COVID-19 and Food Insecurity Early Warning

This brief article is a first early warning about food insecurity resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. The danger is rising and deserves further and more in-depth analysis and monitoring.

As the COVID-19 pandemic developed, we immediately added food insecurity on our watch list of issues to monitor (see our COVID-19 section).

To date, mid-May 2020, indications and signals have started accumulating.

We thus estimate that food insecurity must be added on the watchlist of possible threats to monitor. It warrants in-depth strategic foresight and warning analysis at global and country levels. The very high impact that such threat would have, were it to materialise substantially across countries, is sufficient to pay attention to the issue.

Below, we share with members and readers some early indications of the rise of the issue. We then highlight some points that must be considered in the framework of a strategic foresight and warning or risk analysis. These points should also help with monitoring. Finally, we provide a couple of useful online resources.

Nota Bene: Starting to monitor the rise of a possible danger or threat does not mean that the threat will materialise with absolute certainty. It means that the possibility to see that threat becoming a reality increases. Thus the evolution must be followed closely. Actors may start thinking about developing answers and responses accordingly.

Some early indications and signals

Russia

Polina Devitt, “UPDATE 4-Russia will suspend grain exports for 6 weeks if its quota runs out in mid-May“, Reuters, 17 April 2020.

Anatoly Medetsky and Megan Durisin  “Russia Halts Wheat Exports, Deepening Fears of Global Food Shortages” Time Magazine, 27 April 2020

Iran

Maha El Dahan, Parisa Hafezi, Jonathan Saul, “Exclusive: Iran hunts for grains as coronavirus compounds economic woes“, Reuters, 7 May 2020.

ABC.news, “Iran brings in military to battle locusts threatening crops worth billions“, 16 May 2020.

China

Naveen Thukral, Hallie Gu, “China urges food companies to boost supplies on fears of further COVID-19 disruption“, Reuters, 17 May 2020

U.S.

Meredith T. Niles, Farryl Bertmann, Emily H. Belarmino, Thomas Wentworth, Erin Biehl, Roni A. Neff, “The Early Food Insecurity Impacts of COVID-19“, medRxiv 2020.05.09.20096412; doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.05.09.20096412

Locusts (Global)

Tzvi Joffre, “Locust swarms threaten Middle East, India, Africa amid COVID-19 outbreak“, Jerusalem Post, 17 May 2020

 Catherine Byaruhanga, “How do you fight a locust invasion amid coronavirus?“, BBC News, 25 April 2020

Yang Wanli, “Authorities call for Pakistan, China to unite on locust swarm“, China Daily, 18 March 2020.

Some important points to consider

The timeframe must be the whole COVID-19 disruption period, not only the short term with current stocks.

Possible logistics bottlenecks (e.g. port shutting down) and supply chain tensions must also be considered.

Estimates solely relying on markets cannot be trusted entirely, even more so considering the COVID-19 context. Markets have shown their incapacity to anticipate properly – as evidenced over the last months.

Impacts of countries’ actions, such as China, ramping up and protecting their supply, especially considering their weight, must be taken into account.

Meat supply must be actively monitored considering the spread of COVID-19 in slaughter houses and the Swine Fever (see Jean-Michel Valantin, “China, the African Swine Fever Pandemics and Geopolitics“, 14 October 2019, and The Midwest Floods, the Trade War and the Swine Flu Pandemic: The Agricultural and Food Super Storm is Here!, 3 June 2019).

Possible climate-change related events taking place during the period must not be forgotten.

Some resources

Famine Early Warning Systems Network: Home (Mainly country of interest to USAID: Central America, Africa, Afghanistan)

Food and Agricultural Organisation of the U.N. (FAO): Notably

Food Export Restrictions Tracker developed by David Laborde (IFPRI)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE


Featured image: “Supermarket shelves that stock dry pasta varieties are almost empty due to panic-buying as the result of the COVID-19 coronavirus outbreak. This was taken at a Woolworths supermarket in Melbourne, Australia.” by Christopher Corneschi / CC BY-SA 4.0.


The U.S.-China COVID-19 Competition (2): America and Chimerica in Crisis

The COVID-19 pandemic is hammering the United States. Thus, it is pummeling the deep U.S.-China economic interdependency, also known as “Chimerica” (Jean-Michel Valantin, “The US-China Covid-19 Competition (1)”, The Red (Team) Analysis, April 17, 2020).

(Traduction française automatique par intelligence artificielle.)

The mammoth impact of the pandemic on the U.S. results from the shutting down of entire sectors of the economy. These are the effects of the lockdown and social distancing measures the U.S. political authorities implemented to counter the virus (Hélène Lavoix, “COVID 19- Worst case baseline scenarios, March 13 2020 and COVID 19 scenarios- Making sense of antiviral treatment”, The Red Team) Analysis, April 8 2020). Thus, the combination of those sanitary and economic shocks is tearing apart the very fabric of the American economy.

In the second article of this series, we investigate the strategic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on the China-U.S. relationship, from the “American front” perspective.

However, to understand those dynamics, one has to understand the way the crisis of the U.S. economy is deeply interacting with the Chinese one. This means that, as the U.S. economy slows down, this will also impact China, and reciprocally. Hence, the fundamental issue at stake is the status of the United States as a great power in a locked down and distanced world.

The geopolitics of an unconsumerist America

In order to slow the Covid-19 down in the continental U.S., the Federal government and the state governments implemented a mix of lockdown and social distancing policies. As everywhere in the world, those sanitary policies are hitting hard on the economic activity, especially on consumer spending.

This brutal slowdown of the economy has very deep consequences, because it also slows, if not stops, the U.S. consuming trend. This trend is fundamentally important for the U.S. and thus for the Chinese economy, because U.S. consumerism is the main driver of the U.S. economic growth (Peter Cohan, “Consumer spending is keeping the economy from shrinking – but a new survey of 10 000 Americans says that might end in 2020”, Inc.com, 4 December 2019).

Mass consuming is inherent to the U.S. agricultural and industrial development since the end of the 19th century. As it happens, the alliance of big oil, industry, finance, transport, and urban development induces an intimate relationship between economic growth and consuming growth (Kevin Philipps, Bad Money, Reckless Finance, failed politics and the global crisis of American capitalism, 2008).

This is turning into a massive problem because, since the 2008 financial crisis, consumption has become the main driver of the U.S. economic growth. Consumer spending accounts for 70% of the economic activity (Clark Merrefield, “Economic earthquake: consumer spending in the wake of the Coronavirus pandemic”, Journalist Resource – Harvard Kennedy School, 17 April 2020). The index of consumer sentiment that lost 30 points since March, at a historical low, highlights this trend (Carmen Reinicke, “Those 5 jarring economic signals flashed red this past week – and they show just how quickly a recession is descending on America”, Business insider, 19-04-2020).

The Covid -19 as the new “Limit(s) to Growth”

As it happens, between March and April 2020, more than 32.5 millions American have lost their jobs, because of the lockdown of the economy and of the social distancing of dozens of millions of people (Anneken Tappe, “Leading Indicator: 1 in 5 American workers filed for unemployment benefits since March”, CNN Business, May 7, 2020).

At the start of March 2020, 211.000 American people were unemployed. That was a historic low in unemployment. At the end of March, almost 7 million people were filing for unemployment benefits. Then, during April, more than 22 million more people lost their jobs. This means that one month of lockdown wiped out the 22 million jobs created since 2008 financial crisis (Anneken Tappe, ibid).


For Americans, losing their job means losing health insurance and any financial security. Thus, their consumer spending and purchasing power is drastically diminishing; worse still, their very subsistence is threatened. This gigantic professional, social and economic disaster embeds itself in the slowing down of the U.S. economy as a whole.  

Unemployment epidemic

This “shutdown” of the economy translates into a contraction of the whole economic activity. If, as a consequence of the shutdown, the U.S. GDP fell at a 4.8% annualized rate during the first quarter of 2020, then, according to JP Morgan and Bloomberg this could translate into a, a historic 40% contraction of the U.S. GDP during the second part of 2020 (Patti Domm, “JPMorgan now sees economy contracting by 40% in second quarter, and unemployment reaching 20%“, CNBC Markets, April 10, 2020). This catastrophic recessionary trend is tied to the systemic consequences of the pandemic, which reveals and amplifies the multiple vulnerabilities of the U.S. and global economy.

Towards the Abyss

The Federal Government tried to alleviate this tremendous shock through the USD 2 trillion relief act, in order to finance expanded unemployment, support for businesses and a direct check of USD 1.200 to people. However, by mid-April, the Small Business Administration ran out of its USD 346 billions relief fund after just two weeks (Mark Niquette and Jennifer Jacobs, “Small Business relief funds drained fast, with many shut out”, Bloomberg, 17 April 2020). Moreover, the combined consequences of the lockdown and of unemployment are triggering a mammoth fall in retail sales of 8.7% in March only.

Knowing that the previous worst slump was 3.8% in November 2008, the March 2020 fall is particularly stark. The same is true for industrial and manufacturing outputs, which lost respectively 6.3% and 5.4% in March. As we write, the April numbers are not known yet, but will undoubtedly be worse. Suffering from the same trend, the new residential construction market fell like a rock by 22.3% in March (Carmen Reinicke, ibid).

This integral slow-down of the U.S. economy is one of the drivers of the oil barrel prices fall. The prices went from around USD 50 to USD 20 to USD-37  at the end of April (“Oil price crashes below 0$ for the first time in history amid pandemic”, CGTN, 21 April 2020). It is also a consequence of the global shift to teleworking.

In the U.S., half of the workers are teleworking since the start of the Covid-19 crisis (Katherine Guyot, Isabel V. Sawhill, “Telecommuting will likely continue long after the pandemic”, Brookings, April 6, 2020). Home-working triggers a sharp decline in fuel, and thus oil, consumption. Furthermore, this trend is also radically diminishing the flows of petrodollars, which are irrigating the U.S. and the international financial system.

Chimerica: towards the (financial) dark side?

On the China-U.S. relationships front, this U.S. economic and social catastrophe is also triggering a massive geopolitical crisis. As it happens, the USD 300 billion U.S. trade deficit with China rests upon the purchase of “made in China”goods (Office of the United States Trade representative, “The People’s Republic of China – U.S-China Trade facts“). Thus, the diminishing U.S. consumption also means a lesser consumption of the exported Chinese industrial output in the U.S.. In other terms, the COVID-19 driven U.S. economic disaster is also turning the U.S.-China relationship into a mammoth geo-economic disaster.

Dialectics of recession

As we saw in “Chimerica”, the American economic activity is intimately linked to the Chinese economic growth. The expression Chimerica translates the quasi-intimate process of hybridation between these two mammoth national economies (Niall Ferguson, Xiang Xu, “Making Chimerica Great again”, Wiley one line Library, 21 December 2018).

This process emerges from the installation of thousands of U.S. industries and corporations in China since the 1980s. It creates the template for the mammoth trade relation between the two countries. In the same time, China buys huge amounts of the U.S. debt by purchasing Treasury bonds. In February 2020, China possessed USD 1,097 trillion of Treasury securities.

This sum amounts to 15.4% of U.S. foreign holdings. It turns China into the second largest foreign holder of U.S. debt, just after Japan and its USD 1.26 trillion (Adam Tooze, Crashed, How a decade of financial crises changed the world, 2019 and Jeffery Martin, “China economy has worst quarter in 40 years after Coronavirus lockdowns, leading the world into recession”, Newsweek, 4-17-20).

From trade war to cash war?

This relation is also the driver of the fantastic trade imbalance between China and the U.S.. As such, it is at the core of the trade war that President Donald Trump has been leading against China since 2018 (Jean-Michel Valantin, “The Midwest floods, the trade war and the pandemic swine flu: the agricultural and food super storm is here“, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, September 3, 2019). Since April 2018, Washington D.C. has imposed new tariffs on the majority of Chinese goods, while Beijing retaliates in kind, with variations on the agricultural products (“Factbox: nearly all goods traded by U.S and China will have tariffs by December 15”,  Reuters, October 10, 2019).

However, as we saw in Chimerica (1), the COVID-19 pandemic is dramatically slowing down the Chinese economy. Indeed, as highlighted here, the economic catastrophe in the U.S. makes it more difficult for its market to absorb Chinese goods. Hence the flows of cash going back to China decrease (Shane Croucher, “China, until recently America’s largest creditor, won’t be funding your stimulus check”, Newsweek, 4-22-20).

In other terms, terms, the pandemic is turning the Chimerica growth driver into a twin engine of dialectical recession. Indeed, the U.S. recession is fueling the trade, industrial and financial Chinese slowdown. In the same dynamic, this trend is reducing the financial capabilities of China to buy U.S treasuries.

In this financial environment, China is starting to sell U.S. bonds, in order to generate dollars. Beijing uses these dollars to buy yuans to support its own currency. Beijing thus tries to alleviate the domestic consequences of the 6.8% contraction of its economy during this first quarter. Those dollar sells tend to outweigh U.S. treasury security purchases. (Croucher, ibid).

Cultivating reciprocal (currency) vulnerabilities

This situation takes place at a very bad moment for the U.S. Indeed, the U.S. Treasury issues a tremendous flow of bonds in order to finance the 2 trillion dollars stimulus package. Currently, the Fed is the main buyer of U.S. debts. But the U.S economic authorities are starting to search for domestic investors (Croucher, ibid).

This situation could rapidly become problematic, given the huge flows of dollars both produced by D.C. and by China. Meanwhile, both are turbocharging their respective crisis, not to say recessions.

Thus, the deeply intricate interdependencies built in and upon Chimerica are becoming dialectics of vulnerabilities for the two super powers.

With the next article, we shall see how the dangerous crisis of Chimerica may also super charge its tense geopolitics.

Featured image: Cupertino, California, 10 April 2020, Friday 9-30 a.m. Commute by Travis Wise / CC BY 2.0

Models for the COVID-19 Second Wave

Europe, the Middle East, Oceania, part of South Asia and the U.S. progressively exit the COVID-19 lockdowns and relax the most severe social distancing measures.

In the meantime, China, Singapore and South Korea, the countries that were hit first and succeeded in controlling the first wave, appear to face different dynamics after easing of anti-COVID-19 measures.

South Korea appeared to have fully controlled local contagion, until 10 May (Hyonhee Shin, Josh Smith, “South Korea scrambles to contain nightclub coronavirus outbreak“, Reuters, 11 May 2020). In two days South Korea reported 69 new cases linked to nightclubs and bars in Seoul and races to test contact cases, still needing to trace more than 3000 people. Its borders are closed and entry is submitted to strict quarantines.

China seemed to fare quite well, despite struggling with clusters and imported cases notably in Heilongjiang (William Yang, “China tries to contain new coronavirus outbreak“, DW, 29 April 2020). Then, on 11 May, just above a months after the end of the lockdown, a new cluster arose in Wuhan, the original center of the epidemic, linked to asymptomatic cases (“China’s Wuhan reports first coronavirus cluster since lifting of lockdown“, Reuters, 11 May 2020). On 9 May, it was Northeastern Jilin province that reported a new small cluster, which triggered a lockdown for the city of Shulan (Ibid.).

Singapore knows what can be seen as a second wave, focused on migrant workers, with cases rising exponentially starting early April 2020 (James Crabtree, “How Singapore’s second wave is exposing economic inequalities“, New Statesman, 6 May 2020).

Meanwhile, history shows that for the 1918-1919 so-called “Spanish” Influenza pandemic, the second and third waves were more lethal than the first spring wave (Jeffery K. Taubenberger and David M Morens, “1918 Influenza: the mother of all pandemics,” Emerging infectious diseases vol. 12,1, 2006).

Thus, what are we to expect in the near future regarding this COVID-19 second wave?

Epidemiologists have modelled various types of scenarios to help policy-makers handle the pandemic and create responses that will mitigate, as much as possible, fatalities. This article looks at four such models and scenarios and highlight what they tell us about future waves of COVID-19. Comparing briefly the scenarios with the reality of the situation in China, Singapore and South Korea, we highlight the scenarios that look more likely and underline the need for further research focused on other factors.

The waves as a result of our interactions with the COVID-19

It is now generally accepted that we shall have to live with the COVID-19. The pandemic, whatever the shape of the outbreaks, is expected to persist until immunisation is reached, assuming this is possible. Immunisation will result either from vaccination or from natural immunity. At best, according to our estimates, and considering the need to manufacture billions of doses immunisation will not happen before winter 2022 (see Helene Lavoix, The COVID-19 Pandemic, Surviving and Reconstructing, The Red Team Analysis Society, 24 March 2020). This timeframe does not take into account the time necessary for an immense mass vaccination campaign.

Actors handled the first outbreak of the COVID-19 or first wave as they could, considering that all countries were caught unprepared, with possibly the exception of South Korea. A range of measures were created and applied, including a stringent lockdown across the world, that allowed to handle the surprise and mitigate fatalities. The main objective of these measures was to stop the contagion while not seeing health systems break down. What we successfully did was not to end the epidemic but to change its course. We avoided an immediate possible worst case scenario (Helene Lavoix, Worst Case Baseline Scenarios for the COVID-19 Pandemic, The Red Team Analysis Society, 24 March 2020).

However, the price to pay was that activity stopped, with an immense cost to ways of life, including the economy.

Now, we are entering a new phase, where we shall start learning to live with the COVID-19. The fear is that once activity restarts, then the epidemic will spread and develop again, bringing about a second wave, with its corollary of death, sufferings and danger to see health systems break down. Political authorities are thus rushing to design sets of measures and policies that should allow us living with the COVID-19, instead of being frozen by the danger, until another kind of death takes us all.

The possibility of a second wave, and of next waves in general depend upon the interactions between the virus, and notably the epidemiology of the SARS-CoV-2,, and the responses and actions the various actors will design and implement.

We are thus both dependent for our activity upon the waves of COVID-19 while, in the same time, also contributing to create and shape them.

Second and recurring waves

The Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team March study

First and foremost, we have the influential study of the Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team, Impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to reduce COVID19 mortality and healthcare demand (16 March 2020). Many governments used this report to build their first wave’s lockdown policies.

(A partir de ce point, traduction française automatique par intelligence artificielle.)

In this study, the objective is to minimise fatalities, which demands not overwhelming hospitals and notably the number of intensive care units bed requirements (ICU). The policy measures taken into account are as follows:

  • Case isolation in the home (CI),
  • Voluntary home quarantine (for 14 days – HQ),
  • Social distancing of those over 70 years of age (SDO),
  • Social distancing of entire population (similar to lockdown – SD),
  • Closure of schools and universities (PC).

The study, among other critical factors, considers the R0 (R-nought) or basic reproduction number of an infectious disease. This is a measure that represents “the expected number of secondary cases produced by a typical infected individual early in an epidemic” (O Diekmann; J.A.P. Heesterbeek and J.A.J. Metz (1990). “On the definition and the computation of the basic reproduction ratio R0 in models for infectious diseases in heterogeneous populations”Journal of Mathematical Biology 28: 356–382). They “examine values between 2.0 and 2.6”, which is in the range of most estimates. They also take into account the acquired immunity against the SARS-CoV-2 and consider it to be similar to what is obtained against the seasonal influenza, i.e. re-infection cannot reoccur the next season.

With this model, the Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team finds that, for a R0=2.2, after the end of the first wave and once the social distancing of entire population measures are relaxed and school and universities re-open, assuming all other measures stay in place, a new wave starts. It triggers the need to start a new period of social distancing of entire population and school and university closure one month after the beginning of the relaxation.

As a whole, over two years, the full range of measures “is in force approximately 2/3 of the time” (p.12). In two years, we thus have, excluding the first wave, eleven waves of two months each, however the apex of each wave is lower. The second wave thus starts immediately once the lockdown stops, but starts being experienced as such one month after the exit strategy, when the need for SD is triggered.

Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team – 16 March study, p. 12 – “Figure 4: Illustration of adaptive triggering of suppression strategies in GB, for R0=2.2, a policy of all four interventions considered, an “on” trigger of 100 ICU cases in a week and an “off” trigger of 50 ICU cases.”

Although further monitoring will be needed, this seems to correspond approximately to the new clusters emerging in China and South Korea. Yet, we are still far in these two countries from the Imperial College estimated needs in ICU one month after exit from lockdown, as shown in the diagram above for example.

The Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health’s model

Scientists of the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health created a model allowing notably for different sensitivity of the virus to seasonality (Stephen M. Kissler, et al. “Projecting the transmission dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 through the postpandemic period“, Science, 14 April 2020).

It obtained scenarios similar to those of the Imperial College, with recurring waves into 2022 “requiring social distancing measures to be in place between 25% (for wintertime R0 = 2 and seasonality…) and 75% (for wintertime R0 = 2.6 and no seasonality …) of that time”.

Obviously, the lower the R0 considered and the more important the seasonality factor, the shorter the social distancing period.

Here, as for the Imperial College’s model, the second wave would start immediately as social distancing measures are relaxed. In the Harvard model, in the U.S. case, new social distancing measures would be needed one month after the end of SD if the virus is not seasonal. If the virus is seasonal and if the first wave took place in Spring, as is more or less the case in the U.S., new social distancing measures would be needed 2,5 months after the end of SD.

The emergence of new clusters in South Korea and China in May would tend to indicate that the virus is not or not strongly seasonal. The Singapore case and the April wave anyway showed that heat and humidity do not appear to deter the virus and the disease.

Three possible scenarios for the CIDRAP

On 30 April 2020, the Centre for Infectious Disease Research and Policy (CIDRAP) of the University of Minnesota published “The future of the COVID-19 pandemic: lessons learned from pandemic influenza,” (Kristine Moore, MD, MPH, Marc Lipsitch, DPhil, John Barry, MA, and Michael Osterholm, PhD, MPH).

Pointing out useful similarities but also differences between influenza and the SARS-CoV-2, notably a higher viral transmissibility for the latter, the CIDRAP outlines three possible scenarios. These scenarios give the outlook of the future wave but are not precise enough to allow estimating when the second wave will start.

The first scenario of the CIDRAP is very similar to the scenario of the Imperial College and of Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health. According to this first scenario, “the first wave of COVID-19 in spring 2020 is followed by a series of repetitive smaller waves that occur through the summer and then consistently over a 1- to 2-year period, gradually diminishing sometime in 2021.” The strength and timing of waves may vary with the efficiency of the controlling measures taken as well as according to other demographic and geographic factors. This first scenario also expects that full SD measures may have to be implemented regularly.

CIDRAP’s second scenario is inspired by the pattern of the 1918-1919 Spanish Flu pandemic. “The first wave of COVID-19 in spring 2020 is followed by a larger wave in the fall or winter of 2020 and one or more smaller subsequent waves in 2021.” Thus, the main difference with the Imperial College and Harvard scenarios is first about intensity. The second wave is the most lethal. Second, it is about timing. The second wave would take place in the next fall or winter. Finally it is about the number of subsequent waves following the second one, creating two sub-scenarios: only one further wave or subsequent smaller waves.

Considering what is happening in China, Singapore and South Korea, the timing does not seem to correspond. The difference probably comes from the measures implemented for the COVID-19, which are likely to have “artificially” stopped the first wave, compared with the 1918 Influenza pandemic. However, the possibility of a more lethal second wave is serious enough to keep this scenario and further detail comparatively the 1918 pandemic and the COVID-19.

The third CIDRAP scenario is different from the previous models. It envisions that “the first wave of COVID-19 in spring 2020 is followed by a “slow burn” of ongoing transmission and case occurrence, but without a clear wave pattern.” In that case the most severe social distancing measures will not have to be reimplemented but “cases and deaths will continue to occur”.

This scenario does not fit what took place in Singapore. It may be, however, too early to discard it. It may also not be universal. In some countries, excess death and sufferings are not acceptable, while there is always the risk that contagion spreads again exponentially. Thus, even a few cases would trigger SD measures, as possibly in New Zealand, or in Shulan in China (e.g. Amy Gunia, “Why New Zealand’s Coronavirus Elimination Strategy Is Unlikely to Work in Most Other Places“, Time, 28 April 2020; Ibid.).

Mobility and Second wave

The most recent study, again by the Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team, focuses on Italy (Report 20: Using mobility to estimate the transmission intensity of COVID-19 in Italy: A subnational analysis with future scenarios, 4 May 2020).

It models scenarios for a relaxation of isolation measures on 4 May 2020, using increase in mobility as a proxy. A second wave is quasi in-built in their model as mobility is the parameter used to make “the time related reproduction number or effective reproduction number (Rt)” change. Thus, what the model tells us is the extent of infection and death in excess, i.e. the size of the wave.

In the first scenario modelled, mobility increases by 20% above pre-lockdown levels, and in the second, it increases by 40%. However, these scenarios do not account for other anti-COVID-19 measures such as school closures, hygiene, face masks, or testing and contact tracing. It only focuses on the mobility factor.

The first finding, unsurprisingly, is that the situation varies according to region. This could indicate that the way China or Germany, for example, handle the COVID-19 could be the way forward, at least as far as the mobility factor is concerned.

In scenario 1 (20% mobility) the number of excess death rises above 100 on approximately 8 June 2020 in Piedmont, 20 June in Veneto and 13 July in Tuscany, before to rise exponentially.

In scenario 2 (40% mobility) the number of excess death rises above 100 on approximately 28 May in Piedmont, 4 June in Veneto, 10 June in Tuscany, 22 June in Lombardy and 4 July in Emilia Romagna and Liguria, before to rise exponentially.

As the authors highlight, these scenarios must be seen as worst case scenarios, knowing that other measures will be implemented.

Thus, except in the third scenario of the CIDRAP, all epidemiological models suggest that we shall face a second wave. Most models consider also following recurring waves.

Now, a brief comparison with the dynamics of the epidemic in China, South Korea and Singapore tend to indicate that the models and scenarios anticipating recurring waves are the most likely. It could also indicate that models are pessimistic in terms of the timing of the second wave, except in the case of Singapore. Yet, in Singapore, other factors not included in the epidemiological models are also at work. Meanwhile, the size thus lethality of the second wave remains a high impact uncertainty that must be considered carefully.

Can we thus find other factors that could help improving assessments of the coming waves? These factors would make foresight even more actionable. They would thus contribute to the design of efficient policies. This is what we shall see with the next article.

Further Bibliographical references

Taubenberger, Jeffery K, and David M Morens. “1918 Influenza: the mother of all pandemics.” Emerging infectious diseases vol. 12,1 (2006): 15-22. doi:10.3201/eid1201.050979

Featured image: Image par Elias Sch. de Pixabay [Public Domain]

The Strange Case of Sweden in the COVID-19 Pandemic

Many countries hit by the pandemic are now exiting or about to exit the period of most stringent isolation measures. Indeed, they estimate they succeeded in controlling contagion. Meanwhile, they avoided the dreaded break down of their health-care system, which could have taken place if hospitals had been overwhelmed.

In Europe, one country stands apart, Sweden. The oft-heard narrative runs as follows: Sweden appears to have decided for a policy of laissez-faire; it recommended but never imposed; it thus has hardly or no exit policy to design and implement, because there is not so much to exit from. Meanwhile, it does fare much better in its handling of the COVID-19, notably in economic terms, while the toll it pays in terms of casualties is far from terrible.

Is this narrative correct? What are the facts? How can we explain the difference between “Sweden and the rest”? Can we already draw lessons from the Swedish case or is it truly too early in the pandemic to do so? Does that mean that all countries who implemented social distanciation and other measures were wrong to do so? Without falling into a caricatural black and white judgement, are there some lessons we could learn from the way Sweden handled this part of the pandemic outbreak? Is it reproductible in time and elsewhere?

These are crucial questions for policy-makers as they are preparing the exit strategy from lockdown and as they need to provide security to their citizens. It could give them further elements to succeed in protecting citizens both from disease and from economic hardship.

These are keys questions for businesses, corporate and financial actors, as they will lobby political authorities for their interests and as they also need to anticipate for the future of their activity.

These are crucial questions for citizens, who need to be able to assess the way their political authorities succeed in their mission of protection of those who are ruled.

This article addresses the way Sweden handled, so far, the COVID-19 pandemic and the “Swedish model” narrative. The aim is to assess in which way the Swedish strategy can be used as a model by others, not to judge the way Swedish authorities handled the COVID-19.

First, the article focuses on the policies and measures Sweden took to face the COVID-19, the rationale for these measures and their actors. Second, it looks at current impacts of these measures, in terms of health and in economic terms. Finally, it wonders about the reality of the idea of an exceptional Swedish model. It looks first, assuming there is a model, to its replicability. Then it questions the very idea of a Swedish model.

Sweden faces the COVID-19

Since the start of the COVID-19, the Public Health Agency of Sweden (Folkhälsomyndigheten) has had the upper hand on all decisions regarding the Swedish answer to the epidemic (Hans Bergstrom, “The Grim Truth About the “Swedish Model”“, Project Syndicate, 17 April 2020). Anders Tegnell, epidemiologist and head of the Department of Public Health Analysis and Data Development of the agency leads the effort (Ibid.).

According to Hans Bergstrom, professor of political science at the University of Gothenburg, Tegnell’s strong and often erroneous convictions paved the way for Sweden strategies (Ibid.). Tegnell did not believe the Chinese outbreak could spread. Then he thought case tracing was a sufficient measure to control the COVID-19, as there was no sign of community transmission inside Sweden (Ibid.). Bergstrom (Ibid,) argues that “between the lines”, Tegnell seeks to progressively achieve herd immunity. Meanwhile, considering that the COVID-19 was there to last, Tegnell thought that policies that could be sustainable over time economically and psychologically had to be implemented (Ibid.).

Indeed, Tegnell interviewed in Nature, confirms this vision:

“This is not a disease that can be stopped or eradicated, at least until a working vaccine is produced. We have to find long-term solutions that keeps the distribution of infections at a decent level. What every country is trying to do is to keep people apart, using the measures we have and the traditions we have to implement those measures. And that’s why we ended up doing slightly different things.

Marta Paterlini, “‘Closing borders is ridiculous’: the epidemiologist behind Sweden’s controversial coronavirus strategy“, Nature, 21 April 2020

Tegnell also stresses that none of the most severe measures implemented elsewhere, such as isolation, are grounded into scientific evidence, and that epidemiologists produced models that were too pessimistic (Paterlini, Ibid.).

As a result, Sweden advised its citizens to practice social distancing and to work from home, but enforced little. Standing at bars is forbidden but restaurants are opened (Emergency Information from Swedish Authorities, “Ban on crowding in restaurants, cafés and bars“, Bekräftad information om coronaviruset, 25 March 2020).

Entry ban applies primarily to foreign citizens attempting to enter Sweden from all countries, except those in the EEA and Switzerland from 17 March 2020 until 15 May, i.e. 30 days (The Swedish Police, Travel to and from Sweden affected until 15 May 2020).

The exemplary Swedish sense of social responsibility and the unique Swedish values are touted as having allowed the policy to be successful. Sweden would be, deep down,

“A model society based on values of social justice and human rationality, with a high level of trust between people and trustworthy authorities. This has its origins from the Social Democrat-introduced concept of “Folkhemmet,” or people’s home, where a welfare state cares for all with the proviso that everyone complies with a communal order.”

Heba Habib, “With science and shared values, Sweden charts own pandemic course“, The Christian Science Monitor, 27 April 2020.

As a result, people are believed to responsibly follow their government’s suggestions, which translates in successful policies. Hence, early April it was estimated that 50% of people worked from home, that usage of public transports had decreased by 50% and that streets in Stockholm were only 30% as busy as before the COVID-19 (“Sweden’s Outlier Response To COVID-19, And Its Results So Far“, PYMNTS.com 16 April 2020)

Thus, until 24 April 2020, Sweden has had a far less constraining policy to control the COVID-19 than its neighbours or than most of the world, as shown in the table below listing the measures Sweden took compared with its Nordic neighbours.

SwedenDenmarkNorway Finland
All travels
14 March – including to Sweden16 March – all non residents banned to enter Norway16 March
Travels outside EEA17 March until 15 May


Quarantine from high risk regions
9 March27 February -all will be quarantined, save those coming back from Sweden and Finland16 March – all returnees must be residents or citizens only – 14 days quarantine
Stay home for non essential functions
13 March19 March (prohibited to stay in cabins, home quarantine)16 March
Gatherings of peopleGathering limited to 500 people – 30 March: gathering limited to 50 people18 March – No gathering above 10 people
16 March – No gathering above 10 people
Secondary education closed
13 March12 March16 March
Primary education closed
16 March12 March16 March
Retails, restaurants, bars etc. closed 25 March – Standing at bars prohibited. Safety distance maintained elsewhere.18 March12 March -except establishment serving foods)16 March – only decrease of non critical activities
Contaminated inner regions locked down


27 March – 15 April Uusimaa
Measures taken to handle the COVID-19 Pandemic in Nordic Countries – Various official sources, according to countries

In a 21 April’s interview, Tegnell acknowledged that most of the Swedish deaths came from care houses for elder people and that an investigation in the high number of deaths is needed (Ibid.). Yet, according to him, it is not the COVID-19 strategy that potentially failed here, but the social-care system (Jenny Anderson, “Sweden’s very different approach to Covid-19“, Quartz, 27 April 2020).

Tegnell also does not believe much into asymptomatic contagion, or only at the margin, and decries closing borders, as the contagion now exists within European borders (Paterlini, Ibid.). However, he is also forgetting that Sweden is de facto protected by others’ closing borders and by others’ policies.

As a whole, Tegnell is satisfied with the policy he designed and its results.

However other top Swedish scientists contested this approach and 22 of them published an open letter in the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter: “Public health authorities have failed – now politicians must intervene.” There they highlighted a dangerous failure of public-health authorities as deaths topped 1000. They asked political authorities to intervene and change policies.

On April 15, 2020, the Swedish Parliament indeed “extended their agreement on temporary parliamentary procedure during the COVID-19 outbreak to last until at least April 29, 2020” (Library of Congress, Legal Monitor; Sveriges Riksdag, 15 April 2020).

Yet policies did not change, up until 24-27 April 2020.

Impacts… so far

What are the impacts of the policies Sweden implemented regarding the COVID-19?

Health results

A peak?

On 24 April 2020, there has been 17.567 cases identified and 2.152 deaths (John Hopkins CSSE: Tracking the COVID-19 (ex 2019-nCoV) spread in real-time). On 27 and 28 April, 11:30, there has been respectively 18.926 and 19621 cases identified and 2.274 and 2.355 deaths (Official Swedish data updates), but data for the last 7 days still need to be consolidated (Maddy Savage, “Coronavirus: Has Sweden got its science right?“, BBC News, 25 April 2020). So far hospitals have not been overwhelmed: 1.353 for 27 April, 1388 people for 28 April are in intensive care.

As we monitor the situation after publication of the article, on 4 May 2020, we have 22.721 cases identified and 2.274 and 2.769 deaths (Official Swedish data updates). Interestingly, the figures for 24, 27 and 28 April are now revised and give respectively 18.100, 19.400 and 20.100 cumulative positive cases.

Sweden, 28 April 2020 – Latest updates on the outbreak of coronavirus disease (covid-19). 
The page is updated daily with number of cases at 14:00

The Public Health Agency of Sweden suggested, first, that, in Stockholm, the epidemic peaked on 17 April 2020 (Reuters, “Swedish health agency says virus has peaked in Stockholm, no easing of restrictions yet“, 21 April 2020). Stockholm represents half of the confirmed cases in Sweden (Ibid.).

Yet, by 27 April 2020, the number of daily cases still rises, with a strong increase between 21 and 24 April, then with lower rises. If the trends continues towards lower increases, then a peak may indeed have been reached.

However as the new updated graph for 4 May 2020 (monitoring after publications) depicts, the revised data show an increase rather than a decrease. Furthermore, 29 April is the day with the highest number of positive cases since the start of the epidemic, i.e. 778 cases, followed by 24 April with 769 cases and 28 April with 750 cases. Thus the idea of a peak for Sweden needs to be questioned, and monitored considering also the variations in data.

COVID-19 cases in Sweden – 27 April 2020
COVID-19 cases in Sweden – 28 April 2020
COVID-19 cases in Sweden – 4 May 2020 – Thus giving updated data for 26-29 April

Meanwhile, as shown on the graphs below, and considering the uncertainties on data for the last seven days, the number of deaths reported has strongly fallen and the number of people in intensive care units has also fallen.

COVID-19 fatalities in Sweden – 27 April 2020
COVID-19 ICU in Sweden – 27 April 2020

Thus do we have a peak or not? The reality of a peak is still unclear and only time will tell (John Hopkins data, see also official Swedish data updates). Nonetheless, as we shall see below, the 21 to 24 April period cancelled previous expectations of a peak.

Comparisons

Compared with its neighbours, even considering its larger population, Sweden has fared less well, as shown in the table below. Swedish rates are rather similar to those of the Netherlands, another country that initially had a laissez faire policy.

24 April 2020SwedenDenmarkNorway FinlandNetherlands
Population10 230 0005 806 0005 368 0005 518 00017 280 000
Cases17 5678 4087 4444 39536 727
%0,17172 %0,14482 %0,13867 %0,07965 %0,21254 %
Fatality Rates2 1524031991774 304
% / pop0,0210 %0,0069 %0,0037 %0,0032 %0,0249 %
% / cases12,2502 %4,7931 %2,6733 %4,0273 %11,7189 %
The COVID-19 in Nordic Countries – Data for 24 April 2020 – John Hopkins CSSE: Tracking the COVID-19
Denmark COVID-19 daily cases up until 27 April 2020 (John Hopkins CSSE: Tracking the COVID-19)
Norway COVID-19 daily cases up until 27 April 2020 (John Hopkins CSSE: Tracking the COVID-19)

All the three other Nordic countries, notably Norway, seem to have clearly peaked. The Netherlands has also most probably peaked.

Finland COVID-19 daily cases up until 27 April 2020 (John Hopkins CSSE: Tracking the COVID-19)
Netherlands COVID-19 daily cases up until 27 April 2020 (John Hopkins CSSE: Tracking the COVID-19)

In the case of Sweden, and as we shall further see below, there is ground to worry that Sweden’s peak is not so easy to achieve.

Economic results

Despite rather lax policies compared with most other countries, Sweden also faces economic damages.

Indeed, Sweden also depends on others for its trade and activity. Thus, on 8 April, the economic research unit of BNP Paribas estimated that the country would be hard hit by the major slowdown in global trade, as exports account for 45.6% of Sweden’s GDP.

Yet, some indicators, such as personal spending and unemployment’s increase were also better in Sweden than in Norway (Darren McCaffrey, “Analysis: Is Sweden right in its handling of COVID-19?“, Euronews, 22 April 2020).

Nonetheless, on 24 April 2020, the Swedish finance minister stated that she expected the economy to shrink by 7%, more than she initially thought, and unemployment to reach 11% (Radio Sweden, “More restaurant corona inspections, economy expected to be hit harder, more infections in nursing homes“, 24 April 2020).

So is there really ground for a model? Sweden did not fare as well as its neighbours in terms of protecting the health of its citizens. Yet, it also did not fare worse than, for example, the Netherlands, so far. But again, the Netherlands appears to have peaked. Meanwhile, the economic cost for Sweden is on a par with 14 April IMF forecasts for the Netherlands as the Dutch economy is expected to shrinking by 7.5% in 2020 (DutchNews.nl, “IMF sees Dutch economy shrinking 7.5% this year, unemployment to hit 6.5%” 14 April 2020).

At first glance, and considering that we are still at the start of the pandemic, it is difficult to assess if we have or not a Swedish model. Let us thus now look at a potential replicability of the model, and then at the evolution of the last couple of days.

A Swedish model?

If there is a Swedish model, is it replicable?

First, besides the role the cultural and socio-political values model plays, Sweden was also probably protected from even higher levels of contagion by a low population density, as shown on the comparative graph below, and despite variations according to areas.

Population density (people per sq. km of land area) – Italy, Sweden, France, Spain, Denmark – Food and Agriculture Organization and World Bank population estimates.

Second, Sweden did not have the same global exposure to the world as other nations such as Spain, Italy or France. Indeed, using World Bank statistics, in 2018, Sweden’s main partners, for exports, were Germany, Norway, Finland, Denmark and the United States, and for imports they were Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and United Kingdom. By comparison, France’s major partners for exports were Germany, the United States, Spain, Italy and Belgium, and for imports they were Germany, China, Italy, Belgium and Spain. Italy’s major partners were for exports Germany, France, the United States, Spain and the United Kingdom and, for imports, Germany, France, China, Netherlands and Spain.

As a whole, Sweden receives far less travellers (tourism includes business trips) than other countries that were more quickly and more intensely hit by the COVID-19, as shown in chart below for Inbound tourism 2018 (UNWTO statistics).

2018 Inbound Tourism for Sweden with comparisons – (UNWTO statistics)

Thus, considering the specificities of Sweden, if there is a model, it can only be replicated in countries that benefit from the same conditions. Meanwhile, these specific factors also point out that rather than only a specifically designed model, we have here particular circumstances, as for every country, or more largely unit of analysis, interacting with a specific strategy.

But is there truly a Swedish model?

Now, we may also wonder if there is truly a Swedish model, considering the 21-24 April 2020 COVID-19 related data.

Towards a change of policies? Not a different model but different dynamics?

The Swedish government also noted the new rise of cases observed between 21 and 24 April (David Nikel, “Sweden Health Chief Admits ‘It’s Not Over’ As Coronavirus Cases Leap“, Forbes, 24 April 2020). The Swedish Public Health Agency acknowledged the increase. As reported by Forbes, Tegnell stated:

“There have been more deaths than expected. It is definitely not over. We see that especially in the small rise in Stockholm again”

David Nikel, “Sweden Health Chief Admits ‘It’s Not Over’ As Coronavirus Cases Leap“, Forbes, 24 April 2020.

The disappointing results would be related to the Easter week-end.

As a result, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency warned that people should not relax their responsible approaches (Ibid.). In the meantime the mayor of Stockholm threatened to close restaurants and bars if safe distancing was not respected (ibid.). Some of them were indeed shut by the local food safety board, while Springtime celebrations were cancelled (Radio Sweden, “Stockholm bars shut due to crowding, springtime celebrations cancelled, warning for long-term unemployment“, 27 April 2020).

Thus, when confronted with an unexpected rise of cases, the Swedish authorities have to resort to the same policies as others. They have to reinforce social distanciation rules.

If such rises happen again, then, considering the very recent decisions, it is possible that the authorities will need to continue on the path of more stringent measures.

In that case, Sweden would just follow on the track of other countries. The “model” would actually rather be a longer initial phase, until more stringent measures become necessary.

If the data are improve and then remain good, then Sweden may relax measures again. Thus, if there is a model, it may be one that promotes flexibility.

Timing matters for preparedness

Should COVID-19 cases rise strongly again, Sweden would then risk facing a shortage of intensive care units ICU), as happened elsewhere.

It seems, however, that Sweden is well prepared in terms of ICU capacities. The ICU initial (pre-COVID-19) capacity of Sweden was 526 beds (Joacim Rocklov, “COVID-19 health care demand and mortality in Sweden in response to non-pharmaceutical (NPIs) mitigation and suppression scenarios“, MedRxiv, 7 April 2020).

Rocklov estimated the ICU capacity could be doubled with preparedness, which is what seems to have taken place (Ibid., Anderson, Ibid.).

On 26 and 27 April, COVID-19 patients in ICU would be respectively 558 and 543, thus hovering above the initial number of beds available for all pathologies (Svenska Intensivvårdsregistret). If the capacity has doubled as a result of preparedness, then Sweden is probably able to handle a substantial amount of new cases.

Preparedness in terms of ICU capacities, assuming the doubling of the capacity is correct, could be seen as a successful element of the Swedish model, but it could also have been achieved with less fatalities.

Towards homogenisation?

Now, if the Swedish political authorities were to continue on the path towards more severe restrictions, because they do not succeed in truly achieving a peak, this evolution could take place just when other countries relax their policies.

The countries exiting from severe isolation measures will then fear a return of the epidemic and a second wave. They will most certainly pay a very high attention to the possibility of imported cases, as China does. Thus the Swedish strategy of not believing in travel controls, added to an uncertain peak could threaten to backfire. As a result, the combination of factors could force Sweden to also change its travel policies. This is all the more likely that Sweden did contribute to the general European contagion as early a 7 February 2020, as shown in the fascinating Spanish study tracing the phylogenies of the virus in Europe (Francisco Díez-Fuertes, et al. “Phylodynamics of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in Spain“, bioRxiv, 20 April 2020). True enough, on 7 February most European countries were mocking those fearing a ridiculous small flu-like epidemic. Yet, since then, they appear to have learned.

In that case, the uncertainty of the epidemic curve could play as a disadvantage for Sweden, or, to the least, would force Sweden towards homogenisation. The great political scientist Fred Halliday has shown the imperatives of homogenisation in international relations (Rethinking International Relations, 1994). Further research would be needed here to evaluate if the case of Sweden could give us indications that such dynamics towards homogenisation will be at work in the months and years to come, which is crucial to properly build scenarios.

The model in this case would be different from what was initially expected. It would show the importance of timing, the possible danger of an uncertain epidemic curve as seen by others and a possible tendency towards homogeneity.

Trial by pandemic

If ever the COVID-19 evolution went wrong, and if Sweden had to abandon its touted “cultural” model, then it would be the very belief-system underpinning its socio-political organisation that would be questioned.

Trust in political authorities could be impaired, which would twice hurt the Swedish polity. First, as for any political system, the legitimacy of political authorities would diminish. Second, because trust in the system is so crucial to Sweden values, these very values could be shaken. To measure the difference, imagine a system where the constructed shared historical values led to diffidence towards central political authorities, as in the U.S..

However, this “trial by pandemic” is not exclusively a threat for Sweden. Each and every polity has to face it. How each will handle it, how each will be able to reinvent its system to overcome the threat will most probably deeply change each society and the international system.

It is probably too early in the pandemic to conclude with certainty about the success of the Swedish measures in handling the pandemic. However, looking at the Swedish case helped us understanding better how societies handle the COVID-19 pandemic. It also highlighted that there is no such a thing as a Swedish model that could be an easy recipe to follow by all in our global struggle against the COVID-19.

Further bibliography

Francisco Díez-Fuertes, María Iglesias Caballero, Sara Monzón, Pilar Jiménez, Sarai Varona, Isabel Cuesta, Ángel Zaballos, Michael M Thomson, Mercedes Jiménez, Javier García Pérez, Francisco Pozo, Mayte Pérez-Olmeda, José Alcamí, Inmaculada Casas, “Phylodynamics of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in Spain” bioRxiv 2020.04.20.050039; doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.04.20.050039

Paul W Franks, “Covid 19 coronavirus: Sweden thinks we’re underestimating how many people have had virus“, The New Zealand Herald, 24 April 2020.

Featured image: Kurious (pixabay.com)

The COVID-19 Shaping the World – The Red (Team) Analysis Weekly – 23 April 2020

This is the 23 April 2020 issue of our weekly scan for political and geopolitical risks (open access).

Editorial: The COVID-19 has already deeply reshaped the world.

Imagine the headlines and the social networks buzz on the oil prices amazing rout, if we were not in a time of pandemic! It would certainly not be as it is now. Of course, both the COVID-19 and the oil quasi irrelevance are linked, but the imagination exercise points out how much our perceptions and interests have changed over the course of less than two months.

Yet, this “shaping the world” by the COVID-19 is likely far from being finished.

Now, we also face a fight back by those who want the world of globalisation – the world of the last 20 years – to return, expressed, among others, through favouring “herd immunity”, hyping a Swedish success in resisting isolation and lockdown, and a return of the narrative according to which “the COVID-19 is hardly more lethal than seasonal flu”.

This is mixed with a serious risk to see the U.S. collapse. But, are we certain this is “just” the U.S.? Or could it be the Western liberal democracy model that could collapse? And is this “just” this model that could end, or are we facing the collapse of the modern state system?

Furthermore, these threats are also mixed with a serious risk to see war coming to the fore. War and pandemic should not fare well together. But then, we are living extraordinary and bizarre times, with cascading and complex impacts. And animosity is running high, notably against China. And China has also to face the very likely end of the bounty that was delocalisation, as countries want to recover their industrial and economic sovereignty.

And these are only some of the major uncertainties we face.

Using horizon scanning, each week, we collect weak – and less weak – signals. These point to new, emerging, escalating or stabilising problems. As a result, they indicate how trends or dynamics evolve.

The Scan

The 23 April 2020 scan→

Horizon scanning, weak signals and biases

We call signals weak, because it is still difficult to discern them among a vast array of events. However, our biases often alter our capacity to measure the strength of the signal. As a result, the perception of strength will vary according to the awareness of the actor. At worst, biases may be so strong that they completely block the very identification of the signal.

In the field of strategic foresight and warning, risk management and future studies, it is the job of good analysts to scan the horizon. As a result, they can perceive signals. Analysts then evaluate the strength of these signals according to specific risks and dynamics. Finally, they deliver their findings to users. These users can be other analysts, officers or decision-makers.

You can read a more detailed explanation in one of our cornerstone articles: Horizon Scanning and Monitoring for Warning: Definition and Practice.

The sections of the scan

Each section of the scan focuses on signals related to a specific theme:

  • world (international politics and geopolitics);
  • economy;
  • science including AI, QIS, technology and weapons, ;
  • analysis, strategy and futures;
  • the Covid-19 pandemic;
  • energy and environment.

However, in a complex world, categories are merely a convenient way to present information, when facts and events interact across boundaries.

The information collected (crowdsourced) does not mean endorsement.

Featured image: Milky Way above SPECULOOS / The Search for habitable Planets – EClipsing ULtra-cOOl Stars (SPECULOOS) is searching for Earth-like planets around tiny, dim stars in front of a panorama of the Milky Way. Credit: ESO/P. Horálek.

The COVID-19 and the U.S.-China competition (1)

What is “great powers competition” in a time of global confinement?

As we write this article, half of the human species is or has been confined in homes or apartments, in cities and slums. In China, for example, confinement is a massive political and social undertaking. All around the world hundreds of millions of people are living “inside”. Since its start, the epidemic spread from the wet market of Wuhan to South Korea and other Asian countries, India, Europe, Africa, Latin America and the U.S. and Canada. In April 2020, more than 3 billion people are confined (Hélène Lavoix, “COVID 19- Worst case baseline scenarios, March 13 2020 and COVID 19 scenarios- Making sense of antiviral treatment”, The Red (Team) Analysis, April 8 2020).

The rapid spread of the virus triggers contrasted answers from the U.S. federal state and from the different levels of political authorities. Consequently, the U.S. economy is on a free fall trajectory, while social cohesion is under tremendous sanitary and financial pressure. In one week, 6.6 million American people filed for unemployment (Catherine Thorbecke, “6.6 million more Americans file for unemployment amid financial crisis”, ABC News, 9 April 2020).

This situation begs a series of questions about the geopolitical and strategic consequences of the Chinese confinement and of the U.S. reactions to the COVID-19 for the China-U.S. relationships. Indeed, their interactions are extremely deep, notably because of the economic interdependence that links these two giants, without uniting them.

Chimerica versus COVID-19

This relation is so dense that Niall Ferguson calls it “Chimerica”. This expression translates the quasi-intimate process of hybridation between these two mammoth national economies (Niall Ferguson, Xiang Xu, “Making Chimerica Great again”, Wiley one line Library, 21 December 2018). This process emerges both from the installation of thousands of U.S. industries and corporations in China and from the mammoth trade relation between the two countries.

This relation is also the driver of the fantastic trade imbalance between China and the U.S. As such, it is at the core of the trade war launched by President Donald Trump against China in 2018 (Jean-Michel Valantin, “The Midwest floods, the trade war and the pandemic swine flu: the agricultural and food super storm is here“, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, September 3, 2019).

In other terms, the present and future of “Chimerica” is fundamentally related to the consequences of the “global confinement” triggered by the global pandemic of COVID-19.

In this new series, we are going to evaluate and anticipate the way the COVID-19 is deeply redefining the U.S.-China interdependency. That is to say, we shall assess the potential types of partnerships or conflicts it could unleash.

In this first article, we shall see how the COVID-19 triggers the equivalent of a geo economic warfare on Chimerica.

From China’s lockdown to global confinement

At the start of 2020, after a few weeks of tragic hesitation, the Chinese political authorities reacted very strongly in the face of the COVID-19 epidemic. They locked down entire cities and provinces, with Wuhan and Hubei province in the first place.

The Chinese Central power cancelled the New Years festivities, and prolonged the official holidays, before confining hundred of millions of Chinese people. This decision intended to decrease the demographic density in working places in Chinese urban areas and especially to stop the dissemination through the travels of massive numbers of people in order to break the contamination chain (Hélène Lavoix, “Why the COVID 19 is NOT a Black Swan event”, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, March 6, 2020).

For example, on 23 January 2020, the Chinese national authorities decided to impose a complete lockdown on the 11 million people city of Wuhan. This drastic measure aimed at containing the spread of the COVID-19 outbreak, probably originating from the wet market of the city, throughout the country. An immediate consequence of China’s urban confinement was a massive decrease in economic activity (Associated Press, “China reports Jan-Feb economic activity worse than expected”, US News, 16 mars 2020).

Three weeks later, the epidemic being a matter of national emergency, measures of partial and total lockdown were vigorously enforced in numerous provinces and cities. This meant that 500 million Chinese citizens were living through confinement measures. This represented almost 7% of the whole of humanity.

From a strictly analytical point of view, this was, so far, a unique feat of social engineering. However, the international spread of the virus started before the confinement.

Towards international confinement

Pandemic

As a result, the pandemic blazed throughout the globalized world, from China to the rest of Asia and Eurasia. The virus expanded everywhere, from South Korea and Asia, to Italy, France, Great Britain and Europe, to Australia and New Zealand, Africa, Latin America, the U.S. and Canada. Thus, during February and March 2020, the COVID-19 became the first global human pandemic of the 21st century.

Half of the human species is confined (Hélène Lavoix, “COVID 19-Worst case baseline scenarios”, ibid). The geopolitical consequences of this sanitary initially domestic crisis were developing at a gigantic scale.

From China to Chimerica

This dire sanitary-economic situation begs the question of what the confinement of both China and the U.S. means for Chimerica?

De facto, the Chinese economic reality is inseparable of the U.S.-China relationship. Indeed, if the U.S. industrial output represents “only” 16,6% of the world production, while China’s industrial output weighs 28%, it is the result of the installation of large segments of the U.S. industrial base in China and in Asia since the 1980s (Felix Richer, “China is the world’s manufacturing power”, Statista, Feb 18, 2020).

Chimerica results from the export of China-based products at very low costs to the U.S. consumer base.

Chimerica and China’s growth

Chimerica

From this point of view, Chimerica literally “is” the different dimensions of the fantastic trade imbalance between the two countries. Since 1986, this imbalance went from zero to more than 336 billion dollars in 2017 and 378 billion dollars in 2018 (Office of the United States Trade representative, “The People’s Republic of China – U.S-China Trade facts“).

One notes that, since 2002 when China joined the World Trade Organization, this imbalance has been growing and accelerating. The Chinese GDP follows the same dynamic. As it happens, according to the IMF, in 2001, China’s GDP corresponded to 13% of the U.S. GDP. It represented 25% of the U.S. GDP in 2007 and 60% in 2016. In 2016, the IMF was projecting a growth of the 2023 Chinese GDP that would make it equivalent to 88% of the U.S. GDP.

In other terms, Chimerica is at the core of the Chinese growth, as well as the heart of the U.S. economy (Niall Ferguson, Xiang Xu, ibid).

The COVID-19 slows down China’s economy…

The coercive measures of forcibly enforced urban lockdown and quarantine drastically slowed the Chinese economy down. They did so by diminishing the industrial and trade activity throughout the country. As a result, the import-export global relationship of China with Asia, and the rest of the world also slowed down.

Thus, as China accounts for a mammoth 28% of the world industrial output, its slowing down impacts the global industrial output. The Caixin/Markit China manufacturing PMI, as well as IMF studies, reveal that, in January and February 2020, China’s industrial production suffered a historic contraction. China’s industrial production was 25% lower than during the same period in 2019. In the meantime, retail sales also suffered a massive 35% drop (Huileng Tan, “China’s factory activity slumps in February in weakest reading on record, private survey shows”, in “A private survey shows shows China’s manufacturing activity expanded slightly in March”, CNBC, updated 1 March 2020).

Impacting America

From this point of view, the confinement of China and its industrial and economic consequence literally rippled through and down the China-U.S. production, trade, finance, and logistical arteries. Moreover, the confinement of part of America is rapidly affects the consuming habits of the U.S. population (Lucia Mutikani, “U.S consumer prices post largest drop in five years amid coronavirus disruptions”, Reuters, April 10, 2020).

Confinement as a geo-economic warfare

Oil as indication

However, “Chimerica” is also the core driver of the world economy. The viral crisis is reinforcing the slowing down trade. It is already translating through the fall of oil Chinese imports and on the oil prices, amid the Russia-Saudi Arabia-Mexico initial oil production dispute (Gillian Rich, “Oil prices mixed after OPEC+ surrenders to Mexico on massive deal”, Investors Business Daily, 10 April 2020). As of 12 April 2020, oil prices are at historic lows, between 22$ and 24$. One must remember that, at the worst of the 2008 crisis, oil prices slumped “only” at 40$.

However, oil is the material and energetic driver of the world economy and finance. This dizzying fall of the oil prices is expressing a global deceleration of production and transport activities. It also means a mammoth loss of petro-dollars that thus cannot be injected in international transactions.

Chimerica as an economic battlefield

So, the consequences of the COVID-19 are triggering the equivalent of a geo-economic warfare on the hybrid U.S.-China economy. However, since 2018, this US-China hybrid economy was already under pressure because of the U.S.-China trade war.

The combination of both the pandemic and the trade war turns Chimerica into an inside-out economic battlefield. As the virus and confinement policies spread through the road of globalization, the whole world is decreasing its interactions with China.

Pandemic as a geo-economic warfare

Actually, we may wonder if those safety measures are triggering a situation with consequences similar to a worldwide geo-economic conflict. Theorised since 1990, a “geoeconomic war” is thought as a way to inflict a country the same kind of damages that could be wrought by military means. This approach concerns infrastructures as well as the financial dimensions of life quality. The idea is to use economics as weapon systems (Edward Luttwak, “From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics”, The National Interest, 1990 and Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, War by other Means, Geoeconomics and Statecraft, 2016)).

Thus, in a very strange and surprising way, the COVID 19 crisis appears as a new kind of economic disruptive force. As it happens,, this unwanted offensive strikes China, and the U.S., thus Chimerica.

However this battlefield deploys itself on numerous fronts. First, let us see what happens on the savage American front.

Featured image: Image par Gerd Altmann de Pixabay [Public Domain]

The Red (Team) Analysis Weekly – 9 April 2020 – COVID-19 Cognitive Overload?

This is the 9 April 2020 issue of our weekly scan for political and geopolitical risks (open access). Again, a very large part is devoted to the COVID-19. Read the scan below, after the editorial, quite long this week.

Editorial

First, this week’s scan features the excellent article “Stretching the International Order to Its Breaking Point” by Thomas Wright, Senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in The Atlantic. The highlight for the article reads:

“The greatest error that geopolitical analysts can make may be believing that the crisis will be over in three to four months.”

It is not only geopolitical analysts that are making this error, but, apparently, an increasingly large majority of people, whatever their position and role in the system.

As we progress here, at The Red (Team) Analysis Society, with the building of scenarios for the COVID-19, the idea of a crisis with a rapid end looks more and more improbable, not to say impossible. The COVID-19 is a pandemic, caused by a highly contagious, dangerous virus about which we know extremely little. It is highly improbable it disappears as if by magic, because it is inconvenient to human beings.

The sketch Wright paints for the future is highly interesting and is definitely a must read.

The second point I would like to make for this scan, considering the signals collected, is the incredible sheer mass of texts, articles, posts, etc. produced on the COVID-19. It is not only the COVID-19 cases that grow exponentially, but also publications about it. Thus, we are also faced with the dangers of a huge information overload. It is impossible to keep track of all the articles. It is impossible to even skim through them to sort out quality articles from rubbish, serious articles from fake news, scientific analysis from mere opinion. We certainly cannot rely on Google or search engines, as their algorithms rarely privileges quality and relevance. Google, for example, in its ranking, puts a high premium on page-speed and commercial stuff. But are these truly important criteria to find truly crucial articles on key uncertainties regarding the COVID-19?

The COVID-19 information overload will accelerate the need for closure, which is already enhanced by the stress and the crisis. The need for closure is the imperious need to get answers, any answer, immediately. It rises notably with time-pressure, critical when going through duress and crisis, and with environmental noise, which includes information overload (for more on the need for closure, cognitive biases in general and strategies to mitigate them, see our online course 1 – Geopolitical Risks and Crisis Anticipation: Analytical Model – module 2). Of course, when faced with a pandemic, jumping to decisions and responses is not a very good idea. On the contrary, one needs to think peacefully and to use evidenced-based analysis, and to wait, when necessary, until proper analysis and science-based findings become available. Thus one needs to have a low need for closure.

Now, the very means we have to obtain analysis and scientific articles, the web, because of the massive amount of texts on the COVID-19, creates an information and cognitive overload that, in turn, generates need for closure thus stops the capacity to think. Thus, to be able to know, we impair our ability to think.

Disaster looms.

Actors will probably fall back on classical means to obtain information: the system as it exists (which includes also the pre-COVID-19 Google, Bing and others algorithms). But, this directs us to ask a very inconvenient question.What led us all to first an outbreak of a completely unknown disease, then to an epidemic then to a pandemic, with all the unpreparedness that is everywhere increasingly documented is this very system. Hence, is that system the best to select the relevant and reliable information we need to face and overcome the pandemic?

If not the system then what? Could part of the system be salvaged and should other parts be abandoned? Here our topic is selection of quality and relevant analysis, but should these questions be also extended to the whole system?


The Scan

Using horizon scanning, each week, we collect weak – and less weak – signals. These point to new, emerging, escalating or stabilising problems. As a result, they indicate how trends or dynamics evolve.

The 9 April 2020 scan→

Horizon scanning, weak signals and biases

We call signals weak, because it is still difficult to discern them among a vast array of events. However, our biases often alter our capacity to measure the strength of the signal. As a result, the perception of strength will vary according to the awareness of the actor. At worst, biases may be so strong that they completely block the very identification of the signal.

In the field of strategic foresight and warning, risk management and future studies, it is the job of good analysts to scan the horizon. As a result, they can perceive signals. Analysts then evaluate the strength of these signals according to specific risks and dynamics. Finally, they deliver their findings to users. These users can be other analysts, officers or decision-makers.

You can read a more detailed explanation in one of our cornerstone articles: Horizon Scanning and Monitoring for Warning: Definition and Practice.

The sections of the scan

Each section of the scan focuses on signals related to a specific theme:

  • world (international politics and geopolitics);
  • economy;
  • science including AI, QIS, technology and weapons, ;
  • analysis, strategy and futures;
  • the Covid-19 pandemic;
  • energy and environment.

However, in a complex world, categories are merely a convenient way to present information, when facts and events interact across boundaries.

The information collected (crowdsourced) does not mean endorsement.

Featured image: Milky Way above SPECULOOS / The Search for habitable Planets – EClipsing ULtra-cOOl Stars (SPECULOOS) is searching for Earth-like planets around tiny, dim stars in front of a panorama of the Milky Way. Credit: ESO/P. Horálek.

The COVID-19, Immunity and Isolation Exit Strategy

One of the critical and key uncertainty about the COVID-19, among so many, is the immunity a patient may have after recovery from the COVID-19. In other words, can someone who recovered from the COVID-19 catch the disease again and infect other people again?

As long as we have neither vaccine nor fully efficient antiviral treatment, specific acquired immunity, i.e. the immunity developed as the body fights then recovers from the disease, is one of the key variables at the center of the few solutions we have to handle the pandemic. Because, as we saw, we shall not be able to use vaccination for immunisation before at the very best winter 2022, and considering the uncertainty considering treatments against the SARS-CoV-2, specific acquired immunity becomes even more important.

This immunity is also key to determine exit strategies to isolation and lockdown. Indeed, one of the components of the exit strategy that may be designed is to allow people who have developed an acquired immunity to return to normal life (e.g. Ran Balicer, “Coronavirus: Two Things Must Happen Before Initiating Exit Strategy“, Haaretz, 2 April 2020).

Thus what do we know or not, so far, about this immunity? How can we handle the uncertainty? Finally, what does that imply for an exit strategy? This is what we shall see in this article.

Many questions and few answers, yet.

In a nutshell and schematically, when a pathogen such as the SARS-CoV-2 enters the body, the immune system develops a range of reactions to fight against the intruder and attacker (for a very interesting clear, detailed biological and medical explanation see, for example, “Features of an Immune Response“, in Immune System Research, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases). The creation of antibodies is one of these responses. Antibodies will attack the intruder. If the immune system is victorious against the SARS-CoV-2, then the patient recovers. His or her body keeps traces of war that took place. The patient will now also have an acquired immunity (e.g. Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Immune System“).

However, as Morgane Bomsel, virologist and immunologist underlines:

“The question is to know if it [the acquired immunity] will be protective of nor, and how long it will last” (La question est de savoir si elle va être protectrice ou pas, et combien de temps elle va durer) .

in Camille Gaubert, Interview with Morgane Bomsel, “Covid-19 : l’immunisation pourrait, chez certains, ne pas protéger d’une deuxième infection“, Sciences et Avenir, 1 April 2020)

Protective acquired immunity after recovery from the COVID-19?

First, thus, one needs to find the various components of the acquired immunity in the body. For example, antibodies need to be present in such a quantity that they are sufficient to prevent infection again (Wu, IBId., Callow, K A et al., ibid.). Such antibodies were detected in a patient with mild-to-moderate symptoms “before symptomatic recovery. These immunological changes persisted for at least 7 d following full resolution of symptoms” (Thevarajan, I., Nguyen, T.H.O., Koutsakos, M. et al., “Breadth of concomitant immune responses prior to patient recovery: a case report of non-severe COVID-19“, Nat Med; 2020).

Then, Linlin Bao, et al., in a not yet peer-reviewed article, showed on rhesus macaques that those could not be reinfected, “after the symptoms were alleviated and the specific antibody tested positively”, at 5 days post-infection (“Reinfection could not occur in SARS-CoV-2 infected rhesus macaques“, bioRxiv, 14, March 2020.

On 27 March 2020, the Helmholtz Centre for Infection Research (HZI) in Germany announced the start of a much larger study, on 100.000 individuals. The donors’ “blood will be regularly tested for antibodies against the Covid-19 pathogen. The study will provide a more accurate picture of immunity and pandemic development.” The center goes on highlighting that following this study, one may imagine giving a kind of immunity certificate to people who developed an immunity, which would allow them to return to normal life (Ibid.). The tests should start in April 2020 and first results should be available at the end of the same month (Veronika Hackenbroch, “Large Antibody Study to Determine Germans’ Immunity to Covid-19“, der Spiegel, 27 March 2020). Improvements in the test procedure – thus reliability of the study – should take place between end of May 2020 and end of June 2020 (Ibid,).

Thus, it would seem, according to what we now know, that we indeed obtain a protective acquired immunity. Utmost caution, however, must still be exerted waiting for other studies’ results, such as the German study.

Furthermore, we must also account for the possibility, that, for some individuals, a different immune response develops. In two other coronaviruses, the SARS and the MERS, for some people, the antibodies facilitated infection rather than preventing it Camille Gaubert, Interview with Morgane Bomsel, “Covid-19 : l’immunisation pourrait, chez certains, ne pas protéger d’une deuxième infection“, Sciences et Avenir, 1 April 2020). Favourable results for experiments in vitro gave opposite, negative results in vivo experiments (ibid.). If such were the case for the SARS-CoV-2, however, possible negative impacts of antibodies could then be blocked with adequate treatment (ibid.). However, this would be again more pharmaceutical efforts to endeavour.

The possible existence of such individuals that would then possibly be more fragile after infection needs to be thoroughly deepen and then checked before general measures are applied to the population.

Length of the protective acquired immunity

However, antibodies remain in the body, for a while (e.g. interviews with virologists and immunologists in Katherine J. Wu, “What Scientists Know About Immunity to the Novel Coronavirus“, Smithsonian Magazine, 30 march 2020; Callow, K A et al. “The time course of the immune response to experimental coronavirus infection of man.” Epidemiology and infection vol. 105,2 1990; Gaubert, Ibid.).

But how long is this while? This is the first unknown we face. Antibodies usually diminish with time then disappear (Wu, ibid.). Thus, how long do we keep these antibodies? For how long will the acquired immunity be protective?

Then, another related question is about the immune memory: will antibodies be able to remember the attacker well enough to generate the proper response (Wu, Ibid.)?

Thus, to summarise, for our purpose the key question is: for how long will the acquired immunity be protective?

Currently, although we do not know with certainty, most scientists seem to consider as likely hypothesis that, in general, patients who have recovered from the COVID-19 will be sufficiently immunised, for a while.

The possible length of the naturally acquired immunity considered varies.

Indeed, our knowledge of the SARS-CoV-2 is extremely recent. It started with recorded data mainly in January 2020. Thus at the beginning of April 2020, we cannot know with certainty the possible length of the immunity beyond 2 to 3 months. This is one more reason why monitoring what is happening in China, where the first patients recovered, is so important.

Various hypotheses are considered.

If the SARS-CoV-2 is similar to the coronavirus giving the common cold, then some scientists state that the immunity could last “years” (Interview with Angela Rasmussen, a virologist at Columbia University in Brian Resnick, “The 9 most important unanswered questions about Covid-19“, Vox, 20 March 2020). However, other results, obtained with the coronavirus 229E, show a more complex picture, as some individuals could also, in experiment, become reinfected a year later (Callow, K A et al. “The time course of the immune response to experimental coronavirus infection of man”, Epidemiology and infection, vol. 105,2, 1990).

If the coronavirus behaves as the seasonal flu, the hypothesis the Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team used, then re-infection is considered as “highly unlikely in the same or following season” (Impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to reduce COVID19 mortality and healthcare demand, 16 March 2020, p. 4). However, the seasonal flu is not a coronavirus.

Other uncertainties

The condition and age of the patient, as well as genetics, may also impact the response of the immune system (Wu, Ibid.).

Finally, mutations may occur as the virus duplicates itself, leading to new strains the body cannot recognise, as with the seasonal flu (Wu, Ibid.). This is however less likely for coronaviruses than for flu viruses (Ibid.). But coronaviruses can also “trade segments of their genetic code with each other”, which allows them to trick the immune system. (Ibid.). In that case, the acquired immunity would be useless. Note that this would also be true for a vaccine.

Virologists and immunologists most probably have other much more specific questions to which they need to find answers.

Thus, with such a new disease, we are still faced with many uncertainties. How can we handle them?

Impacts on the architecture of scenarios

Again, scenarios are a crucial tool to handle these uncertainties.

Our scenario structure is currently as follows. The main scenario we consider as most likely is that we shall have to wait for a vaccine until winter 2022 (at best) (see Hélène Lavoix, The COVID-19 Pandemic – Surviving and Reconstructing, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, 24 March 2020, last updated 3 April 2020). Then we need to account for the possibility to see the emergence of treatments impacting the disease (see Hélène Lavoix, Covid-19 – Scenarios – Making Sense of Antiviral Treatment, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, 30 March 2020).

Now, ideally, we would need to have another epidemiological layer of models and scenarios that vary to include various possibilities for the acquired immune response. We would build the next layer of our scenarios out of these.

Until such detailed epidemiological models are available, if ever, we need to handle the variable “immunity” as correctly as possible, through different sub-scenarios useful for our purpose. The best way at this stage is to consider a first batch of sub-scenarios where a fully protective immunity is developed upon recovery and to have this immunity vary according to time.

Considering that the detailed epidemiological model that many governments use is the model the Imperial College COVID-19 response team developed (Ibid.), it is interesting for our purpose to look at a scenario that is less optimistic than the “same season and next one” immunity they used, for example less than one year, one that is the Imperial College scenario and one that is more optimistic, for example, an immunity that lasts from one and a half to two years.

That said, the Imperial College’s model shows that “temporary suppression” (with social distancing of the entire population, case isolation, household quarantine and school and university closure) is the only way forward not to overwhelm the health system and to prevent massive fatalities. It also shows that because this suppression is successful, then only a small number of individuals will develop immunity. Hence, for a collective approach focused necessarily on health, fatalities and not overwhelming the health system, variations on the acquired immunity, because they play on small numbers, may not be a key variable.

Things are, however, more challenging for the second objective all polities must fulfil, i.e. ensuring the fundamental security a society needs to survive as well as not to break down (see The COVID-19 Pandemic – Surviving and Reconstructing, and Summary of previous findings in Covid-19 – Scenarios – Making Sense of Antiviral Treatment). Indeed, critical functions must continue, and, as much as possible, a new economy must start emerging. As a reminder, the first objective is to reduce as much as possible the fatalities resulting from the disease (see Summary of previous findings, ibid.).

Hence the need for sub-scenarios that consider acquired immunity and its length.

Finally, to make sure we cover the whole range of possible futures, we may create a “complex immunity” scenario that would actually cover all other cases. This scenario would, for example, include a situation where the acquired immunity varies so much according to diverse criteria that it becomes difficult, rapidly, to create adequate understanding and thus policies. It could also be used if our knowledge is so uncertain and the involved risks are so high that similarly, no policy can be created easily. With time, or according to the decision-makers for whom the actionable scenarios are created, this “cluster scenario” would need to be developed adequately.

This “complex scenario” would be the least favourable.

Immunity and exit strategy

We must highlight first that the theories and models created to handle the exit of the “suppression/isolation” period need to account for the immunity uncertainty.

Thus, considering the high cost in lives and sufferings, as well as the impacts across domains, we must consider all scenarios. We cannot consider only the most likely and most preferable scenario. Actually, we need either to make sure that policies will be correct across scenarios or that they are flexible enough to switch in a timely way from one scenario to another. In that case, this demands precise monitoring and warning that will allow to steer policies, again in a timely manner. This flexibility should also allow to fully integrate new understanding and new results on the length and protection of the acquired immunity, as they become known.

Policies also need to be correct at both individual and collective level, considering the high stakes in terms of legitimacy for political authorities. For example, the policies should try to consider the possibility of individual variations in terms of acquired immunity.

In terms of exit strategy, for example, the current assumption, considering the early results (see above) is that people who were positive to the COVID-19 and recovered, now have a protective immunity to the SARS-CoV-2. However, it does not seem that the length of the immunity is, so far, taken into account.

The challenge thus becomes, in terms of handling of the pandemic and exit of the isolation/suppression phase to identify who has antibodies. If we wanted to also make sure the length of the immunity is considered, then we would need to make sure that a possible fading of the immunity can be identified.

The answer to this need will be in the serological tests, which are currently developed worldwide (Chad Terhune, Allison Martell, Julie Steenhuysen, “U.S. companies, labs rush to produce blood test for coronavirus immunity“, Reuters, 25 March 2020; Gretchen Vogel, “New blood tests for antibodies could show true scale of coronavirus pandemic“, Science, 19 March 2020; Hugo Jalinière, “Les tests de sérologie, clé du déconfinement“, Sciences et Avenir, 30 mars 2020; Lauren Chadwick, “Coronavirus: Antibody tests ‘will be crucial’ in determining when to lift lockdowns“, Euronews, 6 April 2020; for a list of commercially developed tests all categories, not only serological, see Find, Covid-19 Diagnostics resource centre).

Assuming that the tests are reliable, we nonetheless find again the familiar problem of quantities. The ongoing “war for face masks” is very likely to be again reproduced, this time, with tests. Masks as well as serological tests become crucial stakes to fulfil the two objectives of societies faced with the COVID-19 pandemic. Those who will be able to develop and secure for their populations as much and as many of the necessary tools – including smart strategies – to both survive and ensure the fundamentals of security, will survive best. Furthermore, they are also likely to be earlier and better able to interact again with each other.

To account for the length of the immunity, if the tests which are developed cannot detect early enough a fading of immunity, then testing many times subjects may become necessary. However, here the problem of test quantity – and test operationalisation – increases. Continuing imperatively protective gestures as well as a generalisation of face masks is thus likely to be necessary to compensate for insufficient serological testing.

With the next articles we shall continue exploring the factors which are key to build the general architecture of our scenarios.


Some detailed references and bibliography

Callow, K A et al. “The time course of the immune response to experimental coronavirus infection of man.” Epidemiology and infection vol. 105,2 (1990): 435-46. doi:10.1017/s0950268800048019

Linlin Bao, Wei Deng, Hong Gao, Chong Xiao, Jiayi Liu, Jing Xue, Qi Lv, Jiangning Liu, Pin Yu, Yanfeng Xu, Feifei Qi, Yajin Qu, Fengdi Li, Zhiguang Xiang, Haisheng Yu, Shuran Gong, Mingya Liu, Guanpeng Wang, Shunyi Wang, Zhiqi Song, Wenjie Zhao, Yunlin Han, Linna Zhao, Xing Liu, Qiang Wei, Chuan Qin, “Reinfection could not occur in SARS-CoV-2 infected rhesus macaques“, bioRxiv, 14, March 2020, 2020.03.13.990226; doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.03.13.990226

Thevarajan, I., Nguyen, T.H.O., Koutsakos, M. et al. Breadth of concomitant immune responses prior to patient recovery: a case report of non-severe COVID-19. Nat Med (2020).https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-020-0819-2

Shi, Y., Wang, Y., Shao, C. et al. COVID-19 infection: the perspectives on immune responses. Cell Death Differ (2020). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41418-020-0530-3


Featured image: Image par Gerd Altmann de Pixabay


COVID-19 Antiviral Treatments and Scenarios

The world is now struggling to know how to face the COVID-19 pandemic. We want to know how long the pandemic will last. Actually, what we want to know is when the pandemic will end and when life will be able to resume normally.

As we explained in the opening article for this series, to be able to answer these questions, considering the very high number of uncertainties involved, we need to use scenarios. Our aim is to contribute to the creation of robust scenarios in our field, political science and international relations. We are thus concerned with the future of polities, i.e. the futures of organised societies. Nonetheless, to be able to do so, we obviously have to take into account what other sciences, those primarily concerned with diseases and pandemics, find out.

For now we are trying to establish both the general structure for our scenario tree and the timeframe. Thus we study main critical factors that will allow us to articulate our scenarios.

In this article, we first briefly summarise the points made in previous articles. We then turn to the antiviral prophylaxis and treatment as a second key critical factor.

Summary of previous findings

Objectives of societies faced with a pandemic

Because we have collectively and individually “chosen” not to accept the baseline worst case scenario, then our main aim is now survival for each individual, and for each polity, society or country. Fundamentally, as long as the pandemic continues, thus as long as the baseline worst case scenario could become a reality, each polity will need to fulfil simultaneously two objectives.

First objective

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The first objective is to reduce as much as possible the fatalities resulting from the disease. This implies reducing the number of infected people and caring for those who are ill. This means, in turn, not overwhelming the care system.

Should we fail, then, not only the dreaded scenario we seek to avoid would take place, but, at worst, all other fatalities and deaths we succeeded to prevent over centuries could come back. The excess deaths (compared with the pre-pandemic time) would be dramatic. It would also seriously impaire the capacity of a society to ensure its security and, at term its survival.

Second objective

The second objective is to continue having a society that ensures fundamental security.

Simultaneous objectives

The two aims must be fulfilled at the same time.

Indeed, if fundamental security is not ensured, then the system will rapidly collapse. Neither caring for diseased people, nor containment measures will be possible anymore. The pandemic will run its course as with the worst case scenario, but the situation will be even worse. If we do not stop the pandemic, then death and disease will take their toll and damage the capacity of society to ensure its security. Society will be fragilised, and in turn will less be able to handle the pandemic, increasing fatalities. We risk here to fall into a vicious circle.

Immunisation and vaccine as a first key critical factor

We explained in the previous article, that immunisation through vaccination is a first critical factor around which we can organise the architecture of our scenarios. We also assessed – with many uncertainties remaining – that we could not expect such immunisation to take place before winter 2022-2023. This gives us a first broad likely scenario upon which we can concentrate. Within this scenario that we shall use as framework, we need to understand the futures of our systems as they face the COVID-19 over the next two to three years.

Actually, another implicit scenario at the same level of analysis should also be made explicit. This scenario is, however, uncontrollable, according to the current and expected stage of knowledge. The virus, could lose either its infectious power or its lethality or a strong immunity could also develop naturally among human beings. In that case, the pandemic would end much earlier. This scenario being less likely and also obviously less threatening, considering limited resources, we shall not, right now, examine it. Nonetheless the factors influencing the probability of this scenario must be monitored.

Antiviral prophylaxis and treatment – a second key critical factor

Antiviral prophylaxis and treatment are a second critical factor for our scenarios architecture. Indeed, we try to reduce fatality. Thus, if we have a cure for the disease, the possibility of the worst case baseline scenario disappears.

To date, 30 March 2020, there is no known antiviral treatment against the SARS-CoV-2, i.e. certain and having gone through all the usual testing process.

Thus, some of the key questions we must ask are as follows. Is it possible to see a treatment discovered and developed? Which types of effects this treatment could have on the disease and on the pandemic? When could this treatment become available?

Here, we face a supplementary challenge as controversies, debates, power and ego-struggles have entered the field. Meanwhile, notably out of fear, panic, or lack of trust in governments, these debates and struggles have been transformed and relayed as rumours, fake news, and conspiracy theories.

As far as we are concerned, we shall rely on scientific papers and focus on looking for elements which are key for our aim, contributing to establish valid scenarios. We shall also keep the issue of the timeframe in mind.

Possible candidate antiviral treatments from existing and known drugs

The Chloroquine hope and debate

Since mid-February and increasingly so as the pandemic spread, the efficiency of chloroquine, either as Chloroquine phosphate or as one of Chloroquine’s derivate, hydroxychloroquine, to treat patients infected with the SARS-CoV-2, has become a hot topic in scientific and lay publications (see a non-exhaustive bibliography below). Some promote it as the Graal that will save us all from the disease. Others just underline that the necessary clinical tests allowing to assert and measure its efficiency – as well as the ideal posology according to the stage of the disease – have not yet been completed. Meanwhile, conspiracy theories abound.

Hope from a Chinese publication

In a nutshell, the issue is relatively simple. On 19 February 2020, as an e-publication, Gao J, Tian Z, Yang X, published a letter for advanced publication titled “Breakthrough: Chloroquine phosphate has shown apparent efficacy in treatment of COVID-19 associated pneumonia in
clinical studies” in the journal BioScience Trends. There, they notably stated that

“The drug is recommended to be included in the next version of the Guidelines for the Prevention, Diagnosis, and Treatment of Pneumonia Caused by COVID-19 issued by the National Health Commission of the People’s Republic of China for treatment of COVID-19 infection in larger populations in the future.”

They also underlined that

“results from more than 100 patients have demonstrated that chloroquine phosphate is superior to the control treatment in inhibiting the exacerbation of pneumonia, improving lung imaging findings, promoting a virus negative conversion, and shortening the disease course according to the news briefing”.

The need for further trials

Now, those who urge caution do so because they would like to have access to all these trials and to be able to replicate and enlarge them.

Consequently, up to 30 March 2020, at least 17 studies (out of 22 trials) have started, or are planned, to carry out further testing of the efficiency of hydroxychloroquine on patients with COVID-19. They are taking place from South Korea to the U.S. through Thailand, Brazil and the EU. They address various stages of the clinical trials studying a drug. One of these studies only has been completed, in Shanghai. Its results have been published in the Journal of Zhejiang University (Medical Sciences, 3 March 2020). It was carried out only on 30 patients.

Disappointing results on a small sample

We should note that the results of the Shanghai’s trial show no impact of hydroxychloroquine on patients, compared with the control group. Even worse, although on such a small group conclusions are only tentative, one patient under hydroxychloroquine developed to a severe condition (ibid).

A French microbiologist promotes the treatment

Meanwhile, some French immunologists and specialists in microbiology headed by the Director of the State Institut Hospitalo-Universitaire Méditerranée (IHM) Infection Didier Raoult promoted the early use of Chloroquine (Philippe Colson , et al., “Chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine as available weapons to fight COVID-19”, International Journal of Antimicrobial Agents, 26 February 2020). Furthermore, the same team tested Chloroquine with Azythromycine on 26 patients, 16 others being used as control group (Gautret et al. (2020) Hydroxychloroquine and azithromycin as a treatment of COVID‐19: results of an open‐label non‐randomized clinical trial). On 22 March 2020, they decided to start applying hydroxychloroquine massively to infected people in Marseille, adding furthermore Azythromycine.

Out of the 17 studies mentioned earlier, three of them test the combination of Hydroxychloroquine and Azythromycin.

Further need to be careful

Meanwhile, scientists, including from the IHM, have warned about the difference between in vitro successful experiments and in vivo ones. For example, Franck Touret et Xavier de Lamballerie in “Of chloroquine and COVID-19” (Antiviral Research 177 (2020) 104762) pointed out various negative possible impacts in previous attempts at using Chloroquine on other types of viruses. Notably, “in a nonhuman primate model of CHIKV infection”, the use of Chloroquine was shown to delay the cellular immune response (Ibid.). Even though every virus is different, these earlier trials on other viruses highlight the need for caution.

An indication from outside the medical world

To this, we should add an indication coming from outside the world of clinical tests. If China considers “the apparent efficacy” of Chloroquine since 19 February, it has nonetheless continued its lockdown, travel bans and quarantine policy on the country. Indeed, for example, lockdown on Wuhan will be partially lifted only on 8 April 2020 (BBC News, “Coronavirus: Wuhan to ease lockdown as world battles pandemic“, 24 March 2020). Furthermore, China is rightly being extra careful with not allowing new imported cases to spread (BBC News, “Coronavirus travel: China bars foreign visitors as imported cases rise“, 27 March 2020). It is paying particular attention to all cases, in case a new wave of COVID-19 would hit the country (Ibid).

Should Chloroquine – possibly added to Azythromycine – be such a miracle drug, then China would not be so afraid of seeing a new epidemic outbreak. Thus, if we take Chinese policies and behaviour as indication, Chloroquine could hopefully alleviate sufferings, but not critically change the disease behaviour.

The results of the clinical trials will tell.

Other candidate treatments

Meanwhile, China and other countries are testing other drugs and molecules, such as arbidol, remdesivir, favipiravir, lopinavir and ritonavir, also with immunomodulator interferon beta-1b and others (Liying Dong, Shasha Hu, Jianjun Gao, Discovering drugs to treat coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), Drug Discov Ther. 2020;14(1):58-60. doi: 10.5582/ddt.2020.01012; Lindsey R. Baden, M.D., and Eric J. Rubin, M.D., Ph.D., Covid-19 — The Search for Effective Therapy, NEJM, 18 March 2020; Camille Gaubert, “Coronavirus : lancement d’un essai clinique sur 3.200 patients atteints de Covid-19“, Sciences et Avenir, 12 March 2020; John Cahill, “Potential COVID-19 therapeutics currently in development“, European Pharmaceutical Review, 26 March).

Major ongoing trials

Among all these candidates the WHO has selected four treatments as most promising for a very large trial: the “experimental antiviral compound called remdesivir; the malaria medications chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine; a combination of two HIV drugs, lopinavir and ritonavir; and that same combination plus interferon-beta” (Kai KupferschmidtJon Cohen, “WHO launches global megatrial of the four most promising coronavirus treatments“, Science, 22 March 2020). The WHO solidarity trial is expected to run from March 2020 to March 2021 (ISRCTN registry).

The French INSERM coordinates a European corresponding trial called DISCOVERY on 3200 patients. It started on 22 March. Fifteen days after the inclusion of each patient, the analysis of treatment efficacy and safety will be evaluated.

We should also count the Institut Hospitalo-Universitaire Méditerranée 22 March beginning of treatment of patients with Chloroquine and Azythromycine also as a trial. Indeed, it differs from SOLIDARITY and DISCOVERY because it adds Azithromycine. This point could be important if we consider the pre-test done, as Azythromycine seemed to have a critical role to play (Ibid.).

As highlighted above, according to the database Clinicaltrials.gov of the U.S. government, 22 trials are currently taking place on various drugs.

Discovering new treatments or uncovering less common treatments

This type of scenario is quite similar, in terms of process, to what we saw with vaccines. We must first discover or unearth one or more molecules that may positively impact the development of the disease, yet without adverse effects.

Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and supercomputers against the SARS-CoV-2

As existing and known drugs and treatments are tried, researchers are also also busy trying to unearth or discover molecules that could help fight the SARS-CoV-2.

For example the Institut Pasteur of Lille – France (EN version) tests molecules on the virus thanks to robots in a specially confined laboratory. As a result, researchers can greatly speed the rhythm of tests. Thousands are carried out daily. Meanwhile, the combination of molecules by pairs for testing is also automated (website).

DeepMind, or rather DeepMind Technologies Limited, the famous artificial intelligence / deep learning lab. Alphabet Inc. (Google) bought, joined the efforts to fight the SARS-CoV-2 ( Computational predictions of protein structures associated with COVID-19, 5 March 2020 – for more on artificial intelligence and deep learning see our related series). It used the latest version of their AlphaFold system to “release structure predictions of several under-studied proteins associated with SARS-CoV-2”. Should these deep learning predictions then be confirmed through experiments, then they will have contributed to a better knowledge of the virus and possibly to the development of new drugs.

Researchers at the U.S. Oak Ridge National Lab (Department of Energy) use Summit, the most powerful supercomputer to date, “to run through a database of existing drug compounds to see which combinations might prevent cell infection of COVID-19” (Brandi Vincent, “Researchers at Oak Ridge National Lab Tap into Supercomputing to Help Combat Coronavirus“, Nextgov.com, 11 March 2020). Researchers could simulate 8,000 compounds and select 77 that have “the potential to impair COVID-19’s ability to dock with and infect host cells” (Dave Turek, “US Dept of Energy Brings the World’s Most Powerful Supercomputer, the IBM POWER9-based Summit, Into the Fight Against COVID-19“, IBM News Room, nd). It took them a couple of days instead of “months on a normal computer” (Ibid.).

As we pointed out in our series on supercomputers and computing power, these are increasingly key factors for the present and the future. In this case, supercomputers could be critical in the fight against this pandemic.

Other efforts using supercomputing power, such as a NSF programme or the European program Exscalate4CoV are at work (Oliver Peckham, “Global Supercomputing Is Mobilizing Against COVID-19“, 12 March 2020, HPC Wire). For example,

“E4C is operating through Exscalate, a supercomputing platform that uses a chemical library of over 500 billion molecules to conduct pathogen research. Specifically, E4C is aiming to identify candidate molecules for drugs, help design a biochemical and cellular screening test, identify key genomic regions in COVID-19 and more”. 

Oliver Peckham, “Global Supercomputing Is Mobilizing Against COVID-19“, 12 March 2020, HPC Wire

We could also imagine that companies and start-ups in the quantum information science field, who highlighted the importance of quantum computing and simulation in the field of chemistry, for example, or material science, would be actively contributing to the fight against the COVID-19 (e.g. Foreseeing the Future Quantum-Artificial Intelligence World and Geopolitics; Quantum Optimization and the Future of Government). A similar point could be made regarding logistics necessary to survive the pandemics, working from the Volkswagen Group research with D-Wave (Quantum Optimization, Ibid.). Yet, up to 30 March 2020, no open source information regarding the participation of the “quantum world” in the fight against the COVID-19 seems to be available.

When could such a new treatment become available?

There is no way to know how close we are to the discovery of the right molecule or combination of molecules.

Once it is discovered, the new potential drug will have to go through the whole process of trial and development, including clinical trials (e.g. EU Drug Discovery and Development, U.S. Biopharmaceutical Research & Development).

Classically – i.e. when we are not in an emergency mode – this process takes 10 to 15 years (Drug discovery, Ibid.) as shown in the picture below.

Then, even if we are lucky and manage to shorten the process – to how long? – we shall still need to manufacture the drug and then deliver it.

First, this explains why the current focus is on known drugs. Second, this highlights that totally new drugs may not help us on the short and even medium term.

This reminds us that major world pandemics, in the past, lasted not months, but years. Meanwhile, outbreaks happened across centuries. If ever, for antiviral treatments, hope is only in the discovery of a totally new medicine, then then waiting (actively) for a vaccine moved from being a pessimistic scenario to being an optimistic scenario.

Key elements to look for in an anti SARS-CoV-2 treatment and to inject in scenarios

Because an antiviral treatment can mix different drugs, posologies and approaches, sub-scenarios will need to include main elements impacting epidemiological models. To identify them, we used the model of the Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team in Impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to reduce COVID19 mortality and healthcare demand, 16 March 2020. As a result, we shall also get the indicators we need to monitor candidate treatments.

We assume that, once a treatment is found, epidemiologists will relatively rapidly run their models and publish results. In turn, this will allow us updating our scenarios as well as their likelihoods.

The key elements to which we need to pay attention are as follows.

Impact on infectiousness

For example, the treatment could be given prophylactically to everyone, or to the contact cases of an infected person. In turn, the treatment could also lower the cases of asymptomatic or very mild symptomatic infections.

Impact on immunity

The impact of treatment on immunity after recovery from infection, on the short term and on the long-term needs to be evaluated.

Impact on severity of disease

If the treatment is given to symptomatic cases, we shall monitor if the treatment lowers the amount of patients developing severe, critical and fatal disease. This could twice decrease the pressure on the health system. Indeed, we would have less patients needing stays in hospitals. Furthermore, the duration of the stay in hospital could also diminish. Currently, the Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team estimates that we have:

“A total duration of stay in hospital of 8 days if critical care is not required and 16 days (with 10 days in ICU) if critical care is required. With 30% of hospitalised cases requiring critical care, we obtain an overall mean duration of hospitalisation of 10.4 days…”

Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team, Impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to reduce COVID19 mortality and healthcare demand, 16 March 2020

Manufacturing and supply

Again, as for vaccine, the manufacturing of doses and their availability per country will need to be envisioned in detailed scenarios. Supply tensions are likely to emerge. As a result, we may possibly face international tensions. Should the quantity of the new drug be insufficient per country, then it would be interesting if epidemiological models were run according to possible supply.

New treatment(s) against the SARS-CoV-2 could offer any combination of the proprieties above. Ideally, epidemiological models or those built on them would also account for the feedbacks between non-pharmaceutical interventions, new treatments beneficial impacts and drug availability.

With the next articles, we shall continue to explore the factors that determine the architecture of our scenarios.


Bibliography

Tara Haelle, “Chloroquine Use For COVID-19 Shows No Benefit In First Small—But Limited—Controlled Trial“, Forbes, 25 marche 2020.

Tony Y. Hu, Matthew Frieman & Joy Wolfram, “Insights from nanomedicine into chloroquine efficacy against COVID-19“, Nature, 23 March 2020.

Xueting Yao, Fei Ye, Miao Zhang, Cheng Cui, Baoying Huang, Peihua Niu, Xu Liu, Li Zhao, Erdan Dong, Chunli Song, Siyan Zhan, Roujian Lu, Haiyan Li, Wenjie Tan, Dongyang Liu, In Vitro Antiviral Activity and Projection of Optimized Dosing Design of Hydroxychloroquine for the Treatment of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), Clinical Infectious Diseases, , ciaa237, https://doi.org/10.1093/cid/ciaa237

Adam Rogers, Chloroquine May Fight Covid-19—and Silicon Valley’s Into It, Wire, 19 March 2020.

Liu, J., Cao, R., Xu, M. et al. Hydroxychloroquine, a less toxic derivative of chloroquine, is effective in inhibiting SARS-CoV-2 infection in vitroNature, Cell Discov 6, 16 (2020), 18 March 2020. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41421-020-0156-0

Philippe Colson, Jean-Marc Rolain, Jean-Christophe Lagier, Philippe Brouqui, Didier Raoult, “Chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine as available weapons to fight COVID-19“, International Journal of Antimicrobial Agents (2020), doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijantimicag.2020.105932

Gautret et al. (2020) Hydroxychloroquine and azithromycin as a treatment of COVID‐19: results of an open‐label non‐randomized clinical trial. International Journal of Antimicrobial Agents – In Press 17 March 2020 – DOI : 10.1016/j.ijantimicag.2020.105949.

Guangdong Provincial Department of Science and Technology and Guangdong Provincial Health Committee Multi-center Collaborative Group on Chloroquine Phosphate for New Coronavirus Pneumonia, “Expert Consensus on Chloroquine Phosphate for New Coronavirus Pneumonia” [J]. Chinese Journal of Tuberculosis and Respiratory Medicine, 2020,43 (03 ): 185-188. DOI: 10.3760 / cma.j.issn.1001-0939.2020.03.009


Featured image: Image by Darko Stojanovic from Pixabay 


The COVID-19 Pandemic, Surviving and Reconstructing

The COVID-19 pandemic is now a global fact. It still involves many uncertainties. At present and in the near future, we need to handle the ongoing pandemic as a global catastrophic crisis with complex cascading impacts. We also need to start thinking about reconstruction. We are here concerned with reconstruction that will allow polities to fully function again, i.e. not to be in emergency mode. That may go from norms to socio-political systems, through ways to produce goods and services. It may be elements of these systems, or larger parts of them.

In this article, we explain first that we have tools to plan ahead properly and constructively even considering the condition of utter uncertainty. We must not allow the unpreparedness disaster that is also striking us to go on. Unpreparedness, resulting from lack of anticipation, must also stop.

We then turn to the real issue we need to consider: surviving and reconstructing. We thus outline our research question and our scope. We explain that we are coming back to the fundamentals of politics (and not politician politics). We start outlining how both surviving and reconstructing are intertwined. As a result, we paint a sketch of what is ahead and what we need to further research.

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Finally, we start the construction of a structure for our set of scenarios that will outline the possible futures. We underline that two factors are critical and will determine our future: vaccine and antiviral prophylaxis and treatment. Here we focus on the first of this factor, vaccine. We do not only look at the discovery of the right vaccine for the COVID-19 but also at the various stages of the immunization process. As a result, we obtain a first estimate that mass campaigns of vaccination may start earliest around winter 2022-2023 (all vaccine candidates). The next article focuses on antiviral prophylaxis and treatment.

Considering the very large scope of the task ahead, this article is the first of a series of articles focusing on strategic foresight and anticipation to survive at best the COVID-19 and then reconstruct.

Tools to stop unpreparedness

To be able to achieve the goals of surviving (across domains) and reconstructing, we need to deploy and use, at the same time, monitoring for warning and strategic foresight. And this is NOT an option but a crucial necessity.

Monitoring for adequate models and to struggle against deadly biases

Monitoring must take place in two areas. First, we must monitor what is happening in science, across many disciplines. Then, we must also consider what is happening on the ground. This monitoring will allow revising a knowledge that is everyday checked, changed, and improved.

With the result of our monitoring, we shall need to update all our models, including those implicit models we use everyday and which are active, unknowingly, in our heads. Indeed, if we do not do that, these inner models will become cognitive biases. And cognitive biases, when survival is at stake, can be deadly.

This part is extremely challenging because we know that human beings are naturally bad at updating the inner models that allow them to understand the world (e.g. Heuer, Richards J. Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999 – more in our online course 1 – Module 3).

For example, as shown by Anderson et al., if we are presented with a new problem and do not have a lot of information about it, our brain creates a first very approximative model. That model makes sense of whatever data we have (Craig A. Anderson, Mark R. Lepper, and Lee Ross, Perseverance of Social Theories: The Role of Explanation in the Persistence of Discredited Information, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1980, Vol. 39, No.6, 1037-1049).

Then, once this model is created, it becomes very difficult to change it. Effort is necessary to do so. In other words, most people, will stick to their initial model, even though new facts and evidence arise. It is not that they lie or that they show bad will, although this, of course, may also happen. It is that those people had first to make sense of a new problem with insufficient information. As they receive new information, their model has become inadequate but it still filters their understanding (Craig A. Anderson et al. ibid.).

Unfortunately, the COVID-19 pandemic exactly corresponds to the worst possible case to generate this kind of cognitive bias. We have the emergence of a new virus, then a completely new pandemic situation, with completely novel cascading impacts. We are thus in the perfect situation to see outdated inner cognitive models wreck havoc on a situation that is already catastrophic.

Thus, we absolutely need to apply all methodologies that help us overcome the use of outdated models. Explicit modelling and methodologies of strategic foresight and warning including monitoring are crucial here.

We must all learn to handle uncertainty

Strategic foresight and notably scenarios, furthermore, can help us handling uncertainties when they remain.

Indeed, modeling and scenario-building are the methodological tools epidemiologists use (e.g. for a recent and very influential study, Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team, Impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to reduce COVID19 mortality and healthcare demand, 16 March 2020). And we, as social scientists, risk managers and decision-makers, must also follow suit and use this approach.

Meanwhile, the range of responses we deploy must also, ideally, be as quick and flexible as possible. This is challenging, but this is possible.

Even small businesses can do it. One way forward, in terms of capabilities, could be to mutualise some parts of the work, for example within chambers of commerce, or professional associations.

Even individuals can and should do it. Indeed, in a pandemic, they are those who are first on the front line. The need to care and protect first and foremost the medical staff is constantly highlighted. This is, of course, indispensable. Each profession that participates in activities crucial for survival is key.

Yet, alongside them as professional groups, those who fight on the front line are each and every individual, their body and their understanding of the situation. They are those who will stop or not the contagion. And they are those who will win against the virus or not.

Framing our issue – surviving then reconstructing

Rediscovering survival matters

We have moved from a normal type of life and system to an emergency one, where only survival matters.

The reasons for this move, despite the many conspiracy theories and denials of all sorts spreading, is grounded in the risks entailed by what we called crude worst case baseline scenarios. This is the epidemiological approach where overall possible fatalities are estimated, before scenarios to handle the pandemic start being modelled (e.g. Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team, Impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to reduce COVID19 mortality and healthcare demand, 16 March 2020). We thus shall not come back to this point here.

Thus, we have become aware again of the importance of survival as prime motivation. We are living the essence of what politics is really about: human beings are organised in society to survive, and the fundamental mission of political authorities is to ensure their survival and security (e.g. What is Political Risk? and related bibliography). Most people had forgotten these essentials, but the pandemic reminded us powerfully and pitilessly of these fundamentals.

If you think about it, what we are all living through is absolutely extra-ordinary. Country after country, in a couple of days, according to cases, we went from a business as usual state (for those who were not paying attention to the world) to complete confinement, end of economic supremacy, closed borders, end of freedom, end of “fun”. And 168 countries face, one after the other, the same ordeal in a couple of months. And we see it and communicate about it across vast distances. This is completely new too.

Destruction and reconstruction

Meanwhile, and as a result, the usual pre-COVID-19 system is being destroyed.

The scope, magnitude and depth of the destruction will depend upon how long the COVID-19 state of emergency system will last, upon the lethality and the amount of sufferings the pandemic will inflict on the population. It will also depend, relatedly, on the way the pandemic and the COVID-19 emergency system are handled and the resilience of the pre-COVID system.

The reconstruction, in turn, will depend upon what “part” of the pre-COVID-19 world as a socio-ideological and political system has been destroyed and how this destruction was carried out. It will be determined by the amount of damages and sheer destructions the pandemic directly caused. The state of the various actors at the end of the pandemic, i.e strength, capabilities, intentions, trauma etc., will also, and as strongly, influence reconstruction.

The case of face mask shortages

For example, what the populations and their ruling authorities live, the intractable hurdles and fear they face, will remain as a burning mark in their memories. Those will certainly strongly shape their future decisions and actions.

For instance, the whole of Europe and the U.S. face an incredible shortage of face masks (e.g. Yanqiu Rachel Zhou, “The global effort to tackle the coronavirus face mask shortage“, The Conversation, 17 March 2020; Keith Bradsher and Liz Alderman, “The World Needs Masks. China Makes Them — But Has Been Hoarding Them“, 13 March 2020, updated 16 March, The New York Times).

This results from past mismanagement and from intense outsourcing of face mask manufacturing capabilities, notably to China that produces half of them (Ibid.; Fabien Magnenou, “Coronavirus : pourquoi la France manque-t-elle de masques de protection respiratoire ?“, France Info, 19 March 2020).

Consequently, the non-producers must wait on others’, and notably China, good will and benevolence and gifts. They must wait until exports become available again.

Thus, new production capabilities must be recreated from scratch, in a hurry, thanks to imagination, courage and good will, while the know-how must be reinvented. Adequate materials may lack. At the beginning, the resulting products may not be as safe as needed (e.g. Juliette Garnier, “Coronavirus : mobilisation générale pour fabriquer des masques en tissu“, Le Monde, 17 March 2020).

In the meantime, the contagion spreads and people die. On the bright side, innovation and new ways to produce will emerge from this struggle for face masks.

Yet, the stress and the fatalities and the fear will certainly not be forgotten in our lifetime and maybe for generations. As a result, it is very likely that major outsourcing to China or elsewhere is over, especially for goods that could be of critical importance.

To come back to our main question, we are thus faced with a twin task. We must foresee the near future to be able to survive while, in the same time, identifying various scenarios of destruction and nascent reconstruction. Then, building from and upon this first layer, we must foresee possible ways to reconstruct.

Looking for a first structure for our set of scenarios

On the importance of time

As a preamble, we need to stress a supplementary challenge we face when building the architecture of our set of scenarios for the COVID-19 pandemic.

We need to introduce a relatively precise timeframe. Indeed, the length of time during which the pandemic will last, as well as the timing and duration of measures taken does matter. This is obvious when looking at epidemiological studies, which will be one of the main materials upon which we shall build (e.g. Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team, Ibid.; Joseph T Wu et al. Nowcasting and forecasting the potential domestic and international spread of the 2019-nCoV outbreak originating in Wuhan, China: a modelling studyThe Lancet, 31 January 2020).

Key critical factors: vaccine and antiviral prophylaxis and treatment

The first factor that determines all the others is the existence – or rather in our case the non-existence – of vaccine and/or antiviral prophylaxis and treatment. Once either vaccine or treatment or both are viable, then a second key question is their availability in sufficient quantity where they are needed. Finally, we have the operationalisation of mass vaccination and/or treatment. These elements are absolutely critical.*

Indeed, once a vaccine will have become widely available and will have immunised the population, then the pandemic will end. In the case of treatments, we shall have potentially more variations and shades, but, fundamentally, the way the factor operates will likely be similar. We shall refine this statement after analysis.

The scientific effort to identify possible vaccines candidates and antiviral prophylaxis and treatment is considerable. This could take place thanks notably to very early Chinese efforts to “sequence the genetic material of Sars-CoV-2” and willingness to share it as quickly as possible (e.g. Wu, F., Zhao, S., Yu, B. et al. A new coronavirus associated with human respiratory disease in ChinaNature 579, 265–269 (2020), 3 February 2020; updated GenBank “SARS-CoV-2 (Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2) Sequences“; Laura Spinney, “When will a coronavirus vaccine be ready?“, The Guardian, 13 March 2020).

We should, however, note – for the next pandemic – that time has been lost those last years and notably since the SARS 2003 epidemic. Indeed, “medication against coronaviruses” were not included in the progress made over the last 25 years in antiviral medication (interview of Matthias Götte, a biochemist and viral researcher from Hamburg in Kerstin Kullmann und Veronika Hackenbroch, “The Urgent Search for a Cure for COVID-19“, Der Spiegel, 13 March 2020).

Vaccine

Discovery matters

Various companies, universities and research laboratories would currently be exploring between 15 (Pang et al., Feb 2020, see table on vaccines) and 35 vaccine candidates of various types (Laura Spinney, Ibid.). They are all in the early stages of the overall process (Ibid.; John Hodgson, “The pandemic pipeline“, Nature, 20 March 2020). By 15 April, more than 70 vaccine candidates would be explored, five being at the preliminary trials’ stage (Christine Soares, “The lifeline pipeline“, Reuters, 13 April 2020).

For example, human trials have already started for U.S. Moderna Therapeutics’ candidate vaccine (Michelle Roberts, “Coronavirus: US volunteers test first vaccine“, BBC, 17 March 2020). In that case the animal trials have even been skipped (Ibid.). Other human trials will start in April 2020 (Spinney, Ibid.). French Sanofi is also working on a candidate vaccine (see below).

Hodgson states that another candidate vaccine, developed by Singapore, would be at the manufacturing stage (Hodgson, Ibid.). This is probably an editing mistake, because after verification, the vaccine, developed with the Company Arcturus has not yet entered clinical trials. They expect to start phase 1 of clinical trials “in the third quarter of the year” and to complete it at the end of 2020 or beginning of 2021 (Joyce Teo, “Countries, including Singapore, in race to develop vaccine“, Straits Times, 25 March 2020). Thus, Singapore and Arcturus are nowhere near the manufacturing stage. However, Arcturus suggests that their manufacturing process will be quicker than for other vaccines (Arcturus website ibid.).

Chinese CanSino Biologics Inc. has also started conducting first phase clinical trial, which should last until December 2020 (China embarks on clinical trial for virus vaccine, The Star, 22 March 2020).

Manufacturing vaccin doses matters too

In general, scientific studies estimate that we are at best between 10 and 18 months away from a vaccine (e.g. interviews in Spinney, Ibid.; Helen Stillwell, “SARS-CoV-2 – The vaccine landscape“, Virology Blog; 11 March 2020; Roy M Anderson et al., “How will country-based mitigation measures influence the course of the COVID-19 epidemic?” – The Lancet – Published online March 09, 2020). These studies however rarely mention which phase of the vaccination process is included in these 10 to 18 months.

The director of the U.S. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (N.I.A.I.D.) assesses that “the earliest it [a vaccine] would be deployable is in a year to a year and a half,” which would tend to imply that it has been manufactured by then (Carolyn Kormann, “How Long Will It Take to Develop a Coronavirus Vaccine?“, The New Yorker, 8 March 2020).

For its part, the global head of vaccine research and development of Sanofi estimates that, at best “a vaccine could be fully ready for licensure in a year and a half.” (Ibid.) In that case, this means that the time to manufacture doses is not included in the year and a half. This may sound logical as without the composition of the vaccine, it may be hard to assess the time needed to produce it and in which quantities.

As far as estimates of manufactured doses are concerned, the firm Inovio, for example has as target 1 million doses by the end of 2020 (Tarryn Mento, “Inovio Pharamaceuticals Fast-Tracking Human Trials, Working On 1 Million Doses Of Coronavirus Vaccine“, KPBS, 20 March 2020). This is only a target as its production capability by end of January 2020 was 100.000 doses a year (Jon Cohen, “Scientists are moving at record speed to create new coronavirus vaccines—but they may come too late“, Science, Jan. 27, 2020).

Moderna could produce at best 100 million doses a year, but would use all its production capability for it (Cohen, ibid.). For another candidate vaccine, “the Queensland team says it could make 200,000 doses in 6 months” (Cohen, Ibid,).

Sanofi, for the U.S., “has the established capacity and infrastructure to make up to 600 million doses in two existing facilities based in New York and Pennsylvania, without compromising the supply of vaccines for other illnesses, including influenza” (Sanofi, “Sanofi Mobilizes to Develop a Vaccine against COVID-19“, 23 march 2020). Meanwhile, on 23 March 2020, Sanofi confirmed its timeline: “We estimate that we will have a vaccine candidate available for in vitro testing within six months and potentially enter clinical trials within a year and a half” (Sanofi, “Sanofi’s Response in the Fight against COVID-19“, 23 march 2020).

In he meantime, the 2017 created Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovation (CEPI) is building up its capacity to produce “multiple millions of doses available within 12–18 months” (Hodgson, Ibid.).

China vaccines manufacturers also now have massive capabilities to produce vaccines. In 2018, Yaming Zheng et al. estimated that China produced annually 700 million vaccine doses (The landscape of vaccines in China: history, classification, supply, and priceBMC Infect Dis).

Global estimates of future production of vaccine doses remain quite elusive and will need to be handled through scenarios, waiting for further research.

How long could the emergency or survival period last? A first estimate

This first open source brief review gives us the guidelines to conduct further in-depth study and to define the monitoring that will need to take place. Indeed, we now have the material to identify at least a first batch of indicators to monitor to follow the situation on the ground.

Meanwhile, each uncertainty related to the “vaccine factor” will create a sub-branch in our scenario tree. In other words, in the following paragraphs, each time I’ll make an assumption and use a word such as “imagine” or “if”, this means that we are dealing with sub-branches and sub-scenarios.

Waiting for a finalised architecture for our scenario tree, we can already roughly outline a very optimistic scenario. This is a scenario where at least one current candidate vaccine goes successfully through all the trials, in 12 months. This brings us, for the start of the manufacturing process to March 2021.

Here, we must remember that Singapore and those using a technology similar to Arcturus could produce more quickly the vaccines. However, the clinical trials must be successful first.

Now, a 2018 presentation by the chair of RA WG at Vaccines Europe (a specialised vaccines group within the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA), the professional association of the pharmaceutical industry in Europe) gives 24 months for the overall vaccine manufacturing process, up to distribution (slide 6 – see below).

2018 presentation by Michel Stoffel, chair of RA WG at Vaccines Europe

Let us imagine – but further sub-scenarios will be necessary here actually – that efforts will be made and succeed at speeding up this process and reduce it to 20 months. This brings us to November 2022. And then a mass vaccination campaign must start. We shall leave this part aside for now, but it is nonetheless important to underline that a mass immunization campaign is not a small endeavour (e.g. WHO “Aide Mémoire – To ensure the efficiency and safety of mass immunization campaigns with injectable vaccines“)

Here, we must wonder about the number of doses that need to be injected for immunization. We must wonder about the length of the immunization. If ever the SARS-CoV-2 mutates and changes every year, as with the flu, or if it does not, we have different scenarios in front of us.

In the best of case, we can imagine that only one dose needs to be injected, and that immunization will last for years. We may also assume that herd immunity can be reached with only 70% of the population receiving the vaccine (a crude estimate of what is considered as necessary for the influenza, see, Kenneth A.McLean, Shoshanna ​Goldin, Claudia Nannei, Erin Sparrow, Guido Torelli, “The 2015 global production capacity of seasonal and pandemic influenza vaccine“,Vaccine, Volume 34, Issue 45, 26 October 2016, pp. 5410-5413; “Community Protection“, table in Paul E.M. Fine, … W. John Edmunds, in Plotkin’s Vaccines (Seventh Edition), 2018).

In these conditions, as a crude approximation, we may need a production of 70% x 7,7 billion = 5,39 billion doses to immunize the world against the SARS-CoV-2.

Various scenarios of collaboration and possible international tensions related to this production may thus also need to be built.

In any case the evolution of the vaccine process must be closely anticipated and monitored for action as no nation and no government will be there able to afford a situation looking like what happened with face masks.

As a conclusion, a first crude estimate of a best case scenario for the vaccine suggests that we shall have to wait until winter 2022-2023. This assessment includes many unknowns that we must handle through scenarios, monitoring and ongoing revision. Furthermore, completely unpredictable events, can also occur, such as a mutation of the virus towards less lethality for example, to be optimistic.

We have progressed into building the overall structure of our scenario tree. We also have a timeframe. Meanwhile, this timeframe also tells us that we cannot sit and wait for a vaccine. At this very early stage of our work, the years ahead for the surviving system or surviving stage, will likely need to include a vast array of imaginative solutions, mixing isolation and lock down, new ways of organisation and production, improved personal protection, new technological capabilities such as artificial intelligence, and, critically, antiviral prophylaxis and treatment.

We shall look next at main potential antiviral treatment including the chloroquine that generates so much hope (e.g. Zhonghua Jie He He Hu Xi Za Zhi. 2020 Mar 12;43(3):185-188. doi: 10.3760/cma.j.issn.1001-0939.2020.03.009 “Expert consensus on chloroquine phosphate for the treatment of novel coronavirus pneumonia”; Jianjun Gao, Zhenxue Tian, Xu Yang, “Breakthrough: Chloroquine phosphate has shown apparent efficacy in treatment of COVID-19 associated pneumonia in clinical studies“, BioScience Trends, 2020, Volume 14, Issue 1, Pages 72-73, Released March 16, 2020, [Advance publication] Released February 19, 2020).


*For vaccines, the 2017 created Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovation (CEPI) identifies five steps: Discovery, Development /licensure, Manufacture, Delivery/stockpiling, Last mile.


Further detailed bibliography

Anderson, Roy M, Hans Heesterbeek, Don Klinkenberg, T Déirdre Hollingsworth, “How will country-based mitigation measures influence the course of the COVID-19 epidemic?” – The Lancet – Published online March 09, 2020

Pang J, Wang MX, Ang IYH, Tan, SHX, Lewis RF, Chen, JI, Gutierrez RA, Gwee SXW, Chua PEY, Yan Q, Ng XY, Yap RKS, Tan HY, Teo YY, Tan CC, Cook AR, Yap JCH, Hsu LY, “Potential Rapid Diagnostics, Vaccine Therapeutics for 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV): A Systematic Review,” J. Clin. Med. (2020) 9(3), doi: 10.3390/jcm9030623 (received 13 February 2020 ).

Wu, F., Zhao, S., Yu, B. et al. A new coronavirus associated with human respiratory disease in ChinaNature 579, 265–269 (2020), 3 February 2020. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-020-2008-3.

Thevarajan, I., Nguyen, T.H.O., Koutsakos, M. et al. Breadth of concomitant immune responses prior to patient recovery: a case report of non-severe COVID-19Nat Med (2020). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-020-0819-2

Zheng, Y., Rodewald, L., Yang, J. et al. The landscape of vaccines in China: history, classification, supply, and priceBMC Infect Dis18, 502 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12879-018-3422-0


Featured image: Image by Gerd Altmann from Pixabay, Public Domain


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