With two primary warring alliances and two rival governments, Libya’s civil war is becoming increasingly polarized. The Islamist/Misratan coalition, or Dawn of Libya, which supports the General National Congress (GNC) in Tripoli, is battling General Haftar and the Nationalist coalition, which supports the Council of Representatives in Tobruk. With this in mind, we shall begin the present state of play with the Nationalist coalition. In this post, we shall specifically evaluate the Petroleum Facilities Guard, the Army of Cyrenaica, the Cyrenaica Protection Force, the Libyan military, al-Saiqa (Special Forces), al-Sawaiq Brigade, and al-Qaqa Brigade. The remaining groups – the Libyan National Army, Zintan Brigades, various tribes and regional forces – shall be presented in the next post. The Council of …
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Each week our scan collects weak – and less weak – signals… We present below the most interesting or relevant features for each section.
World (all matters related to war, international and national security) – This week, we can point out, besides many other signals and articles, a must read article on “Putin’s Great Gamble” by Pr Nikolas K. Gvosdev, which not only enlightens understanding of current relations but also is crucial to foresee next moves.
The way the war against the Islamic State impacts Turkey and its relationships to other players, including the U.S., is also of utmost importance for the way the war will be waged in the future by the different actors.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace policy recommendations for a EU Foreign Policy strongly committed to
A powerful paradox lies at the heart of the current oil and gas global rush (Michael Klare, The Race for what’s left, 2012). On the one hand, the energy global demand necessitates to find and exploit oil and gas deposits, while looking for new ones, even in extreme environmental and political situations, as in the Arctic or the Niger river Delta (Al Jazeera, “Who is stealing Nigerian oil?“, 13 Sept. 2014). On the other hand, 97% of climatologists have developed a consensus in establishing that the current uses of oil and gas are changing the Earth climate (IPCC, fifth report, 2014) at such a speed and rate that basic life conditions could be altered for the whole of the human …
The remaining part of this article is for our members and those who purchased special access plans. Make sure you get real analysis and not opinion, or, worse, fake news. Log in and access this article.
Each week our scan collects weak – and less weak – signals… This week, we have revisited sections available in the Weekly to better reflect relevant issues and problems and ease reading. You can now find a section on Ebola – read notably a sobering article on underreporting and the real number of Ebola cases, besides news on vaccines and treatments, and governments’ policies. A section devoted to technology and weapons or armaments, aims at presenting potentially transformational technologies as well as latest procurements. This week, what stands out is an awakening regarding big data imagined promises.
Parliamentary election in Ukraine will be held on 26 October 2014. Meanwhile, the road towards full peace in Eastern Ukraine is still uncertain, despite the 5 September Minsk protocol and its 19 September memorandum (OSCE), witness, among others, the battles for Donetsk airport and latest fighting in Luhansk or near Mariupol (OSCE SMM reports). Furthermore, on 2 November, the special status territories of the Donbass, the “self-proclaimed” Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) will vote to elect their respective heads and representatives at the People’s Assemblies (Ria Novosti, 11 October 2014).It is thus all the more important to continue our evaluation of the state of play for the various Ukrainian actors. Ukraine is indeed more than ever poised at …
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Each week our scan collects weak – and less weak – signals… This week a very important “exclusive” by Reuters regarding a new Saudi strategy of lower energy prices, with all the potential impacts this may have on, for example fracking in the U.S. or Russian energy strategy. An interesting article on how Internet-based flight tracking tools and potential impact for air force, some elements on Iran intelligence, and a new very complete scholarly research on the use of snipers in Maidan, which could more than question current beliefs. Of course much on the Islamic State, Syria, Ebola (world section – an article on big data and Ebola in the tech section), Russia, weapons (tech section), etc.
The Weekly is the scan of The Red (Team) Analysis Society and it focuses on national and international security issues. It was started as an experiment with Paper.li as a way to collect ideas, notably through Twitter. Its success and its usefulness led to its continuation.
The information collected (crowdsourced) does not mean endorsement but points to new, emerging, escalating or stabilizing problems and issues.
If you wish to consult the scan after the end of the week period, use the “archives” directly on The Weekly.
Featured image: “C-band Radar-dish Antenna”. Licensed under Public domain via Wikimedia Commons
The fall of Muammar Gaddafi and his revolutionary regime in 2011 has ushered in an era of factional violence between city militias, military units, and Islamic and nationalist brigades. According to LibyaBodyCount.org (see detailed bibliographic reference below), 1,741 Libyans have been killed in violent clashes or assassinations from January to September 2014 alone. Although the site’s body count statistics cannot be taken as official numbers since they are based on media reports, it offers the best estimation.
The conflict has created 250,000 refugees with, in August 2014, a peak rate of 5,000-6,000 crossing the Tunisian border each day, forcing Tunisia to close its border. Egypt and Algeria have also closed their borders, forcing Libyans to either stay in the country as displaced persons, or attempt to cross the Mediterranean Sea as refugees. Libya’s post-Gaddafi era has brought about a failed state that is increasingly plagued by civil war and all the associated negative effects.
A continuing and strengthening Libyan civil war poses a significant challenge in the North African and Middle Eastern regions, and even beyond. Besides the direct domestic disaster resulting from civil war, the involvement of five foreign regional governments (each with their own political or security stake in Libya) backing the fighting domestic actors could be a powder-keg, further destabilizing the region.
Furthermore, radical Libyan Islamist groups, such as Ansar al-Sharia, may be tempting opportunities for outside terrorist organizations; therefore, a continuing civil war between Islamic and nationalist forces in an oil-rich region could potentially invite foreign extremist groups that would ensure the continuance and likely spread of instability, as suggested by Egypt. According to Christopher Chivvis and Jeffrey Martini from the RAND Corporation, jihadist groups in Libya are certainly a minority, but are still very deadly and a potential “future threat” (2014).
Hence, this post begins a series on the Libyan crisis and post-Gaddafi civil war. The objective of this series is to provide analysis and strategic foresight for the next five years in Libya, which is crucial to conduct considering the potential strategic impact of the war and related uncertainties.
Due to the sheer number of armed groups, the increasing involvement of regional actors, and the constant change in territorial control, we must analyze the crisis and make strategic foresight conclusions through adaptable lenses. With this in mind, we shall present throughout the series the state of play for each actor in the Nationalist and Dawn of Libya coalitions, the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries, Mujahideen Shura Council, and the involved regional actors, while emphasizing their goals and beliefs as much as possible before pursuing scenarios. In this opening post, we shall present the current situation and underline its main features, including using metrics to evaluate the severity of the Libyan “crisis”.
Brief outlook of the situation (October 2014)
Libya’s descent into chaos can be attributed to many variables. However, the primary variable involves the interim government’s failure to make visible progress (in the form of stable governance, justice, finance, and security in the post-conflict phase) – and particularly its inability to control the armed groups that were once integrated under the transitional government. It will be vital to keep those elements in mind once a peace process is in sight.
Libya is currently split between two rival governments – the elected Council of Representatives currently located in Tobruk (the newly elected parliament that replaced the GNC) and the General National Congress in Tripoli (Libya’s former legislative authority during the interim phase). Furthermore, most of Libya’s major armed groups have merged into warring coalitions: the Dawn of Libya – composed of Misrata brigades and Islamist groups – on the one hand, and General Haftar and his nationalist allies, on the other. A third alliance, called the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries, is an umbrella group comprised of Ansar al-Sharia, Libya Shield One, the Rafallah al-Sahati Companies, and 17 February Revolutionary Martyr’s Brigade (Ending Libya’s Civil War, 2014), while a Derna-based alliance called the Mujahideen Shura Council is comprised of Salafi-jihadists (see Islamist Forces Part I) The more radical Islamist umbrella groups oppose the Nationalist Coalition – similar to the Dawn of Libya – however, they have not ideologically aligned themselves with Dawn of Libya. General Haftar faces two fronts of Salafi-jihadist alliances and the primarily-Islamist yet pro-revolutionary Dawn of Libya. Dawn of Libya controls Tripoli and Misrata, the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries is currently battling Haftar in Benghazi, and the Mujahideen Shura Council is operating in Derna.
Khalifa Haftar is a renegade general who established his own National Army and seeks to remove Islamist factions and influence from Libya. The Dawn of Libya announced its support for the General National Congress, while General Haftar has allied with the Council of Representatives in Tobruk. Haftar had called for a new government to replace the GNC either to minimize the influence of Islamist politicians or as a strategic “coup attempt” to consolidate political power and influence, or both. Haftar prefers the newly elected Council of Representatives to the Islamic-dominated GNC, thus making him a strong ally to the government in Tobruk.
During the interim phase, armed groups – whether affiliated or not with the state – fought for regional control and influence, or were tasked by government ministries to handle specific security operations. However, the launch of Haftar’s “Operation Dignity” (with the goal of eliminating Islamist militias and terrorism) forced many prominent groups to form alliances. As a result, the western-based Islamist groups and the Misratan brigades have joined forces against General Haftar and his allies, while the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries and Mujahideen Shura Council clash with Haftar in the east. The Dawn of Libya controls the major cities of Tripoli and Misrata, the Shura Council is battling Haftar to retain control of Benghazi, the Mujahideen Shura Council controls Derna, and the Nationalist coalition controls Al-Zintan in the west with Al-Bayda and Tobruk in the east.
Libyan Actors Main Positions. Google Maps, map data: Basarsoft, Google, ORION-ME 2014. Blue Circle: General National Congress. Blue Balloons: Dawn of Libya (Islamist/Misrata Coalition). Red Balloons: Ansar al-Sharia. Orange Balloons: Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries. Green Circle: Council of Representatives. Green Balloons: General Haftar and Nationalist Coalition. Black Balloon: Mujahideen Shura Council. Black Star: Islamic State. Blue Diamonds: Regional Supporter of Operation Dawn. Green Diamonds: Regional Supporter of Operation Dignity.
Characterizing the Libyan conflict
Most of the fighting occurs in the Tripolitania and Cirenaica regions with epicenters in Tripoli and Benghazi, both currently under Islamist control; however, Libya’s conflict cannot be classified as a simple rivalry between Islamists and secularists – a notion iterated by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (Barak Barfi, “Khalifa Haftar: Rebuilding Libya from the Top Down,” August 2014). Both loose coalitions contain tribal, regional, religious, and ideological fracture lines, with differences existing between the individual Islamic groups as well. Tensions and divisions exist between Salafist-jihadist groups, like Ansar al-Sharia, and the more democratic Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated groups. Divisions in Libyan armed groups and society include, but are not limited to:
Islamist vs. Nationalist
General National Congress vs. Council of Representatives
These divisions, along with the continued widespread violence in Libya, thus pose two difficulties that pertain to the availability of statistics: 1) most casualty counts are based on media reports, making it difficult to produce accurate statistics and 2) acquiring accurate strength numbers for armed groups, particularly unofficial brigades and organizations, can be extremely problematic due to shifting alliances and unofficial reporting. In addition to statistics difficulties, Libya has a “hybrid security order”, where government controlled forces – such as the military and law enforcement – often coordinate with unofficial armed groups, according to Frederic Wehrey (“What’s Behind Libya’s Spiraling Violence?” July 28, 2014) from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This blurs the differentiation between state-controlled and non-state group operations.
Libya, a case for war
Of the estimated 1,700 armed groups in Libya (Council on Foreign Relations, January 2014), only a prominent handful is capable of causing significant change in their cities or regions. At this point, it would seem that no singular armed group has the capability to take control of the country (notion shared by Frederic Wehrey) and as a result, has resorted to loose coalitions with similar strategic goals. In Libya, it seems that the absence of a dominating player can create a perpetual cycle of territorial loss and gain between armed groups locked in a civil war. Whereas Libya may have been labeled a limited war on a national scale in 2013 (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research), the current situation on the ground creates a case for Libya that can be confidently labeled as civil war – based on HIIK’s methodology. In fact, the violence thus far in 2014 rivals the NATO intervention to overthrow Gaddafi in 2011.
Based on HIIK’s methodology for conflict classification, Libya likely entered the civil war phase in mid-May or June 2014, however, complete data could only make a case for July, August and September, as summarized in the table below and explained next.
Analysis of Libya’s conflict status in July, August, and September 2014, according to HIIK methodology.
Heavy weapons, including an array of airstrikes from Libyan and regional actors, were utilized in all three months with August and September seeing an increased employment of heavy weapons.
The highest number of personnel involved is more difficult to determine. However, it is certain that there were more than 50 involved (HIIK’s low threshold) and it is likely that the number of involved personnel was greater than or equal to 400 (HIIK’s high threshold) – considering the number of armed groups involved in each clash and their estimated strength numbers.
Furthermore, July, August and September saw an increased spike of violence and casualties. All three months saw greater than 60 casualties (HIIK high threshold). There was also infrastructure destruction in July and August when missiles and heavy shelling destroyed fuel depots, aircraft and the main terminal at Tripoli International Airport. Residential neighborhoods were heavily shelled in September resulting in residential destruction.
Lastly, all three months saw more than 20,000 Libyan refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (20,000 – HIIK’s high threshold). According to UNHCR, 100,000 Libyans were displaced in just three weeks (September – October 2014), bringing the total number of refugees and displaced persons to 287,000.
We shall examine all possibilities of Libya’s future over the next five years, in the rest of this series, including the preferred scenario of de-escalation, assuming it is plausible.
———–
Bibliography and Resources
Featured image: This rebel pick-up truck at Ajdabiya had a four-barreled Grad missile launcher mounted on the back. 23 April 2011, by Al Jazeera English (High-powered technical) [CC-BY-SA-2.0 via Wikimedia Commons
Each week our scan collects weak – and less weak – signals… This week a very interesting article on Ukraine copycat war with Russia by a Kiev Post journalist (including the creation of a UT copied on Russian RT), a very complete health section devoted to Ebola, an article on “The Navy’s Future Fleet of Swarming Boat-Drones” by The Atlantic and of course much on the Islamic State, China, Russia, India, latest IARPA efforts, weapons (business section), etc.
The Weekly is the scan of The Red (Team) Analysis Society and it focuses on national and international security issues. It was started as an experiment with Paper.li as a way to collect ideas, notably through Twitter. Its success and its usefulness led to its continuation.
The information collected (crowdsourced) does not mean endorsement but points to new, emerging, escalating or stabilizing problems and issues.
If you wish to consult the scan after the end of the week period, use the “archives” directly on The Weekly.
Featured image: “C-band Radar-dish Antenna”. Licensed under Public domain via Wikimedia Commons
A major world power shift is happening in the Arctic. It is due to new massive oil and gas discoveries, combined with the effects of climate change. In effect, on 28 September 2014, Igor Sechin, CEO of Rosneft, the Russian mammoth oil company, announced the discovery of a giant oil field in the Kara Sea, north of Siberia (Zero Hedge, “Russia discovers massive Arctic oil field which maybe larger than the Gulf of Mexico“, 28 September, 2014). According to the first commentaries, this sub-sea structure called Universitetskaya, potentially, could contain reserves of oil and gas equal or superior to the Gulf of Mexico. As Igor Sechin declared, quoted by Bloomberg (Arkhipov, Chierman and Chilcote, “Russia says Arctic well drilled with Exxon Mobil …
The remaining part of this article is for our members and those who purchased special access plans. Make sure you get real analysis and not opinion, or, worse, fake news. Log in and access this article.
Each week our scan collects weak – and less weak – signals…
Editorial – Epidemic, pandemic and uncertainty – Besides the increasingly likely and logical spread of the Islamist threat to Libya – after India as seen over the last weeks, the still very unstable situation in Ukraine and its international corollaries, from tension within the EU to tension with Russia, or to energy security risks, to name only a few threats we face, the spread of the Ebola epidemic to the American continent confronts us not only with a major danger but also with the difficulty of “decision-taking” in conditions of high uncertainty.
Indeed various logics and interests conflict, each taking advantage of the uncertainty to try to prevail.
In the case of Ebola, we have the deadly epidemic that is spreading in Western Africa, and now is reaching America, as it could have reached – or is actually already doing so – other continents. The security of citizens and of the various countries concerned would demand that borders be better monitored, with adequate measures to prevent the spread of the disease. Yet, such surveillance is obviously complicated but also expensive to set up. Thus the later it is set up – if ever – the better, all the more so that we do not actually know if or when the epidemic may spread. Uncertainty at work.
Furthermore, as reported by Andrew England and Javier Blas for the Financial Times “Ebola stigma hits wider African economies“. Thus the economic risk to some countries, as also recalled in one of the articles of The Weekly, is considered as a major factor in dealing with an epidemic and related risk of pandemic. Indeed, imagine some borders are closed, the cost to trade and business in general for those countries and for interests dealing with them would be very high. If ever the epidemic stops (as we saw in previous years with the SARS, H5N1 and A(H1N1) – WHO), then governments will be criticized and the quarantined countries will suffer to overcome the economic impact. Yet, if the epidemic is not stopped and is transformed in a pandemic, then the cost will be much higher, to say the least and to say nothing of the global and total disruption that would be most likely. We all have in mind the impact of the fourteenth century Great Plague in Europe, called the Black Death. All countries would be hit. Uncertainty, again, is at work, as well as the way we currently prioritize short-term economy and wealth above everything else.
The way out of this highly dangerous dilemma, is a better and more systematically used approach to tackling uncertainty, i.e. strategic foresight and warning or risk management (see Lavoix, When risk management meets SF&W), considering all elements and impacts as well as likelihood and timelines, in a realistic and courageous way.
Note also that an interesting – and easy – way to better understand what pandemics are is to use gaming, thus transforming it in serious gaming. Try Pandemics 2 where you play the role of a virus and “its your job to infect everyone in the world with your disease.” Note also that this game is a first step to use Red Teaming (taking the point of view of the enemy, see more on the excellent Red Team Journal website) in the case of epidemics and pandemics, and thus to improve our strategies.
The Weekly is the scan of The Red (Team) Analysis Society and it focuses on national and international security issues. It was started as an experiment with Paper.li as a way to collect ideas, notably through Twitter. Its success and its usefulness led to its continuation.
The information collected (crowdsourced) does not mean endorsement but points to new, emerging, escalating or stabilizing problems and issues.
If you wish to consult the scan after the end of the week period, use the “archives” directly on The Weekly.
Featured image: Color-enhanced electron micrograph of Ebola virus particles by Thomas W. Geisbert, Boston University School of Medicine [CC-BY-2.5 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5)], via Wikimedia Commons.
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