Nationalist Salafis and Global Jihadis in Syria

This article will be the last one that presents the current state of play and the five categories of actors fighting in and over Syria.

The rise of the two groups of factions presented below – the Syrian Sunni factions intending to install an Islamist state in Syria and the Sunni extremist factions with a global jihadi agenda – as well as their mobilization power has been, first, eased by the protracted quality of the conflict and the despair it implied among Syrian people. It was then facilitated by the initial inability of the moderates to find support in the West, thus to demonstrate their power.

“Nationalist Salafis”: Syrian Sunni factions intending to install an Islamist state in Syria

The first nexus is composed of more extreme Islamist groups – compared with those seen previously – and of “Nationalist Salafis” groups – to use Lund (2013:14) terminology, noting that scholar of Jihad in Syria, Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi questions the very dichotomy between Nationalist Salafis and Jihadi Salafis (see below update 8 July).

Nationalist Salafis want to create an Islamic Sharia state in Syria. Lund (2013: 14) quotes Abdulrahman Alhaj, an expert on Syrian Islamism he interviewed in January 2013:

“When it comes to the salafis, we have to separate between two things. There are publicly declared salafi groups who have an experience of [armed] salafi work outside Syria, and who have a systematic salafi thinking. These groups, the salafiya-jihadiya [salafi-jihadism], are not many, but they affect people’s thinking.”

“The others are young, extremist people. They are Sunni Muslims who just follow this path because there is a lot of violence. Day after day, they come face to face with violence, so they adopt salafism, but they are not really part of the salafiya-jihadiya ideologically. Like Ahrar al-Sham: they are not part of the salafi-jihadi movement. There are of course real salafis among them, but mostly they are just extremist sunnis without a systematic salafi ideology. It’s very different from Jabhat al-Nosra.”

Within those groups one finds two major alliances, who are attempting to unite factions.

The Syria Liberation Front (SLF) also known as the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF) factions (Jabhat Tahrir Souriya or Jabhat al-Tahrir al-Souriya al-Islamiya) was created in September 2012 when some factions ended their associations with the FSA and dissolved with the creation of the Islamic Front on 22 November 2013. The groups that are mentioned as belonging to the SLF are: two of Syria largest Islamist groups, Kataeb al-Farouq and Suqour al-Sham (Lund 2013: 16), Liwa al-Tawhid and Liwa al-Islam (Lund 3013: 27 using Noah Bonsey, Lund, 3 April 2013). According to Lund, most of the SLF factions are also now part of the Supreme Joint Military Command Council (Ibid: 13), despite their ideological outlook, which also underlines again the pragmatic feature of affiliations and the shifting and lose characteristic of alliances, as suggested previously.

The SILF/SLF would count an estimated 37.000 fighters (Ignatius, 2 Avril 2013; see also Lund’s related comment, 3 April 2013).

The Syrian Islamic Front (SIF) (Al-Jabha al-Islamiya al-Souriya) was created in December 2012 under the leadership of the more powerful Ahrar al-Sham and dissolved with the creation of the Islamic Front on 22 November 2013. It initially included 11 factions, covering most of the territory (see mapping below and previous versions of the mapping accessible below), which were, in January and February 2013, reduced to 7 through the merging of various groups  (Lund, 2013: 25-27). Since April 2013, the SIF counts one new member, the Haqq Battalions Gathering (Tajammou Kataeb al-Haqq) (Lund, May 3 2013). Between 10.000 and 30.000 fighters could be part of the SIF (Lund, 2013: 23).

Talks between initial SIF groups and the SLF had taken place when the SLF was created  but failed for various reasons, from ideological to disagreements between groups.

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Lund (Ibid: 17-19) qualifies the SIF as an Islamist “Third Way,” strictly salafist but also pragmatic, able to discuss with the West, and to cooperate on the ground with the SMC or with salafi-jihadi groups, while also criticizing the latter, as shows the 4 May 2013 statement by Ahrar al-Sham on “Jabhat al-Nosra’s recent declaration of allegiance to al-Qaida’s Ayman al-Zawahiri.” (Lund, 4 May 2013):

“It seeks to demonstrate a strict salafi identity, and makes no attempt to hide its opposition to secularism and democracy. but it also tries to highlight a streak of pragmatism and moderation, intended to reassure both syrians and foreign policymakers. In this way, it sets itself apart as an Islamist ”third way”, different from both the most radical fringe of the uprising, and from its Western-backed islamist mainstream.” (Lund, 2013: 17)

However, the SIF aims at establishing a Sunni Islamist Theocracy, allowing only some modicum of consultation and political freedom within the bounds of sharia law (Ibid: 19). It has already started working towards this goal when, as described by Lund (Ibid: 25), it develops a “humanitarian and non-military activity.” It does not only fight but also plays the role of a real political authority, which strengthens both its mobilization power and its resource-base. Thus, overthrowing the regime of Bashar al-Assad is only a step towards achieving its objectives, and the “Third Way” may only last temporarily, assuming the SIF continues its current course, and finds access to sufficient and secure resources and fundings (for details on funding see Ibid: 27).

For more details on the SIF and, among others, salafism in Syria, I highly recommend Lund’s report.

Update 31 May 2013

  • 26 May 2013 – The SLF would have declared war on The Kurds: “a statement signed by no less than twenty-one armed groups declared ”Kurdish defense units, YPG, are traitors because they are against our Jihad.”The goal, according to the statement, is a “pending the completion of comprehensive cleansing process”, liberation from “PKK and Shabiha”. The statement was published by the “Syrian Islamic Liberation Front” – Syria Report, 27 May 2013 – “Insurgents Declare War on Syrian Kurds“

Update 8 July 2013

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi in his meticulous analysis of the relationships between JAN and ISIS (see below), for the region of Raqqah (24 June 2013 for Jihadology), following common demonstrations, questions:

“In Raqqah itself, further evidence of an ISIS-JAN unity became clear in the counter-demonstrations on the ground. Here is one such video, featuring several youths holding the banners of Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiya (which, to recall, was the main group of battalions responsible for the rebel takeover of Raqqah in March), ISIS and the general flag of jihad.

… The recent developments should also debunk the false dichotomy posed by some commentators of ‘Salafist nationalist’ Syrian Islamic Front [SIF] groups like Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiya versus transnational jihadist groups (cf. my overview of statements put out by various factions on Sheikh Jowlani’s bayah to Sheikh Aymenn al-Zawahiri).”

Next updates

21 October 2013: Facing the Fog of War in Syria: The Syrian Islamists Play the Regional “Game of Thrones” 

27 January 2014: the Rise of the Salafi-Nationalists?

Sunni extremist factions with a global jihadi agenda

Global Jihadi, Syria, Syrian actors, Al Qaida, Al-Nusra

The last nexus is composed of salafi-jihadi groups or salafis groups with a global agenda, such as Al Qaida, and includes many foreign fighters – Tunisian, Libyan, Iraqi, Chechen (e.g. Solovieva, 26 April 2013, AlMonitor; Kavkav center, 26 March 2013) and European. ICSR Insight estimates that “between 140 and 600 Europeans” from fourteen countries, “have gone to Syria since early 2011, representing 7-11 per cent of the foreign fighter total” (April 2013).

The best known group is Jahbat Al-Nosra or Al-Nusra, created in January 2012 and declared a terrorist group by the U.S. in December 2012. It is seen “as the most effective fighting force in Syria” (Bergen and Rowland, 10 April 2013). In November 2012, Washington Post David Ignatius, using sources from the FSA, considered it included “between 6,000 and 10,000 fighters.”

In mid-April, Jabhat al-Nosra, answering to al-Zawahiri and then to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of Al Qaida in Iraq (ISI, Islamic State of Iraq) and as excellently summarized by Lund (4 May 2013) “promised to follow every order from Zawahiri as long as this does not contravene sharia law,” while refusing merging with ISI (see for full detailed analysis and translated documents, Barber, 14 April 2013). Jabhat al-Nosra thus asserts an Al Qaida in Syria, in a nationalist move that is not without recalling salafi-nationalist groups, and stresses its aim to establish an Islamist state in Syria, “The Islamic State of al-Sham” (ISIS – see below update 8 July). Al-Sham stands for Bilad al-Sham, i.e. The Levant (today’s Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Israel, and potentially the Hatay Province of Turkey). The choice of words could potentially indicate a wish to revise borders, although such aim would need to be proven.

Until the more recent succesfull offensive of pro-Assad groups (Spyer, 3 May 2013), the salafis nationalists and the global jihadis tended to be most successful militarily, seizing important locations and infrastructure, while they mobilized effectively, somehow along the lines of a “People’s War” (less the Maoist ideology).

This, in turn, prompted progressively the beginning of a change of policy regarding the delivery and type of aid given to the moderate factions by their supporting external powers. It also potentially started to soften the position of Russia, concerned by the development of jihadi terrorism, thus allowing for improvement in diplomatic talks towards negotiations, as explained by Putin in an interview with German broadcaster ARD (Ria Novosti, 5 April 2013), and as seems to be ongoing even if chaotically.

Update 8 July 2013

Aymen Jawad Al Tamimi evaluates the relationships between JAN and ISIS, where they sometimes designate the same entity, but not always, through a meticulous and thorough regional analyses:

Update 24 February 2014

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Now we have described all the actors on the Syrian battlefield. Now we shall be able to put forward a few scenarios.

————

To Scenario 1: Peace in Geneva.

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Detailed bibliography.

The Kurds in the Syrian War

In 2013, the Kurds in Syria have their own agenda, which will determine their actions. As the other Kurdish communities in the region, their priority is to create a semi-autonomous Kurdistan where they live, notably in the NorthEast of Syria. Kurdish enclaves in Syria can also be found around Jarabulus – North – and Afrin – Northwest, North of Aleppo (Tejel, 2009: xiii). As analyzed by Spyer, their recent history tells the Kurds in Syria that mastering their own destiny is the only way to live decently and according to their own way of life, thus benefiting for once from the bounty of their land, in terms of oil and crops (Spyer, March 9 2013). The Syrian Kurds’ objective was again reasserted by Sipan Hamo, commander-in-chief of …

Continue reading “The Kurds in the Syrian War”

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The Red (team) Analysis Weekly No97, 25 April 2013

Our own worst enemies – One major lesson that can be learned for the Boston tragedy is that efforts at improving systems and alertness can never stop in times of heightened tension and threats multiplication, at least not as long as problems have not been properly analyzed, causes courageously tackled, and real solutions imagined and implemented. Winning battles do not always mean winning a war, and deep-seated systemic problems will not go away out of wishful thinking, old remedies and temporary efforts, even if the last 60 years of relative peace, easy growth and consumerist society have tried to make us believe otherwise. Hence the various issues that are plaguing our contemporary did not go away those last weeks (and years), but, on the contrary, continue to escalate, while imaginative solutions so far only concern extreme environments, notably space. Should we not also take lessons from this strategically imaginative approach to apply it to other problems?

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national security, scan, weak signal, horizon scanning, risk

Pro-Assad Groups and Moderate Opposition Forces

Keeping in mind the complex and fluid character of the situation in Syria we addressed previously, this article and the next ones will present the current state of play and the various categories of actors fighting in and over Syria, namely the pro-Assad groups, the moderate opposition forces and the Muslim Brotherhood “related” groups, the Islamist groups fighting for an Islamist state in Syria, the groups linked to a global Jihadi Front, and, finally, the Kurds in Syria, without forgetting the external actors. Scenarios for the future will follow from this assessment. The scenarios will then evolve, notably in terms of likelihood, from changes on the battleground and in interactions between all actors.

main actors 3

Pro-Assad regime groups

The regime and government of Bashar al-Assad has lost full domestic legitimacy (or there would not be a civil war) and a large part of international legitimacy, but it remains recognized and backed notably by China and Russia – both with veto power at the UN security council – Iran and Iraq. Algeria, Iraq and Lebanon opposed the Arab League’s “decision to give the opposition the vacant Syrian seat” (The Guardian, 26 March 2013), suspended since November 2011.

Evaluating Pro-Assad regime Forces

Syrian Forces

The pro-Assad Syrian fighting groups are composed of the regular Army and the Republican Guards, as well as pro-Assad militias (both Alawite  and composite – Sunni, Christian, Druze), all backed up by the Security Forces and the Police Force. All Alawites should not be considered as supporting the Assad regime, as shows the conference organised in Cairo on 23 March 2013 by Alawites promoting a “democratic alternative” (Reuters).

The details below are summarized from the excellent report by Joseph Holliday, The Assad Regime: from Counterinsurgency to Civil War (March 2013 for the ISW).

Regular Army and Republican Guards

According to Holliday, Al-Assad has a policy of only “electively deploying [t]his loyal core of military supporters.” As a result “a working estimate of 65,000 to 75,000 loyal, deployable Syrian regime troops emerges” out of “the Syrian Armed Forces, a basis that includes over 300,000 troops (including Air Force and Air defense personnel)” (p.27).  From this figure should be removed casualties, estimated by Holliday at 7620 killed and 30500 wounded by end of December 2012 (see table p.28), which represents approximatively half of the regime estimated deployed troops, partially or completely compensated by recruitment (p.29). As underlined by Holliday and the International Crisis Group, those men are however a “hardcore nucleus of regime supporters”(p.29).  A decentralization of command and control, allowing for flexibility and initiative by low- and mid-level officers, according to local conditions, was implemented during the Summer 2012 (Ibid).

Security Forces: The Mukhabarat

(For a more detailed and clear explanation, read Holliday, Appendix 3) They are constituted of four intelligence services, whose “primary mission was to ‘monitor and intervene aggressively against potential domestic threats to the regime’ (Campbell, 2009).” (p.54) However, they are now acting more like militias than like intelligence services (p.30). In addition, each operates its own prisons. Each service is present throughout the whole territory with a branch in each province. Using an interview he realized, Holliday writes that “one former regime insider suggested it [The Mukhabarat] could be as large as 200,000 security officers and personnel, but this figure could include administrative personnel and informants and cannot be verified” (p. 55), and, most probably, not all of them are fighters. (p.30).

Militias or paramilitary forces
  • The shabiha: A network of “Mafia-like organizations,” “made up of mostly Alawite criminal smuggling networks led by members of the extended Assad family” (p. 16), but also from other communities origins, when in areas without an Alawite population (p.17).
  • Popular Committees, or Lijan sha‘biya becoming the National defense Forces, or Quwat ad-Difa‘a al-Watani: “Minority populations who have armed themselves to protect their towns and neighborhoods from anti-government fighters” (p.16). They started being trained and “formalized” as The National defense Forces, or Quwat ad-Difa‘a al-Watani, in early 2013, with Iran’s support (p.31).
  • The “People’s Army” or Jaysh al-Sha‘bi: “Institutional militias” have existed in Syria since the early 1980s (then named munazzamat sha‘biya  before it became Jaysh al-Sha‘bi in the mid-1980s) (p.16). The “People’s Army” is composed of the best and most trustworthy fighters found in the previous two groups. It has been “trained and supported by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRCG-QF) and Lebanese Hezbollah” (p. 30). It was estimated to include 100.000 fighters at the end of 2011 (Holliday using van Dam, 2011, and IISS Military balance 2011). However, Holliday also mentions that Iranian Commander Mohammed Ali Jafari referred to “50.000 popular forces” in September 2012 (p. 30).

As underlined by Holliday, fear, reprisals, massacres and atrocities of minorities at the hand of extremists may only increase the number of people joining the various militias.

Iran’s action with the militias would support Smyth‘s point (2013), according to which Iran is also preparing for a post al-Assad situation by creating sub-networks within the Syrian Shia community, as well as by supporting other (Sunni) militiamen. Holliday suggested a similar Iranian role in a post al-Assad Syria (p.32).

Foreign Forces 

To the Syrian forces must be added foreign groups such as the Lebanese Hezbollah, groups coming from Iraq with Iranian support such the Mahdi Army (Muqtada al-Sadr’s Liwa al-Yom al-Mauwud), Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Hizbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s Quds Force (Ammar Abdulhamid, 2013; Smyth, 2013). See the full report for further details, pp.11-12.

Update 28 May 2013

Read next

See here for detailed bibliography and list of primary sources.

The National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (NC) and the Supreme Joint Military Command Council (SJMCC or SMC)

An umbrella group of various opposition and fighting factions, of more or less moderate obedience, the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (also translated as National Coalition for the Forces of the Revolution and the Syrian Opposition – Lund, 2013), which absorbed the previous Syrian National Council (Lund, 2013: 12), was formed in November 2012, pushed among others by the U.S. and Qatar. It was initially headed by Ahmed Moadh al-Khatib. It was recognized by many Western nations (see list on Wikipedia), by Turkey, by the Arab States of the Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Oman), as the “legitimate representative of the Syrian people. The Arab League (except for Algeria, Iraq and Lebanon) recognised the Coalition as their “legitimate representative and main interlocutor”. This recognition was reasserted at the recent Arab League summit in Doha on 26 March 2013 (The Guardian).

Then, the united face of the Syrian moderate opposition – as well as its moderation – was questioned, notably by the election of Ghassam Hitto as Prime Minister of the interim opposition government, recommended by Mustafa Sabbagh, Secretary General of the Coalition, and supported by the Muslin Brotherhood and Qatar (see update 8 July 2013 below for the changing face of the “moderate opposition” with the downfall of the Muslim Brotherhood following events in Egypt). As a result the president Al-Khatib resigned, confirming he was stepping down on 21 April 2013 (Al Arabyia and AFP), while some leaders in the opposition voiced their disapproval, including in the Free Syrian Army (FSA), refusing to recognize Hitto (e.g. AFP 24 March 2013). See update 8 July 2013 below for the changing face of the “moderate opposition” with the downfall of the Muslim Brotherhood following events in Egypt.

The SNC created the Supreme Joint Military Command Council (SJMCC or SMC) with Brigadier General Salim Idriss elected as Chief of Staff. The SMC is meant to integrate and lead the FSA and is organised according to five fronts (Eastern Front: Raqqa-Deir Ezzor and Al Hassakah – Northern Front: Aleppo and Idlib – Central Front: Homs-Rastan – Western Front: Hama-Latakia-Tartus – Southern Front: Damascus-Dar’a-Suwayda).

Syria, Syrian governorates

A detailed report by the Institute for the Study of War’s Syria Analyst Elizabeth O’Bagy on this endeavour may be found here, but must be read in the light of the debate between Debeuf and Lund on the FSA.

How many fighters belong to the SMC? This is a crucial question however a very difficult one. If we use David Ignatius estimates for the Washington Post, we read that “Idriss and his Free Syrian Army command about 50,000 more fighters, rebel sources say” (Ignatius, 3 April 2013). However, Lund (4 April 2013) in his comment on Ignatius’ article for Syria Comment questions this estimates, considering the complexity and fluidity of the situation on the ground. O’Bagy, in her detailed report on the FSA does not seem to include a global estimate. Lund in his article on the FSA (16 March 2013) underlines that “If all the factions which have declared in favor of Idriss were added up, they’d count at least 50,000 men, perhaps many more.” However, as he stresses, those groups include some that belong too to other nexus, such as Suqour el-Sham that is part of the Syria Liberation Front (SLF) also known as the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF).  Thus, if we are looking at the number of fighters who are “moderate,” then one should substract from the 50.000 all those men who fight first for other groups, and thus are only very loosely affiliated with the SMC.

The NC and SMC are those who receive “Western” aid, which is, officially, non-lethal, although, as monitored through crowdsourcing and explained in Chivers and Schmitt article for the New York Times (24 March 2013), military aid “from the C.I.A.” (mainly a consultative role) “Arab governments and Turkey” has found its way into Syria since early 2012. Meanwhile military training, on a small scale, “led by the US, but involves[ing] British and French instructors” would be provided in Jordan (Borger and Hopkins, 8 March 2013, The Guardian). It is thus crucial for the NC and the SMC to present a united front to the world, to reassure regarding their capacity to act and harness various groups and to reassert their moderation, because it is only under those conditions that they will continue to receive support or even increase its amount and change its nature. The fear from potential backers is that aid and weapons provided spread throughout groups and not only fuel the Syrian conflict but also favour regional spill-over, while also potentially finding their way back into Western countries, favouring violence in an environment made more volatile by the crisis.

The meeting of the Friends of Syria group in Istanbul on 20 and 21 April 2013 exemplifies those interactions. There, US Secretary of State John Kerry announced that a new non-lethal package to the SMC of up to USD 130 million would be added to the 117 million already given (AP, 20 April 2013). France and Great Britain push for changing the EU arm embargo on Syria; Germany is more reserved but announced it would accept it (Spencer, 21 April 2013, The Telegraph, EUbusiness, 22 April 2013), while The Netherlands would be more reserved (AP, 20 April) and Scandinavian countries would oppose it (EUbusiness, 22 April). Both France and the UK have let believe that they could decide to move forward even without a European agreement (Traynor, 14 March 2013, The Guardian). The EU also decided to ease its oil embargo on Syria to support the NC (EUbusiness, 22 April).

Update 28 May 2013

The road to Geneva 2

Update 8 July 2013

The Egyptian revolution of 30 June 2013 with the ousting of President Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood affiliates, the refusal by the Muslim Brotherhood to join the new coalition and its call to fight had immediate implications for the SNC in Syria. Indeed the SNC was meeting in Istanbul to elect a new President. After the usual discussions and delays, the Egyptian defeat of the Muslim Brotherhood most probably contributed, along other factors specific to Syria, to see the Saudi backed Ahmad Al Assi Jarba elected, over the Qatar backed Mustafa Sabbagh, knowing that Qatar is a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, “the Brotherhood representative, Farouq Tayfour, was elected one of two vice-presidents of the Syrian National Coalition in a sign the group still retains influence in Syrian opposition politics.” (Erika Solomon, Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Reuters, 6 July 2013). Badr Jamous is General Secretary.

See also

Update 16 October 2013

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SMC Jan 2014
A thumbnail of the evolving mapping

Read next the update for 24 February 2014, the start of a new phase.

Potential Futures for Syria in the Fog of War

FSA, rebels, AK47s, Syria, civil war

In 2013, the Syrian civil war is more than two years old and, according to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, would have claimed the lives of more than 60.000 people (until November 2012), while 1.2 million fled to neighbouring countries and 4 million were internally displaced (AFP, 4 April 2013). The Syrian war is a challenging problem for strategic foresight and warning because, besides the humanitarian disaster, the risks to regional and global peace and stability continuously increase, because the conflict is redrawing the strategic outlook of the region while participating into the global paradigm shift, and, finally, because the fog of war makes our anticipatory task more difficult and complex. We shall address those issues in a series of posts on the war in Syria and  emerging potential futures.

We are facing three – related – sets of problems. First, we must deal with the war itself, where three, four or five types of Syrian actors and their “international backers” – or even more according to typologies, as we shall discuss below – and not two, fight for power. Second, we must prepare for the following peace while, third, evaluating and considering the still being redesigned strategic environment. Their specific characteristics will depend upon the length of the war, how it is waged and the way it ends. The peace should be prepared to be made constructive, positive, and lasting, and the strategic environment conducive to interests.* Getting ready for the second period and succeeding there starts with actions taken during the war and with the fate of the war itself, according to three main scenarios (leading to ten sub-scenarios) grounded in the current state of play.

To be able to use these scenarios for warning, regularly revisions should include what is happening on the ground. Methodologically, ongoing monitoring of the situation and related updating of scenarios may be the only way forward to deal with the fog of war.

Understanding the current state of play and the actors

Before to present the actors (click here), it is necessary to make two preliminary remarks.

1- Interestingly, in many analyses and reports on the war in Syria, one finds mention of only two or three groups of actors: the regime of Bashar al-Assad and the insurgency, to which are sometimes added the Kurds in Syria, who initially sat in an almost neutral position. Save for a few more detailed studies, which show how much more complex the situation is, “the insurgency” tends to be taken either as a broad umbrella label, or, more worryingly, as a monolithic bloc. A few interacting factors are probably at work here to explain this approach:

  • We are faced with cognitive biases, or more specifically with the problem of enduring cognitive models in the face of new evidence, when the initial model was created early and with very few available evidence (Anderson, Lepper, and Ross, 1980). The tendency of our human brain to also overestimate “intentional centralized direction and planning” (Heuer, chapter 11, bias 2) is also probably at play.
  • The difficulty to get information on the ground makes it even more complex to obtain reliable evidences that would ease our understanding of the situation on the battlefield. We should nevertheless underline, as noted in a recent EAworldview article, that the civil war in Syria is redefining how we get to know what is happening in the case of war, and it is thanks to the dedication of many, to a real crowdsourcing effort, and to the web and communication technologies that knowledge of the situation emerges. Compare, for example, with our blindness in past situations such as Cambodia. However, this also casts everyone in the role of collector of information and analyst (intelligence and scientific research roles), for which s/he has not been trained and that must be learned by trial and errors.
  • Most probably, observers and analysts need to face conscious and unconscious deception and manipulation by fighting actors on the ground. Each group of fighters has an aim, as well as its own unconscious biases and partial vision and understanding of the situation. The story of each group, of each battle, be it told through written or video means or through interviews will reflect specific perceptions and goals, which must also be considered. The difficulty is very well underlined in the introductory paragraphs of a recent article by Matthew Barber on the excellent Syria Comment of Joshua Landis when he uses the new Syria Video facility to analyse “The Raqqa Story: Rebel Structure, Planning, and Possible War Crimes.”
  • As a result, analysts are also actors in the Syrian war.
  • Syria, civil war, mapFurthermore, most of the time, the maps available in open source – however impressive the amount of details found on them, which is furthermore regularly updated (as the Wikipedia map shown here which describes the situation in Syria as of 23 March 2013) – only communicate part of the picture and could lead to partial conclusions. They are nevertheless not only informative (and incredibly so most often) but also useful, as long as the reality of the situation is not forgotten, and one could build upon them to include the various broad types of fighting opposition.

2- Following Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi in his “Jihad in Syria,” and Phillip Smith, a central idea should be kept in mind regarding the Syrian civil war – and generally most civil wars: the situation is fluid, changing and much more complex to describe than any categorization could allow.

The Syrian battlefield involves more than 1000 factions and groups (Smith), some more powerful than others. It would seem we are at this stage when the length of the war has created enough havoc and chaos to allow every willing clan to create its own localised guerrilla group (Lund, 2013: 10), whilst the dynamics of the Syrian insurgency has not  – or not yet or not completely – allowed a few groups to take real pre-eminence. Thus, all classifications should be taken with the utmost carefulness and what is true one day may well change the next. Alliances and participation in one group or another must also be considered as temporary. Those warring dynamics, yet, need to be observed and understood, because it is finally on the battleground that the destiny of Syria is being played out, while the interactions between international actors and this battleground progressively and incrementally impact the region and shape potential futures. (Author: Dr Helene Lavoix – for Red (team) Analysis – posted on 15 April 2013).

Next article click here.

* Interests will vary according to actors, each trying to influence the overall situation to achieve its goals at best.

Featured image: Free Syrian Army soldier walking among rubble in Aleppo during the Syrian civil war. 6 October 2012. By Voice of America News: Scott Bobb reports from Aleppo, Syria [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

——

Detailed bibliography and list of primary sources forthcoming

The Red (team) Analysis Weekly No93, 28 March 2013

Are political authorities back? Many high-tech and cyber related signals emerged this week, from the massive DDoS attack to digital arm trade, right to kill hackers, DNA computing, quantum technology or space entrepreneurs, besides the possibility of renewed attacks by “climato-skeptics,” when scientists wonder if the frozen spring could be linked to a slower gulf stream, and when political impacts of natural catastrophes start being studies more consistently. Meanwhile, the Syrian quagmire deepens, progressively dragging the region in, and tensions in Northeast Asia heighten. And at the core, because strong political authorities are crucial to deal with those multiple challenges, Cyprus as a potential signal of finally awakened “rulers,” taking income where it is rather than impoverishing further their capabilities and support base, a new episode in the age-old struggle of the fight between rulers and wealthy, liquidity awash elite.

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horizon scanning, national security, weak signal, risk

A Road to Hell? Climate Change and Public Deficit

Salvador Dali, Climate change, Hobbesian World, Civil WarThe existence of climate change is now recognized as a fact, besides a few remaining climate-sceptics. Its impact is, however, very far from being systematically included in analyses, as should be done and as will be, hopefully, increasingly the norm.

A large part of the efforts related to climate change are focused on scenarios dealing with the long-term future – the end of the century – and this crucial multi-disciplinary endeavour must continue or even be reinforced. This should not, however, dispense us with looking too at the short to medium term (up to ten years) future, as climate change and its impacts are not only something that our children, grand children, and great grand children will know, but a change of context that has already started. Furthermore, those short to medium term direct and indirect impacts and the way they are faced, are most likely to have a crucial impact on our future long-term understanding and capabilities. Here, I would like to focus on the potential impacts of rising natural catastrophes on the state (government in American terms) and possible consequences.

A rising number of natural catastrophes and overall losses worldwide

To be able to start considering such impacts, one must break at least two other biases. The first is inherited from the post World War II “self-determination” period, and can be caricatured as the belief that only poorer and developing countries will suffer from climate change; the main problems are first that rich countries should pay for the huge losses that poorer countries will incur, second that they should also pay for those countries that are getting rich quickly (e.g. China and India), because “the first world” polluted in the past to become rich. The second bias is that only rare, large, noticeable events matter and will impact us. Such events, e.g. Sandy, do definitely count, and furthermore may serve to raise awareness, especially when they hit a well-mediatized country, both in terms of classical media and world-wide-web coverage, such as the United States. They are, nonetheless, not the only ones, and all events must be considered (ideally, loss of biodiversity and of “ecosystem services” should also be included).

The data held and publicised by re-insurance companies are currently one of the best entry point for estimations of the past existence and costs of climate change related events. Munich-Re, notably, has “one of the world‘s largest databases on natural catastrophes” (Munich-Re, 2013: 3) and publishes regularly analyses related to natural catastrophes. If we wanted to focus solely on climate change, then geophysical events (earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis) should be left aside. However, the latter risks  are also part of the slowly evolving conditions with which a society must deal in terms of security, notably in the Ring of Fire considering plate tectonics, as the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami on 11 March 2011 in Japan reminded us. They should thus be kept.

In terms of geographical localization, the three world maps of natural catastrophes for 2010, 2011 and 2012 below (download from Munich-Re for full size pdf), show that, obviously, the whole world is impacted.

2012_mrnatcatservice_natural_disasters2012_worldmap_en

2011_mrnatcatservice_natural_disasters2011_worldmap_touch_en

2010_mrnatcatservice_natural_disasters2010_worldmap_touch_en

The breakdown by continent of all natural catastrophes between 1980 and 2012 (Munich-Re, Topics Geo 2012, 2013, pp. 54-55), in terms of number of events, fatalities and overall losses is even more telling. Monetary losses are much higher in the so-called developed world, while fatalities dramatically rise in poorer countries. Neither one nor the other is a cause for rejoicing, and the first may have bearings on the second.

1980-2012 Natural Catastrophes, fatalities, overall losses, number of events

The world also knows increasingly more natural catastrophes (note the longer series for the U.S., starting in 1950), as shown by the figures below, and more costly ones, the United States bearing the brunt of insured losses (Munich-Re, 2012 NatCat Year in Review).

blobal trends events 1980 2012

number US 1950 2011

global trends cost 1980 2012

A cost to states and governments: increased fiscal exposure

Those events have obviously a direct cost to states, as underlined in the 2013 High Risk Report of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (when this cost is usually ever hardly mentioned notably in discussions on public deficit, austerity and budgets):

 “These impacts [climate change] will result in increased fiscal exposure for the federal government in many areas, including, but not limited to its role as (1) the owner or operator of extensive infrastructure such as defence facilities and federal property vulnerable to climate impacts, (2) the insurer of property and crops vulnerable to climate impacts, (3) the provider of data and technical assistance to state and local governments responsible for managing the impacts of climate change on their activities, and (4) the provider of aid in response to disasters. For example, disaster declarations have increased over recent decades, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has obligated over $80 billion in federal assistance for disasters declared during fiscal years 2004 through 2011.[3] In addition, on December 7, 2012, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) within the Executive Office of the President requested $60.4 billion in federal resources for Superstorm Sandy recovery efforts to “build a more resilient Nation prepared to face both current and future challenges, including a changing climate.”

For 2012, for the U.S., Munich-Re estimates the overall (direct?) loss to US$101,13 billion, which represents 9,28% of the public deficit (US$1.089 billion). By comparison, the Watson Institute in the Costs of War project estimated the overall cost of the war in Iraq, for the U.S., at US$2,2 trillion. This would correspond to approximately US$251,43 billion per year (total cost incurred between 20 March 2003 and December 2011, i.e. 105 months). Thus, for the U.S., the estimated 2012 direct costs of natural catastrophes represent 40,22% of the estimated yearly cost of the war in Iraq. One of the major differences between both is that losses stemming from natural catastrophes will not stop but rather increase.

We must also not forget indirect costs to states in terms of loss of revenues: each catastrophe has an economic impact on all actors, from individuals to companies (as well as probably health related cost for people), which will then be translated into fewer taxes thus income for the state.

This is not only true – adapted to each state’s specificities – for all countries, but the “increased fiscal exposure” is most likely to have been going on from at least the early 1990s, if we consider Munich-Re charts. Specific research should be made to gather  clearer and better knowledge. The share those supplementary costs have in so many countries’ public deficit should thus be estimated and considered.

For the future, as underlined by the U.S. G.A.O. 2013 High Risk Report, we should also add to those accumulated losses the cost of adaptive measures to climate change, expensive but necessary and cheaper than inaction (e.g. upgrading or changing infrastructures: adapting bridges, roads, buildings etc.) and of mitigating ones (carbon capture storage, changing energy mix, and all the devices we shall need to create and use).

A road to hell?

Thus, we have rising costs linked to dangers that cannot be avoided anymore. Meanwhile, policies aim at reducing state expenditures to struggle against increasing public deficit, when facing natural catastrophes obviously means rising public expenses.

In the meantime, those very dangers are most probably lowering incomes, which may only contribute to deepen the overall public deficit. This, in turn, if we remain in the same policy framework, which, among others, fails to consider fully climate change and other natural disasters, will lead to further reduction of state expenditures.

The most likely consequences, if we stay on this trajectory, are that states or governments will be increasingly unable to ensure the security of their citizens, with impact in terms of legitimacy, which, in turn, may only lead to social disorders. As a result, fatalities and casualties may only rise worldwide in all countries from unhindered impacts of disasters, civil unrest, rising criminality and reduction of aid and cooperation. We would thus be heading for a Hobbesian pre-Leviathan world, but in a harsher natural environment.

Privatization and outsourcing may not be the universal panacea, in the absence of a strong state, as respected and upheld regulatory frameworks are necessary (OECD, 2011: 18) and as impoverished people hit by multiple disasters may not be the best clients to earn profits.

Human societies may not have had to face anthropogenic environmental changes in the past, but, throughout history, they did successfully rise above the challenges of increasing costs of governance because of novel dangers. Everything being equal, these past periods could provide us with ideas regarding the solutions that must be imagined and then implemented.

Short of falling into extremely predatory authoritarian systems, where a few may survive on the despair of the many – and I recommend reading Suzanne Collins’ truly excellent novel The Hungers’ Games as  an example of one of the many faces such a system could take – solutions must involve new income for political authorities to allow them ensuring security, which will most probably lead to the creation of new socio-political models of organization. In a world that seems to have lost its hope, its enthusiasm and its bearings, such a mammoth challenge could be construed as an immense rallying and mobilizing project, for those leaders with a vision.

—————

Special thanks to Dr Jean-Michel Valantin, specialised in environmental security and author of the recent Guerre et Nature (War and Nature) for many exciting discussions and for helping me overcoming information overload and finding back U.S. G.A.O. 2013 High Risk Report. 

Della Croce, R., C. Kaminker and F. Stewart (2011), “The Role of Pension Funds in Financing Green Growth Initiatives”, OECD Working Papers on Finance, Insurance and Private Pensions,  No. 10, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg58j1lwdjd-en

Munich-Re, 2012 NATURAL CATASTROPHE YEAR IN REVIEW, January 3, 2013.

The Red (team) Analysis Weekly No91, 14 March 2013

The Actors and the System: Powerlessness? If we were to estimate the power of the actors by their ability to stabilize the system, they would not fare very well, and this, in itself, is a signal that tensions will most probably continue to rise and escalate in intensity, as well as widen in scope. One of the interesting question would thus be: How long can this system withstand the pressure until it breaks?

Click on image to read on Paper.li.

National Security, Horizon Scanning, Warning, War, escalation

Puzzle: Strange Parallels in Global Trends 2030

Global Trends 2030 is the 5th edition of the foresight document the U.S. National Intelligence Council prepares every four years and publicly publishes just after the  presidential election. It aims at being  “a forward-looking document to aid policymakers in their long-term planning on key issues of worldwide importance.” In the words of Chris Kojm, current chairman of the NIC, it is “a framework for thinking about the future.”

puzzle, Global Trends 2030The Global Trends (GT) series is an important read for those interested in the U.S., in international relations, national security, foreign policy and politics, in the future, as well as in strategic foresight methodology (this last edition is notably exemplary in the way it developed a real strategy of delivery). Considering the quality of the content, I was  particularly intrigued by a strange parallel made in the chapter on the role of the United States as game-changer, and deemed important enough to be used almost verbatim in the executive summary to introduce the “alternative worlds”, ie. the four fictionalised scenarios resulting from the study:

“The present recalls past transition points—such as 1815, 1919, 1945, and 1989—when the path forward was not clear-cut and the world faced the possibility of different global futures. We have more than enough information to suggest that however rapid change has been over the past couple decades, the rate of change will accelerate in the future.” (Executive summary, p.xii)

“The present recalls past transition points—such as 1815, 1919, or 1945—when the path forward was not clear-cut and the world faced the possibility
 of different global futures. In all those cases, the transition was extended and re-balancing was partly a matter of trial and error.” (p.105)

Those dates mark the end of wars but, unless we are not living in the same world, 2012/13 ends no war. Comparisons or analogies are never gratuitous and always mean something, would it be only to help the reader understand better the writer’s thoughts. We are thus faced with a puzzle, what did the authors of GT had in mind, and what could it mean, more generally, for our understanding of the world and its future?

1815, 1919, 1945 and 1989: war and new order

Why were those four specific dates chosen? GT 2030 explains those dates were chosen for what they heralded: a new area, a novel world order with a reconfiguration of power. The box p.106 titled “World rebalanced—Parallels with the Past?” and that focuses on the 19th century “long peace” starting in 1815, confirms this perspective. However, the author of this comparison also underlines that, in 1815, the great powers were “coming out of over 25 years of conflict”.

The four years chosen thus do also obviously correspond to the end of systemic or global war periods.

In a nutshell, 1815 marks the end of the French Revolution and of the corresponding wars, including the Napoleonic ones, when the new France defended its novel system against the interests of the old privileged monarchic system, as shown by Fred Halliday in the development of the concept of homogeneity (1994: 94-123). Using Burke, Halliday underlines that “The stability of other societies in Europe required that France too be liked them. Without homogeneity, there could be neither internal nor international peace… For what he [Burke] is arguing is that relations between states rest above all not on the conduct of foreign policy in the narrow sense, but on convergence and similitude in domestic arrangements, in other words on the prevalence of a homogeneous international society” (pp.107-112). Needless to say, the new ideas and system promoted by the French revolutionary ideals lost, to a Bourbon restoration in France and the continuity of privileges in Europe. It also ushered the period of the long European peace heralded by the Congress of Vienna – as GT 2030 emphasises – which lasted until 1870 when Prussia invaded and defeated France. This peace was mainly European, as China, notably, was opened to foreign powers during the 1839 Opium War, the 1839 Chinese defeat and the 1842 treaty of Nanking (Nanjing). The international system was being redrawn.

1919 marks the end of World War I, with its 16 million deaths and 20 million wounded (civilian and armed forces). It also directly prepared World War II, notably through the mammoth reparations demanded from Germany with the Treaty of Versailles. If World War I heralded the end of an order or failed to do so thus paving the way for World War II can be debated. Most importantly, the First World War was marked by the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the birth of the Soviet Union.

WWII alliances, Global Trends 20301945 corresponds to the end of World War II, the “deadliest conflict in history” (60 million death), the fight to death between the Axis Power (Germany, Italy, Japan but also Thailand, Finland, Hungary, Romania, Iraq, etc. and the Allied Powers (see map). 1945 heralded too a world as divided at the Yalta conference and that was to give the bipolar order of the Cold War. Meanwhile, the fear of the spread of Communist ideals and power was instrumental in making the 1947 Marshall Plan possible, and in changing the balance of power between Western classes. The privileged elite, faced with the memory of the Great Depression and of the war and now the fear of Communism, gave much to the working and middle class. A new chapter of history indeed started with the expansion of the Middle Class during the post-war boom.

1989 marks the end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union and of Communism. The Cold War was not as bloodless as could be believed, considering all the proxy wars that were fought and the casualties they implied (see UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and an interesting synthesis by Filip Spagnoli, “Statistics on Violent Conflict”). It ushered the belief in the end of history (Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man) and of the inevitable, inexorable but fundamentally good globalization, the era of Davos, and of a gradually unchecked and “dislocating” capitalism, as pointed out by the Henry Jackson Initiative in its project ‘Towards a More Inclusive Capitalism.’

What if 2012/2013 were also perceived as the end of a war?

If we now come back to our 2013 world, it is obvious that the last 5 to 10 years have not seen such global lethal wars as those we briefly reviewed. Those wars are also so famous it is impossible that the scholars having researched and written the report ignore them, and overlook the instrumental role they played in the birth of a new world order, the element they want to stress.

The first (and less interesting) possibility that could explain our puzzle is that the comparison used (the dates chosen) to find a meaning to the current transition is unjustified and is linked to one or many biases. For example, the fear of a new global war could be at work. Such bias could also be seen in the asserted but debatable belief that, despite rising odds of interstate conflicts, world wars are now impossible. This fear, and the implausibility of global wars are exemplified in the introduction to GT 2030 first scenario, “stalled engines”:

“Arguably, darker scenarios are imaginable, including a complete breakdown and reversal of globalization due potentially to a large-scale conflict on the order of a World War I or World War II, but such outcomes do not seem probable.” (p.xii)

Yet, one finds instances of similar fears but with different comparisons and conclusions, the current period being compared with 1913, as in the opening sentences of the second scenario of GT 2030, or with the 1929 crisis.

GT 2030 could also be a victim of the current trend towards a lack of  historical depth – and daring to go as far back as 1815 is in itself a feat that deserves to be applauded. Yet, this may be insufficient and we may have to go even further back in history to find more adequate model, as suggested here. Our transition could be much deeper and larger than the one envisioned in GT 2030. However, then, could the authors truly write it? Would such thoughts meet the criteria of timeliness? Would references to even older times be considered or just dismissed as irrelevant because too ancient?

Another possibility to explain this strange choice is that, unconsciously or implicitly, 2012/2013 is really seen as the end of a period akin to a war.

The only instances that spring to mind are the War on Terror starting with 9/11 and that would then be over, or the financial and economic crisis starting with the subprime crisis in the U.S. in 2007 that would also have been overcome.

Considering the current war in Syria and the evolution of the situation there, the spread of Al Qaeda despite the death of Bin Laden, the uncertainties regarding the situations in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia among others, the tension with Iran, as well as the perspective found in GT 2030 on terrorism (pp. 52, 60, 68*, 103 etc.) or interstate war (pp. 61-68), it seems unlikely that the authors referred to the end of the War on Terror.

Thus remains only the global crisis.

Assuming this is correct, what would that mean? However serious and dangerous the financial crisis has been so far, it certainly should not compare with the scope of destructions of war, except in a world that would principally and foremost be defined in economic terms.

This would emphasize how much our present values material goods over life, which indeed tends to correspond to the modernizing materialist paradigm.

PIGS, RUPIIGS, 2010, Global Trends 2030This could also signify the relief that comes after tension, as harsh austerity measures have been finally imposed without leading to any serious social uprising besides protests (and there we should exercise great caution as the relief may be linked to our improper knowledge of dynamics and processes of revolts in our current world, as well as by the difficulty to think the time of political process, which is long.)

This could imply that the world of now entrenched and still rising inequalities, where the Western working class and middle class – to say nothing of the poor – are to be sacrificed on the altar of global profits and global growth (before Asians, for example, know the same fate), is not a transition period that will end but the start of a new order. This would thus made the third fictionalized narrative of GT 2030, “Gini Out-of-the-Bottle” the most likely scenario.

The real reason for the use of these strange parallels is probably a mix of all the above. It can be seen as exemplifying the various and conflicting beliefs and fears with which our transition era has to contend. Only by wondering and unpacking those puzzles shall we be able to make those beliefs conscious and, in the best of case, rise above them to create a better world for all… assuming this is not an old, past, out-of-fashion ideal.

*GT2030 envisions that “the recent religious wave is receding and could end by 2030” (p.68). This implies that it has not happened yet.

The Shale Oil and Gas Security Sigils

The aim of the Shale Oil and Gas Security Sigils is to be a daily scan focusing on security related to shale oil and gas.

We are currently investigating new AI ways to deliver an even better East Seas Security Sigils. The original complimentary version ran from May 2012 to April 2023.

Although technological experimentations to extract shale gas and oil started in the 19th century, it is only in the 1980s and 1990s they started being commercially exploited on a relatively large-scale in the U.S., and in 2005 that production truly meaningfully took off, first  in the Barnett Shale with shale gas (EIA, 2011). Since then, production of both shale oil and shale gas is seen as a game-changer, already operative in the U.S., potential in those countries with reserves. Shale fuels remain controversial, notably considering the various environmental risks, the social opposition and distrust, the uncertainty regarding recoverable reserves, the evolution of technology and regulations, and the opposite interests of different actors.

shale oil, shale gas, fracking, peak oil

The rising concern about shale fuels and the way they are produced, “fracking” (properly “hydraulic fracturing”, the technology used to recover shale gas and oil) is perfectly exemplified by the results obtained in volume with Google search for the years 2004, 2008 and 2012. The Google Trends curves below (representing percentages, not quantities) also underline concern about fracking. There, however, interest in shale gas increases more than concern for shale oil (also probably because “shale gas” tends to cover all shale related fuels) while peak oil becomes less trendy. This also reminds us that information and analysis are and will be one of the arena where the power struggles for or against shale fuels takes place.

shale oil, shale gas, fracking, peak oil

Considering the crucial importance of energy for our civilization and its impact on the environment (this needs to be reminded as the curves below would be dwarfed by other search terms like “baseball,” “football,” or “Oscars”), it is necessary to keep abreast of developments in this area to be able to anticipate potential evolutions in this fluid and volatile context, as well as to read documents from all sources if one wants to obtain, in fine, as objective as possible a judgement on the future.

The Sigils are a series of scans exploring the horizon for weak signals related to various issues relevant to the security of societies, polities, nations and citizens.

EIA, Review of Emerging Resources: U.S. Shale Gas and Shale Oil Plays, 2011.

Featured image: Cozy Dell Formation — Giant shale rip-up clast at the base of a high-density turbidite. In the Topatopa Mountains, Ventura County, Southern California.By Mikesclark (Own work) [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons

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