存在。统治与回应(1859-1905), (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1969); Lavoix, ibid.

由Dr Helene Lavoix (MSc PhD Lond)发布

Helene Lavoix博士伦敦大学博士(国际关系) ,是Red Team Analysis Society的总裁/CEO。她专门研究国际关系、国家和国际安全问题的战略预见和早期预警。她目前的工作重点是乌克兰战争、国际秩序和中国的崛起、行星越轨行为和国际关系、战略预见和预警方法、激进化以及新技术和安全。