This article is the sixth of our series focusing on scenarios depicting interventions in the Libyan war. In our previous article, we discussed the preliminary stages of an international coalition created to intervene in Libya in favor of the nationalists – either by invitation from the nationalist government, or if the new unity government fails and fragments. However, Libya’s new Government of National Accord (GNA) is now recognized by the U.S., UK, Italy, Germany and France as “the only legitimate government in Libya” (European Union Statement, March 13, 2016; Musa, Boston Globe, March 13, 2016), which means that any international intervention that favors the nationalist side will now occur only after (and if) this unity government fragments into former factions. …
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Scenarios for the Future of Libya – Scenario 2 (2) – The Joint Arab Force Intervenes
This article is the second of our series focusing on scenarios depicting interventions in the Libyan war. As detailed previously we have reached the following stage in our sub-scenarios: External actors have decided to militarily intervene in Libya by taking a side with either the GNC or COR (Sc 2.1.1). The League of Arab States (LAS) meets to decide about an intervention in Libya and to form the related Joint Arab Force. Considering the position of each country, the debates are very animated to say the least (Sc 2.1.1.1). As a result, the Arab League internally fragments over the decision to intervene. Nonetheless a Joint Arab Force is formed involving three countries, Egypt, the UAE, and Jordan. It is about …
Scenarios for the Future of Libya – Scenarios 2 (1) – The Joint Arab Force Takes a Side
After having examined the first scenarios – diplomatic negotiations between the Council of Representatives (COR) and General National Congress (GNC) towards peace – with this article we shall begin detailing a second set of scenarios focusing on external intervention and evaluating their likelihood. The organization of the whole series for the future of Libya can be found here. This scenario and its sub-scenarios are grounded in the premises that despite the advocacy of external actors to avoid foreign involvement in Libya’s civil war, consideration of intervention increases as Libya heads closer to a failed state, and as Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaida affiliates expand their areas of operation. In our first intervention scenarios category, external actors decide to intervene in …
Scenarios for the Future of Libya – Scenarios 1 (3) – A Successful Peacebuilding Mission?
After having discussed the formation of a unity government, with this article we shall continue detailing the scenarios assessing the potential for a peaceful solution for Libya’s future within the next three to five years, suggest indicators to monitor their happenstance and progressively evaluate their likelihood. Our focus here will be on the scenario where an international peacebuilding mission is necessary to see the Libyan government and state progress towards stabilisation. The first possibility for the evolution of sub-scenario 1.1.1 was presented here (scenario 1.1.1.1 “The unity government functions” – i.e. without international assistance, and then articulated around the ability or not to face the Salafi threats). The organisation of the whole series of scenarios for the future of Libya can be found …
Scenarios for the Future of Libya – Scenarios 1: Towards Peace? (1)
Image: Libyan dialogue participants in Skhirat, Morocco, posted on UNSMIL Facebook page, 26 June 2015rAfter having focused on understanding the actors in Libya’s civil war, and presented our basic scenarios outline (see previous post), with this article we shall begin detailing the scenarios and evaluating their likelihood, starting with assessing the potential for a peaceful solution for Libya’s future within the next three to five years.Scenarios 1: Towards Peace The Council of Representatives (COR) and General National Congress (GNC) have agreed to participate in diplomatic talks for the sake of achieving peace and ending Libya’s civil war. Click to access larger imageScenario 1.1: The Peace Negotiations, Brokered by External Forces, are Successful and a Peace Treaty is SignedAn external actor, …
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Potential Futures for Libya Series – Features of a War
The fall of Muammar Gaddafi and his revolutionary regime in 2011 has ushered in an era of factional violence between city militias, military units, and Islamic and nationalist brigades. According to LibyaBodyCount.org (see detailed bibliographic reference below), 1,741 Libyans have been killed in violent clashes or assassinations from January to September 2014 alone. Although the site’s body …
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Seminars in Brussels: 2013-2020
In 2013, Vesalius College, the Institute for European Studies (IES) and the Global Governance Institute (GGI) created an Advanced Certificate in Global Risk Analysis & Crisis Management that included 10 modules. The Red Team took an active part in the curriculum design of the first part “Risk Analysis and Early Warning” at the start of …
Conflict in Ukraine – Setting the Stage
The crisis in Ukraine started on 21 November 2013 with the Euromaidan protests in Kiev. Six months later, it is threatening to become a full-blown civil war with severe global impacts, unless the situation is stabilised. As for any conflict it is important to assess possible futures and impacts at all levels. Image: Mstyslav Chernov/Unframe – CC BY-SA 3.0This article starts a series on the conflict in Ukraine, which aims at providing the most possible useful analysis of the situation. As we did with Syria, the series will focus on the states of play for the actors and the situation on the ground, a necessary foundation for any proper strategic foresight and warning regarding the conflict.After outlining our analytical framework to overcome the difficulties related to propaganda, we shall define and …
Evaluating Scenarios and Indicators for the Syrian War
Every year, The Economist, in its “The World in…” series, assesses it successes and failures regarding its past yearly forecasts (e.g. for 2012). This is an exemplary behaviour that should be adopted by all practitioners: if we are to deliver good and actionable strategic foresight and warning, and to improve our process, methodology and thus our final products, then we should always evaluate our work. Having now completed our last series of updates on the state of play for the Syrian war, we can now start assessing how our own scenarios and indicators fared so far, if they need to be updated and the potential methodological improvements that we should endeavour.Evaluating the scenariosAs the Geneva conference took place (see previous post), we …
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The Syrian War: the Start of a New Phase
This (long) post ends the current series of updates on the Syrian war. It focuses on the evolution within the National Coalition and the Supreme Military Council, the expected failure of Geneva 2 and the start of a new phase in the Syrian war. This will allow us, next, to finally turn to an evaluation of our scenarios and indicators.The National Coalition and the Supreme Military CouncilThe last alliance to emerge over the Autumn has been Syria Revolutionaries Front (SRF), created on 9 December 2013 (see Youtube video), which is composed of moderate or non-ideologically motivated groups, as detailed by Lund (13 Dec 2013) and mapped below (click on the image for a larger picture). It is a reaction to the Salafi-Nationalist re-organization as …
