Each week our scan collects weak – and less weak – signals for political and geopolitical risk of interest to private and public actors. Find out more on horizon scanning, signals, what they are and how to use them: “Horizon Scanning and Monitoring for Anticipation: Definition and Practice“. Read below our latest complimentary Weekly horizon scanning. …
Continue reading “The Red (Team) Analysis Weekly – US-China tensions escalate – 4 October 2018”
This article focuses on the race to exascale computing and its multi-dimensional political and geopolitical impacts, a crucial response major actors are implementing in terms of High Performance Computing (HPC) power, notably for the development of their artificial intelligence (AI) systems. It thus ends for now our series on HPC as driver of and stake for AI, among the five we identified in Artificial Intelligence – Forces, Drivers and Stakes: the classical big data, HPC and the race to quantum supremacy as related critical uncertainty, algorithms, “sensors and expressors”, and finally needs and usages.
Critical Uncertainty ➚➚➚ Disruption of the current AI-power race for private and public actors alike – The U.S. takes a very serious lead in the race.
➚➚ Accelerating expansion of AI
➚➚ Accelerating emergence of the AI-world
➚➚ Increased odds to see the U.S. consolidating its lead in the AI-power race.
➚➚ Escalating AI-power race notably between the U.S. and China.
➚➚ Rising challenge for the rest of the world to catch up
➚ Potential for escalating tension U.S. – China, including between AI actors […]
This article focuses on the political and geopolitical consequences of the feedback relationship linking Artificial Intelligence (AI) in its Deep Learning component and computing power – hardware – or rather high performance computing power (HPC). It builds on a first part where we explained and detailed this connection. Related Artificial Intelligence, Computing Power and Geopolitics …
Continue reading “Artificial Intelligence, Computing Power and Geopolitics (2)”
The second decade of the 21st century appears to be rough for the U.S.. Could it mean that American power is waning? The question of a putative decline of the U.S. regularly emerges in international relations and in the media since at least the 1970s (Kenneth Waltz; Theory of International Politics, 1979: 177-178). However, each …
Continue reading “Which U.S. Decline? The View from the U.S. National Intelligence Council”
In this article, we shall assess the likelihood of a total victory in Libya in the medium term by al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. By victory, we mean a complete victory by one side over its adversaries, which is not imposed from the top down by external powers. In the previous article, we evaluated the likelihood for the lasting victory of each government, finding that a COR victory was least unlikely. Now that intervention is already occurring, as we saw in our article on intervention scenarios, the “Salafist Victory” scenarios are considered sub-scenarios of Scenario 2: Intervention instead of independent scenarios. As such, this will be reflected in the indicators, mapping and likelihoods. Indeed, as events unfolded and intervention took …
Continue reading “Evaluating Likelihoods for the Future of Libya – A Salafist Victory?”
In this article, we shall assess the likelihood of a lasting victory by the GNC, GNA, and COR—in other words, the ability of each government to not only achieve victory, but also to maintain lasting control. By victory, we mean a complete victory by one side over its adversaries, which is not imposed from the top down by external powers. In the previous article, we evaluated the likelihood for the initial victory of each government, finding that a COR victory was least unlikely. Now that intervention is already occurring, as we saw in our article on intervention scenarios, the “Total Victory” scenarios are considered sub-scenarios of Scenario 2: Intervention instead of independent scenarios. As such, this will be reflected in …
Continue reading “Evaluating Likelihoods for the Future of Libya – Scenarios of Victories (2)”
During March 2017, King Salman of Saudi Arabia ended a six weeks tour in Asia with a state visit in China and a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. This visit included the opportunity to start the negotiations about the integration of Saudi Arabia to the Chinese New Silk Road Grand strategy (Michael Tanchum, “Saudi Arabia …
Continue reading “Saudi Arabia and the Chinese New Silk Road”
This article focuses on the “rise of populism”, the second explanation given for two of the major recent political and geopolitical surprises – i.e. the Brexit and the election of Donald Trump as U.S. President, and a major concern for many regarding the future evolution of Europe, the EU, and more largely the liberal paradigm in its globalisation guise.
Previously, we presented the current scholarly definition of populism, and suggested that it was less representative of reality than thought at first glance (“A perfect definition?“). Here, we shall focus on a too often forgotten aspect of “populism”, the way the word is actually used to disparagingly brand a protest movement or party and reinsert it within a larger political science framework. We shall explain how this practice of “populism-labelling” is actually fraught with three main dangers, which, furthermore, interact.
This article and the next focuses on the “rise of populism”, the second explanation given for two of the major recent political and geopolitical surprises – i.e. the Brexit and the election of Donald Trump as U.S. President. Populism and its rise are potentially at the heart of a possible crisis in Europe, and world-wide, should “populist” …
Continue reading “Investigating the Rise of Populism – A Perfect Definition?”
