Image: July Ceasefire posted
by Government of National Accord Facebook page,
25 July 2017
Having evaluated the likelihood for each scenario for the future of Libya (see detail here), we shall now present updated likelihoods that account for changes that have taken place since we began the evaluations. Because both intervention and spillover are already undoubtedly occurring in Libya, our scenarios are now considered sub-scenarios of Scenario 2: Intervention and spillover instead of independent scenarios. We shall then present the complete set of scenarios, with the updated likelihoods.
Executive Summary
Now that we have evaluated each scenario for the future of Libya, we organized them into a single graph that allows for a more accurate strategic picture. Our complete set of scenarios now reflects updated likelihoods that account for recent events on the ground. The ceasefire and subsequent dialogue between the COR and GNA, the various crises and strategic shifts in the Middle East that have affected the ability of external actors to intervene, and counter-migration efforts by Italy and Libyan tribes have notably affected the likelihood of several scenarios.
Based on the current realities and updated likelihoods, we found that continued civil war was the most likely outcome of peace talks (98%); continued war with a change in strategic terms was twice as likely to occur as a total victory (66%); and increased intervention was nearly 45% likely to occur, with no increased intervention slightly higher at more than 55%.
Full article 2110 words – approx. 5 pages
Notes: In the following article, we shall use the acronym COR for the Council of Representatives (nationalists), GNC for the General National Congress (Islamists), and GNA for the UN-backed Government of National Accord (unity government).
Editor’s note: To assess conflict and war, and thus when we refer to war or civil war, we are using the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) dynamic scale for conflicts (Conflict Barometer 2016, pp.6-8). There may thus be discrepancy between the words we use and official statements and labelling. The latter are indeed decided for any political reasons, but do not necessarily aim at representing the reality on the ground.
Changes in Indicators
To calculate more accurate assessments in a peace scenario, we removed and combined slightly redundant indicators, improved the wording of an indicator related to the involvement of external actors, and added another to account for public pressure and political fragmentation.
- Removed the redundant indicator Are Libyan actors willing to attend and participate in peace talks?
- Combined the redundant armed coalitions indicators into a single indicator: Despite intervention and any territorial gains, are armed coalitions unable to achieve a total victory?
- Reworded the external pressure indicator: Are external actors applying a sufficient amount of pressure or incentives on Libyan actors that encourages them to participate in peace talks?
- Added a new indicator: Is public protest and or internal political fragmentation pressuring actors to participate in peace talks?
We also explored the individual likelihoods of the COR, GNC, and GNA participating in peace talks mediated by external actors by assessing the scenario’s indicators on the basis of each government. At 62%, we found that the GNA would be the actor most likely to participate in peace talks, followed by the COR at 49%, and the GNC at less than 1%. This supplementary assessment may prove useful for diplomats in determining the level of difficulty to bring individual actors to the peace table.
As we see in the Peace scenario’s final likelihoods at the conclusion of this post, these updates provide a clearer assessment for foresight and warnings in Libya.
Editor’s note: In terms of methodology, this points out the importance of viewing and using scenarios as a living tool. Indeed, through the monitoring and warning phase, improvement compared with the initial set of scenarios and its indicators appear, and must be included.
Significant Likelihood Updates
Upon updating the Peace scenario indicators, we then re-assessed each scenario’s likelihoods based on events that occurred on the ground since publication. Based on these new calculations, we determined that the most likely direction would be a continuation of civil war with a change in strategic terms (increased intervention, partition, and increased spillover). We also found that the least likely scenarios include partition; a signed peace treaty; and an Al-Qaida, Islamic State, or GNC victory.
Although the likelihoods changed in all scenarios, noteworthy changes in likelihood occurred in the peace scenarios, increased intervention scenarios, and increased spillover scenarios.
We use the following table for our likelihood levels:
Towards Peace
After modifying the indicators for this scenario and its sub-scenarios, as well as updating the likelihoods to account for recent diplomatic events, the likelihood for Libyan actors agreeing to participate in peace talks mediated by external actors stands at 42%. Several major events impacted our peace indicators. In July, France brokered a ceasefire and a promise to work towards 2018 Libyan elections, both of which were agreed upon by GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj and General Khalifa Haftar (Sanchez, The Telegraph, July 25; Defence Web, September 7).
In late September, delegations from the COR and the GNA met in Tunisia to begin negotiating acceptable reforms to the Libyan Political Agreement signed in December 2015—an agreement that has not been approved by the COR (Ibrahim, The Libya Observer, September 26; PressTV, September 26). These two events increased the likelihoods of multiple indicators, particularly Do the identities of the external mediator(s) minimally affect the willingness of Libyan actors to participate? and Do views on General Haftar or the GNA minimally affect the willingness of actors to participate?
The amount of external pressure and incentives on Libyan actors to participate in peace talks also increased the likelihood of a peaceful resolution. As evidenced by the ceasefire, France has worked with the Libyan actors to get them to the table, and continues to push for diplomacy (Amara, Reuters, September 4). Perhaps most importantly, French efforts to include Haftar in peace talks (Ibid.) and the willingness of Italy’s defense ministry to meet with him regarding security issues have legitimized Haftar as a key actor in Libya’s stabilization (Middle East Monitor, September 27; Assad, The Libya Observer, September 27)—which provides a significant incentive for the general who appears to be seeking the presidency (Ghanmi, Middle East Online, September 18; Libyan Express, September 7). In addition, the European Union renewed sanctions against three key individuals that are seen as hindering the peace process (AllAfrica, September 28)—signifying a more substantial show of pressure by external actors.
Lastly, the governments are facing public protest and internal political fragmentation that may pressure them to participate in peace talks. On September 25, thousands of Libyans took to the streets in protest of the current governments and their inability to make progress (Libyan Express, September 25), as well as to support the political vision of Basit Igtet—a former political candidate who has begun attracting support across Libya (Libyan Express, September 25; Libyan Express, September 12). Furthermore, both the GNA and COR have experienced political fragmentation among their members (Libyan Express, August 22; Alharathy, The Libya Observer, August 28; Assad, The Libya Observer, September 4). Considering these realities, this new indicator was given an 85% likelihood.
Intervention
The likelihood of increased intervention in support of the COR decreased by 10% primarily due to external supporters facing more constraints on their ability to intervene. Although the ongoing Qatar crisis only slightly affects the United Arab Emirates’ ability, Egypt’s situation in the Sinai most impacted this likelihood. In the face of a bloody counter-terrorism campaign against the Islamic State’s Wilayat Sinai, Egypt has become increasingly bogged down and now faces calls to boost its military presence in the Sinai Peninsula (Raghavan, The Washington Post, September 15; Ouf, Middle East Online, September 17).
The likelihood of external actors intervening in support of the GNC fell by 15% as a result of added constraints on Qatar and Turkey to intervene. The Qatar crisis has caused significant strain on Doha’s economy—as well as diminished its “financial clout in Africa” (Al Sherbini, Gulf News, September 25; Khatri, Doha News, September 15; Torchia, Reuters, October 1). Meanwhile Turkey is increasing its military presence on the Syrian border (Reuters, September 17), scrambling to fill its critical need for military pilots (Gurcan, Al-Monitor, September 4), and is now focusing on a response in northern Iraq regarding the Kurdish pursuit for independence (CBS News, September 30; Kayaoglu, Al-Monitor, September 18).
Since the Intervention article’s date of publication, the GNC has conclusively experienced heightened risk in the form of losing territorial control in Tripoli and being politically overshadowed by the GNA and COR (Eye on ISIS in Libya, May 30; Libya Herald, May 29; Libya Herald, July 7)—boosting the indicator’s likelihood to 100%.
Each of the indicators for increased intervention in support of the GNA rose slightly, which increased the scenario’s overall likelihood by 11%. Notably, the GNA is facing heightened risk as the COR recently called on the international community to recognize the COR’s legitimacy (The New Indian Express, September 17); the GNA has seen signs of political fragmentation over the past months (Assad, Libya Observer, September 4; Middle East Eye, July 1; Najjair, The Libya Observer, June 22); Islamic State forces are regaining territory (Libyan Express, September 4; Libyan Express, September 3); and thousands of Libyans protested the current governments in late September—instead, supporting the former candidate for the post of Libyan Premier, Basit Igtet, and his vision for a reformed government (Libyan Express, September 12; Libyan Express, September 25; Libyan Express, September 27).
Increased Spillover
The likelihood of increased spillover fell largely as a result of Italian counter-migration initiatives and a Toubou brigade’s anti-smuggling efforts. This year, Italian deals and actions in Libya have helped curb illegal migration by as much as 85% in recent months (Walsh and Horowitz, The New York Times, September 17; Wintour, The Guardian, September 7). There have been allegations that Rome negotiated agreements with Libyan militias to compensate them for stopping the migrant flow (Herbert and Harchaoui, The Washington Post, September 26; Wintour, The Guardian, September 7; Assad, The Libya Observer, August 30)—allegations that the Italian government denies (Libyan Express, August 30, 2017). Instead of paying militias, Italy contends that the decrease in migrants through Libya is a result of its diplomatic efforts and other incentives for militias, such as “the possibility of rejoining a regularly paid, national army” (Walsh and Horowitz, The New York Times, September 17).
Italy has also overtly supported the GNA by sending a military vessel to assist the coast guard, training Libya’s coast guard and navy, and restoring Libya’s unusable naval vessels (Geldi, Anadolu Agency, August 3; Middle East Monitor, September 19; ANSAmed, September 5). Regardless of its methods, Italy’s agreements with the GNA and Libya’s militias have produced the desired effect of decreasing the flow of migrants from crossing the Mediterranean to Italy.
Meanwhile, the Sukour Al-Sahra Brigade—a Toubou brigade—recently took measures to blockade Libya’s border with Niger and Chad in an effort to end the smuggling of illicit goods and illegal migrants (Adel, Libya Herald, September 11; Libya Herald, September 7). A Toubou leader in Qatrun recently reported that the migrant flow from Niger into Libya had significantly decreased (Libya Herald, September 7).
Indicator and Scenario Updates
After determining the individual scenario likelihoods based on their indicators, we combined the scenarios into a single graph that shows their ultimate likelihood. Considering two of the three governments have entered into dialogue under a new UN peace plan (Boh, Africa News, September 26; PressTV, September 26), the peace talk’s most likely end result of failure helped determine the likelihood of continued war. From here, to cover the future range of possibilities, we assessed the likelihood of a total victory—whether by one of the Libyan governments, Al-Qaida, or the Islamic State—and mutually exclusive scenarios, the continuation of civil war with a change in strategic terms. Here, we assessed the likelihood of increased intervention and no increased intervention, followed by partition and increased spillover.
Based on the current realities and updated likelihoods, we found that continued civil war was the most likely outcome of peace talks (98%); continued war with a change in strategic terms was twice as likely to occur as a total victory (66%); and increased intervention was nearly 45% likely to occur, with no increased intervention slightly higher at more than 55%. (Download large image here: The Future of Libya within the next 3 years - Final Likelihoods 16 Oct 2017.jpg – The image and thus detailed articulated set of scenarios is part of member-only downloadable content).
Although we have concluded our detailing of the scenarios for Libya’s future, we shall continue to monitor events on the ground and occasionally provide likelihood updates as needed.
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Feature Photo: July Ceasefire posted by Government of National Accord Facebook page, 25 July 2017
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