{"id":4429,"date":"2013-05-06T18:28:25","date_gmt":"2013-05-06T16:28:25","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.redanalysis.org\/?p=4429"},"modified":"2022-05-30T21:03:41","modified_gmt":"2022-05-30T19:03:41","slug":"%e5%af%b9%e5%8f%99%e5%88%a9%e4%ba%9a%e7%9a%84%e6%88%98%e7%95%a5%e6%83%85%e6%8a%a5%e8%af%84%e4%bc%b0-%e7%ac%ac%e5%9b%9b%e9%98%b6%e6%ae%b5-%e7%ac%ac%e4%b8%89%e9%83%a8%e5%88%86","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/redanalysis.org\/zh\/2013\/05\/06\/strategic-intelligence-assessment-for-syria-4-state-of-play-part-iii\/","title":{"rendered":"\u53d9\u5229\u4e9a\u7684\u6c11\u65cf\u4e3b\u4e49\u8428\u62c9\u83f2\u6d3e\u548c\u5168\u7403\u5723\u6218\u8005"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

This article will be the last one that presents the current state of play and the five categories of actors fighting in and over Syria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The rise of the two groups of factions presented below – the Syrian Sunni factions intending to install an Islamist state in Syria and the Sunni extremist factions with a global jihadi agenda – as well as their mobilization power has been, first, eased by the protracted quality of the conflict and the despair it implied among Syrian people. It was then facilitated by the initial inability of the moderates<\/a> to find support in the West, thus to demonstrate their power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

“Nationalist Salafis”: Syrian Sunni factions intending to install an Islamist state in Syria<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The first nexus is composed of more extreme Islamist groups – compared with those seen previously<\/a> – and of “Nationalist Salafis” groups – to use Lund (2013:14<\/a>) terminology, noting that scholar of Jihad in Syria, Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi questions the very dichotomy between Nationalist Salafis and Jihadi Salafis (see below update 8 July<\/em>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nationalist Salafis want to create an Islamic Sharia state in Syria. Lund (2013: 14<\/a>) quotes Abdulrahman Alhaj<\/a>, an expert on Syrian Islamism he interviewed in January 2013:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cWhen it comes to the salafis, we have to separate between two things. There are publicly declared salafi groups who have an experience of [armed] salafi work outside Syria, and who have a systematic salafi thinking. These groups, the salafiya-jihadiya [salafi-jihadism], are not many, but they affect people\u2019s thinking.\u201d<\/p>

\u201cThe others are young, extremist people. They are Sunni Muslims who just follow this path because there is a lot of violence. Day after day, they come face to face with violence, so they adopt salafism, but they are not really part of the salafiya-jihadiya ideologically. Like Ahrar al-Sham: they are not part of the salafi-jihadi movement. There are of course real salafis among them, but mostly they are just extremist sunnis without a systematic salafi ideology. It\u2019s very different from Jabhat al-Nosra.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Within those groups one finds two major alliances, who are attempting to unite factions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Syria Liberation Front (SLF) also known as the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF) factions<\/span> (Jabhat Tahrir Souriya<\/em> or Jabhat al-Tahrir al-Souriya al-Islamiya<\/em>) was created in September 2012 when some factions ended their associations with the FSA and dissolved with the creation of the Islamic Front on 22 November 2013. The groups that are mentioned as belonging to the SLF are: two of Syria largest Islamist groups, Kataeb al-Farouq and Suqour al-Sham (Lund 2013: 16), Liwa al-Tawhid and Liwa al-Islam (Lund 3013: 27 using Noah Bonsey, Lund, 3 April 2013<\/a>). According to Lund, most of the SLF factions are also now part of the <\/span>Supreme Joint Military Command Council<\/a> (Ibid: 13)<\/span>, despite their ideological outlook, which also underlines again the pragmatic feature of affiliations and the shifting and lose characteristic of alliances, as suggested previously<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The SILF\/SLF would count an estimated 37.000 fighters (Ignatius, 2 Avril 2013<\/a>; see also Lund’s related comment, 3 April 2013<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Syrian Islamic Front (SIF)<\/span> (Al-Jabha al-Islamiya al-Souriya) was created in December 2012 under the leadership of the more powerful Ahrar al-Sham and dissolved with the creation of the Islamic Front on 22 November 2013. It initially included 11 factions, covering most of the territory (see mapping below and previous versions of the mapping accessible below), which were, in January and February 2013, reduced to 7 through the merging of various groups  (Lund, 2013: 25-27). Since April 2013, the SIF counts one new member, the Haqq Battalions Gathering (Tajammou Kataeb al-Haqq) (Lund, May 3 2013<\/a>). Between 10.000 and 30.000 fighters could be part of the SIF (Lund, 2013: 23).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Talks between initial SIF groups and the SLF had taken place when the SLF was created  but failed for various reasons, from ideological to disagreements between groups.<\/p>\n\n\n<\/p>\n

To access the actors’ mapping (updated 27\/01\/2014), become a member<\/a> of The Red Team Analysis Society.  If you are interested in specific actors’ mapping and latest updates, \"\"<\/a>contact us<\/a>.
\nIf you are already a member, please login<\/a> (don’t forget to refresh the page). You can access the page through my account<\/a>, click on view in “My membership table” to access the list of the articles available to members only).<\/em><\/p>\n

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Lund (Ibid: 17-19) qualifies the SIF as an Islamist “Third Way,” strictly salafist but also pragmatic, able to discuss with the West, and to cooperate on the ground with the SMC or with salafi-jihadi groups, while also criticizing the latter, as shows the 4 May 2013 statement by Ahrar al-Sham on “Jabhat al-Nosra\u2019s recent declaration of allegiance to al-Qaida\u2019s Ayman al-Zawahiri.” (Lund, 4 May 2013<\/a>):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

“It seeks to demonstrate a strict salafi identity, and makes no attempt to hide its opposition to secularism and democracy. but it also tries to highlight a streak of pragmatism and moderation, intended to reassure both syrians and foreign policymakers. In this way, it sets itself apart as an Islamist \u201dthird way\u201d, different from both the most radical fringe of the uprising, and from its Western-backed islamist mainstream.” (Lund, 2013: 17)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

However, the SIF aims at establishing a Sunni Islamist Theocracy, allowing only some modicum of consultation and political freedom within the bounds of sharia law (Ibid: 19). It has already started working towards this goal when, as described by Lund (Ibid: 25), <\/a>it develops a “humanitarian and non-military activity.” It does not only fight but also plays the role of a real political authority, which strengthens both its mobilization power and its resource-base. Thus, overthrowing the regime of Bashar al-Assad is only a step towards achieving its objectives, and the “Third Way” may only last temporarily, assuming the SIF continues its current course, and finds access to sufficient and secure resources and fundings (for details on funding see Ibid: 27).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For more details on the SIF and, among others, salafism in Syria, I highly recommend Lund’s report<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Update 31 May 2013<\/h3>\n\n\n\n