{"id":4639,"date":"2013-07-08T06:11:28","date_gmt":"2013-07-08T04:11:28","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.redanalysis.org\/?p=4639"},"modified":"2022-05-30T20:35:51","modified_gmt":"2022-05-30T18:35:51","slug":"%e8%af%84%e4%bc%b0%e5%8f%99%e5%88%a9%e4%ba%9a%e6%88%98%e5%9c%ba%e4%b8%8a%e7%9a%84%e5%8a%9b%e9%87%8f","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/redanalysis.org\/zh\/2013\/07\/08\/evaluating-forces-on-the-syrian-battlefield\/","title":{"rendered":"\u8bc4\u4f30\u53d9\u5229\u4e9a\u6218\u573a\u4e0a\u7684\u90e8\u961f"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Having an idea of the forces fighting on the battlefield in Syria is crucial to understand the state of play, to follow the course of the war, to evaluate the impact of the decisions taken by external players, and to estimate the likelihood to see one scenario<\/a> (or one of its variations) happening. To obtain the best possible understanding of the theater of war other elements such as training, armament*, command and control situation, etc. should ideally also be considered. Yet, fighting women and men remain a crucial and foremost component.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Here is a synthesis of the various estimates found for each warring group, as it is only when they are seen together that they take their full meaning. Before to enter into details for each group, the graphics below (click on an image to enlarge) aim first at summarizing and representing visually the relative scale of the various forces. Second,  those forces are seen in the light of a Syrian population that would have grown increasingly divided along sectarian lines by the war, with consequences in terms of creating a future peace as well as in terms of strategies of mobilization and “population control”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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All forces on the Syrian battleground – high and low estimates<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n
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Fighting Forces on the Syrian Battleground<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n
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All forces in Syria compared with a population that would be seen through sectarian lenses<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n
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All forces in Syria compared with a population that would be seen through sectarian lenses (no labels to allow seeing size of smaller forces)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

How many fighters belong to the Supreme Joint Military Command Council (SJMCC or SMC)?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Moderates or all opposition forces<\/h3>\n\n\n
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\"FSA,<\/a><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n

This is a crucial question, however a very difficult one. If we use David Ignatius estimates for the Washington Post, we read that \u201cIdriss and his Free Syrian Army command about 50,000 more fighters, rebel sources say\u201d (Ignatius, 3 April 2013<\/a>). Lund (4 April 2013<\/a>), in his comment on Ignatius\u2019 article for Syria Comment,<\/em> questions this estimates, considering the complexity and fluidity of the situation on the ground. O\u2019Bagy, in her detailed report on the FSA<\/a> does not include a global estimate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lund in his article on the FSA (16 March 2013<\/a>) underlines that \u201cIf all the factions which have declared in favor of Idriss were added up, they\u2019d count at least 50,000 men, perhaps many more.\u201d However, as he stresses, those groups include some that belong too to other nexus, such as Suqour el-Sham that is part of the Syria Liberation Front (SLF) also known as the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF)<\/a>. Thus, if we are looking at the number of fighters who are \u201cmoderate,\u201d then one should substract from the 50.000 all those men who fight first for other groups, and thus are only very loosely affiliated with the SMC.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Keeping this in mind, the International Center for the Study of Radicalisation (ICRS)  gives the figure of 60,000 men as “the most conservative estimate for the current <\/em>[April 2013] size of rebel forces” in his Insight: European Foreign Fighters in Syria<\/a>. At the opposite end of the spectrum, one finds an AFP article (13 April 2013<\/a>) emphasizing that “experts say the Free Syrian Army comprises some 140,000 fighters”, but without mention of any source.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

We should also consider all those small groups that are mainly local (see here<\/a>), as it is not clear from given estimates if they are counted or not.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What happened to the defectors?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

When trying to find estimates for the FSA and the SMC, counting forces seems to have proceeded according to two stages.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the beginning of the war, during 2011 and part of 2012, observers and students of the Syrian war were focusing on defectors from the Syrian Army, who led the creation of the Free Syrian Army on 23 September 2011<\/a>, under the leadership of Colonel Reyad Mousa Al-As’ad. Defectors, both soldiers and officers, were meant to join the FSA, which would constitute the core of the new security forces after the fall of the Al-Assad regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, as underlined by O’Bagy (Ibid<\/a>: 10-11), using a New York Times article (Liam Stack, 27 October 2011<\/a>), one of the many problems the FSA had to face was that the command group led by Reyad Mousa Al-As’ad defecting officers were kept in an “officer’s camp” in Turkey that was located far away from the Syrian battlefield. This led to a disconnect between fighting troops and command. Meanwhile, most probably, many soldiers and officers defecting must have joined the forces on the ground. In the same New York Times article, Colonel Al-As’ad “would not specify the number of fighters, saying only that it was more than 10,000, and he was unwilling to disclose the number of battalions, claiming that the group had 18 \u201cannounced\u201d battalions and an unspecified number of secret ones. None of his claims could be independently verified.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This figure of 10,000 would correspond to the estimated number of defectors given by “an American official” on 26 October 2011 (Nada Bakri, Defectors Claim Attack That Killed Syria Soldiers<\/a>, NYT) and by “sources” (“Western Intelligence agencies”?) in a Haaretz’ article  by Avi Issacharoff and Amos Harel<\/a> on 21 December 2011. However, by December 2011, Colonel Al-As’ad claimed that the FSA now counted 20,000 fighters (Safak Timur, AFP<\/a>, Dec 1, 2011). The uncertainty regarding numbers is well summarized by a 2 December 2011 AlJazeera article<\/a>: “The group is now believed to number between 1,000 and 25,000 divided over 22 battalions spread across the country.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Then, observers stopped focusing on defectors and tried to give estimates for the troops fighting more or less loosely under the SMC, the FSA or as “opposition forces”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Defectors, whatever their number, most probably joined not only the FSA or the SMC according to the time of defection, but also mobilizing or fighting groups according to their family, geographical and religious allegiances and to the fate of the overall force. The less the “structuring” command and control “center” has to offer (including in material terms, such as weapons, logistics etc.), the less it can show its power and strength, the more likely fighters will join or rather give a stronger allegiance to other factions. For example, as reported by Mona Mahmood and Ian Black for the Guardian<\/a> (8 May 2013), FSA troops have increasingly defected to Al-Nusra during the first part of 2013 (note that defections to salafi-jihadis may be both real and hyped as bargaining chip to obtain more from external support).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pro Al-Assad regime Forces<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Syrian Forces<\/em><\/h3>\n\n\n
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\"Syrian_guard\"<\/a><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n

The pro-Assad Syrian fighting groups are composed of the regular Army and the Republican Guards, as well as pro-Assad militias (both Alawite  and composite \u2013 Sunni, Christian, Druze), all backed up by the Security Forces and the Police Force. All Alawites should not be considered as supporting the Assad regime, as shows the conference organised in Cairo on 23 March 2013 by Alawites promoting a \u201cdemocratic alternative\u201d (Reuters<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The details below are summarized from the excellent report by Joseph Holliday, The Assad Regime: from Counterinsurgency to Civil War<\/em> <\/a>(March 2013 for the ISW).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regular Army and Republican Guards<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to Holliday, Al-Assad has a policy of only \u201celectively deploying [t]his loyal core of military supporters.\u201d As a result \u201da working estimate of 65,000 to 75,000 loyal, deployable Syrian regime troops emerges\u201d out of \u201cthe Syrian Armed Forces, a basis that includes over 300,000 troops (including Air Force and Air defense personnel)\u201d (p.27).  From this figure should be removed casualties, estimated by Holliday at 7620 killed and 30500 wounded by end of December 2012 (see table p.28), which represents approximatively half of the regime estimated deployed troops, partially or completely compensated by recruitment (p.29). As underlined by Holliday and the Interntaional Crisis Group, those men are however a \u201chardcore nucleus of regime supporters\u201d(p.29).  A decentralization of command and control, allowing for flexibility and initiative by low- and mid-level officers, according to local conditions, was implemented during the Summer 2012 (Ibid).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Security Forces: The Mukhabarat<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

(For a more detailed and clear explanation, read Holliday, Appendix 3) They are constituted of four intelligence services, whose \u201cprimary mission was to \u2018monitor and intervene aggressively against potential domestic threats to the regime\u2019 (Campbell, 2009<\/a>).\u201d (p.54) However, they are now acting more like militias than like intelligence services (p.30). In addition, each operates its own prisons. Each service is present throughout the whole territory with a branch in each province. Using an interview he realized, Holliday writes that \u201cone former regime insider suggested it [The Mukhabarat<\/em>] could be as large as 200,000 security officers and personnel, but this figure could include administrative personnel and informants and cannot be verified\u201d (p. 55), and, most probably, not all of them are fighters. (p.30).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Militias or paramilitary forces<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n