(艺术设计。 Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli)

整个世界陷入了一场以美国为一方、以中国为另一方的巨人之争。这种对抗发生在不同的层面,通过各种形式和层面的力量。向战争升级的趋势正在发挥作用。战争并不是不可避免的,然而它是可能的。为了更好地在升级和可能的战争中生存,我们必须了解其多个方面。国家行为者则应根据自己的国家利益,考虑到各种力量的作用而采取行动。

尽管这在很多人看来是不可想象的,但主要行为者的目的可能不是为了避免战争。正如我们在 美国国家利益和平和避免战争绝不是美国的目标。事实上,他们非常准确地写道,美国国防的优先事项是 "阻止侵略,同时准备在必要时在冲突中获胜,优先考虑中国在印度-太平洋的挑战,然后是俄罗斯在欧洲的挑战"(U.S. National Defense Strategy 2022 – Factsheet). This means that war is an option. Thus we must all be ready for the possibility of war between China and the U.S.. It is also with this strategic framework in mind that we must understand the war in Ukraine, the relationships with Russia and NATO’s expansion.

在这篇文章中,我们重点讨论了中国和美国之间冲突的系统性和规范性问题。

First, we briefly explain the dimensions of the confrontation, systemic and interstate. We look then at two interrelated approaches for the systemic dimension: the evolution of the relative power of states and the struggle for norms and international order and consequences on war. Finally, we examine examples of Chinese global strategic communication (aka “宣传“) at normative level, looking at seven short videos published on official Chinese Youtube channels dealing with various issues, from the ecology to NATO’s expansion through the U.S. essential wrongdoing.

对抗的层面

在系统层面,第三层次的分析(1)我们见证了中国作为新的主导力量的崛起,以及美国为继续成为统治世界的唯一超级大国而进行的斗争。同时,在两个相应的秩序之间存在着一场战争:一个与中国有关的新兴秩序和一个由美国领导的仍然占主导地位但正在衰落的秩序。

即使中美之间还没有真正的战争, 严格意义上的严格意义上的战争,但这两个秩序之间的战争已经在乌克兰开始,同时正在向涉及中国的战争升级。例如,2022年6月的北约峰会不仅包括美国的亚洲盟友,而且产生的新的重要文件, 2022年北约战略概 highlights “the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security” (pp. 5 & 10). For example:

它[中国]力图颠覆基于规则的国际秩序,包括在空间、网络和海洋领域。中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦之间不断深化的战略伙伴关系,以及它们破坏基于规则的国际秩序的相互加强的企图,与我们的价值观和利益背道而驰。

2022年北约战略概, 2022年6月29日,第5页

在第二个分析层面,即国家间关系,世界舞台上的各种行为者通过美国和中国之间的战斗来制定系统性的战斗。这个层面,或者更准确地说,国家行动的结果将反过来影响系统性的战斗。

A good representation for this ongoing “battle of giants” is a kind of 3D board, where each level of the board also interacts with other levels. Using a 2D board as representation cannot yield a proper understanding of the confrontation.

因此,战略、政策以及更广泛的所有行为者的行动都需要被理解、规划和评估其在每个级别的所有领域和所有层面的影响。

全球性的规范之争

触发的陷阱

因此,在系统层面,中国的崛起威胁着美国的主导地位。

The Americans perceive it as such, as expressed in their many national threats assessments (see Helene Lavoix, “美国的国家利益“). American scholars condone also this understanding of world politics, as exemplified by the Harvard publication on Thucydides’s Trap (来自格雷厄姆-埃里森的研究和著作。 注定的战争:美国和中国能否摆脱修昔底德的陷阱? Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017)。根据Allison的说法,一个新的世界大国的崛起威胁着现有的大国,因此,在过去的500年中,16个案例中有12个发生了战争。恐惧是触发陷阱的一个关键因素(同上)。

Joseph Nye criticism of Thucydides’s trap, the 金德尔伯格的陷阱 questions Allison’s number of cases and argues that bad policy choices rather than systemic inevitability were at work to trigger wars. However, Nye does not discard the existence of Thucydides’s trap. He adds a new explanatory component, following Kindleberger, the architect of the Marshall plan, according to which one cause of war when a new power rises is its inability to provide global public goods. Thus, the world in general, and the United States in particular, must also worry about the strength, capacity and willingness of China to deliver global public goods.

然而,在中国和美国的情况下,我们可能会想,金德尔伯格陷阱理论是否不需要改进。的确,随着各种力量的相互作用,中国在规范层面上日益发挥着重要的作用,理想情况下,这应该会降低金德尔伯格陷阱被触发的风险。然而,当然,从美国的角度来看,中国的规范性行动和相关交流被认为是对美国的国际霸权和国家利益的威胁。因此,美国和从中受益的行为者 美国的和平 势必会攻击这一发展。

总而言之,我们处于铁砧和铁锤之间:一个强大的中国,包括在系统层面,很可能增加美国的威胁感,从而引发与美国及其盟友的战争,而一个不够强大的中国,无论如何都会赞成战争,因为它不能提供全球公共产品。

此外,问题还在于所提供的全球公共产品的性质。事实上,中国和美国对全球公共产品的看法和理解很可能不同。

这让我们想到了全球规范的问题。

规范和观念之争

As Thucydides’s trap is triggered, the U.S., through their actions at both interstate and systemic levels, further force China to also act at normative and international order level.

一个秩序是由规范统治的,即 "具有特定身份的行为者的适当行为标准"(Martha Finnemore, Kathryn Sikkink "国际规范动态和政治变化" 国际组织, Vol. 52, No. 4, International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics, Autumn, 1998). As a result, international norms “make clear what behaviour is considered appropriate and when a line has been crossed” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Priority #2: International Norms,2020年11月)。

Thus, in our case, we have an order ruled according to American standards of appropriate behaviour, alongside what we tend to currently perceive as universal principles, as enshrined, for example, in the UN charter. This American order is declining (Thucydides’s trap). The challenging and rising order is ruled according to Chinese standards of appropriate behaviour, alongside also universal principles that may or may not be enshrined in the UN charter, and may only be partially perceived as universal. Possibly also, some of the principles enshrined in the UN charter are perceived differently according to order.

The perception and interpretation of international norms are also part of the normative battles taking place at the systemic level of analysis. For example, the norm of territoriality for sovereign states is a fundamental and universal principle for the modern state system. We understand it as universal. However, before that norm spread throughout states and space, from the 17th century until the end of the 19th century – start of the 20th century, we could find other types of norms and organisations. The “galactic polities”(2) 在东南亚佛教系统中,构成了一个不同类型的秩序的案例(见注释 (2) 下面还有Thongchai, Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1994). Hence the so-called universality of norms is actually contingent to space and time and thus not universal at all. The Caliphate promoted by the Islamic State is another case of order totally different from the current system (see, for example, Hélène Lavoix, 伊斯兰国的心理行动--世界之战The Red Team Analysis Society, 19 January 2015).

When the U.S. act to uphold the norms of their order according to their own standard of behaviour and protest against or combat China’s standard of behaviour, they truly perceive Chinese norms as threatening and often “wrong”, according to their own norms, which they genuinely believe to be universal. For example, as we spelled out, 2022年北约战略概 stresses what NATO perceives as attacks on its rules-based international order. During the June 22 NATO Summit, according to a South Korean official, “South Korea’s president warned… of the threat to universal values at a time of new conflict and competition, a reference to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and China’s engagement with Russia” (Hyonhee Shin, 路透社,2022年6月30日)。

Of course, China, does not perceive itself as “wrong” or “malevolent”. Thus, it will want to counter any strategic communication of the U.S. and its allies that would spread the perception of a China that is dangerous and negative for the world. China is therefore enticed into first increasingly having an international strategy that promotes global public goods as it defines it – and not as the U.S. sees it – and into a related global communication that will explain why the Chinese vision of the norms and the very norms China’s upholds are right, good and universal. In the same time, the Chinese will portray the wrong doing of the U.S..

In terms of strategic communication the two messages – promoting one’s norms and fighting against the other’s norms – may be grouped together or presented separately, as we shall see with the examples below.

同时,两种规范性的世界观之间的差异得到了强调。在这个过程的最后,如果中国取得了胜利,一个建立在中国规范之上的新的全球秩序就会出现,包括中国对普遍规范的看法。

换句话说,争夺规范性最高地位的斗争本身就共同构建了出现的全球秩序的类型、其内容和全球统治的能力。

中国的全球规范性沟通

中国的传播走向全球化和规范化

As expected, China “is increasingly targeting a wider audience than just its diasporas, as demonstrated by the growing number of Chinese propaganda outlets published in a number of foreign languages (环球时报中国日报, CGTN, Xinhua, etc.)” (Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer and Paul Charon, “俄罗斯是飓风,中国是气候变化。信息战的不同方式", 岩石上的战争, 21 January 2020). In so doing, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is only catching up with what the U.S. and other world nations have been doing since World War II through the use of international broadcasting services as supporting capabilities for their information operations (see Helene Lavoix, 信息战与乌克兰战争, The Red Team Analysis Society,2022年5月24日)。

这就是我们前面解释的中国战略沟通的内容。通过提供全球公共产品,以及通过对规范的认知和理解的争夺,中国被推到了规范层面上的战斗。

Interestingly, the very way the American and allied doctrine labels “adversary strategic communication” as “propaganda”, as we saw (信息战), is already a preemptive strike against all Chinese international broadcasting services’ production and thus against emerging Chinese norms. It is an effort to make sure these normes do not spread and settle. For example, Jeangène Vilmer and Charon belittle Chinese media as “propaganda outlets” in their analytical paper (see above), when these media are merely international broadcasting services, and thus supporting China’s strategic communication. Many Western analysts and officials, similarly would immediately cast any Chinese media production as “propaganda”.

然而,中国媒体制作的东西给了我们一个关于中国标准内容的宝贵指示。这种产出将告诉我们哪些未来的标准可能成为主导,哪些标准正在和将要进行的战斗,等等。我们现在就来看看这样的例子。

中国通过视频进行规范性战略传播的案例

我们在此考察了《环球时报》和CGTN制作的一些视频,作为中国全球战略传播在规范层面的标志。我们只看了发布在Youtube上的例子,因此是针对非中国观众的。

At first glance, we can note a flourish of series that could reveal an effort at finding something that works in addressing a global audience. The second observation is that China seems to have difficulties to truly captivate Youtube’s audience and get traffic as expressed in number of views. However, considering the number of Chinese TV channels available in many countries, the relatively small number of views on Youtube should be taken with a pinch of salt. Further research would be needed to measure the real impact of China’s normative actions and of its related global communication in the world.

Whatever their impacts, as we explained, these videos will be useful to us as they will indicate Chinese efforts in terms of norms. We should expect to find videos highlighting the good brought about by Chinese actions with their normative underpinnings, videos stressing more simply Chinese norms and finally videos highlighting American wrongdoing, either singularly or by comparison with Chinese behaviour. Actually, we could identify other interesting videos according to China’s perception of itself and of the world (see Hélène Lavoix, “中国对美国国际政治的看法", The Red Team Analysis Society2021年9月27日),但这将是另一篇文章的内容。

突出中国行动带来的好处的视频及其规范性的基础

生态学和生态行动越来越多地出现在中国视频中。这让我们预计,在这个层面上将会发生一场规范性的战斗。

With this video, “China launches first megaton-capable offshore carbon storage project”, China highlights technological capabilities and the importance of ecological concern and restoration as norm.

“China launches first megaton-capable offshore carbon storage project” – 29 June 2022

The example below, where Chinese President “Xi Jinping encourages green development modeled on the Kekeya project” not only features efficient Chinese actions regarding the restoration of ecological systems, but also the benefit of Chinese political system as headed by President Xi Jinping (by opposition to Western vision of China as an autocratic system) and the benevolence and positivity of China’s actions in Xinjiang (by opposition to Western attacks regarding human rights in Xinjiang).

“Xi Jinping encourages green development modeled on the Kekeya project” – 5 June 2022

强调中国规范的视频

我们这里有一些视频,显示了例如对中国文化和传统的推广。文化影响和推广完全是规范层面的一部分。美国在这个问题上的影响的例子,从好莱坞到麦克唐纳和可口可乐。

下面的视频来自CGTN的一个武术系列,是这种类型的一个经典案例。

Nanzhi Quan: Be fierce and forceful at every step|南枝拳 – 29 June 2022

突出美国人劣迹的视频

One of the longest series (651 videos by 27 June 2022) on Global Times is “Hu Says” where Mr Hu makes brief analyses and comments on international affairs. He not only gives China’s perspective and position on various topics but also often highlights American or Western negative or questionable behaviour.

For example, regarding the June 2022 G7, “Hu says” highlights that the G7 has become subservient to American aims. As a result, from a Chinese perspective, this shows that the G7 cannot be seen as a global institution interested in global public goods.

A more violent example of these types of videos was broadcast on 22 April 2022 and is named “Unmasking the superpower”. It aims at “unmasking the true evil nature of the U.S.”

“Unmasking the superpower”, Global Times, published on 22 April 2022

突出美国人的错误行为与中国人的行为相比的视频。

In this category, we have as example two videos of the series “Mr Hu”.

第一篇是对2022年欧洲扩大北约的回答,并将在美国影响下饱受战争蹂躏的欧洲与由于仁慈和爱好和平的中国而和平的亚洲进行了比较。

Europe will certainly not become more secure after this round of NATO expansion – 29 June 2022

The second example highlights Chinese incomprehension when seeing Americans accepting an extremely bad management of the COVID-19 pandemic by the U.S. political authorities. In so doing, Mr Hu highlights a weakness of America in terms of organisation when compared with China alongside the fact that the U.S. does not truly puts first the lives of its citizens. The audience is meant to contrast this American policy with the Chinese one, which is truly concerned with human lives. From there follows an interrogation regarding the true value of democracy and legitimacy in America, which is an answer to American’s denunciations of the Chinese autocratic system. We are truly in a normative battle for the best type of belief-based socio-political system.

The tolerance that US society isn’t in chaos despite of its COVID-19 deaths is incredible – 9 February 2022

这些例子只是中国定期播放的无数个案例中的一些。

我们正处于一场以信仰为基础的战争之中,它使一个新兴的世界与一个衰退的世界对峙。哪种秩序会占上风还不清楚。然而,可以肯定的是,没有哪个秩序准备屈服,恰恰相反。因此,升级可能只会继续下去,可能直到一场完全成熟的战争。

笔记

(1) 在此,我们采用了《国际关系》中所确定的三个层次的经典分析模式 Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysiss by Kenneth N. Waltz (New York, Columbia University: 1959) – Readers in a hurry may also read the review by David. J Singer, “国际冲突。三个层次的分析." 世界政治, vol. 12, no.3, 1960, pp.453-61. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/2009401.

还有一个第一层次的分析,即个人行为者,但我们将不在此考虑它。

(2) 摘自Helene Lavoix,"民族主义 "和 "种族灭绝":民族性、权威和反对的构建--柬埔寨的案例(1861-1979)--博士论文--东方和非洲研究学院(伦敦大学),2005。通过以下途径访问和下载 大英图书馆的宗旨.: “In the Southeast Asian Buddhist political system characterised as “Galactic polities,”… various centres’ relative importance and power fluidly increased (waxed) or decreased (waned) (for this paragraph Stanley Tambiah, 世界征服者与世界放弃者:历史背景下的泰国佛教与政体研究 (剑桥:剑桥大学出版社,1976年),第121-127页)。一个衰退的中心吸引实力较弱的中心进入其轨道。主要中心对其他中心的松散控制随着距离的增加而减少,并导致联盟和支流关系的变化。无常是一种规则。

然而,海上贸易、火器和国家间的竞争等因素的发展给银河系的政体带来了缓慢的演变。Victor Lieberman,"地方一体化和欧亚的类似物。构建东南亚历史,约1350-1830年;" 现代亚洲研究 273 (1993), pp.475-572.和 Strange Parallels, Southeast Asia in Global Context, c.800-1830, Vol.1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). The system progressively lost its fluidity and tended towards an increasing and irrevocable “political integration” of the lesser tributary centres by the major centres (Ibid. p.485).”

由Dr Helene Lavoix (MSc PhD Lond)发布

Helene Lavoix博士伦敦大学博士(国际关系) ,是Red Team Analysis Society的总裁/CEO。她专门研究国际关系、国家和国际安全问题的战略预见和早期预警。她目前的工作重点是乌克兰战争、国际秩序和中国的崛起、行星越轨行为和国际关系、战略预见和预警方法、激进化以及新技术和安全。

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