A glimpse into the future? As expected last week, the Egyptian events have already started impacting the world. Influence is rising and falling not only within the Arab World but also internationally, with what appears to be an American struggle to make sense of the events and respond adequately and a steadfast Russian foreign policy. Tension also rises with attacks in the Sinai, while a new outlook for the Syrian opposition could well be emerging. Domestically, the Tamarod approach reaches not only Tunisia but also Libya. Meanwhile, on twitter, the connection has started being made between Turkey and Egypt, each side supporting its counterpart in the other country.
Things seem however far from being settled in Egypt, as in the rest of the world. If the choice of El-Beblawi as Prime Minister is to mean also IMF remedies resembling the structural reforms that were applied in the 1980s or more recently what was done to Greece, then the likelihood to see further uprisings and unrest in Egypt would increase. Meanwhile, Greek citizens could very well turn to Egypt as model and reinterpret the Tamarod movement and what followed according to their own needs. The never-ending economic crisis, heightened by rising security issues linked to climate change could also spread unrest to more countries, now that a way forward in agreement with Democratic values has been found. Meanwhile, the religious approach and movements could also be strengthened and radicalized by the same causes.
Having an idea of the forces fighting on the battlefield in Syria is crucial to understand the state of play, to follow the course of the war, to evaluate the impact of the decisions taken by external players, and to estimate the likelihood to see one scenario (or one of its variations) happening. To obtain the best possible understanding of the theater of war other elements such as training, armament*, command and control situation, etc. should ideally also be considered. Yet, fighting women and men remain a crucial and foremost component.
Here is a synthesis of the various estimates found for each warring group, as it is only when they are seen together that they take their full meaning. Before to enter into details for each group, the graphics below (click on an image to enlarge) aim first at summarizing and representing visually the relative scale of the various forces. Second, those forces are seen in the light of a Syrian population that would have grown increasingly divided along sectarian lines by the war, with consequences in terms of creating a future peace as well as in terms of strategies of mobilization and “population control”.
All forces on the Syrian battleground – high and low estimatesFighting Forces on the Syrian BattlegroundAll forces in Syria compared with a population that would be seen through sectarian lensesAll forces in Syria compared with a population that would be seen through sectarian lenses (no labels to allow seeing size of smaller forces)
How many fighters belong to the Supreme Joint Military Command Council (SJMCC or SMC)?
Moderates or all opposition forces
This is a crucial question, however a very difficult one. If we use David Ignatius estimates for the Washington Post, we read that “Idriss and his Free Syrian Army command about 50,000 more fighters, rebel sources say” (Ignatius, 3 April 2013). Lund (4 April 2013), in his comment on Ignatius’ article for Syria Comment, questions this estimates, considering the complexity and fluidity of the situation on the ground. O’Bagy, in her detailed report on the FSA does not include a global estimate.
Lund in his article on the FSA (16 March 2013) underlines that “If all the factions which have declared in favor of Idriss were added up, they’d count at least 50,000 men, perhaps many more.” However, as he stresses, those groups include some that belong too to other nexus, such as Suqour el-Sham that is part of the Syria Liberation Front (SLF) also known as the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF). Thus, if we are looking at the number of fighters who are “moderate,” then one should substract from the 50.000 all those men who fight first for other groups, and thus are only very loosely affiliated with the SMC.
Keeping this in mind, the International Center for the Study of Radicalisation (ICRS) gives the figure of 60,000 men as “the most conservative estimate for the current [April 2013] size of rebel forces” in his Insight: European Foreign Fighters in Syria. At the opposite end of the spectrum, one finds an AFP article (13 April 2013) emphasizing that “experts say the Free Syrian Army comprises some 140,000 fighters”, but without mention of any source.
We should also consider all those small groups that are mainly local (see here), as it is not clear from given estimates if they are counted or not.
What happened to the defectors?
When trying to find estimates for the FSA and the SMC, counting forces seems to have proceeded according to two stages.
At the beginning of the war, during 2011 and part of 2012, observers and students of the Syrian war were focusing on defectors from the Syrian Army, who led the creation of the Free Syrian Army on 23 September 2011, under the leadership of Colonel Reyad Mousa Al-As’ad. Defectors, both soldiers and officers, were meant to join the FSA, which would constitute the core of the new security forces after the fall of the Al-Assad regime.
However, as underlined by O’Bagy (Ibid: 10-11), using a New York Times article (Liam Stack, 27 October 2011), one of the many problems the FSA had to face was that the command group led by Reyad Mousa Al-As’ad defecting officers were kept in an “officer’s camp” in Turkey that was located far away from the Syrian battlefield. This led to a disconnect between fighting troops and command. Meanwhile, most probably, many soldiers and officers defecting must have joined the forces on the ground. In the same New York Times article, Colonel Al-As’ad “would not specify the number of fighters, saying only that it was more than 10,000, and he was unwilling to disclose the number of battalions, claiming that the group had 18 “announced” battalions and an unspecified number of secret ones. None of his claims could be independently verified.”
This figure of 10,000 would correspond to the estimated number of defectors given by “an American official” on 26 October 2011 (Nada Bakri, Defectors Claim Attack That Killed Syria Soldiers, NYT) and by “sources” (“Western Intelligence agencies”?) in a Haaretz’ article by Avi Issacharoff and Amos Harel on 21 December 2011. However, by December 2011, Colonel Al-As’ad claimed that the FSA now counted 20,000 fighters (Safak Timur, AFP, Dec 1, 2011). The uncertainty regarding numbers is well summarized by a 2 December 2011 AlJazeera article: “The group is now believed to number between 1,000 and 25,000 divided over 22 battalions spread across the country.”
Then, observers stopped focusing on defectors and tried to give estimates for the troops fighting more or less loosely under the SMC, the FSA or as “opposition forces”.
Defectors, whatever their number, most probably joined not only the FSA or the SMC according to the time of defection, but also mobilizing or fighting groups according to their family, geographical and religious allegiances and to the fate of the overall force. The less the “structuring” command and control “center” has to offer (including in material terms, such as weapons, logistics etc.), the less it can show its power and strength, the more likely fighters will join or rather give a stronger allegiance to other factions. For example, as reported by Mona Mahmood and Ian Black for the Guardian (8 May 2013), FSA troops have increasingly defected to Al-Nusra during the first part of 2013 (note that defections to salafi-jihadis may be both real and hyped as bargaining chip to obtain more from external support).
Pro Al-Assad regime Forces
Syrian Forces
The pro-Assad Syrian fighting groups are composed of the regular Army and the Republican Guards, as well as pro-Assad militias (both Alawite and composite – Sunni, Christian, Druze), all backed up by the Security Forces and the Police Force. All Alawites should not be considered as supporting the Assad regime, as shows the conference organised in Cairo on 23 March 2013 by Alawites promoting a “democratic alternative” (Reuters).
According to Holliday, Al-Assad has a policy of only “electively deploying [t]his loyal core of military supporters.” As a result ”a working estimate of 65,000 to 75,000 loyal, deployable Syrian regime troops emerges” out of “the Syrian Armed Forces, a basis that includes over 300,000 troops (including Air Force and Air defense personnel)” (p.27). From this figure should be removed casualties, estimated by Holliday at 7620 killed and 30500 wounded by end of December 2012 (see table p.28), which represents approximatively half of the regime estimated deployed troops, partially or completely compensated by recruitment (p.29). As underlined by Holliday and the Interntaional Crisis Group, those men are however a “hardcore nucleus of regime supporters”(p.29). A decentralization of command and control, allowing for flexibility and initiative by low- and mid-level officers, according to local conditions, was implemented during the Summer 2012 (Ibid).
Security Forces: The Mukhabarat
(For a more detailed and clear explanation, read Holliday, Appendix 3) They are constituted of four intelligence services, whose “primary mission was to ‘monitor and intervene aggressively against potential domestic threats to the regime’ (Campbell, 2009).” (p.54) However, they are now acting more like militias than like intelligence services (p.30). In addition, each operates its own prisons. Each service is present throughout the whole territory with a branch in each province. Using an interview he realized, Holliday writes that “one former regime insider suggested it [The Mukhabarat] could be as large as 200,000 security officers and personnel, but this figure could include administrative personnel and informants and cannot be verified” (p. 55), and, most probably, not all of them are fighters. (p.30).
Militias or paramilitary forces
The shabiha: A network of “Mafia-like organizations,” “made up of mostly Alawite criminal smuggling networks led by members of the extended Assad family” (p. 16), but also from other communities origins, when in areas without an Alawite population (p.17).
Popular Committees, or Lijan sha‘biya becomingthe National Defense Forces, or Quwat ad-Difa‘a al-Watani:“Minority populations who have armed themselves to protect their towns and neighborhoods from anti-government fighters” (p.16). They started being trained and ”formalized” as The National defense Forces, or Quwat ad-Difa‘a al-Watani, in early 2013, with Iran’s support (p.31).
The “People’s Army” or Jaysh al-Sha‘bi: “Institutional militias” have existed in Syria since the early 1980s (then named munazzamat sha‘biya before it became Jaysh al-Sha‘bi in the mid-1980s) (p.16). The “People’s Army” is composed of the best and most trustworthy fighters found in the previous two groups. It has been “trained and supported by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRCG-QF) and Lebanese Hezbollah” (p. 30). It was estimated to include 100.000 fighters at the end of 2011 (Holliday using van Dam, 2011, and IISS Military balance 2011). However, Holliday also mentions that Iranian Commander Mohammed Ali Jafari referred to “50.000 popular forces” in September 2012 (p. 30).
As underlined by Holliday, fear, reprisals, massacres and atrocities of minorities at the hand of extremists may only increase the number of people joining the various militias.
Iran’s action with the militias would support Smyth‘s point (2013), according to which Iran is also preparing for a post al-Assad situation by creating sub-networks within the Syrian Shia community, as well as by supporting other (Sunni) militiamen. Holliday suggested a similar Iranian role in a post al-Assad Syria (p.32).
To the Syrian forces must be added foreign groups such as the Lebanese Hezbollah, groups coming from Iraq with Iranian support such the Mahdi Army (Muqtada al-Sadr’s Liwa al-Yom al-Mauwud), Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s Quds Force (Ammar Abdulhamid, 2013; Smyth, 2013).
The Hezbollah
At the end of May 2013, the Hezbollah fighters in Syria have been estimated to reach between 3000 to 4000 troops by the French foreign minister and 7000 troops according to General Idriss (Hezbollah fighters ‘invading’ Syria – rebel chief, BBC News, 30 May 2013).
Meanwhile, the leader of the Lebanese Forces (LF) party, Samir Geagea, estimates that the overall number of Hezbollah fighters does “not exceed 5000 soldiers”, as reported by Elie Hajj (Rethinking Hezbollah’s Role in Syria, 18 June 2013, Al-Monitor Lebanon Pulse). According to IRIB World Service (Iran English Radio), that would be using a NATO report (title and link not mentioned), “the Lebanese resistance group maintains a 65,000-strong army, which is difficult to confront.” (NATO concerned over Hezbollah’s might, 13 January 2013, IRIB).
Those fighters constitute a well trained and serious force. As underlined by Nasser Chararah (Hezbollah’s Youth Strategy, 18 June, 2013, Al-Monitor Lebanon Pulse), “”Hezbollah had gone beyond being a huge militia, becoming a large military and professional force that follows a creative organizational and combat approach. This approach combines organizational conduct subjected to tight control and communications, and elite forces with a rich experience in the various types of guerilla fighting. The most prominent characteristic of this force is that a high percentage of its ranks consist of youth with specialized degrees, making it an educated army.”
Iranian forces
As we saw previously, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRCG-QF) have been training the People’s Forces since 2011 and most probably used as advisers. Mid-June 2013, according to Robert Fisk, Iran would have decided “to send a first contingent of 4,000 Iranian Revolutionary Guards to Syria to support President Bashar al-Assad’s forces” (Robert Fisk, 16 June 2013, The Independent on Sunday).
Other groups (mainly Shia)
Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigade
According to Mona Mahmood, and Martin Chulov, “interviews with serving and former members of Abu Fadl al-Abbas (Facebook Page) suggest that upwards of 10,000 volunteers – all of them Shia Muslims, and many from outside Syria – have joined their ranks in the past year alone.” (Syrian war widens Sunni-Shia schism as foreign jihadis join fight for shrines, 4 June 2013, The Guardian).
Iraq’s main Shia militias: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Hezbollah and fighters from the Mahdi Army (Muqtada al-Sadr’s Liwa al-Yom al-Mauwud).
Syrian Sunni factions intending to install an Islamist state in Syria
The Syria Liberation Front (SLF) also known as the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF) factions (Jabhat Tahrir Souriya or Jabhat al-Tahrir al-Souriya al-Islamiya) would count an estimated 37.000 fighters (Ignatius, 2 Avril 2013; see also Lund’s related comment, 3 April 2013).
The Syrian Islamic Front (SIF) (Al-Jabha al-Islamiya al-Souriya) would count between 10.000 and 30.000 fighters (Lund, 2013: 23).
To those figures should be added the unknown number of fighters belonging to other groups.
Sunni extremist factions with a global jihadi agenda
In November 2012, Washington Post David Ignatius, using sources from the FSA, considered Jahbat Al-Nosra or Al-Nusra (JAN) included “between 6,000 and 10,000 fighters.”
However, other groups fighting in Syria have a global Jihadi agenda. Are those other groups actually included within the count for JAN or not? Furthermore we know of the presence of many foreign fighters. Are the latter counted within the figures given for JAN or not? Most importantly, are those figures increasing or decreasing, and if they are increasing, which populations are mobilized?
This is notably important considering the latest arrival of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and its coexisting relationship with JAN (see for a summary Lund, 4 May 2013). Aymen Jawad Al Tamimi evaluates the relationships between JAN and ISIS, where they sometimes designate the same entity, but not always, through a meticulous and thorough regional analyses:
Unfortunately, no estimates of forces that would be specific to ISIS, according to cases are included. It might be very difficult if not impossible to evaluate them.
* as far as weapons and armament are concerned see notably the incredible research work done on Brown Moses ‘s blog.
The BBC World Service – World Have Your Say invites three experts, including from Red (Team) Analysis, to discuss: “We also hear from France, where it’s been alleged that the country’s foreign intelligence service has been intercepting computer and telephone data on a vast scale, like the controversial US Prism programme.” (5 July 2013, 12:30) – Listen to the podcast here.
Egypt: a complete game-changer – The events that have been taking place in Egypt as well as the reaction to them illustrate the potential end of a very shallow understanding of democracy since the end of World War II. This shallow understanding of democracy limited it to elections, thus to politician politics, with a complete disregard for all other values and ideals included within democracy and with a complete denial of the complex links existing between regime (democracy for example), state, and ruler (which is currently “the nation”). This shallow understanding went hand in hand with modernization, its materialistic vision of the world and the related corresponding institutions. Egyptians have yesterday put an end to this approach and the flurry of articles wondering if it was a coup – in the meantime completely ignoring, even denying, the successful mobilizing effort of the opposition, the Tamarod movement, the loss of legitimacy faced by the Morsi government and issues related to values, i.e. Islamism, and politics – as well as similar reactions by foreign governments insisting solely on coming elections show the unease and even fear that this novel development ushers. We have started a new phase in the worldwide movement of protest and efforts to find political systems adapted to our present and future that had become obvious in 2010 but could be already perceptible in 2005 and maybe before.
What could be the impacts of this change? As Tunisia shows, we may expect renewed protest movements, worldwide. If they were previously locked into a paralyzing respect for democracy, because of the specific, shallow, understanding of its meaning, they should now find there not only new strength and spirit but also organizing and mobilizing principles. The world that was said to be moved only by modernization and materialism could well be ending with consequences in terms of understanding of events (the worldview or Weltanschaung), of values upheld other than greed and profit, of struggle against all forms of extremism, which were slowly being accepted by the materialistic world, and of changes in the very institutions that supported that world (notably the UN and the Washington Consensus organizations). This also means more polarization to come and potentially more violence, as those who benefitted from the previous world will not see it disappear without fighting. In a related way, alliances and power would be shifting, with impact in geopolitical and geostrategic terms. Last but not least, this might also mean new approaches to climate change.
(21 Feb 2014)Aleppo Security by First Mile Geo (“First Mile Geo was leveraged to collect, manage, and visualize time-series data from within the human tragedy still unfolding in Aleppo City, street block by street block” with findings related to security, humanitarian conditions, governance, political allegiance)
Syria Deeply (“exploring a new model of storytelling around a global crisis.” – mainly interviews, reposting and regular review referring to major media articles, some features have not been updated since July 2013)
The Syrian Civil War, mainly domestic, battlefield
General Resources and Blogs
Must Read
Joshua Landis’ Syria Comment (regular, original analyses and findings, often includes review of articles on Syria)
(17 January 2014)Syria in Crisis – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (regular, original analyses and findings)
*The National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NC), the Supreme Joint Military Command Council (SJMCC or SMC) and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) – (see State of Play I)
Aaron Y. Zelin, Evan F. Kohlmann, Laith al-Khouri, Convoy of Martyrs in the Levant: A Joint Study Charting the Evolving Role of Sunni Foreign Fighters in the Armed Uprising Against the Assad Regime in Syria, June 2013, Flashpoint Partners.
What could a cat standing for elections in Mexico, clearly a prank, have to do with international relations, politics and national security? Why choose it as feature when so many other possible signals could have been highlighted such as new high tech capabilities and weapons, the evolution of the war in Syria and its impact in Lebanon, the region and global international politics, the new cyber-hotline between the U.S. and Russia, moves in Central Asia and the Caucasus or the never-ending questions on the crisis and Europe, without forgetting, of course the dramatic issue of climate change and its always nearer impact? The answer is in the symbolism, as underlined in The Guardian article: this cat is about political disenchantment, which goes hand in hand with loss of legitimacy, not only of a specific government, regime, or state, but of a whole system. It is a powerful symbol for the protests that flare in one country after another, now in Brazil after Turkey, then recede, then start again, in the same country or elsewhere. It is a sign that we are facing globally very deep changes – progressively revealed through all the other signals – and that societies are aware of those challenges and not quite satisfied with the way they are handled, or can be handled by the current system. It most probably indicates, in our disorganized collective efforts to face those challenges, more changes and more crises to come, until we find satisfying answers.
Despite the recent victory in Qusayr by the pro Al-Assad groups, and despite the strategic character of the city, this scenario seems to be unlikely, but not impossible, in a very near future.
To obtain complete victory, we may assume that the regime of Bashar Al-Assad would continue and even strengthen his current strategy of population displacement and use of foreign forces. However, this strategy has profound impacts that would make the construction of peace much more difficult: it favours sectarianism, the spiral of fear, hatred, and retribution, while destroying wealth and thus making it more difficult to deal with displaced people and providing for their return to normal life.
As underlined almost a year ago by Joshua Landis:
“The broader Alawite community fears the possibility of aimless retribution. To avoid this, Assad is likely to pursue the Lebanon option: turn Syria into a swamp and create chaos out of Syria’s sects and factions. It is a strategy of playing upon divisions to sow chaos.” (Creating a Syrian Swamp: Assad’s ‘Plan B’”, for Syria Comment, August 10, 2012)
Joseph Holliday excellent report, The Assad Regime: from Counterinsurgency to Civil War(March 2013 for the ISW, notably pp.19-23), provides for an account of the regime’s strategy in terms of populations’ displacement, aiming at separating “the rebellion” from a potential basis. According to him, starting from the months following the shelling of Homs in February 2012, it was increasingly pursued intentionally (p.19, also “Syria’s Mutating Conflict,” International Crisis Group, August 2012: 6-7). Before that, it would also have been done “at least in Alawite-majority coastal regions,” where “repeated clearance operations in coastal Sunni enclaves took place” (p.19). It is done in five ways:
Use of artillery shelling on towns and neighborhoods, or “scorched earth policy” (Holliday: pp.19-20, ICG: 6-9)
Campaign of bulldozing neighborhoods in Damascus and also Hama with assistance of paramilitary troops to expel people (Autumn 2012 – pp.21-22)
Massacres of men, women, and children in Sunni villages and neighborhoods across Syria by pro-regime militia, notably in areas close to Alawite villages and neighborhood (pp.21-22). Holliday however underlines that “Although pro-regime militias have been primarily responsible for these killings, it is difficult to exonerate the regime of responsibility in most cases.” (p.21)
Air power, including the use of helicopters and so-called “barrel-bombs” (improvised bombs constructed from oil drums and dropped by Syrian helicopters,” incendiary device aiming at better destroying buildings), the targeting of bakeries pp.22-25).
Use of Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missile (SSBM) against the population starting from January 2013 (pp.24-25).
As a result, the number of refugees and internally displaced persons increases exponentially. In April, according to the AFP more than 60.000 had died (until November 2012), while 1.2 million had fled to neighbouring countries and 4 million were internally displaced. On 13 June 2013, the UN estimates that at least 93.000 people had died so far during the conflict (BBC News, 13 June). On 17 June, 1.64 million people are refugees in other countries, according to UNHCR ongoing estimates and Syria counts 4.25 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) according to USAID and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center.
Everything being equal, for any student of Cambodia, the situation has an eerie feeling of déjà vu in terms of refugees (during the 1970-1975 war, during the Democratic Kampuchea – Khmer Rouge regime – and after), of emptying of cities and towns (by the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) – the “Khmer Rouge” – once victory was achieved) and violence against one’s own population. It is not by chance that Holliday uses in his report the term of “cleansing”. Hopefully for Syria and for Syrians, the comparison will stop there. Nevertheless, considering the very high tension in the country, not only since the beginning of the civil war, but also previously, as Syria has been under a state of emergency between 1963 and April 2011, the very destruction of the social fabric brought about by the way the civil war is waged, as noted by Lyse Doucet in her “Qusair – the Syrian city that died” (BBC News, 7 June 2013), it is hard to imagine how a victorious Al-Assad regime could rule by any other means than fear and again emergency, to remain positive and not to jump to hasty conclusions.
The help and support of the victorious regime’s allies would then be crucial to avoid seeing paranoia, violence and retribution settling in.
Although it would be diplomatically complex, if not impossible, to implement, Syria would have to be brought back in the family of nations as quickly as possible for the same reasons. Any pressure would have to be exerted with the utmost caution while also and always thinking in terms of impact on civilian populations. Failure to do so could lead to very adverse consequences for the population. It could also have the potential to create a core block of states (Iran, Iraq, Syria) with whom relations, for many other countries, would be tense. Russia and China would then have the power to act as balancing weight.
Estimating Likelihood for Scenario 3.4.
if we consider the forces on the ground (forthcoming post), this scenario is the least unlikely of the last four we outlined. However, the likelihood to see a real and complete victory, followed by a peace, are still slim.
Some indicators that could be followed as influencing the likelihood of this scenario:
the type of support granted to the various insurgent groups;
the capacity of the insurgent groups to unite and be efficient;
the way the insurgent groups will fight and mobilize the population, including succeeding or failing to protect them against the population displacement of the Al-Assad regime;
the support and level of protection insurgent groups and civilian populations could obtain with certainty after victory;
the level of threat, both external and internal, felt by the victorious power;
the kind of support given to the new Syrian regime;
the capacity to integrate again the new Syria in the international society of states;
the way refugees and IDPs are reintegrated (and the support negotiated, i.e. granted and accepted);
the power and wisdom of various trade networks in favouring sustainable and fair business;
the interest and play of various organised crime networks in the situation in Syria.
This scenario ends our series of scenarios for Syria in the short to medium term future.
Header image: Bashar al-Assad visiting The tomb of the Unknown Soldier by Syrianist (Own work) [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons
In the midst of turmoil – Once you get beyond the tsunami of articles regarding the NSA, we continue seeing the same pattern of deep and painful changes emerging as observed over the last months. Eurozone countries are not only in crisis, but, most probably, living through a deep shift. For now, Greece leads the way in bearing the brunt of changes, but the UK, Italy, Ireland, or France, this week, are not being spared. We may also wonder if the events in Turkey, after the Arab Spring, the Real Democracy Now movement in Europe, notably Spain, and the Occupy movement are not one supplementary symptom of the increasingly numerous and widespread efforts of societies to find their way in a world that has changed, is changing and has not stabilized yet.
Meanwhile, geo-strategically, the Middle East is definitely in the midst of turmoil, while Asia faces its own changes and challenges, India being again under the spot light this week.
This post will outline the last but one scenario for Syria for the short to medium term, i.e. “a Secular Syria” resulting from a real victory by one of the warring groups. Considering the current state of play, this scenario is unlikely, even utopic. Yet, imagining it will also suggest possible policy and strategy that could change the odds.
The various scenarios constructed over the last weeks are summarized in the graph below. This “mapping” starts exploring ways to look at sets of scenarios as a systemic and dynamic whole. The thickness of the arrow shows higher probability and shorter timeline: the thicker an arrow, the more likely and the quicker a scenario would evolve in a specific direction; alternatively a dotted line shows lower probability and/or longer timeline. Probability and timeline will evolve according to events.
Scenario 3.3.2.: A Secular Syria?
To see a secular Syria rising from the ashes of the war would presuppose a victory of the Supreme Joint Military Command Council (SJMCC or SMC), especially won by fighters affiliated with moderate or secular groups, while the ascendency of the Muslim Brotherhood within the political corresponding body, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NC) has waned.
As of today, it is thus even more unlikely than the previous scenario. First, the absence of coordination and of an efficient command-and-control structure, as analysed by Ignatius (7 June 2013, The Washington Post) in the recent loss of Qusair to the pro Al-Assad groups is a severe impediment. Second, the estimated weakness in numbers of fighters of the FSA (if Islamist and Muslim Brotherhood’s supported groups are not included) seriously constrains the possibility of victory (Ignatius, 3 April 2013 and Lund, 4 April 2013). Finally, the secular and moderate within the NC hardly have any external support, as the American and European hesitations show daily.
Nevertheless, let us imagine that dynamics change and that this utopian scenario becomes a reality, under a new type of leadership, successfully unifying and mobilizing the rebellion in a non-sectarian way. Building upon Matthew Barber’s series of three posts (27 May 2013 for Syrian Comment) focusing on Sufi Sheikh Muhammad al-Yaqoubi and how hopes to see him officially elected to the National Coalition were dashed at the end of May 2013, this leadership could be Sufi. Indeed, Barber underlines:
“An emerging Sufi current within the Syrian resistance could soon provide an alternative to Muslim Brotherhood hegemony and change the dynamics of the political opposition.” (Barber,22 May 2013, Syria Comment)
Countries, such as the U.S., the U.K., or France, who look for a way to support a solution that would end the Syrian conflict, avoid a sectarian bloodshed and the prospect of a Syrian balkanization, respect democracy and fundamental rights, without favouring extremism, and further tensions or even war in the region, would have perceived backing such a current as an answer. Practically, and depending upon further investigation, interested actors would have worked with “the Movement for Building Civilization” or Tiyaar Binaa’ al-Hadara, which should be “operating soon out of an office in Jordan” (Interview with Sheikh al-Ya’qoubi, Barber, 30 May 2013). As explained by Barber,
“Sheikh al-Ya’qoubi and other Sufi leaders have been building influence lately, working together for about six months to form an umbrella organization for rebel groups comprised of Sunnis and Sufis aligned with Syria’s mainstream values, rather than Islamist agendas. The organization is called the Movement for Building Civilization. He and his peers have produced a charter document which rebels groups can sign.” (Barber,22 May 2013, Syria Comment)
Starting from the 200 groups with which the Sufi Sheikhs (ibid.), strengthened by the novel supports received, more groups would join under a fortifying SMC, which would be increasingly victorious, despite fierce battles. Meanwhile, the ascendency of the moderates within the NC would increase. According to Barber (Ibid., see also the series on Salafi and Sufi influences on Islam in Syria in Syria Comment, 2007), Sufi ulema enjoy considerable backing within the Sunni Muslim population in Syria. According to Sheikh al-Ya’qoubi, “probably one-quarter of the Syrian population is Sufi” (interview), which would represent 5.6 million people (on World Bank estimates for 2012). Such highly respected figures as
“Sheikh al-Ya’qoubi represent[s] the kind of moderate, traditional Islam that most Syrians are familiar with, the Islam challenged by both the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists. Though taking an unambiguous stance against the regime’s violence, injustice, and terror, he [Sheikh al-Ya’qoubi] also continues to exert his influence encouraging rebels to avoid terrorism through fatwas condemning tactics such as car-bombings, kidnapping, landmines, the killing of prisoners, and violence against non-combatants politically aligned with the regime… He maintains a very clear position defending the rights of all minorities, including those condemned by extremists as heterodox… He thinks Syria’s current family laws are just fine, and are already sufficiently compatible with the shari’a. He also believes that legal reform should not be pursued before a constitutionally-based committee can be formed which would tackle any needed changes, after the regime has fallen and a new Syrian government has been created.” (Barber,22 May 2013, Syria Comment)
As a result, a strong mobilization of the Sunni population, starting from the Sufi core, would occur. Sectarian fears decreasing in general, the mobilization capabilities of other groups (including those allowing for the creation of Bashar al-Assad regime’s “People’s Army” or Jaysh al-Sha‘bi (see the excellent report by Joseph Holliday, The Assad Regime: from Counterinsurgency to Civil War– March 2013 for the ISW) would progressively disappear. Step by step, non Sunni groups and people would start believing in and actively supporting the new vision of a secular, moderate Syria. Considering the influence of Sufism among Kurds in Syria (Paulo Pinto, Syrian Studies Association Bulletin, Vol 16, No 1, 2011), a reaffirmed common ground would be found and the Kurds would fully join the new forces.
Furthermore, building previous historical ties as explained by Weismann (excerpt reported by Joshua Landis, 11 May 2007), the new Sufi outlook could find common ground with both the Syrian Salafis and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, and thus integrate them.
As a result, victory would truly mean a Syria where all people and groups are integrated, save for warlords and the most violent actors that would still need to be brought back within society. Syria could constitute a novel model of secular, yet spiritual, and predominantly Muslim polity. As such, it might also be perceived as a threat by other actors in other countries, who could also feel their own power, derived from other models, questioned. The new secular Syria would have to pay attention to such dangers, however without falling into the trap of paranoia.
Estimating Likelihood for Scenario 3.3.2.
Right now, if conditions do not change, and as underlined earlier, this scenario is quite unlikely. However, assuming the Movement for Building Civilization (or a similar initiative) succeeds in being born, then it has the potential for slowly and progressively changing the odds from highly unlikely to plausible and even probable. Most importantly, the right timing for each action will need to be respected, as many times underlined by Sheikh al-Ya’qoubi.
Some indicators that could be followed as influencing the likelihood of this scenario:
Creation of the Movement for Building Civilization (or a similar initiative) with real linkages in Syria;
Mobilization of the Syrian population, across groups and communities;
Strategic, operational and tactical skills of the SMC under this new configuration and of the fighting groups affiliated with the Movement.
Propaganda and deception aiming at fueling fears and hatred (external and internal).
Proper material support by various actors;
Proper discussions and cooperation between supporters and the moderate forces leading to commonly agreed actions if any;
Patience of external supporters;
Actions against the proponents of a secular Syria by actors (external and internal) who are sponsoring other solutions for Syria;
Regionalization of the war;
Changes of situation for one of the external players (e.g. what implications may the events in Turkey have on the situation – current and prospects – in Syria?);
This article continues exploring various scenarios around the theme of “a real victory in Syria” by one or the other groups fighting on the ground, starting first with a Nationalist Islamic Syria, and then moving to a Syria under the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood. For each scenario, current estimates of likelihood will be outlined and some indicators influencing probability will be suggested.
Scenario 3.2.: A Nationalist Islamic Syria?
If the victorious groups are Sunni Islamist and Salafi-Nationalist factions, then they would implement an Islamic state in Syria. According to Lund, and assuming those groups follow the January 2013 SIF’s official charter, they would “establish a state guided by sharia law at all costs, while also making some gestures towards moderation and tolerance for minority groups”, (p.16) or in their own terms they would “… build a civilized Islamic society in Syria, ruled by the law of God” (p.19).
They would be opposed “to secularism and democracy” (p.17) because “Islamic Shari’a cannot be put to a vote” (p.20) however, “elections could still be used as a system to appoint representatives and leaders…” as long as modalities and potential parties are bound by Shari’ia.
Rather than adopting a confrontational position they would be “eager to reach a modus vivendi with the West”, as shows their willingness “to open communication channels” during the war. (p.18)
On the path to victory, as they would have given as much attention to war as to building the real foundations for an Islamic society (“the civilian movement, from which springs missionary, educational, humanitarian, media, political and [public] service [movements]” (19), once in power their task towards stabilizing peace would be eased. They would seek to maintain, expand and deepen those already existing structures and processes. They would focus on Syria and its needs.
Succeeding fully in building this type of peace in Syria would most probably be hardest and most challenging as far as non Sunni Islamist groups are concerned. How could the very different faith and ways of life be accommodated by a state abiding to Shari’a ? Could they be successfully integrated and how? Or would this lead to a renewal of civil war, to multiple exodus, and in the case of the Kurds to a semi-autonomous or fully independent Kurdistan?
Assuming that the best way to integrate those communities are not found, would this lead again to foreign involvement and, as a result to heightened possibilities for war?
Estimating Likelihood for Scenario 3.2.
The more pragmatic and more Syria-centric agenda of those groups, as well as the number of fighters (between 47000 and 67000 fighters if estimates (Lund, Ignatius, see detail here) for the SIF and the SLF/SILF are added), and their structure, imply that this scenario is less unlikely than the previous one. However, considering the military strength of the Pro-Assad groups, as well as the rising regionalization of the civil war, it is still far from being likely.
Some indicators that could be followed as influencing the likelihood of this scenario:
Continuing disunity and internecine struggle within the “moderate” opposition (NC) with impact on the capacity to garner support without and within and related consequence on military operations.
Success or failure in the opening of communication channels with the West – and more broadly internationally – by such groups on the mode of what is done by the SIF, and in the ability to convince about their pragmatic, Syrian centric approach.
Capacity of those groups to endeavour and succeed in providing the Syrian population with “public services” both according to the groups ideology and without creating any adverse reaction.
Increasing regionalisation of the conflict and international wish to put an end to it.
Change in the overall configuration of the external support.
Scenario 3.3.: A Secular Syria?
This scenario (or rather a variation around this theme) would be meant to happen if the victorious group is the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NC) and its corresponding fighting arm, the Supreme Joint Military Command Council (SJMCC or SMC).
This would first presuppose that the various groups affiliated with the SMC succeed in uniting their forces to fight, while the NC would find a widely accepted way to elect representatives and to function. Notably, this would imply that internecine struggles, as were for example displayed during the last week of May 2013 (e.g. Barber for Syria Comments, 27 May 2013), between more secular and moderate groups, on the one hand, and, on the other, the Muslim Brotherhood – as well as their supports – stop, and that whatever alliances were made with various factions hold and are honoured. The NC and the SMC would also need to find a way to manage the “correct” support from their allies, i.e. enough and in the right manner to have sufficient fire power to fight successfully and to deliver to the population they seek to mobilize and who are under their authority, yet without creating an adverse reaction among Nationalists who could accuse them to sell Syria to foreign interests.
Considering the differences existing between the Muslin Brotherhood and other groups, we may imagine two possible sub-scenarios.
Scenario 3.3.1. A Muslim Brotherhood’s Syria
Assuming a NC with a Muslim Brotherhood strong leaning wins, and that it has achieved enough power over the fighting forces of the SMC, we would have a system that “supports democratic elections and many political freedoms while espousing a vision for a Syrian state that implements Sunni Islamic frames of reference for its legislation.” (O’Bagy, Jihad in Syria, Sept 2012 :17).
Indeed as Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi notes, the “Muslim Brotherhood’s conception of applying Islamic law [is] through gradual action…step by step, in order to facilitate understanding, studying, acceptance and submission” (for Syria Comment, 20 March 2013). If we turn to the text used as reference by Al-Tamimi, we not only find a description of this needed gradual action, but also reference to the ultimate aim, the restoration of the Caliphate (see previous post for more on the Caliphate).
“We must not impose Islamic shari’a, forcing the people to adopt something about which they are ignorant and with which they are unfamiliar… If we do this, [various] ploys will be used to circumvent it, and there will be hypocrisy. [People] will exhibit Islamic [behavior] only outwardly…
“Noah, peace be upon him, received a clear sign, a stark vision, a prophecy, and mercy that his people did not understand… Noah could not force or impose [his faith upon the people]. He determined the principle of choosing [one’s] faith [as a result of] persuasion and reflection, [instead of] oppression, authority, condescension, and coercion. …
“There is no other way but gradual action, preparing the [people’s] souls and setting an example, so that faith will enter their hearts… Gradual action does not impose Islam at once, but rather step by step, in order to facilitate understanding, studying, acceptance, and submission.
…
“The Prophet, peace be upon him, acted in a gradual manner, by first preparing the people, and then [preparing] family, society, state, and finally the caliphate…
“I ask the honorable Al-Azhar to rally the Islamic streams in order to unite the Muslim word and effort, restore the caliphate, and prepare a practical plan to implement the law of Allah the Exalted. ” (Article on Muslim Brotherhood Website: Implement Shari’a in Phases, June 11, 2011; MEMRI, July 5, 2011, Special Dispatch No.3969)
This scenario can thus be seen as a mix of scenario 3.2. in terms of pace and pragmatic approach, being even ready for slower changes, with, at the beginning, a less strict view of what can be done or not, and of scenario 3.1. in terms of ultimate goal, but on a much longer timeframe, and certainly with different means.
Estimating Likelihood for Scenario 3.3.1.
This scenario, so far, seems to be quite unlikely considering the weakness and disunity of the NC and of the SMC. Furthermore, the very history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, implying, as explained by O’Bagy (Jihad in Syria, 2012: 11-13), the distrust of the population and the weakness of their presence and network within Syria, would make it even less likely, despite the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood within the NC today.
Some indicators that could be followed as influencing the likelihood of this scenario
Strong external support (up to external intervention) compensating for absence of legitimacy, of support network and of presence on the ground and allowing to create one
Ability to unite factions under Brotherhood’s leadership;
Absence or disappearance of better alternative for various actors, notably the population
Successful “hearts and minds” campaign within Syria to win over the population and build legitimacy.
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