Signals: Kurd Military Command on Kirkuk; Iran again…

Impact on Issues ➚➚➚ ➃  /➄ Iraq vs Kurds – ➚ ➄ Syria  – ➚ ➃ Middle East Tension➚➚  Iran Iraqi and regional influence➚ Russia, U.S., Gulf Countries Conundrum➘ Russia Influence➘ U.S. influence – ➙ U.S.weight (unwilling? influence) The Iraqi attack on Peshmergas-controlled Kirkuk continued on 16 October and, as a result Iraqis forces, allegedly according to Kurds backed by Iranian Quds (special forces of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – IRGC), seized the city.The Kurds retreated rather than fought, which led to mutual accusations between the two main Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) to have abandoned the city. Internecine struggle thus continues to plague Kurdish actions and capacity to attain objectives.For previous and other signals check theHorizon …

Continue reading “Signals: Kurd Military Command on Kirkuk; Iran again…”

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Final Scenario for the Future of Libya and their Likelihoods

Image: July Ceasefire posted
by Government of National Accord Facebook page,
25 July 2017

Having evaluated the likelihood for each scenario for the future of Libya (see detail here), we shall now present updated likelihoods that account for changes that have taken place since we began the evaluations. Because both intervention and spillover are already undoubtedly occurring in Libya, our scenarios are now considered sub-scenarios of Scenario 2: Intervention and spillover instead of independent scenarios.  We shall then present the complete set of scenarios, with the updated likelihoods.

Executive Summary

Now that we have evaluated each scenario for the future of Libya, we organized them into a single graph that allows for a more accurate strategic picture. Our complete set of scenarios now reflects updated likelihoods that account for recent events on the ground. The ceasefire and subsequent dialogue between the COR and GNA, the various crises and strategic shifts in the Middle East that have affected the ability of external actors to intervene, and counter-migration efforts by Italy and Libyan tribes have notably affected the likelihood of several scenarios.

Based on the current realities and updated likelihoods, we found that continued civil war was the most likely outcome of peace talks (98%); continued war with a change in strategic terms was twice as likely to occur as a total victory (66%); and increased intervention was nearly 45% likely to occur, with no increased intervention slightly higher at more than 55%.

Full article 2110 words – approx. 5 pages

Notes: In the following article, we shall use the acronym COR for the Council of Representatives (nationalists), GNC for the General National Congress (Islamists), and GNA for the UN-backed Government of National Accord (unity government).

Editor’s note: To assess conflict and war, and thus when we refer to war or civil war, we are using the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) dynamic scale for conflicts (Conflict Barometer 2016, pp.6-8).  There may thus be discrepancy between the words we use and official statements and labelling. The latter are indeed decided for any political reasons, but do not necessarily aim at representing the reality on the ground.  

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Although we have concluded our detailing of the scenarios for Libya’s future, we shall continue to monitor events on the ground and occasionally provide likelihood updates as needed.

Bibliography

Feature Photo: July Ceasefire posted by Government of National Accord Facebook page, 25 July 2017

Abdulkader Assad, “Haftar meets Italian Defense Minister in Rome,” The Libya Observer, September 27, 2017

Abdulkader Assad, “Presidential Council collapsing from the inside as three members reject Al-Sirraj’s decisions,” The Libya Observer, September 4, 2017

Abdulkader Assad, “With Italy’s aid, Libyan UN-proposed government pays militias money to block migrants routes,” The Libya Observer, August 30, 2017

Abdullah Ben Ibrahim, “Libyan Political Agreement amendment meeting kicks off in Tunisia,” The Libya Observer, September 26, 2017

Andrew Torchia, “Qatar growth sinks as oil sector stalls, sanctions cause minor damage,” Reuters, October 1, 2017

Barin Kayaoglu, “Turkish military sends anti-referendum message with exercises across border,” Al-Monitor, September 18, 2017

Declan Walsh and Jason Horowitz, “Italy, Going It Alone, Stalls the Flow of Migrants. But at What Cost?” The New York Times, September 17, 2017

Elvis Boh, “Libyan rival parties hold peace talks in Tunisia,” Africa News, September 26, 2017

“Ghwell said his fighters withdrew to prevent further damage in Tripoli,” Libya Herald, May 29, 2017

“Haftar in Italy to discuss terrorism and smuggling,” Middle East Monitor, September 27, 2017

Hani Amara, “French foreign minister in Libya to push peace deal,” Reuters, September 4, 2017

“HoR member Baira says Speaker is an obstacle,” Libyan Express, August 22, 2017

Housam Najjair, “High Council member calls for Swehli’s immediate resignation,” The Libya Observer, June 22, 2017

Ibrahim Ouf, “Cairo facing calls to increase Sinai military presence,” Middle East Online, September 17, 2017

“Igtet to announce new Libyan government by end of October,” Libyan Express, September 27, 2017

“IS militants control Wadi Al-Ahmar near Sirte,” Libyan Express, September 3, 2017

“Italian foreign ministry denies AP report about paying Libyan militias to block migrants,” Libyan Express, August 30, 2017

“Italy begins training Libyan navy and coastguard,” Middle East Monitor, September 19, 2017

“Italy restoring Libyan ships, training coast guard – Pinot,” ANSAmed, September 5, 2017

Jalel Harchaoui and Matthew Herbert, “Italy claims it’s found a solution to Europe’s migrant problem. Here’s why Italy’s wrong.” The Washington Post, September 26, 2017

Jamal Adel, “Qatrun Tebu brigade clamps down on southern border smuggling,” Libya Herald, September 11, 2017

“Kurdish referendum triggers retaliation from Iraq, Turkey,” CBS News, September 30, 2017

Lamine Ghanmi, “Libya’s strongman seeks national leadership without a vote,” Middle East Online, September 18, 2017

“Libya: EU Renews Sanctions for Six Months Against Obstructing Peace,” All Africa, September 28, 2017

“Libya groups start talks in Tunisia to launch new UN plan,” PressTV, September 26, 2017

“Libyan eastern so-called army spokesman: IS terrorists moving to northern Libya,” Libyan Express, September 4, 2017

“Libyan strongman forcing people to sign recommendation for him to become president,” Libyan Express, September 7, 2017

“Libya’s unity government suffers blow as four ministers resign,” Middle East Eye, July 1, 2016

“Libya’s wannabe president, Basit Igtet, starts getting likes across the country,” Libyan Express, September 12, 2017

Meryem Goktas and Mahmut Geldi, “Italian military mission arrives in Libya,” Anadolu Agency, August 3, 2017

Metin Gurcan, “Turkey adds to its critical deficit of military pilots,” Al-Monitor, September 4, 2017

Patrick Wintour, “Italian minister defends methods that led to 87% drop in migrants from Libya,” The Guardian, September 7, 2017

“’Positive signs after Libya peace talks,” DefenceWeb, September 7, 2017

“Pro-Ghwell forces halt advance on Tripoli after Serraj calls for international allies to attack,” Libya Herald, July 7, 2017

Raf Sanchez, “Libya rivals agree to ceasefire and elections after peace talks hosted by Emmanuel Macron,” The Telegraph, July 25, 2017

Ramadan Al Sherbini, “Financially strained, Qatar’s clout in Africa diminishes,” Gulf News, September 25, 2017

“Rival Libya government seeks international recognition,” The New Indian Express, September 17, 2017

Safa Alharathy, “MP Abu Shagur resigns from HoR,” The Libya Observer, August 28, 2017

Shabina S. Khatri, “Report: Qatar spends nearly $40 billion to support crisis-hit economy,” Doha News, September 15, 2017

“Southern border reported blockaded as Qatrun leader confirms “big” drop in migrants coming from Niger,” Libya Herald, September 7, 2017

Sudarsan Raghavan, “Egypt’s long, bloody fight against the Islamic State in Sinai is going nowhere,” The Washington Post, September 15, 2017

The Anti-ISIS Coalition, Eye on ISIS in Libya, May 30, 2017

“Thousands take to public squares in Libya to back up Igtet’s call for reform,” Libyan Express, September 25, 2017

“Turkey sends military vehicles, equipment to Syrian border: Anadolu,” Reuters, September 17, 2017

Signals: Towards War In Iraq between Kurds and Iraqis, Iran…

Impact on Issues ➚➚ ➃  /➄ Iraq vs Kurds – ➚ ➄ Syria  – ➚ ➃ Middle East Tension➚  Iran Iraqi and regional influence➚ Russia, U.S., Gulf Countries Conundrum➘ Russia Influence➘ U.S. influence – ➚ U.S.weight (unwilling? influence) Around Kirkuk, skirmishes have now taken place in the early hours of Monday 16 October 2017 between Iraqis troops and Hashd al-Shaabi forces (Popular Mobilization Forces – Shiite militias) on the one hand, Peshmergas from both the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Meanwhile, civilians from Kirkuk would be ready to fight against Iraqi troops and would be joined, according to Kurdish Peshmergas, by civilians from Erbil, Duhok and Sulaimani. Tension or contradicting orders would also have taken place between different Peshmergas units. Contradicting statements …

Continue reading “Signals: Towards War In Iraq between Kurds and Iraqis, Iran…”

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Signal: North Korea Discussed as an Issue among NATO Ambassadors…

Impact on Issues

➚ Activation of NATO Art. 5 by the U.S. (Still not started, seen as far away, yet issue on the agenda) 

➚ ➁ NATO military involvement in North Korea, thus EU and European states’ military entanglement in North Korea
➚  ➁  World War
➘ Independent European Common Foreign and Security Policy –
➘ Independent European Member States Foreign Policy –
➚ U.S. influence

Alternatively
➙  ?  Demise of NATO through withdrawing of members

(Nota: the still far away – legally – activation of Art.5 is indicated in the colour of and number for the crisis level)

U.S. Ambassador Kay Bailey Hutchison to NATO, in a 12 October 2017 interview with David Ignatius (See video below, The Washington Post), explains that, among NATO ambassadors, North Korea and related issues are starting to be discussed, because “North Korea is a common threat…” “and that “is beginning to come to the forefront”. She mentions the host of complications involved, notably considering the American missile defence that is protecting Europe, as, according to her, these are currently directed towards the Middle East and would have to be redirected to face a North Korea threat. So “all of that is in the early stages of being discussed”.

However, she also stresses twice that North Korea is not discussed “as a decision”. She underlines that there would be “so many steps before we come to this point”, i.e. before the U.S. would come to the stage of activating Art. 5 on Collective Defence.

“Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security .”

Ambassador Hutchison reminds us that, in a worst case scenario, still unlikely, whatever the doubts of European states and of the European Union regarding the use of a military option against North Korea by the U.S., whatever their declarations according to which they would not back military actions by the U.S., and whatever their wishes for an emphasis on negotiations with North Korea, they would be likely to become, even unwillingly, embroiled in a potential future conflict with North Korea, by virtue of alliance mechanism (note that discussions regarding who attacked first would be most likely to take place too).

The impacts are severe. First, should NATO Art. 5 be triggered and should members of the Alliance, then, not withdraw from NATO, this could be the start of a war involving three continents. The potential military Chinese and Russian responses would determine the possibility to see the start of an even more global war.

Second, this points out the intrinsic weakness of a European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as long as there is no proper common defence, and as long as NATO is privileged over a European Defence. As a result, European States and the European Union are highly likely to be forced into a foreign and security policy rather subservient to American interests.

Alternatively, should the price of war appear as too high for Europeans, then we could see an unravelling of NATO. The impacts above would then have to be reassessed.

Signal located between minutes 14:13 – 20:06 of the interview.

PostLive

Securing Tomorrow with David Ignatius and Amb. Kay Bailey Hutchison On Thursday, October 12, The Washington Post hosted Kay Bailey Hutchison, the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO, for an interview with columnist David Ignatius. Ambassador Hutchison discussed the future of the transatlantic alliance, mounting threats from Russia and North Korea and her top priorities in the areas of military cooperation, intelligence-gathering and combating terrorism.

Signal: A View from China – its Rising Arms Exports

Impact on Issues

➚ ➀ ➁ China-U.S. Tension – ➚ Chinese influence (including OBOR/New Silk Road) – ➘ U.S. influence – ➘ USD supremacy – Uncertainty: American East Asian strategic presence and East Asian stability

China has become the third larger exporter of arms in the world, even though it is still far behind the U.S. and Russia. It has moved from selling lower-end weapons to advanced ones, as its R&D capabilities improved.

China stresses its competitiveness in terms of prices and services, but recognised the lack of experience in real-life battles.

Interestingly, China also tries to promote and justify a kind of “Chinese exceptionalism” in selling weapons, as China’s sales would promote regional stability whilst American ones would foster instability.

This may only increase the American feeling of threat in terms of their global relative power status. China is now a new competitor that counts also in arms’ deals and will only see its weight rising with time.

Furthermore, as the arms’ deals are likely to be increasingly made and paid in Yuan and/or partner’s currency, this will directly impact the supremacy of the USD.

Finally, as China will most probably mix its One Belt One Road (OBOR) strategy with weapons exports, American influence may dwindle or to the least be strongly counter-balanced on the short to mid-term on the New Silk Road segments, with impacts for American businesses.

The impact on the strategic presence of America in Asia is more uncertain as Asian countries, on the one hand, may want to balance China and the U.S., but, on the other, may be warry of an aggressive American presence in the area, hence, most probably, China’s emphasis on the contrast between China as bringing stabilisation versus the US as fostering instability. As a result of future possible protracted tensions between the U.S. and China, instability could develop in East Asia.

 

China rising in arms trade – Global Times

China has become a larger player in the global arms industry in recent years and exports have been shifting from low-end weapons to increasingly advanced ones, though the country applies strict rules to arms exports.

The state of major arms transfers in 8 graphics | SIPRI

This week, SIPRI released new data on international arms transfers of major weapons. We’ve picked out some key trends in the data and present the state of arms transfers in eight graphics.

Featured image: One of the Chinese hypersonic gliding vehicle projects. Its configuration was first exposed by Military Report on CCTV-7 by 果壳军事 (Own work) [CC BY-SA 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0)], via Wikimedia Commons.

Signals: Catalonia Declaration of Independence, Spain Reaction (updated 16:04 CET 11 Oct 2017)

Impact on Issues

➘➚ ➂  Catalonia vs Spain

➚ ➁ Secessions and deep changes of nations within the EU… and globally

Should Madrid be conciliant, the way Catalonia offered to operationalise the independence it declared could be stabilising. It is however unlikely events will unfold that simply and peacefully, considering Spain position on 10 October evening.

A lull or rather repeat of the 10 October and 11 October morning events was created by Spanish President of Government Rajoy following the extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers on Catalonia Independence held on 11 Oct 2017. Mr Rajoy asked Catalonia to end uncertainty and make clear if Catalonia had or not declared independence. He stressed the Spanish government’s wish for a return to legality and normality, however also wielding the threat of Spanish Constitution art. 155 (the art. by which Spain can take over the governance of Catalonia and thus suspend Catalonia autonomy).

As a result, although it seemed clear from the 10 October elements (see detail below) that Catalonia had declared independence,  uncertainty was reintroduced…. until the next declaration by Catalonia.

We may surmise that Madrid understood very clearly Catalonia’s position, or they would not have convened the extraordinary meeting. However, considering the possible dire consequences, they decided to surf on the general confusion spread by the media to give Catalonia what they could see as a second chance to give up independence.

The likelihood to see Catalonia standing up to its prior declaration seems to be higher than the probability to see it bow. However, Catalonia’s leaders are also subjected to an enormous pressure from all actors. This is why scenarios are the best means to navigate political and geopolitical uncertainties, because they allow to plan for the whole range of possibilities and not to become prey to an impossible “game of prediction”.

10 October 2017 signals

Catalonia President Carles Puigdemont indeed declared Independence on 10 October 2017 at the end of his speech to the Catalonia Parliament, Catalonia becoming a republic:

https://twitter.com/catalangov/status/917806871800635393

The declaration of independence is confirmed by the signature of the Declaration of the Representatives of Catalonia that followed according to which:

“Catalonia restores today its full sovereignty…

We call on all states and international organizations to recognize the Catalan republic as an independent and sovereign state. We call on the Catalan government to take all necessary measures to make possible and fully effective this declaration of independence and the measures contained in the transition law that founds the republic.”

Catalan leader signs document declaring independence from Spain

Catalan leader Carles Puigdemont and other regional politicians signed a document declaring Catalonia’s independence from Spain, but it was unclear if the document would have any legal value.

There, notably, the international part of state legitimacy is sought, which according to existing declarations by international governments Catalonia is, right now, not likely to obtain easily.

After the initial declaration, President Puigdemont also called to suspend the effects of the declaration to open a period of dialogue:

https://twitter.com/catalangov/status/917807509657841668

This is nothing else than common sense and governance. Indeed, only a bad ruler – and ignorant individuals – could believe that a proper independence could practically become operational in the blink of an instant, without working out constructively and peacefully (ideally) how separation could take place, not only at all levels of state administration but also in terms of infrastructures for example. This shows thus not indecisiveness but practicality and resolve, as well as a will to implement independence as well and as peacefully as possible.

Madrid, however, is unlikely to accept the independence and its peaceful implementation through negotiations as indicated by Deputy Prime Minister Soraya Saenz de Santamaria 10 October evening speech (Official Transcript of Vice President Soraya Saenz de Santamaria Speech – 10 October 2017). Then, she notably announced that the President of the Government had convened an extraordinary Council of Ministers on 11 October at 9:00am to deal with the situation in Catalonia.

The decision of Madrid at the issue of the Council should have determined how events would unfold next, towards further escalation or stabilisation, had a second round of declarations not been decided by President of Government Rajoy.

https://twitter.com/Sorayapp/status/917852616230670339

Signal: Political Dealings and Scenarios in Spain vs Catalonia

Impact on Issues

➘ + ➙ ➂  Catalonia vs Spain (see further outlined scenarios below) – ➚ ➁ Secessions and deep changes of nations within the EU… and globally

Warning (Opportunity) – Opportunity to plan ahead for the EU and its member states, as well as worldwide?

Independence is meant to be declared by Catalonia President Carles Puigdemont on 10 October 2017 afternoon. Meanwhile, Catalonia secessionist political leaders would have also been trying to broker a deal with Spanish Socialists, Podemos and the Basque Nationalists. Such deal would then allow forcing Prime Minister Rajoy out and, most probably, trying to replace him by a leader that would not only accept Catalonia Independence but also work with Catalonia to make it possible, i.e. it would take place in a constructive way.

According to Bloomberg (below), it is unlikely that the Socialists accept. Yet this would most probably be the least dangerous and unpalatable way forward for both Spain and Catalonia.

Yet, should this unlikely scenario come to occur, the impact would be huge for the European Union and its member states, as others could follow Catalonia.

It is here necessary to remind that neither the European Union nor its members, nor for that matters all actors, should find this evolution of events surprising. Indeed had they paid attention or applied the knowledge offered by political science on nationalism, nation-ness and nation-building they would know that if one changes the modern-state, then one also has an immediate impact on the nation. It has indeed been shown by the modernist theoreticians of the nation, such as Gellner, Smith or Anderson, that the nation is a child of the modern-state. As the European Union is, by essence, changing the structures and the process of the modern state, then it follows logically that the nations that existed will also be impacted.

Related

Bibliography – The Future of the Nation-State

The Power of Maps

Those nations that were thought as coterminous with the modern state in its borders are no more. They have evolved under the actions of both the European Union and the weaker and changed states that have become its members.

These are dynamics that must be considered as peacefully as possible – and as properly and constructively as possible – as they will not stop but, on the contrary, are highly likely to continue, not only in Spain but also elsewhere. We can even go further that the European Union: the decades of “globalisation” and neo-liberalism having deeply impacted the state, the phenomenon at hand may not only be European, but … global, and should be envisioned as such. Here because for once policy-makers and decision-makers are forced to confront political dynamics they either did not understand or denied, we have a larger opportunity to anticipate properly the future and thus to design correct courses of actions, according to objectives.

Further, Bloomberg’s article uses – at last – scenarios to envision the way the situation may evolve between Spain and Catalonia. However, they limit themselves to the very near future and stop short of really envisioning consequences, indeed shying away from it with a “what happens next is anyone guess”.

Related

Towards an Operational Methodology to Analyze Future Security Threats and Political Risk (1)

to

How to Analyze Future Security Threats (5): Scenarios and Crises

Well, this is not anyone’s guess. Scenarios may and actually should be constructed already past this very short-term future. Understanding of escalation, crises and conflicts, as it involves identity politics and nationalism  – i.e. political science and international relations – has a lot to bring to the building of these scenarios, that we shall see anyway unfold in the future.

It is already possible to give a broad framework and possible (but by no means certain) end points for each of the four scenarios correctly identified by Bloomberg (- note that proper scenario-building would let emerge further scenarios for each branch and that these can be coupled with “scenarios for Europe”):

➚ ➄ Declaration of Independence + Emergency: escalation towards violence with possibility ultimately of civil war;

➘ ➀  Declaration of Independence + No Emergency: stabilisation with constructive independence;

No declaration of Independence + Emergency:
➘ ➀ Either indeed the secessionist have lost – as envisioned by Bloomberg – but with negative impact on the whole Catalonia morale and structure;
Or
➚➚ ➄ Renewed and worst tension towards independence, as a deep feeling of unfairness will also settle. Higher likelihood for polarization and violence, resentment and ultimately civil war;

➘ ➀ No declaration of Independence + No Emergency: Back to the previous situation, stabilisation .

 

Catalans Offer Spanish Socialists Pact to Oust Rajoy

Catalan secessionists have opened a second-front in their campaign against the government in Madrid, urging the opposition Socialists to forge a coalition to oust Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, according to two people with knowledge of the outreach.

Sources of American Decline… and Power – The View from the U.S. National Intelligence Council

The question of a U.S. decline is increasingly on the agenda as signals seem to pile up to indicate a relative loss of power status. The last instance of such dynamics at play is the 4 to 8 October 2017 state visit to Russia of King Salman Saudi Arabia King Salman, a long-standing close ally of the U.S. since 1945. The  return of the King was stressed by Saudi ArabNews as “a four-day historic state visit to Russia, which had seen Saudi-Russian ties reaching new heights”. This visit appears thus to herald the start of a new period, where a U.S. decline could be a reality.

We examine this very loss of American power through a series of three articles, which look at three dimensions of U.S. decline as perceived – publicly – by the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC), part of the U.S. Office of The Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Previously, we sought to understand what the NIC means exactly by a U.S. decline and its onset. Here, in this article, we shall focus on the sources of American decline and power, as identified by the NIC, which will also give us indicators to monitor the decline. Finally, in the third article we shall point out the paradoxical character of a U.S. decline, and address the inability of the U.S. to accept its demise as superpower.

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Full article 2110 words – approx. 5 pages

Featured image by Bruce Emmerling, Public Domain, Pixabay

Detailed bibliography

America’s civil engineers, “Infrastructure Report Card“, 2017.

National Intelligence Council, Global Trends: The Paradox of Progress (GT), Office of the Director of National Intelligence, (for the public version, January 2017).

The Red (Team) Analysis Society, “The Shale Oil and Gas Security Sigils“, Daily Scan.

Valantin, Jean-Michel, “Climate Change: the Long Planetary Bombing“, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, 18 Sept 2017.

Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979.

Read a summary of Waltz’s theory in the Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian, “Political Realism in International Relations“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

Signals: Russia Unveils Policy on Iraq Kurds Independence, Iraqis and Kurds discuss…

Impact on Issues

➘ ➁➀ /➄ Iraq vs Kurds – ➙ ➄ Syria  – ➘ ➀ Russia Conundrum
➚ Russia Influence – ➘ ➃ Middle East Tension – ➘ U.S. influence

Note 13 Oct: Latest signal 16 Oct 2017 as situation has considerably evolved since 11 Oct, showing the essential fluid character of the dynamics ate work.

A flurry of diplomatic moves, visits and consultations is taking place around the Iraqi Kurdistan Independence issue (6 to 8 October).

Russia, which actions we identified previously as a major unknown to assess how the dynamics would probably evolve around Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence, has now lifted this uncertainty, as publicised on 7 October 2017 through an interview by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov with Sputnik (see signal below).

According to the interview and the way it is worded, Russia both recognises the referendum and its result, reasserts its commitment to the Iraqi Kurds, but without alienating Baghdad. Russia’s commitment to stabilisation in the region is therefore reasserted, while Russia also reassured the Kurds that they would not be once more betrayed and abandoned. The stake Russia has in Iraqi Kurdistan, notably around oil, as Rosneft and the Kurdistan Regional government (KRG) are about to sign an agreement for the construction project of Kurdistan Region’s natural gas pipeline infrastructure, has further given Russia supplementary weight and stake in developments around the Iraqi Kurdistan independence.

Most probably relatedly and following this strong signal sent by Russia – as well as highly certain behind-the-scene diplomatic work – Kurdish Prime Minister Barzani of the KRG met successively with two of Iraq’s three vice-presidents on 7 October and Iraqi parliament speaker Salim al-Jabouri in Erbil on 8 October. Although none had any official mandate, as recalled by Baghdad on 8 October, these shows that negotiations are ongoing, and part of “consultations” as nonetheless acknowledged by Baghdad.

The current Kurdish position is that they are “ready for dialogue with Baghdad ‘without preconditions from any side in a defined time frame.'” (Barzani). They also point out that neighbours – i.e. Turkey and Iran – should not be dragged into the issue as this only complexifies the problem.

Baghdad for its part, reasserting it did not want to trigger a new war, wants that “any dialogue between the two sides should be under ‘the framework of the [Iraqi] constitution” that stipulates protecting the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq.'”

Original solutions may be created, that would respect all parties’ aims, for example modelled upon the British Commonwealth, or similar. It is highly likely that Russia will weigh in to see a peaceful and constructive solution being found.

Two major uncertainties are now likely to play out. First, Turkey, could insist in seeing further Kurdish independence – whatever its shape – as an existential threat. The danger is here mitigated by a history of good relations between Turkey and the Iraqi KRG (which is different from the history of relations with the Syrian Kurds),  by Russia and Turkey relations as well as by the latest spat and tension between Turkey and the U.S.. Second, an always possible erratic American moves, as they see their influence in the region withering away, could stoke tension and derail a still fragile improvement of the situation.

Main Signal

Russia Reveals Plans for Interaction With Iraqi Kurdistan After Referendum

The Russian Foreign Ministry has commented on its plans for developing relations with Iraqi Kurdistan following an independence referendum. MOSCOW (Sputnik) – Russia will continue economic interaction with Iraqi Kurdistan in coordination with authorities in Baghdad, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov told Sputnik on Saturday.

Other Signals

Rosneft Develops Projects in Iraqi Kurdistan

Successful implementation of the project under discussion will enable Rosneft to play a leading role in the building and expanding Kurdistan Region’s gas transport infrastructure and create synergy with existing projects for development of the oil and gas fields of the 5 blocks awarded to the Company in the region.

Iraq won’t be first party to trigger a war over Kurdistan referendum, NSA

ERBIL, Kurdistan Region – The Iraqi government will not initiate an armed confrontation with the Kurdish government over the disputed independence referendum that was held on September 25 with an overwhelming verdict for leaving Iraq, Iraq’s National Security Advisor said. Falah…

Baghdad not committed to talks between Barzani and Iraqi VPs, spokesperson

ERBIL, Kurdistan Region – The Iraqi government has said that it is not necessarily committed to the outcome of ongoing talks between the Kurdish leadership and two of the Iraqi vice presidents that called to cancel the punitive measures taken against Erbil and for talks between the two sides…

Signal: State visit of Saudi King in Russia

Impact on Issues

➚ U.S. Decline – ➚ Russian Influence – ➘ ➃ Middle East Regional Tension – ➚➚ ➂  Global tension

Among many other impacts, we shall notably stress here that this visit shows the skill of Russian diplomacy and the pertinence of Russian strategy as Russia seems to be highly likely to succeed in  maintaining and developing good relationships with two current ‘competing’ – not to say antagonist – powers: Iran and Saudi Arabia. As a result it is twice a potentially stabilizing influence for the region.

Meanwhile, and relatedly, this State visit also indicates the global relative decline of U.S. influence. As a result, the U.S. is likely to react, which could be a general factor of polarization and escalation worldwide.

Signal

Fresh Start: Saudi Arabia Turns to Russia Seeking to Diversify Foreign Relations

Riyadh has started diversifying its foreign relations due to the US’ further rapprochement with Tel Aviv, Russian political scientist Vyacheslav Smirnov told Radio Sputnik. According to the expert, the first ever visit of King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud to Moscow is likely to strengthen Russo-Saudi ties.

Featured Image: With the King of Saudi Arabia Salman Ben Abdul Aziz Al Saud. From album to material Russian-Saudi talks October 5, 2017 Moscow, The Kremlin

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