The Middle East Powder Keg and the Great Battle for Raqqa

As events accelerate both within Syria on the battlefield and in the region, this article monitors and analyse these developments. It seeks to answer the question: do the unfolding states of affairs increase, or on the contrary decrease, the likelihood to see an intensification of Turkish escalation against the Syrian Kurds and, de facto, Northern Syria?We shall look first at the race that is taking place on the Syrian battlefield around the Battle of Raqqa and towards Deir es-Zor, there addressing furthermore the entrance of a new level of Iranian influence. We shall then turn to the evolving crisis around Qatar, pointing out notably impacts on Turkey and how that crisis and the Battle of Raqqa feed into each other to heighten the risk to see …

Continue reading “The Middle East Powder Keg and the Great Battle for Raqqa”

The remaining part of this article is for our members and those who purchased special access plans. Make sure you get real analysis and not opinion, or, worse, fake news. Log in and access this article.

The “One Belt One Road” Summit and the Chinese Shaping of Globalisation?

On 14 and 15 May 2017, the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) Forum for International Cooperation took place in Beijing. It hosted delegations from 63 countries and several international organisations. Heads of states and governments led in person 29 delegations from Asia, Africa, South America and Europe (“Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation”, Xinhua.net). The forum was intended as an occasion to bolster the Chinese initiative, through panels, workshops, high level roundtables, and meetings about continental infrastructures, energy and resources, financial cooperation mechanisms and sustainable development.

It must be noted that the UN General Secretary, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation, the UNESCO, Interpol, the World Health Organisation, and the Wold Bank were all represented by their general directors and secretaries, while heads of states of international stature such as Russian President Vladimir Putin, or of large regional importance such as Turkish President Recep Tayep Erdogan were also present (“One Belt, One Road Forum for International Cooperation” Wikipedia). In other words, the “OBOR Summit” was an impressive display of the worldwide Chinese influence.

The “One Belt, One Road” initiative is also known as the “New Silk Road” (NSR). This grand strategy, launched in 2013, aims at creating a land and maritime international transport, trade and finance Chinese infrastructure, which spans Asia, Russia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Its aim is to find international reserves of the resources and products necessary to the development and enrichment of China (Jean-Michel Valantin, “China and the New Silk Road – From oil wells to the moon … and beyond”, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, July 6 2015). This endeavour is deployed on such a scale that it becomes a new political, economic and strategic force in the globalized world, for the Chinese national interest.

In this article, we shall analyse how the OBOR Forum reveals the way China is shaping globalization, in a very singular way, based on a “low key” approach. This line of action creates influence through the construction of an international consensus about China’s needs, rather than seeing needs prompting the use of raw force.

The Summit: What is at stake?

The vast majority of the attendants were there to sign deals with China, in a wide array of fields, from transport, as for Poland and Russia, to higher education as for Serbia, Hungary and Mongolia, or oil, to name only a few. The forum was also used by International Organisations to promote their agendas. For example, the UN Secretary-General wished to see OBOR supporting the implementation of strategies to reach the sustainable goals that have become the UN roadmap, while other organisations and countries were signing energy and transport deals (“Antonio Gutteres (UN Secretary-General) remarks at the opening of the Belt and Road Forum (Beijing, China, 14 May 2017)” UN Web TV).

As a result, the Chinese government signed an impressive list of deals and memoranda of agreements about “(Synergizing) Connectivity of Development Policies and Strategies, deepening Project Cooperation for Infrastructure Connectivity, (expanding) Industrial Investment, Enhancing Trade Connectivity, (enhancing) Financial Cooperation, (Promoting) Financial Connectivity, investing more in People’s Livelihood, (Deepening) People-to-People Exchange” (“List of Deliverables of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation”, China Daily, 2017-05-16).

A particularly striking feature of the OBOR Forum is that it revives and modifies the meaning of the “Middle Kingdom”. The Chinese name for China, Zhong Guo (中国) – translated as “Middle” for Zhong and “Kingdom”, “Country” for Guo – has evolved throughout the millennia of Chinese history. Originally, it meant the place where the Emperor lived among its vassals, then it signified the central state of Xin, among other Chinese states. After the unification of the Empire, the “Middle Kingdom” became the Kingdom at the centre of other kingdoms. The centrality thus entailed also means that China is at a place that must be occupied to see guaranteed a kind of political and harmonious, equilibrium, meaning dynamic stability (Quynh Delaunay, Naissance de la Chine moderne, L’Empire du Milieu dans la globalisation, 2014).

Through this historical perspective on the political and geopolitical meaning of what it means for China to be the “”Middle” Kingdom”, it is interesting to note that the OBOR initiative locates China “in the middle” of a system of networks interwoven with the different national interests of the countries part of the Belt and Road, and with the international interests of the international organisation that have attended the summit. What is thus the strategic philosophy underlaying OBOR.

What is the strategic philosophy of OBOR?

The OBOR Forum gathered more than a third of all countries on Earth, thus demonstrating how China installs itself as a centre of attraction at the world level. In other words, the OBOR Forum reveals the success of the Chinese strategy, at a geoeconomic and political level. It has, furthermore, a deeply Chinese meaning, as also underlined above. It reveals the mammoth political clout accumulated by China, which becomes a de facto “attractor” for the countries and international organisations that have signed deals with Beijing during the Forum (Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World, 2012).

The NSR initiative is a strategy aimed at ensuring the constant flow of energy resources, commodities and products, which are necessary to the current industrial and capitalist development of the 1,4 billion strong “Middle Kingdom” (Jean-Michel Valantin, “China and the New Silk Road – From oil wells to the moon … and beyond”, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, July 6 2015). Since 2013, China has been deploying the NSR initiative, which attracts the interest and commitment of numerous Asian, African and Middle Eastern countries. This international rush to Beijing for access to the Chinese market is further reinforcing the attraction of the New Silk Road, the latter also increasing in turn the appeal of the Chinese market. As a result, the New Silk Road becomes a self-reinforcing process at global scale.

As we detailed previously, the New Silk Road is a new expression of the Chinese philosophical and strategic thought (Valantin, “China and the New Silk Road: the Pakistani strategy”, The Red Team Analysis, May 18, 2015). It is grounded in an understanding of the spatial dimension of China, in the geographical sense, as well as in a comprehension of the different countries that are involved in the deployment of the NSR. Space is conceived as a support to spread Chinese influence and power to the “outside”, but also to allow the Middle Kingdom to “aspirate” what it needs from the “outside” to the “inside” (Quynh Delaunay, Naissance de la Chine moderne, L’Empire du Milieu dans la globalisation, 2014). This is why we qualify some spaces as being “useful” to the deployment of the OBOR, and why each “useful space” is related, and “useful”, to other “useful spaces”.

Through this perspective, we understand that the Beijing summit has been a gathering of the delegates from the different “useful spaces” and thus a way to deepen the interconnections between them and the globalised “Middle Kingdom” that China is currently becoming.

Shaping globalisation through the Chinese power of need

There is another layer of geopolitical meaning that is attached to the New Silk Road Forum.

During his introductory speech, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that, to be successful, the NSR initiative must be based on political cooperation, transport infrastructures’ connectivity, innovation and trade. As far as trade is concerned, President Xi further added that the NSR demands to “open [a] platform of cooperation and uphold and grow an open world economy” and to “uphold the multilateral trading regime, advance the building of free trade areas and promote liberalisation and facilitation of trade and investment » (President Xi Jinping “The Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation”, China.org.cn, May 14, 2017).

It is interesting to note that this declaration is a Chinese appropriation of the way the globalisation process has been defined by the U.S. government during the 1990s, while Washington was promoting a worldwide free trade and globalisation, in order to develop a U.S. strategy based on the “shaping of the world”, meaning a shaping of international norms as well as trade and financial flows organised for the economic success of the United States (William J. Clinton, President of the United States of America, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 19, 1999, The American Presidency Project). As the U.S., China promotes free trade outside its frontiers, while remaining cautious and keeping on being carefully protectionist as far as its own economy is concerned (Douglas Bulloch, “Protectionism May Be Rising Around The World, But In China It Never Went Away“, Forbes, October 12, 2016).

Thus, the OBOR Forum reveals how China’s grand strategy establishes the globalisation process itself as a “useful space”, because the international liberalisation of space is an important asset for the Chinese economy. However, if liberalisation is “useful” to open economic spaces to the Chinese exports, it is also useful to multiply imports deals and thus “channel” to China those resources and products that are useful to the Middle Kingdom. In other words, China installs itself “in the middle” of globalisation. If the U.S. started the globalisation process of “shaping the world”, it appears that China is currently shaping globalisation.

This will most certainly have important consequences in terms of the international distribution of power.

About the author: Jean-Michel Valantin (PhD Paris) leads the Environment and Geopolitics Department of The Red (Team) Analysis Society. He is specialised in strategic studies and defence sociology with a focus on environmental geostrategy.

Featured image: Roundtable meeting of leaders at Belt and Road international forum, May 15, 2017 Beijing by Russian Presidential Press and Information Office, Kremlin. CC.0.4.

Evaluating Likelihoods for the Future of Libya – Scenarios of Victories (1)

In this article, we shall assess the likelihood of a total victory by the GNC, GNA, and COR. By total victory, we mean a complete victory by one side over its adversaries, which is not imposed from the top down by external powers. In the previous article, we evaluated the likelihood for various spillover scenarios occurring both in the event of partition and without partition. Now that intervention is already occurring, as we saw in our article on intervention scenarios, the “Total Victory” scenarios are considered sub-scenarios of Scenario 2: Intervention instead of independent scenarios. As such, this will be reflected in the indicators, mapping and likelihoods. Indeed, as events unfolded and intervention took place scenarios 3, which were about …

Continue reading “Evaluating Likelihoods for the Future of Libya – Scenarios of Victories (1)”

The Kurds in Syria – State-Building, New Model and War

Female Kurdish fighters and the battle of Raqqa

This article focuses on state-building in Syria’s Kurdish area, i.e. the Democratic Federal System of Northern Syria, also locally called Rojava, and potential impacts. Indeed, we saw previously that the Kurds’ capacity to build a viable polity in Northern Syria was one crucial element for evaluating not only the outcome of the battle of Raqqa against the Islamic State, but also the way Turkey could become further and more intensely embroiled in the conflict (see Helene Lavoix, “The Battle of Raqqa, the Kurds and Turkey“, The Red Team Analysis Society, 2 May 2017).Extreme cases scenarios☔ Scenario War with Turkey escalates⛵ Directly Impacted Actors: All Eurasian + Middle East states, U.S. (military, diplo); NGOs (for Syria/Iraq/Turkey); Businesses in Turkey, Trade & exchanges with Turkey; Airlines; Maritime activities; Religious institutions…⛅ Scenario Kurdish model contributes to peace …

Continue reading “The Kurds in Syria – State-Building, New Model and War”

Saudi Arabia and the Chinese New Silk Road

During March 2017, King Salman of Saudi Arabia ended a six weeks tour in Asia with a state visit in China and a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. This visit included the opportunity to start the negotiations about the integration of Saudi Arabia to the Chinese New Silk Road Grand strategy (Michael Tanchum, “Saudi Arabia the next stop on China’s maritime silk road”, East Asia Forum, 22 March 2017).

This move corresponds to a convergence of the Chinese grand strategy with the “Saudi Vision 2030”, and seems to be the start of a “Saudi-Asian pivot”, which has important geopolitical consequences. This is a massive international power shift, because it supports the meeting of Saudi and Chinese strategic interests.

In effect, the Arab mammoth oil producer looks for ways to diversity its economy and its alliances, while China looks for ways to satisfy its huge energy needs (Michael Klare, The Race for What’s Left, 2012). To this end, China extends the New Silk Road (NSR) to new countries, already succeeding with other Gulf countries, such as the UAE and Kuwait.

The specificities of the Chinese NSR and of the novel grand strategy devised by Saudi Arabia create and deepen the existence of converging strategies for the two countries, as we shall explore here. As we previously did for the UAE (Jean-Michel Valantin, “The UAE and the Chinese New Silk Road”, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, April 24, 2017), we are going to focus first on the reason why and the way the Chinese New Silk Road and the Saudi grand strategy converge, as well as on the geopolitical meaning of this convergence. We shall also look at the way that confluence supports the emergence of a new kind a sustainable security for both countries.

The Sino-Saudi convergence of strategies

The Sino-Saudi relations are established since 1990. China opened a representation in the Saudi Kingdom while the Cold War was ending (Wang Jin, “China and Saudi Arabia: a new alliance?”, The Diplomat, September 02, 2016). From the 1990s onwards, crude oil exports from the Kingdom to China has been instrumental in the relationship between the two countries. Things are, however, now changing, especially in regard to the Chinese New Silk Road.

This evolution is made obvious with the enormous 65 billion dollars Sino-Saudi investments and trade package signed during the meeting in Beijing between King Salman and President Xi Jinping (Salman Al Dossary, “King Salman in China: the New Silk Road”, Asharq Al Aswat, March 2, 2017). This package includes a memorandum of understanding between Saudi national oil corporation Aramco and China North Industries Group Corporation, in order to build two refineries, one in the Chinese Fujian province, and one in Yanbu in Saudi Arabia. These refineries will further improve the petrochemical capacity of this Saudi port-city located off the Red Sea coast (Michael Tanchum, “Saudi Arabia the next stop on China’s maritime silk road”, East Asia Forum, 22 March 2017).

This move is quite important for Saudi Arabia. Indeed, Saudi Arabia is the first oil supplier for China – almost 67% of China’s oil import has its origin in the Saudi Kingdom, while China is the main destination country for all Saudi exports ( Daniel Workman, “Crude oil imports by countries”, WTEx, March 14, 2017), and the Kingdom intends to secure its share of the Chinese oil market. In this regard, Saudi Arabia competes with Iran and Russia, which are also answering the growing oil needs of China (Jean-Michel Valantin, “The Russian Arctic meets the Chinese New Silk Road”, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, 31 October, 2016 and “Iran, China and the New Silk road”,The Red (Team) Analysis Society, January 4, 2016). It must be noted that those very countries have already developed deep ties with China.

The construction of Sino-Saudi refineries in China and in Saudi Arabia is in itself a strategic evolution, because, for China, the increase in petrochemical capabilities is absolutely necessary to answer its needs not only in crude oil, but also in oil products, for combustion engines and for the chemical industry (Manan Goel, “Vast majority of 7.1m bpd of new distillation capacity to come from Middle East, China and wider Asia-Pacific », Khaleeji Time, May 7, 2016).

Moreover, the Chinese political authorities are committed to a national energy transition, in order to alleviate the importance of coal in the Chinese energy mix. Indeed, coal ash severely pollutes not only the air, but also the water, and endangers agriculture and collective health, thus becoming for China a national health and political issue (Joseph Ayoub, “China Produces and Consumes almost as much coal as the Rest of the World Combined”, Today in Energy, US Energy Information Administration, May 14, 2014 and Jonathan Kaiman, “China’s toxic air pollution resembles nuclear winter, say scientists“, The Guardian, 25 February 2014).

From the Chinese point of view, integrating Saudi Arabia to the New Silk Road initiative is a major geopolitical step. The New Silk Road, also known as “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR), is a strategy aimed at ensuring the constant flow of energy resources, commodities and products that are necessary to the current industrial and capitalist development of the 1,4 billion strong “Middle Kingdom” (Jean-Michel Valantin, “China and the New Silk Road – From oil wells to the moon … and beyond”, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, July 6 2015). Since 2013, China has been deploying the NSR initiative, which attracts the interest and commitment of numerous Asian, African and Middle Eastern countries.

As we detailed previously, the New Silk Road is a new expression of the Chinese philosophical and strategic thought (Valantin, “China and the New Silk Road: the Pakistani strategy”, The Red Team Analysis, May 18, 2015). It is grounded in an understanding of the spatial dimension of China, in the geographic sense, as well as in a comprehension of the different countries that are involved in the deployment of the NSR. Space is conceived as a support to spread Chinese influence and power to the “outside”, but also to allow the Middle Kingdom to “aspirate” what it needs from the “outside” to the “inside” (Quynh Delaunay, Naissance de la Chine moderne, L’Empire du Milieu dans la globalisation, 2014). This is why we qualify some spaces as being “useful” to the deployment of the OBOR, and why each “useful space” is related, and “useful”, to other “useful spaces”.

A fundamental “geographic useful space” for China is the Persian Gulf and its member states. As a result, Saudi Arabia is de facto of great interest for the New Silk Road Initiative. In this conceptual framework, Saudi Arabia becomes a useful space for the NSR not only because it increases the Saudi capabilities to respond to the Chinese energy needs, but also because it furthers the opening of the maritime New Silk Road to the Red Sea, thanks to the Saudi ports, as Yanbu and Djeddah. In other words, it improves the access of the Chinese civil fleet to the Red Sea, then to the Suez canal and thus to the Mediterranean markets of the Middle East, the Near East, the Maghreb and Southern Europe.

Geopolitical meaning

The integration of Saudi Arabia to the NSR has powerful geopolitical consequences for both countries. For China, the fact that the Saudi Kingdom joins its grand strategy installs China even more strongly as the centre of attraction for Gulf Countries (Jean-Michel Valantin, “The UAE and the Chinese New Silk Road”, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, April 26 2017). This confers a mammoth political clout to China, which becomes a de facto “balancing influence” between the Gulf uneasy neighbours and energy actors, and between OPEC and non-OPEC oil producers such as Russia, as all want to be involved with China’s growth, while competing with each others (Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World, 2012). This international competition for the access to the Chinese market is always reinforcing the attraction of the New Silk Road.

For Saudi Arabia, integrating the New Silk Road, which has already reached out to more than twenty countries, especially in Asia and the Middle East, is tantamount to an “Asian pivot”.

Furthermore, to the least, it allows for the creation of some political and economic distance between the Kingdom and the United States. Given the importance of the U.S. for Saudi Arabia since 1944, when an alliance was struck between King Abdulaaziz Saud and President Roosevelt, according to which the U.S. committed themselves to the defence of the Kingdom in exchange for a privileged partnership on oil, this move must be decrypted (Michael Klare, Blood and oil, the dangers and consequences of America’s growing dependency on imported petroleum, 2004).

A key to understanding what is happening lies in the U.S. energy policy that supports the development of shale oil and gas operations and, as a result, competes with the Saudi production while forcing energy prices down. The U.S. becoming an economic threat, the Kingdom finds new alliances to support its development through its economic strategy of diversification (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Oil Flood (1): The Kingdom is Back” and “Oil Flood (2)- Oil and Politics in a (Real) Multipolar World”, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, December 15, 2014, January 12, 2015). For now, the military component of the alliance with the US remains as it is, because Saudi Arabia remains a main oil exporter for America.

Djibouti and the Grand convergence

The “Saudi-Asian pivot” finds an interesting expression through the building of a Saudi naval base in Djibouti, which already hosts French and American bases, while China is completing the construction of its own naval base (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Militarizing the Maritime New Silk Road – in the Arabian Sea”, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, April 19, 2017).

In the same time, Japan is starting the construction of a naval base of its own (Julian Ryall, “Japan to expand military base in Djibouti”, Jane’s 360, 14 October 2016). In other terms, Djibouti is now the place that supports the “African and Middle East pivot” of China and Japan, and the “Asian pivot” of Saudi Arabia. The presence and influence of France and America is thus relatively saturated and diluted by the spatial convergence of the NSR in their immediate neighbourhood, while Saudi Arabia – also using reciprocally the NSR – and Japan prepare their own forms of projection towards respectively Asia and the Mediterranean world.

One of the potential fundamental geopolitical uncertainty generated by this development is how other strategic Middle East countries, especially Egypt, which owns the key access to the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal, are going to position themselves as far as the Chinese New Silk Road is concerned.

Featured image: One Belt, One Road – China in Red, the members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in orange. The 6 proposed corridors in black, 14 May 2017, by Lommes (Own work) [CC BY-SA 4.0 ], via Wikimedia Commons.

Evaluating Likelihoods for Libya – Scenario 2 Increased Spillover and Partition

Featured image: Operation Triton by Tomh903 [CC BY 2.0], via WikimediaAs we discussed in the previous article, intervention and spillover are already occurring—thus we determined the likelihood of three partition scenarios occurring in the midst of intervention and spillover was highly unlikely. In this article, we shall discuss the organization, indicators, and likelihood of the various spillover scenarios occurring both in the event of partition and without partition. When discussing the potential directions of spillover, north refers to Europe; east refers to Egypt; south refers to Niger and Chad; and west refers to Algeria and Tunisia.Note: In the following article, we shall use the acronym COR for the Council of Representatives (nationalists), GNC for the General National Congress (Islamists), and GNA for …

Continue reading “Evaluating Likelihoods for Libya – Scenario 2 Increased Spillover and Partition”

The Battle of Raqqa, the Kurds and Turkey

This article focuses on the evolution of the balance of forces on the battlefield, notably for the Kurds, mainly in Syria but also in Iraq, one of the multiple layers of interactions that must be considered around the battle of Raqqa against the Islamic State. It is part of a series aiming at deciphering the various factors at work that will shape the outcome of the battle of Raqqa and thus impact the future. Such factors must be considered for scenarios as well as monitored for warning, notably by being included in corresponding mapping.The offensive against the Islamic State is progressing in the governorate of Raqqa. However, the outcome will not only be a more or less rapid victory against a crucial …

Continue reading “The Battle of Raqqa, the Kurds and Turkey”

The UAE and the Chinese New Silk Road

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and China are negotiating, at the highest level, the integration of the UAE into the Chinese New Silk Road (NSR) initiative, also called the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative (Sarah Townsend, “UAE and China “working to restore silk road trading route””, Arabian Business.com, 13 December 2015). This move corresponds to the convergence of the Chinese and Emirati grand strategies. This confluence is based on an already thriving relationship between China and the UAE, which represents one-fifth of the Sino-Arab trade for the Gulf countries, with China being the UAE’s second import partner after India (Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat, “The UAE and China’s thriving partnership”, Monthly Monitor Report, A Gulf States Analytics Report, June 2015).

Beyond these more “classical” relationships, the specificities of the Chinese NSR and of the novel grand strategy devised by the UAE create and deepen the existence of converging strategies for the two countries as we shall explore in this article.

We are going to focus on the reason why and the way the Chinese New Silk Road and the UAE grand strategy converge, as well as on the geopolitical meaning of this convergence. We shall also look at the way that confluence supports the emergence of a new kind a sustainable security for both countries.

The Sino-Emirati convergence of strategies

Since 1984, the political and commercial links between China and the UAE have not stopped growing. As Chinese banking, business and finance companies have invested in the UAE and opened offices there, Emirati companies have similarly invested in China and opened offices in Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, among others (Rakhmat, ibid).

In order to deepen these ties and allow then to benefit further from the growth of the Chinese economy, the UAE and China have even signed a currency swap in 2013 for 35 billions Yuan, which allows for the use of the Chinese currency in petroleum transactions (April A. Herlevi, “China and the United Arab Emirates: Sustainable Silk Road Partnership? », The Jamestown Foundation, China Brief Volume, January 25, 2016). This is quite a change for the Persian Gulf, where the petrodollar has literally been invented (Georges Corm, Le Proche-Orient éclaté, 2012).

Meanwhile, the UAE is aware that its current model of development needs too much water and energy for being sustainable in the long run, while its oil reserves are limited and will disappear over the next forty years (“Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed inspirational view of a post-oil UAE”, The National, February 10, 2015). In order to answer these challenges, the UAE thus designs a national grand strategy, based on the industrial and financial development of renewable energies and on nuclear and space politics, at a national and international level (Jean-Michel Valantin, “The UAE Grand strategy for the future- From Earth to Space”, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, July 4, 2016.

On the Chinese side, the New Silk Road, also known as “one belt, one road”, is a strategy aimed at insuring the constant flow of energy resources, commodities and products that are necessary to the current industrial and capitalist development of the 1,4 billion strong “Middle Kingdom” (Jean-Michel Valantin, “China and the New Silk Road – From oil wells to the moon … and beyond”, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, July 6 2015.

For example, the energy and water technology and capabilities developed by the UAE are of great interest for China, given the needs of China in these fields, which enhances the strategic convergence between the two countries, because the UAE development also benefits from the Chinese dynamics.

Since 2013, China is deploying the NSR initiative, which attracts the interest and commitment of numerous Asian, African and Middle Eastern countries.

As we detailed previously, the New Silk Road is a new expression of the Chinese philosophical and strategic thought (Valantin, “China and the New Silk Road: the Pakistani strategy”, The Red Team Analysis, May 18, 2015). It is grounded in an understanding of the spatial dimension of China, in the geographic sense, as well as in a comprehension of the different countries that are involved in the deployment of the NSR. Space is conceived as a support to spread Chinese influence and power to the “outside”, but also to allow the Middle Kingdom to “aspirate” what it needs from the “outside” to the “inside” (Quynh Delaunay, Naissance de la Chine moderne, L’Empire du Milieu dans la globalisation, 2014). This is why we qualify some spaces as being “useful” to the deployment of the OBOR, and why each “useful space” is related, and “useful”, to other “useful spaces”. A fundamental “geographic useful space” for China is the Persian Gulf and its member states. That is why the UAE is de facto of great interest for the New Silk Road Initiative.

Furthermore, as pointed out above, the UAE grand strategy is based upon the interaction between sustainability and security through the transition from oil and gas to the development of a renewable and nuclear energy industrial basis. This strategy is linked with the water scarcity issue in an arid country with a rapidly growing population and an urban infrastructure (Nick Carter, “Even as we generate more in the UAE, we must protect our water and power supplies”, The National, August 3, 2014). It also means that the UAE is becoming a main driver of the transformation of the very notion of the link between sustainability, security and geopolitics (Jean-Michel Valantin, « “The United Arab Emirates, The Rise of an industrial sustainable industrial empire?”, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, June 13 2016.

As a result, the current oil and gas resources of the UAE, its development of a powerful renewable energy industry, added to the UAE geographic location on the southern coast of the Persian Gulf turns the UAE into a strategic partner for the Chinese New Silk Road.

In effect, the Chinese strategy is aimed at creating a planetary-wide “attraction system” from the outside to China. It is necessary to channel in the mineral, energy, and food resources needed by China in order to keep developing itself, while ensuring the social cohesion of its 1.400 billion strong population (Loretta Napoleoni, Maonomics, 2011 and Dambisa Moyo, Winner take all, China’s race for resources and what it means for us, 2012). This energy Chinese need turns the oil and gas of the UAE into a powerful attractor in order to answer to their present needs and thus guarantees the access for the UAE to the Chinese market and thus supports its current development and its clean energy transition strategy.

The geopolitical meaning of the Emirati-New Silk Road convergence

From the Chinese “One Belt, One Road”’s point of view, the UAE is a major geopolitical asset, because of its location and its harbour capabilities. Indeed, the “One Belt, One Road” aims also at creating a network of national and regional spaces that are tied to the different maritime and land Chinese entry points (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Militarizing the Chinese New Silk Road Part (Part1)”, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, March 13, 2017). However, the interest is not one-sided, on the contrary. The two countries become tied together both by their common interest in supporting the development of China and by the relationships they can develop with each other (Deng Yaqing, “A shared path”, The Beijing Review, July 10, 2014).

This convergence of the UAE and the NSR is not a simple new political layer in the UAE-China relationships. In fact, it reorientates it in a significant way, because it turns the UAE into a new part of this Chinese international economic life support system. This means that this new “UAE segment” is going to interact not only with China, but also with other parts, i.e. with other “useful spaces” of this system (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Militarizing the Maritime New Silk Road (2)- in the Arabian Sea”, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, April 3, 2017).

Being located in the Persian Gulf, being an important oil and gas producer and exporter, and having important harbouring installations, the UAE becomes de facto a useful space of the maritime New Silk Road that links with the Pakistani harbour of Gwadar, bought by China on the Arabian Sea, (Valantin, “China and the New Silk Road: the Pakistani strategy”, The Red Team Analysis, May 18, 2015), as well as with the port of Djibouti where Chinese companies and military are building a naval base (Shannon Tiezzi, “China’s “Maritime Silk Road”: don’t forget Africa”, The Diplomat, January 29, 2015).

For the UAE, being a member of the NSR also means benefitting from the Chinese diplomatic capabilities when it comes to its relations with its powerful Iranian and Saudi close neighbours. In effect, it must be noted that Iran is integrated into the NSR, and is developing trade, energy and military relationships with China as well as with Pakistan. For China the very philosophy of the NSR is to help these countries to maintain constructive relationships for their mutual benefit, so that they are lastingly able to support China’s development (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Iran, China and the New Silk Road”, The Red (Team) Analysis, January 4, 2016 and (“Iran, China seal New Silk Road deal”, Press TV, 31 October, 2016).

Thus, a new geopolitics emerges, based on the China’s need as the foundation for an international partnerships between the UAE’s national interest and China’s national interest, which is currently defined by the immense needs driving Chinese growth. This partnership is highly political, because both governments are interlocking their future and their legitimacy through this strategic partnership.

Sustainability and security

Also of strategic importance, being a member of the NSR supports the UAE strategy of economic diversification and of development of a renewable energy industry, influential on an international scale. Economic diversification is of the utmost importance for the UAE, in order to prepare the country for its coming peak oil, while maintaining a thriving economy. The UAE political authorities being deeply aware of the coming end of their oil reserves during the coming decades, the cooperation with China supports both their current oil and gas industry, while supporting the preparation for their energetic transition, as well as their economic diversification (Dania Saadi, “Economic diversification and Expo 2020 to shield Dubai from oil price rout », The National, June 26, 2016).

The UAE works at becoming a clean energy giant, hosting for example the International Renewable energy Agency (IRENA), while China is unleashing an investment capability worth 360 billion dollars for clean energy projects in China and around the world (Fortune editors and Reuters, “Here’s How Much Money China Is Throwing at Renewable Energy“, Fortune, January 5, 2017. In other words, China and the UAE are both working together at redefining geopolitics in terms of energy transition, as a new pillar of national security.

Reciprocally, the Chinese energy demand is such that China has become the world leader on the renewable energy market (Marlow Hood, “China takes global lead in clean energy: report“, Phys.org, January 7, 2017).

The Chinese and Emirati common interest thus converges and creates a strategic relationship through actions aiming at securing the future development of both countries, as, for example, the creation in 2016 of the Joint Strategic Investment Fund. This fund is aimed at supporting the co-development of oil and gas exploration and exploitation. It will also support the construction of transport infrastructures along the New Silk Road and the development of clean energy (“Belt and Road initiative boosts green energy along New Silk Road », Xinhua, 2017-01-18).

This dynamic is especially supported and exemplified by Dubai, which plans to produce 25% of its energy output from renewable in 2025 and 75% in 2050. That is why, for example, the Dubai electricity and water agency (DEWA) develops close ties with leading Chinese companies in this field (“DEWA visits China to boost energy projects in the UAE and Dubai”, Government of Dubai, 1 May 2016).

The energy-water nexus issue and its technological challenges is especially important for a country that is a regional power and needs to guarantee its post-oil future in a region dominated by oil and, more and more, by the attraction created by the Chinese “power of need”. It is also important for China that seeks ways to guarantee its new phase of economic and social development in a world where cheap oil resources are finite. Thus, the integration of the UAE to the Chinese New Silk Road is nothing but the convergence of two development grand strategies in a world of limited resources (Dennis and Donnella Meadows, The Limits to growth – the 30 years update, 2004, Michael Klare, Rising powers, shrinking planet, 2008, and The Race for What’s left, the global scramble for the World’s last resources, 2012).

However, by integrating the New Silk Road, the UAE is also becoming involved into the adverse reactions the Chinese system of attraction is, too, starting to trigger.

We shall look at these reactions and their effects not only on China, but on the network of the New Silk Road in coming articles.

Featured image: Abu Dhabi 2013 by Валерий Дед [CC BY 3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons.

Evaluating Likelihoods for Libya – Scenario 2 Partition

Image: United Nations Photo, [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0], via FlickrWe shall now discuss the organization, indicators, and likelihood of the various partition scenarios, after having detailed the indicators and determined the likelihood for intervention in the last article.Note: In the following article, we shall use the acronym COR for the Council of Representatives (nationalists), GNC for the General National Congress (Islamists), and GNA for the UN-backed Government of National Accord (unity government).Organizing the Scenarios and IndicatorsConsidering that external actors are already intervening in Libya, as we saw previously, as well as the fact that surrounding countries are experiencing migrant, smuggling, and jihadist spillover from Libya’s civil war, we organized the parent scenarios to account for these certainties. The next branch of …

Continue reading “Evaluating Likelihoods for Libya – Scenario 2 Partition”

Investigating the Rise of Populism (2) – Populism-Labelling and its Dangers

This article focuses on the “rise of populism”, the second explanation given for two of the major recent political and geopolitical surprises – i.e. the Brexit and the election of Donald Trump as U.S. President, and a major concern for many regarding the future evolution of Europe, the EU, and more largely the liberal paradigm in its globalisation guise.

Previously, we presented the current scholarly definition of populism, and suggested that it was less representative of reality than thought at first glance (“A perfect definition?“). Here, we shall focus on a too often forgotten aspect of “populism”, the way the word is actually used to disparagingly brand a protest movement or party and reinsert it within a larger political science framework. We shall explain how this practice of “populism-labelling” is actually fraught with three main dangers, which, furthermore, interact.