Image: July Ceasefire posted by Government of National Accord Facebook page, 25 July 2017 Having evaluated the likelihood for each scenario for the future of Libya (see detail here), we shall now present updated likelihoods that account for changes that have taken place since we began the evaluations. Because both intervention and spillover are already …
Continue reading “Final Scenario for the Future of Libya and their Likelihoods”
In this article, we shall assess the likelihood of a total victory in Libya in the medium term by al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. By victory, we mean a complete victory by one side over its adversaries, which is not imposed from the top down by external powers. In the previous article, we evaluated the likelihood for the lasting victory of each government, finding that a COR victory was least unlikely. Now that intervention is already occurring, as we saw in our article on intervention scenarios, the “Salafist Victory” scenarios are considered sub-scenarios of Scenario 2: Intervention instead of independent scenarios. As such, this will be reflected in the indicators, mapping and likelihoods. Indeed, as events unfolded and intervention took …
Continue reading “Evaluating Likelihoods for the Future of Libya – A Salafist Victory?”
In this article, we shall assess the likelihood of a lasting victory by the GNC, GNA, and COR—in other words, the ability of each government to not only achieve victory, but also to maintain lasting control. By victory, we mean a complete victory by one side over its adversaries, which is not imposed from the top down by external powers. In the previous article, we evaluated the likelihood for the initial victory of each government, finding that a COR victory was least unlikely. Now that intervention is already occurring, as we saw in our article on intervention scenarios, the “Total Victory” scenarios are considered sub-scenarios of Scenario 2: Intervention instead of independent scenarios. As such, this will be reflected in …
Continue reading “Evaluating Likelihoods for the Future of Libya – Scenarios of Victories (2)”
In this article, we shall assess the likelihood of a total victory by the GNC, GNA, and COR. By total victory, we mean a complete victory by one side over its adversaries, which is not imposed from the top down by external powers. In the previous article, we evaluated the likelihood for various spillover scenarios occurring both in the event of partition and without partition. Now that intervention is already occurring, as we saw in our article on intervention scenarios, the “Total Victory” scenarios are considered sub-scenarios of Scenario 2: Intervention instead of independent scenarios. As such, this will be reflected in the indicators, mapping and likelihoods. Indeed, as events unfolded and intervention took place scenarios 3, which were about …
Continue reading “Evaluating Likelihoods for the Future of Libya – Scenarios of Victories (1)”
Featured image: by Andrey Belenko, [CC BY 2.0], via Flickrby Andrey Belenko, [CC BY 2.0], via FlickrHaving organized the scenarios and detailed the general methodology for Scenario 2 in the last article, we shall now discuss the indicators for intervention and determine the likelihood of intervention occurring for the General National Congress (GNC), Council of Representatives (COR), and Government of National Accord (GNA), as well as see how the general case envisioned previously needs to be amended to reflect the reality on the ground as interventions have started. The initial narratives for the intervention scenarios can be found here (scenarios 2(1) to 2(9)).Note: we shall use the acronym COR for the Council of Representatives (nationalists), GNC for the General National Congress (Islamists), and …
Continue reading “Evaluating Likelihoods for Libya – Scenario 2 Intervention”
This article focuses on the second of the scenarios depicting a total victory for one Libyan faction, where the nationalist coalition – loyal to a non-Islamist and nationalist government – is victorious and guides Libya towards a secular and nationalist state where Sharia is not a source of governance. In our previous scenario we detailed the scenario of an Islamist victory where the new government gradually, with different paths according to speed, implements Sharia law and puts Libya on the path towards an Islamic state. Note: Considering the future names of potential factions that would result from a new split between the unity government, we shall use the label nationalist for those that supported the nationalist-dominated Council of Representatives (COR) …
Continue reading “Scenarios for the Future of Libya – Sc 3.2 A Nationalist Libya”
The civil war in Libya recently became more complex and dangerous, as the jihadist group Majlis Shura Shabab al-Islam (the Islamic Youth Shura Council) announced that the Eastern Libyan city of Derna is now part of the Islamic State (Zelin, October 10, 2014). An Islamic State (IS) foothold in Eastern Libya could pose concerns for international governments already combatting IS in Syria and Iraq. With its border less than 200 miles from Derna, Egypt is particularly concerned as they are already fighting Islamists, notably in the Sinai. Nevertheless, it is crucial to understand all the actors on the Libyan battlefield, as we are doing here, if one wants to make sense of the civil war and its international ramifications. The …
Continue reading “War in Libya and its Futures: State of Play – Nationalist Forces (2)”
