Scenarios for Syria – 3.4. Back to an Al-Assad Syria?

Syria, refugee camp, Syrian refugee

Despite the recent victory in Qusayr by the pro Al-Assad groups, and despite the strategic character of the city, this scenario  seems to be unlikely, but not impossible, in a very near future.

To obtain complete victory, we may assume that the regime of Bashar Al-Assad would continue and even strengthen his current strategy of population displacement and use of foreign forces. However, this strategy has profound impacts that would make the construction of peace much more difficult: it favours sectarianism, the spiral of fear, hatred, and retribution, while destroying wealth and thus making it more difficult to deal with displaced people and providing for their return to normal life.

As underlined almost a year ago by Joshua Landis:

“The broader Alawite community fears the possibility of aimless retribution. To avoid this, Assad is likely to pursue the Lebanon option: turn Syria into a swamp and create chaos out of Syria’s sects and factions. It is a strategy of playing upon divisions to sow chaos.” (Creating a Syrian Swamp: Assad’s ‘Plan B’”, for Syria Comment, August 10, 2012)

Joseph Holliday excellent report, The Assad Regime: from Counterinsurgency to Civil War (March 2013 for the ISW, notably pp.19-23), provides for an account of the regime’s strategy in terms of populations’ displacement, aiming at separating “the rebellion” from a potential basis. According to him, starting from the months following the shelling of Homs in February 2012, it was increasingly pursued intentionally (p.19, also “Syria’s Mutating Conflict,” International Crisis Group, August 2012: 6-7). Before that, it would also have been done “at least in Alawite-majority coastal regions,” where “repeated clearance operations in coastal Sunni enclaves took place” (p.19). It is done in five ways:

  • Use of artillery shelling on towns and neighborhoods, or “scorched earth policy” (Holliday: pp.19-20, ICG: 6-9)
  • Campaign of bulldozing neighborhoods in Damascus and also Hama with assistance of paramilitary troops to expel people (Autumn 2012 – pp.21-22)
  • Massacres of men, women, and children in Sunni villages and neighborhoods across Syria by pro-regime militia, notably in areas close to Alawite villages and neighborhood (pp.21-22). Holliday however underlines that “Although pro-regime militias have been primarily responsible for these killings, it is difficult to exonerate the regime of responsibility in most cases.” (p.21)
  • Air power, including the use of helicopters and so-called “barrel-bombs” (improvised bombs constructed from oil drums and dropped by Syrian helicopters,” incendiary device aiming at better destroying buildings), the targeting of bakeries pp.22-25).
  • Use of Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missile (SSBM) against the population starting from January 2013 (pp.24-25).

As a result, the number of refugees and internally displaced persons increases exponentially. In April, according to the AFP more than 60.000 had died (until November 2012), while 1.2 million had fled to neighbouring countries and 4 million were internally displaced. On 13 June 2013, the UN estimates that at least 93.000 people had died so far during the conflict (BBC News, 13 June). On 17 June, 1.64 million people are refugees  in other countries, according to UNHCR ongoing estimates and Syria counts 4.25 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) according to USAID and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center.

Syria, internally displaced people

Everything being equal, for any student of Cambodia, the situation has an eerie feeling of déjà vu in terms of refugees (during the 1970-1975 war, during the Democratic Kampuchea – Khmer Rouge regime – and after), of emptying of cities and towns (by the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) – the “Khmer Rouge” – once victory was achieved) and violence against one’s own population. It is not by chance that Holliday uses in his report the term of “cleansing”. Hopefully for Syria and for Syrians, the comparison will stop there. Nevertheless, considering the very high tension in the country, not only since the beginning of the civil war, but also previously, as Syria has been under a state of emergency between 1963 and April 2011, the very destruction of the social fabric brought about by the way the civil war is waged, as noted by Lyse Doucet in her “Qusair – the Syrian city that died” (BBC News, 7 June 2013), it is hard to imagine how a victorious Al-Assad regime could rule by any other means than fear and again emergency, to remain positive and not to jump to hasty conclusions.

The help and support of the victorious regime’s allies would then be crucial to avoid seeing paranoia, violence and retribution settling in.

Although it would be diplomatically complex, if not impossible, to implement, Syria would have to be brought back in the family of nations as quickly as possible for the same reasons. Any pressure would have to be exerted with the utmost caution while also and always thinking in terms of impact on civilian populations. Failure to do so could lead to very adverse consequences for the population. It could also have the potential to create a core block of states (Iran, Iraq, Syria) with whom relations, for many other countries, would be tense. Russia and China would then have the power to act as balancing weight.

Estimating Likelihood for Scenario 3.4.

if we consider the forces on the ground (forthcoming post), this scenario is the least unlikely of the last four we outlined. However, the likelihood to see a real and complete victory, followed by a peace, are still slim.

Some indicators that could be followed as influencing the likelihood of this scenario:

  • the type of support granted to the various insurgent groups;
  • the capacity of the insurgent groups to unite and be efficient;
  • the way the insurgent groups will fight and mobilize the population, including succeeding or failing to protect them against the population displacement of the Al-Assad regime;
  • the support and level of protection insurgent groups and civilian populations could obtain with certainty after victory;
  • the level of threat, both external and internal, felt by the victorious power;
  • the kind of support given to the new Syrian regime;
  • the capacity to integrate again the new Syria in the international society of states;
  • the way refugees and IDPs are reintegrated (and the support negotiated, i.e. granted and accepted);
  • the power and wisdom of various trade networks in favouring sustainable and fair business;
  • the interest and play of various organised crime networks in the situation in Syria.

This scenario ends our series of scenarios for Syria in the short to medium term future.

Header image: Bashar al-Assad visiting The tomb of the Unknown Soldier by Syrianist (Own work) [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons

The Red (team) Analysis Weekly No104, 13 June 2013

In the midst of turmoil – Once you get beyond the tsunami of articles regarding the NSA, we continue seeing the same pattern of deep and painful changes emerging as observed over the last months. Eurozone countries are not only in crisis, but, most probably, living through a deep shift. For now, Greece leads the way in bearing the brunt of changes, but the UK, Italy, Ireland, or France, this week, are not being spared. We may also wonder if the events in Turkey, after the Arab Spring, the Real Democracy Now movement in Europe, notably Spain, and the Occupy movement are not one supplementary symptom of the increasingly numerous and widespread efforts of societies to find their way in a world that has changed, is changing and has not stabilized yet.
Meanwhile, geo-strategically, the Middle East is definitely in the midst of turmoil, while Asia faces its own changes and challenges, India being again under the spot light this week.

Click on the image below to read on Paper.Li

national security, anticipatory intelligence, political risk

Scenarios for Syria – 3.3.2. A Truly Secular Syria?

This post will outline the last but one scenario for Syria for the short to medium term, i.e. “a Secular Syria” resulting from a real victory by one of the warring groups. Considering the current state of play, this scenario is unlikely, even utopic. Yet, imagining it will also suggest possible policy and strategy that could change the odds.

The various scenarios constructed over the last weeks are summarized in the graph below. This “mapping” starts exploring ways to look at sets of scenarios as a systemic and dynamic whole. The thickness of the arrow shows higher probability and shorter timeline: the thicker an arrow, the more likely and the quicker a scenario would evolve in a specific direction; alternatively a dotted line shows lower probability and/or longer timeline. Probability and timeline will evolve according to events.

Syria, Syrian civil war, scenarios, anticipatory intelligence

Scenario 3.3.2.: A Secular Syria?

To see a secular Syria rising from the ashes of the war would presuppose a victory of the Supreme Joint Military Command Council (SJMCC or SMC), especially won by fighters affiliated with moderate or secular groups, while the ascendency of the Muslim Brotherhood within the political corresponding body, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NC) has waned.

As of today, it is thus even more unlikely than the previous scenario. First, the absence of coordination and of an efficient command-and-control structure, as analysed by Ignatius (7 June 2013, The Washington Post) in the recent loss of Qusair to the pro Al-Assad groups is a severe impediment. Second, the estimated weakness in numbers of fighters of the FSA (if Islamist and Muslim Brotherhood’s supported groups are not included) seriously constrains the possibility of victory (Ignatius, 3 April 2013 and Lund, 4 April 2013). Finally, the secular and moderate within the NC hardly have any external support, as the American and European hesitations show daily.

Nevertheless, let us imagine that dynamics change and that this utopian scenario becomes a reality, under a new type of leadership, successfully unifying and mobilizing the rebellion in a non-sectarian way. Building upon Matthew Barber’s series of three posts (27 May 2013 for Syrian Comment) focusing on Sufi Sheikh Muhammad al-Yaqoubi and how hopes to see him officially elected to the National Coalition were dashed at the end of May 2013, this leadership could be Sufi. Indeed, Barber underlines:

“An emerging Sufi current within the Syrian resistance could soon provide an alternative to Muslim Brotherhood hegemony and change the dynamics of the political opposition.” (Barber, 22 May 2013, Syria Comment)

Countries, such as the U.S., the U.K., or France, who look for a way to support a solution that would end the Syrian conflict, avoid a sectarian bloodshed and the prospect of a Syrian balkanization, respect democracy and fundamental rights, without favouring extremism, and further tensions or even war in the region, would have perceived backing such a current as an answer. Practically, and depending upon further investigation, interested actors would have worked with “the Movement for Building Civilization” or Tiyaar Binaa’ al-Hadara, which should be “operating soon out of an office in Jordan” (Interview with Sheikh al-Ya’qoubi, Barber, 30 May 2013). As explained by Barber,

“Sheikh al-Ya’qoubi and other Sufi leaders have been building influence lately, working together for about six months to form an umbrella organization for rebel groups comprised of Sunnis and Sufis aligned with Syria’s mainstream values, rather than Islamist agendas. The organization is called the Movement for Building Civilization. He and his peers have produced a charter document which rebels groups can sign.” (Barber, 22 May 2013, Syria Comment)

Starting from the 200 groups with which the Sufi Sheikhs (ibid.), strengthened by the novel supports received, more groups would join under a fortifying SMC, which would be increasingly victorious, despite fierce battles. Meanwhile, the ascendency of the moderates within the NC would increase. According to Barber (Ibid., see also the series on Salafi and Sufi influences on Islam in Syria in Syria Comment, 2007), Sufi ulema enjoy considerable backing within the Sunni Muslim population in Syria. According to Sheikh al-Ya’qoubi, “probably one-quarter of the Syrian population is Sufi” (interview), which would represent 5.6 million people (on World Bank estimates for 2012). Such highly respected figures as

“Sheikh al-Ya’qoubi represent[s] the kind of moderate, traditional Islam that most Syrians are familiar with, the Islam challenged by both the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists. Though taking an unambiguous stance against the regime’s violence, injustice, and terror, he [Sheikh al-Ya’qoubi] also continues to exert his influence encouraging rebels to avoid terrorism through fatwas condemning tactics such as car-bombings, kidnapping, landmines, the killing of prisoners, and violence against non-combatants politically aligned with the regime… He maintains a very clear position defending the rights of all minorities, including those condemned by extremists as heterodox… He thinks Syria’s current family laws are just fine, and are already sufficiently compatible with the shari’a. He also believes that legal reform should not be pursued before a constitutionally-based committee can be formed which would tackle any needed changes, after the regime has fallen and a new Syrian government has been created.” (Barber, 22 May 2013, Syria Comment)

As a result, a strong mobilization of the Sunni population, starting from the Sufi core, would occur. Sectarian fears decreasing in general, the mobilization capabilities of other groups (including those allowing for the creation of Bashar al-Assad regime’s “People’s Army” or Jaysh al-Sha‘bi (see the excellent report by Joseph Holliday, The Assad Regime: from Counterinsurgency to Civil War – March 2013 for the ISW) would progressively disappear. Step by step, non Sunni groups and people would start believing in and actively supporting the new vision of a secular, moderate Syria. Considering the influence of Sufism among Kurds in Syria (Paulo Pinto, Syrian Studies Association Bulletin, Vol 16, No 1, 2011), a reaffirmed common ground would be found and the Kurds would fully join the new forces.

Furthermore, building previous historical ties as explained by Weismann (excerpt reported by Joshua Landis, 11 May 2007), the new Sufi outlook could find common ground with both the Syrian Salafis and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, and thus integrate them.

As a result, victory would truly mean a Syria where all people and groups are integrated, save for warlords and the most violent actors that would still need to be brought back within society. Syria could constitute a novel model of secular, yet spiritual, and predominantly Muslim polity. As such, it might also be perceived as a threat by other actors in other countries, who could also feel their own power, derived from other models, questioned. The new secular Syria would have to pay attention to such dangers, however without falling into the trap of paranoia.

Estimating Likelihood for Scenario 3.3.2.

Right now, if conditions do not change, and as underlined earlier, this scenario is quite unlikely. However, assuming the Movement for Building Civilization (or a similar initiative) succeeds in being born, then it has the potential for slowly and progressively changing the odds from highly unlikely to plausible and even probable. Most importantly, the right timing for each action will need to be respected, as many times underlined by Sheikh al-Ya’qoubi.

Some indicators that could be followed as influencing the likelihood of this scenario:

  • Creation of the Movement for Building Civilization (or a similar initiative) with real linkages in Syria;
  • Mobilization of the Syrian population, across groups and communities;
  • Strategic, operational and tactical skills of the SMC under this new configuration and of the fighting groups affiliated with the Movement.
  • Propaganda and deception aiming at fueling fears and hatred (external and internal).
  • Proper material support by various actors;
  • Proper discussions and cooperation between supporters and the moderate forces leading to commonly agreed actions if any;
  • Patience of external supporters;
  • Actions against the proponents of a secular Syria by actors (external and internal) who are sponsoring other solutions for Syria;
  • Regionalization of the war;
  • Changes of situation for one of the external players (e.g. what implications may the events in Turkey have on the situation – current and prospects – in Syria?);
  • Changes in the global and regional state of play.

Scenario 3.4.: An Al-Assad Syria?… To be continued.

Featured image: Syria, palmera By Anas Al Rifai (Own work) [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons.

Scenarios for Syria 3. A Nationalist Islamic Syria or a Muslim Brotherhood’s Syria?

This article continues exploring various scenarios around the theme of “a real victory in Syria” by one or the other groups fighting on the ground, starting first with a Nationalist Islamic Syria, and then moving to a Syria under the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood. For each scenario, current estimates of likelihood will be outlined and some indicators influencing probability will be suggested.

Scenario 3.2.: A Nationalist Islamic Syria?

Syrian_Islamic_Front_Logo

If the victorious groups are Sunni Islamist and Salafi-Nationalist factions, then they would implement an Islamic state in Syria. According to Lund, and assuming those groups follow the January 2013 SIF’s official charter, they would “establish a state guided by sharia law at all costs, while also making some gestures towards moderation and tolerance for minority groups”, (p.16) or in their own terms they would  “… build a civilized Islamic society in Syria, ruled by the law of God” (p.19).

Syrian_Liberation_Front_Logo

They would be opposed “to secularism and democracy” (p.17)  because “Islamic Shari’a cannot be put to a vote” (p.20) however, “elections could still be used as a system to appoint representatives and leaders…” as long as modalities and potential parties are bound by Shari’ia.

Rather than adopting a confrontational position they would be “eager to reach a modus vivendi with the West”, as shows their willingness “to open communication channels” during the war. (p.18)

On the path to victory, as they would have given as much attention to war as to building the real foundations for an Islamic society (“the civilian movement, from which springs missionary, educational, humanitarian, media, political and [public] service [movements]” (19), once in power their task towards stabilizing peace would be eased. They would seek to maintain, expand and deepen those already existing structures and processes. They would focus on Syria and its needs.

Succeeding fully in building this type of peace in Syria would most probably be hardest and most challenging as far as non Sunni Islamist groups are concerned. How could the very different faith and ways of life be accommodated by a state abiding to Shari’a ? Could they be successfully integrated and how? Or would this lead to a renewal of civil war, to multiple exodus, and in the case of the Kurds  to a semi-autonomous or fully independent Kurdistan?

Assuming that the best way to integrate those communities are not found, would this lead again to foreign involvement and, as a result to heightened possibilities for war?

Estimating Likelihood for Scenario 3.2.

The more pragmatic and more Syria-centric agenda of those groups, as well as the number of fighters (between 47000 and 67000 fighters if estimates (Lund, Ignatius, see detail here) for the SIF and the SLF/SILF are added), and their structure, imply that this scenario is less unlikely than the previous one. However, considering the military strength of the Pro-Assad groups, as well as the rising regionalization of the civil war, it is still far from being likely.

Some indicators that could be followed as influencing the likelihood of this scenario:

  • Continuing disunity and internecine struggle within the “moderate” opposition  (NC) with impact on the capacity to garner support without and within and  related consequence on military operations.
  • Success or failure in the opening of communication channels with the West – and more broadly internationally – by such groups on the mode of what is done by the SIF, and in the ability to convince about their pragmatic, Syrian centric approach.
  • Capacity of those groups to endeavour and succeed in providing the Syrian population with “public services” both according to the groups ideology and without creating any adverse reaction.
  • Increasing regionalisation of the conflict and international wish to put an end to it.
  • Change in the overall configuration of the external support.

Scenario 3.3.: A Secular Syria?

This scenario (or rather a variation around this theme) would be meant to happen if the victorious group is the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NC) and its corresponding fighting arm, the Supreme Joint Military Command Council (SJMCC or SMC).

This would first presuppose that the various groups affiliated with the SMC succeed in uniting their forces to fight, while the NC would find a widely accepted way to elect  representatives and to function. Notably, this would imply that internecine struggles, as were for example displayed during the last week of May 2013 (e.g. Barber for Syria Comments, 27 May 2013), between more secular and moderate groups, on the one hand, and, on the other, the Muslim Brotherhood – as well as their supports – stop, and that whatever alliances were made with various factions hold and are honoured. The NC and the SMC would also need to find a way to manage the “correct” support from their allies, i.e. enough and in the right manner to have sufficient fire power to fight successfully and to deliver to the population they seek to mobilize and who are under their authority, yet without creating an adverse reaction among Nationalists who could accuse them to sell Syria to foreign interests.

Considering the differences existing between the Muslin Brotherhood and other groups, we may imagine two possible sub-scenarios.

Scenario 3.3.1. A Muslim Brotherhood’s Syria

Syria, civil war, Syrian scenarios

Assuming a NC with a Muslim Brotherhood strong leaning wins, and that it has achieved enough power over the fighting forces of the SMC, we would have a system that “supports democratic elections and many political freedoms while espousing a vision for a Syrian state that implements Sunni Islamic frames of reference for its legislation.” (O’Bagy, Jihad in Syria, Sept 2012 :17).

Indeed as Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi notes, the “Muslim Brotherhood’s conception of applying Islamic law [is] through gradual action…step by step, in order to facilitate understanding, studying, acceptance and submission” (for Syria Comment, 20 March 2013). If we turn to the text used as reference by Al-Tamimi, we not only find a description of this needed gradual action, but also reference to the ultimate aim, the restoration of the Caliphate (see previous post for more on the Caliphate).

 “We must not impose Islamic shari’a, forcing the people to adopt something about which they are ignorant and with which they are unfamiliar… If we do this, [various] ploys will be used to circumvent it, and there will be hypocrisy. [People] will exhibit Islamic [behavior] only outwardly…

“Noah, peace be upon him, received a clear sign, a stark vision, a prophecy, and mercy that his people did not understand… Noah could not force or impose [his faith upon the people]. He determined the principle of choosing [one’s] faith [as a result of] persuasion and reflection, [instead of] oppression, authority, condescension, and coercion. …

“There is no other way but gradual action, preparing the [people’s] souls and setting an example, so that faith will enter their hearts… Gradual action does not impose Islam at once, but rather step by step, in order to facilitate understanding, studying, acceptance, and submission.

…

“The Prophet, peace be upon him, acted in a gradual manner, by first preparing the people, and then [preparing] family, society, state, and finally the caliphate…

“I ask the honorable Al-Azhar to rally the Islamic streams in order to unite the Muslim word and effort, restore the caliphate, and prepare a practical plan to implement the law of Allah the Exalted. ” (Article on Muslim Brotherhood Website: Implement Shari’a in Phases, June 11, 2011; MEMRI, July 5, 2011, Special Dispatch No.3969)

This scenario can thus be seen as a mix of scenario 3.2. in terms of pace and pragmatic approach, being even ready for slower changes, with, at the beginning, a less strict view of what can be done or not, and of scenario 3.1. in terms of ultimate goal, but on a much longer timeframe, and certainly with different means.

Estimating Likelihood for Scenario 3.3.1.

This scenario, so far, seems to be quite unlikely considering the weakness and disunity of the NC and of the SMC. Furthermore, the very history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, implying, as explained by O’Bagy (Jihad in Syria, 2012: 11-13), the distrust of the population and the weakness of their presence and network within Syria, would make it even less likely, despite the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood within the NC today.

Some indicators that could be followed as influencing the likelihood of this scenario

  • Strong external support (up to external intervention) compensating for absence of legitimacy, of support network and of presence on the ground and allowing to create one
  • Ability to unite factions under Brotherhood’s leadership;
  • Absence or disappearance of better alternative for various actors, notably the population
  • Successful “hearts and minds” campaign within Syria to win over the population and build legitimacy.

Scenario 3.3.2.

To be continued…

Featured image: From the Islam Army Facebook Page

The Red (team) Analysis Weekly No102, 30 May 2013

Cognitive shift? Interestingly, compared with only a few months ago, the signals are increasingly linked to geo-strategy, war, geopolitics. The other issues remain crucial and did not disappear, but we can start seeing the overall global system changing, in terms of preeminence given to types of challenges too.

Click on the image below to read on Paper.Li

horizon scanning, national security, political risk, anticipatory intelligence, warning, signal

Scenario for Syria – 3.1: A Real Victory – an Islamic Al-Sham?

victory, striking force, war scenario

Considering the current state of play, scenario 3: A Real Victory in Syria, and its sub-scenarios are rather unlikely in the short-term. However, they are worth outlining because they bring analytical insight into dynamics and potential strategies to favour or counter one or the other possibility, according to interests, and because they could be relevant for the medium term. The chaos and beginning of “warlordism” that characterizes the Syrian situation, as emphasised by analysts, (e.g. Joshua Landis, 1 May 2013, Syria Comment; Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, 14 May 2013, Jihadology; see also first post of the series on Syria) lead to the relatively small probability to see any of those scenarios (or rather variations on them) happening. Nonetheless, as for scenario 1: Peace in Geneva  and scenario 2: No Syrian in Geneva, and besides signals indicating an improvement in the ambient disorder, we shall attempt to outline indicators that could be more specifically monitored for assessment of likelihood and timeline.

Scenario 3: A Real Victory in Syria?*

Once the victory of one of the belligerents over all others happens, then the victor is in a strong domestic position, and may start reconstructing a true peace.

war, scenario, population support

The first years would still be difficult and the new government would have to develop novel ways to stabilize the situation, making sure the vanquished would not find a way back towards violence and war. The state administration would have to be reconstructed where it has been destroyed so that the mission of political authorities may be carried upon successfully. Yet, we are in a political configuration that is much easier than what we had in scenario 1. Indeed, war cannot truly be won on a given territory without fighting troops that are sufficiently united to enable proper strategy, operations and tactics, and without a population that is mobilized and/or controlled (the “support” given by the people can be achieved with more or less coercion, but needs to be there – see notably the literature on  counter-insurgency, and also theories – and practice – of People’s war). Thus, achieving victory means that the victor has also succeeded in having an efficient monopoly of the means of violence (the winning fighting troops and the coercive apparatus within the population, ranging from mild to violent), as well as a way to extract surplus from the population in exchange for services (including waging the war).

As a result, winning the war implies that the fundamental processes underlying functioning political authorities have been implemented and mastered. The change from war and emergency to peace must still be achieved, while the new political authorities must consolidate their legitimacy, and those are crucial challenges, hence the difficult first years, but the foundations for succeeding are there.

How the stabilization from war to peace would be done, with which type of political authorities, and under which kind of regime, would vary with the victorious belligerent. The international impact would change accordingly, with, in turn, consequences on the Syrian domestic situation and the type of peace the victor would succeed in implementing.

Scenario 3.1.: An Islamic al-Sham?

If the victorious groups were Salafi-Jihadi, they would create a theocracy, a strict Sharia state. If we refer to Jabhat al-Nusra’s April declaration (Barber, 14 April 2013, Syria Comment), then they would seek to create the Islamic State of Al-Sham, i.e. a political entity covering the Levant. If we refer to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Al-Qa’ida in Iraq, then their objective would be to create the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) (Ibid). As explained by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi (14 May 2013) and by Lund (22 May 2013, Syria Comment), who also reviews other related analyses, we are currently under a thick fog of war as to what is happening within the Al-Qa’ida factions in Syria: we do not know exactly if there is strife between various groups, how important it is, and which side, if any, will win.

Caliphate, Jihad, Syria, Al-Sham, Scenario

Whatever the reality that will emerge, and for the sake of this scenario, thus assuming that the victorious groups are Salafi-jihadi, the current territorial Syria (with or without the Syrian Kurdistan, according to the way the war would be waged on that part of the territory and won or lost there) would most probably be seen as the heart from which the war to conquer the rest of the Levant (with or without Iraq according to case) could be waged. The new Al Sham would thus be expansionist and carrying the Salafi-Jihadi aim that “seek[s] to establish an islamic caliphate that would encompass the entire Umma, or Muslim community” (O’Bagy, September 2012:17) through all means, from overt war to supporting terrorist networks and individual jihad abroad.

The caliphate or Khilafa is explained in and defined with different terms according to authors, yet similarities remain, notably expansion:

“The most famous exposition of the Islamic theory of State was by the scholar al-Mawardi, who claimed that the establishment of the Caliphate was an Islamic obligation agreed upon by the scholars. His treatise al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya (the rules of governance) remains one of the major classical references for Islamic political theory. In it, he explains that the ruler is either elected by the peoples’ representatives or through being nominated by the previous Caliph. The Caliph’s responsibilities include implementing the hudood (punishments explicitly proscribed in Islam for acts such as theft, rebellion, public acts of extra-marital intercourse), collecting and distributing the taxes according to the Sharia prescriptions, and to protect and expand the borders of the Islamic State.” Dr. Reza Pankhurst, political scientist and historian, specializing in the Middle East and Islamic movements, “Understanding Calls to a Caliphate,” 22 August 2011, Foreign Policy Journal.

“Khilafa (caliphate) for Islamists is the idea that they are duty bound to establish “Islamic states” – described by vague, theoretical, idealistic platitudes – that would then be united in a global, pan-Islamic state or ‘new caliphate’.” Quilliam Foundation researcher Dr Usama Hasan for BBC News, 24 May 2013

“Both historically and doctrinally, the caliphate’s function is to wage jihad, whenever and wherever possible, to bring the infidel world under Islamic dominion and enforce sharia. In fact, most of what is today called the “Muslim world”—from Morocco to Pakistan—was conquered, bit by bit, by a caliphate that began in Arabia in 632.
A jihad-waging, sharia-enforcing caliphate represents a permanent, existentialist enemy—not a temporal foe that can be bought or pacified through diplomacy or concessions. Such a caliphate is precisely what Islamists around the world are feverishly seeking to establish.” Raymond Ibrahim, associate director of the Middle East Forum, 8 March 2011, Gatestone Institute.

Despite the necessity for expansion, aggressive actions might also be delayed, or slowed, to allow first for consolidation at home.

However, if the rivalry between Salafi-Jihadi groups were to re-appear after a victory on the Syrian territory, then the chance for consolidating peace at home would be reduced because of internecine struggle, following, in essence on those that would be taking place currently. In the meantime, the potential for aggressive jihadi actions would be enhanced, as all groups would want to assert their Jihadi credentials and use them to ideologically motivate fighters, while probably also alienating part of the population, which would again contribute to lower the odds to fully stabilize the situation domestically.

The states directly threatened by an aggressive Al-Sham – and other similar regional entities – would have no other choice than to retaliate. The prospects for a regional and global conflagration would be heightened. Peace in Syria would have been short.

Estimating Likelihood for Scenario 3.1.

To date, the likelihood to see this scenario happening is summarized by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi (14 May 2013): “In the midst of such chaos, I see it as unlikely that JAN [Jabhat al-Nusra] will either substantially advance its position or lose ground beyond likely strongholds in the north and east. While JAN may routinely be described as the most effective fighting force, it can be too easy to overstate the group’s actual size and influence. To sum up, I see an equilibrium of disorder developing. »

Using Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi’s article as well as Lund’s (22 May 2013), we can come up with a few indicators that should be followed, besides following the course of the war in Syria:

  • The state of tension, from disagreement to split within Al-Qa’ida groups operating in Syria and between all Salafi-Jihadi factions.
  • The evolution of the situation in Iraq, notably of Al-Qa’ida.
  • The degree of acceptance of strict sharia law within the Syrian population, as well as within the larger regional and global Sunni population.
  • The existence of viable alternatives, both materially and spiritually, for the population, including the persistence of hope: if no other models are provided besides an Islamic state of Al Sham and a caliphate, if people are desperate, then they may well find progressively new meaning and survival in a Islamic Al Sham (read on this the beginning of Reza Pankhurst’s article (22 August 2011).
  • The capability of the Salafi-Jihadi groups first as belligerents then as winning rulers for sustained domestic control and coercion, on the one hand, for co-optation and persuasion on the other.

Scenario 3.2….

to be continued

———-

* Besides a real victory for one of the belligerents, Edward Luttwak, in his article “Give war a chance,” (Foreign Affairs; Jul/Aug 1999; 78, 4) sees a second possibility that could lead to a true peace: the exhaustion of all belligerents. I shall not here take into account this hypothesis because in a short to medium term future, it seems to be even less likely to happen than scenario 3, considering the multiple existing external involvements.

Detailed bibliography and  primary sources forthcoming.

The Red (team) Analysis Weekly No101, 23 May 2013

Uncertainties: Which alliances and partnership will hold, which one will fail, which ones will emerge, for how long? Will the Syrian peace conference occur and will it be successful, at which cost and with which geo-strategic impact? Is the European crisis over or not at all? Will Europeans continue to withstand the pressure, and for how long, and what will be next? Will the mammoth monetary experiment endeavoured by Japan be lethal or was it the right daring move? And what if the global financial and economic crisis was not at all over? Is climate change enhancing the likelihood of mega-tornadoes or not? How will the world face the various environmental pressures and the unintended consequences of the remedies pushed forward? Those rising and spreading uncertainties could show that we are now fully moving on a path fraught with multiple systemic shifts., with more dangers and threats, but also with more space for human liberty, if we are wise enough to take the measure of the challenges ahead.

anticipatory intelligence, risk, horizon scanning, weak signal, national security, political risk

Scenarios for Syria 2: No Syrian in Geneva

Scenario rationale and explanation

The diplomatic talks fail and the international conference in Geneva does not take place or is a face-saving sham (see “Scenario 1: Peace in Geneva?” and its sub scenarios for what could result from a true international conference).

Geneva, conference, Syria peace conference

Considering the current forces on the ground and their balance, we would face a lengthening conflict (probably over years rather than months) with rising prospects of regional and global involvement and chaos. The scope and depth of regional and global spill over would increase with the duration of the Syrian civil war, and, in turn, fuel it.

The spill over and contagion would most probably take four shapes (not mutually exclusive). First, we would face any action ranging from covert operations to war-like actions to war between states (all probably escalating towards wars). This aspect, in its less intense forms, is actually already operating, although the states involved are very cautious not to cross the line (in terms of official statement and language) that would force them into war, as shows, for example, the two Israeli raids on Syria and the way they are reported (among others, see the US apology for confirming Israeli strikes – Jerusalem Post 19 May 2013) . The political part of this spill over is being continually enacted, reminding us of Von Clausewitz famous “War is the mere continuation of politics by other means.” Second, we would face a similar range of actions but between states and actors dubbed “non-state actors,” yet vying for state power). Those two forms of contagion are usually imagined or expected as occurring within the Middle East, lately enlarged to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This is however too narrow a view, as Russia reminded us on 17 May 2013 when it sent “at least 12 warships to patrol waters near its naval base in Tartous, Syria.” (Times of Israel, 17 May 2013) to underline the importance of its interest in Syria and in the region, as underlined, for example by Eldar (AlMonitor, 19 May 2013). The American debate over the type, value and wisdom of an American involvement in Syria is another obvious example of the way the Syrian conflict spills over beyond the region.

Third, countries welcoming Syrian refugees (1,52 million people on 20 May 2013 – UNHCR – see detailed map below) will face a risk of destabilization stemming from the massive influx of people in countries that were not prepared for them, and were already sometimes facing difficult situations. Furthermore, refugees may be linked to fighting units and carry on activities linked to the Syrian war in the host country, thus heightening the risk of seeing those countries dragged into the conflict. Those factors and resulting tensions are already at work, notably in Lebanon (e.g. Euronews 18 May 2013), Jordan (e.g. C. Phillips, The World Today, Volume 68, Number 8/9), Turkey (e.g. Ibid., Krohn, The Atlantic, 17 May 2013).

Syrian refugees, Syrian civil war

A fourth, more unconventional, form of contagion must also be considered. As the crisis lengthens in Europe, European individuals attracted to Salafi-jihadi would increasingly travel to and from Syria (see ICSR Insight, April 2013), heightening not only the direct threat of terrorism within Europe (Europol TE-SAT 2013: 7, 20, 24) and possibly in the U.S. and Canada but also the spread of Salafi-jihadi cells. Considering the crisis and the “fragilising” policies of austerity and “externalization” – i.e. privatization of the state – (especially those concerning the legitimate monopoly of violence), actions by Salafi-jihadi cells could heighten the risk of polarization, for example by favouring further the rise and strengthening of already spreading right-wing extremist movements. Crisis-related unrest could be a favourable environment for violent actions from Salafi-jihadi cells, that would then feed into a more generalized political turmoil. The spread of Salafi-jihadi ideology in countries hit not only by the crisis but also by a lack of hope and vision as well as by denial – whatever the hardship and dangers faced by citizens – is not to discard. In this light, the novel vision promoted by the new Pope Francois 1st, warning against “the cult of money and the dictatorship of an economy which is faceless and lacking any truly human goal” (Squires, The Telegraph, 16 May 2013) might be considered as a potential counterweight.

Similar heightened risks would exist for any country where nationals have found their way to fight in Syria, as for example, Tunisia (Sgrena, IPS, 6 April 2013), and increase with the fragility of the domestic political situation.

Until a real peace takes hold in Syria (and this is thus true too for scenarios 1.1.2. and 1.2.2., see previous post), it will be most necessary to use all anticipatory intelligence or strategic foresight and warning means, foreign policy instruments, and, ultimately, military intervention (which may also be seen as a de facto spill over of the conflict), to try preventing further spill over of the Syrian civil war, assuming this is still possible.

In scenarios 1 and 2, the efficiency of the support provided to the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces will need to be intensely monitored, and aid – lethal and non lethal, official and covert – will have to be steered according to results and potential consequences. In scenario 1, this specific aid, as well as all support (see state of play, part I, II, III) given to specific parties should disappear once a peace agreement is signed. In scenario 2, all aid will need to be monitored in the framework of the types of involvement chosen by the various international actors.

Estimating Likelihood for Scenario 2

What could enhance the likelihood to see such a scenario happening? Events happening currently in the MENA region – and beyond – as well as on the Syrian battlefield must also be read with this dimension in mind. The potential spoilers below must be seen as related  and most of the time feeding into each other.

  • It is finally impossible to find a solution that would be acceptable to all permanent members of the UN Security Council.
  • Crucial international actors seek to extract too many advantages from other nations – related or unrelated to the region – and diplomatic talks fail.
  • Events surrounding the Syrian issue, be it on the battlefield or internationally, finally derail the diplomatic talks by prompting the withdrawal of too many important (because of their involvement with and in Syria or because of their power) international actors. For example, the 15 May 2013 UN General Assembly adoption of the text “condemning violence in Syria, demanding that all sides end hostilities” was judged by both China and Russia as unhelpful, but it may also be read, as underlined by Nashashibi (AlArabyia, 20 May 2013) as an effort to stress the importance of a peaceful solution to the conflict, of “effective representative interlocutors for a political transition,” and thus of the necessity of an international conference. It is also possible that the terror attack in the Turkish town of Reyhanli is part of an effort to derail diplomatic talks (e.g. Seibert, DW, 14 May 2013).
  • It is impossible to bring the regime of Bashar al-Assad to the negotiation table. Similarly, if it were impossible to find a person to represent the regime of Bashar al-Assad that would be acceptable to all parties, then, the international conference could not take place, or, if it were still happening, it would most probably only be a sham, i.e. all parties would not be represented or those accepting to sit at the negotiation table would not be representative of what is happening on the ground.
  • A major surprise occurs that would change the international outlook on Syria and the war.The diplomatic talks could be terminated.

Evolutions for Scenario 2

Scenario 2 should lead either to Scenario 1 or to Scenario 3 (A real Victory in Syria, forthcoming). The main challenge we are facing here, as analysts, is to determine when one or the other will become likely or more likely. The timeline will depend upon what happens under the fog of war, knowing that the thicker the fog, the heightened the possibility for surprise. We shall thus have to constantly monitor the war situation, and, accordingly, revise – and improve –  all possible scenarios. For example, a potential break up of Syria would then also have to be included as sub-scenario (for Scenario 1 and Scenario 3).

Scenario 2 could also, theoretically, lead to a Scenario 4, the invasion and annexation of Syria by an external power. However, considering the current international norms and settings, such a scenario is most unlikely and may be put aside. Should those norms change, or should the current international tension and crises bring about severe upheavals, then the likelihood of scenario 4 would have to be revised and the scenario developed. We may note an unintended side-effect stemming from the international ban on war for conquest. If it improved greatly peace and stability, it also tends to remove an incentive on domestic actors to stop civil war: the warring factions do not risk to see an external actor use the fragility brought about by civil war to annex their territory, thus they can continue fighting.

Scenario 3: A Real Victory in Syria

To be continued….

———-

Detailed bibliography and  primary sources forthcoming.

The Red (team) Analysis Weekly No100, 16 May 2013

Redrawing the global strategic and geopolitical map: From the Syrian civil war and its impact on the region and beyond, with its many uncertainties, moving alliances and dilemmas, to the China-Japan unrelenting tension over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, through the rush for the Arctic, without forgetting the European quagmire and its multi-faceted apparently slow-moving polarization, this is actually the global political and strategic map that is being redrawn. How it will look like is still shrouded in the fog of war … or rather of wars, crises, and battles, present and, unfortunately, to come.

Click on the image below to read on Paper.Li

national security, political risk, horizon scanning, geopolitics, anticipatory intelligence

Scenarios for Syria – 1: Peace in Geneva?

(Updated 22 May 2013) Now that we know and understand better the actors present on the Syrian battlefield, we may start outlining scenarios regarding first plausible futures for Syria and prospects for peace over the short to medium term, and second the regional implications of those scenarios, as the regional and even global geostrategic dimensions of the war in Syria are becoming clearer everyday.

Scenario 1: Negotiating Peace for Syria in Geneva

Syria, Syrian civil war, Syrian talks

The diplomatic talks promoting a negotiated settlement of the Syrian civil war are successful and negotiations start.

Sub-scenario 1.1.: All but the Jihadis

The actors brought around the table are the NC and the Supreme Joint Military Command Council (SMC), the regime of Bashar al-Assad represented by a face-saving person for the regime and a person that would be acceptable to all other parties (assuming such a person exist), the Supreme Kurdish Council (SKC) and the Salafi-Nationalist groups.

Sub-scenario 1.1.1.: A fragile Syrian external peace

An external peace can be brokered. We would have a very fragile peace including all actors except those fighting for a global Jihad. Considering the current level of escalation and the intentions of the most extremist factions, if we want to increase the likelihood to see a real positive peace – corresponding to many Western countries’ declared foreign policy vision, upholding the rule of law and human rights – last, then we need to make sure that the following elements are included: a strong presence and support of the international community (despite the public deficit challenge mentioned above), a properly devised strategic plan and real actions rather than unrealistic pledges that are inherently escalating when what must be stopped is also the “people”s war” efficient policy of the extremist factions.

Timing would also be of the essence once the peace is brokered, as speed and real efficiency are crucial. Notably, and considering the heightened sensitivity of a people having had to go through a civil war, as well as the religious environment, corruption and various dysfunctions within the peace-building intervening system, should be avoided.

It would thus be crucial to start working towards a proper plan to construct the peace as soon as possible, using all bilateral and multilateral cooperation channels. To make sure the peace-building process is properly implemented, actionable early warning and monitoring systems should be planned and constructed from the start.

The next five to ten years would remain a very delicate period with heightened risks of re-escalation towards war.

Sub-scenario 1.1.2.: Back to civil war – Jihadis’ advantage?

The negotiations fail and Syria falls again into civil war, but with changed conditions: the failure will have a price for each actor involved, according to the reasons for and conditions surrounding the failure. The global-jihadi groups would most probably benefit most.

Sub-scenario 1.2.: All but the Salafis

The actors brought around the table are the NC and the SMC, the regime of Bashar al-Assad represented by a face-saving person for the regime and a person that would be acceptable to all other parties (assuming such a person exist) and the SKC.

The Salafi-Nationalist groups (all or most of them), even those having linked to the SMC, would refuse to participate in the negotiations.

Sub-scenario 1.2.1.: An unlikely very fragile external peace

The negotiations succeed. The external peace that is brokered is even more fragile. The prospects for successfully implementing it would be greatly reduced. All the risks already present in the previous sub-scenario (1.1.1) would be heightened. With a level of power (resources, troops and actions) constant compared with sub-scenario 1.1.1., the likelihood of success would be inversely proportional to the policy and actions of the Salafi-Nationalist groups, ranging from only refusing to participate in the negotiations and settlement to actively denouncing and fighting them. To increase the likelihood of success, the level of power applied would have to be proportionally enhanced and the length of time during which this power would be necessary would have to be increased. In other words, more troops and more civilian personal, as well as more resources would have to be dedicated to Syria for longer.

Sub-scenario 1.2.2.: Back to civil war – Salafis’ advantage?

The negotiations fail and Syria is dragged again into civil war.

Scenario similar to 1.1.2 but with a very strong advantage for the Salafi groups, be they nationalist or jihadi.

Estimating Likelihood for Scenario 1

What could enhance the likelihood to see such a scenario happening?  What are the supporting facts increasing the plausibility of scenario 1?

  • The civil war in Syria drags on, with specific evolution and dynamics over the winter 2012/2013 favouring diplomatic talks between international powers (see end of last post);
  • Fear by external actors to see further use and spread of chemical weapons,
  • Heightened fear by external actors to see the Syrian conflict spilling over further, which was bound to happen considering its regional and global dimension, supported notably by the Al Qaeda nexus April statements, by the declarations of  Hassan Nasrallah, leader of the Lebanese Hezbollah acknowledging his group fights besides the regime of Bashar al-Assad (Black and Roberts, The Guardian, 30 April 2013), by the 3 and 5 May Israeli attacks on Syria (e.g. interesting analysis by Ben Caspit, 5 May 2013, AlMonitor), then by the 11 May 2013 terror attack on the Turkish town of Reyhanli, (Daloglu, 12 May 2013 AlMonitor), the latter linking too to the refugees issue and its destabilizing dimension for neighbouring countries.
  • Difficulty to implement rapidly, efficiently and with a high likelihood of success any other solution. Lack of clear support in the domestic constituencies of potentially intervening countries, notably in the U.S., for those solutions, and possible polarisation of opinions, considering multiple diasporas and humanitarian disaster.
  • Cost of intervention for intervening countries, considering the widespread problem of public deficits and the solutions usually chosen to face this challenge (reduction of public expenses and privatization of the state).
  • Leading to Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Secretary of State John Kerry announcement that Russia and The U.S. had agreed “to work towards convening an international conference to find a political solution to the conflict in Syria,” and thus to the continuation of diplomatic work in this direction (BBC, 7 May 2013), as well as to the ongoing diplomatic exchanges between concerned partied.
  • Increased violence and multiplication of attacks – to a point – would not be an indication that talks will finally fail to bring about peace negotiations, nor that peace negotiations are breaking down, as actors will seek the strongest bargaining position possible at the negotiation table and this position is obtained through fighting. Renewed battles should be seen as (a dramatic) part of the overall negotiation process.
  • Which Syrian actors must participate? Considering the diversity of actors on the ground, this point is particularly delicate, crucial and will most probably lead to many discussions, declarations, bargains and twists, as the two declarations below let us expect.
    • Moaz Al-Khatib, ex-President of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NC) suggested “We refuse any radical thinking but this does not mean we can exclude them, they are Syrians and they have the right to speak up, and we need to enter into a dialogue with them. They are Syrians and for me a Syrian is worth more than the whole world” (Phil Sands, The National, May 9, 2013). It is most likely that an official participation by Salafi-Jihadi groups will be rejected by international powers as well as by part of the NC factions, however covert dialogue could take place between Syrian some actors. The question could also be asked for Salafi-Nationalist groups.
    • The surprising declaration by “Abdul Qader Saleh, commander of the Al-Tawhid Brigade,” member of the Syrian Liberation Front to “the Turkish news agency Cihan” accusing Israel to have destroyed weapons that were about to be seized by “the rebellion” and not arms that were about to reach the Hezbollah, thus to side with Iran and the Hezbollah to support Assad (Ynet, 13 May 2013) could signal an early hardening of the SLF (which had been suggested as possible by Lund, 2013: 27). This declaration might in turn prepare the ground for refusing the potential negotiations or for building a stronger bargaining position.

Scenario 2: No Syrian in Geneva

The diplomatic talks fail … to be continued.

——

Detailed bibliography and  primary sources forthcoming.

EN
FR ZH EN