Strategic foresight and early warning are grounded in the idea of preventing surprise and more specifically strategic surprise. However, if we move away from the general idea of “strategic surprise” and try to be specific, i.e. if we try to apply the concept to a specific threat or issue we try to anticipate, then the …
Continue reading “Assessing the “Strategic” in Strategic Surprise”
(Art design: Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli) Have you ever heard about Cassandra’s brother, who shared his sister’s gift of prophecy but not her curse? Could this legend, as other ancient myths, facts and histories, give us some clues to make our delivery and communication of strategic foresight and early warning products more efficient? Could it tell us …
Continue reading “From Seer to King – Success with Strategic Foresight and Warning”
You will find below public documents and products related to strategic foresight, warning, risk analysis and intelligence, published by countries, international organisations and private actors. Interesting documents are added progressively. Latest, we added the video just published (28 April 2021) by the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence to advertise their recently released …
Continue reading “Strategic Foresight, Warning and Intelligence Products and Documents”
A warning does not exist if it is not delivered. This is a key lesson highlighted by the famous expert in warning Cynthia Grabo, who worked as an intelligence analyst for the U.S. government from 1942 to 1980 (Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, Editor’s Preface). Similarly, a foresight product such as scenarios, for example, …
Continue reading “Communication of Strategic Foresight and Early Warning”
A race has started for quantum technologies or quantum information systems (QIS). Indeed, considering initially and notably the consequences in terms of cryptology – dubbed a “crypto-apocalypse” – no country may allow another state or a foreign company to be the first to develop quantum computing.
However, since the initial worry about cryptology somehow triggered the current quantum revolution, the situation has changed, discoveries have taken place… read more
[Fully rewritten version v3] To exist, risk and foresight products as well as warnings must be delivered to those who must act upon them, the customers, clients or users. These anticipation analyses must also be actionable, which means that they need to include the right information necessary to see action taken. Yet, if you deliver …
Continue reading “Revisiting Timeliness for Strategic Foresight and Warning and Risk Management”
This article defines and briefly explains the various names and labels given to activities and practices anticipating or foreseeing the future. Indeed, from risk management to Strategic Foresight and Warning (SF&W) the field of anticipation includes many perspectives and practices centred on different themes. Meanwhile, various actors use different names for SF&W, or very similar approaches. It is thus important to clarify what various labels and names mean, even if borders between categories are often fuzzy.
Editorial – Risks on the US Dollar Supremacy? Among the flurry of articles part of the violent “battle for hearts and minds” regarding Ukraine and opposing directly Russia on the one hand, the U.S and Europe on the other, continues emerging, quite loudly this week, an interrogation regarding the international order, this time in its monetary guise. Put bluntly, the question is as follows: “Are we seeing the beginning of the end of the US dollar based international monetary order?”The question is related to oil because of the importance of petrodollars. We may thus wonder if a potential U.S. strategy, assuming it could work (read Steve LeVine article “How the US might persuade the Saudis to co-conspire in unleashing an oil weapon …
Continue reading “The Red Team Analysis Weekly 145 – Risks on the US Dollar Supremacy?”
The BBC World Service – World Have Your Say invites three experts, including from Red (team) Analysis, to discuss the alleged interception of phone and data by France’s foreign intelligence service, in a way similar to the US Prism programme.
Global Trends 2030 compares our current transition period with 1815, 1919, 1945 and 1989. Yet we have not known recently any global systemic war. Thus why choose such a comparison? What could explain such a puzzling choice and what could we learn from it, for our understanding of the world and its potential future(s)?
