War in Ukraine, Megadrought and the Coming Global Food Crisis – Anthropocene Wars (3)

The War in Ukraine as a Perfect Storm

The war in Ukraine triggers a global whirlwind involving energy and food crisis. The latter is quite singular, because it combines the consequences of the war on the global agricultural system with massive extreme weather events, such as the U.S. midwestern megadrought.

War as global disruption

Indeed, since the start of the Russian offensive in Ukraine, the war added to the economic sanctions imposed by the EU, the U.S. and the G7 on Russia. The sanctions and the war have had disrupting effects on the Ukrainian and Russian exports of cereals, essentially wheat, maize and barley. (FAO Information Note on The Importance of Ukraine and the Russian Federation for Global Agricultural Markets and the Risks Associated with the Current Conflict – 25 March 2022 Update).

From sanctions to un-sanctions

From the beginning to the end of march, the sanctions regime targeted, among others, financial services and agricultural exports, making it harder for Russia to export its agricultural products on the international markets (Maxim Suchkov, “Repercussions of Russian sanctions, from agriculture to microchips”, Russia Matters, 10 March 2022). This had immediate effects on the prices, bcause of a worldwide demand that was already high and supply quite tight (Patti Domm, “A fertilizer shortage, worsened by war in Ukraine, is driving up global food prices and scarcity“, CNBC, April 6, 2022).

However, on the 24 March, Washington eased some of the sanctions on Russian agricultural products, notably on fertilizers (“USA eases sanctions on agricultural products, including fertilizers”, The Investologist, 31 March 2022).

On the Ukrainian side, the damages on the transport system, and the blocking of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov ports, among them Mariupol and its harbour, drastically diminish the Ukrainian export capability. The Ukrainian authorities try to compensate by redirecting the grains exports through railways.

However, the quantities that can be moved by rail are much lower. In the same time, the transport time and costs are higher. (Silvia Aloisi and Pavel Polityuk, “Ukraine could lose $6 billions in Grain exports with ports blocked”, Reuters, March 21, 2022 and  “Ukraine’s grain exports held up while railways struggle to cope, analyst said”, Reuters, April 2, 2022)

Furthermore, the fact that a large part of those exports do not reach the international markets is only the most superficial part of the coming global agricultural shock.

Indeed, the main agricultural centres and crops need fertilizers. As it happens, if the U.S. and Canada are major producers of potassium potash and nitrogen fertilizers, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine are major exporters.

If the U.S administration eased the export ban on 24 March 2022, the Russian political authorities decided first to reduce their exports, before easing those measures at the start of April (Shelby Myers, Veronica Nigh, “Too Many to Count – Factors Driving Fertilizers Prices higher and Higher”, Market Intel, December 13, 2021 and Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “Russia increases export quotas of fertilizers easing supply to India“, The Economic Times, 20 April 2022).

These export swings have reduced the amount of fertiliser available in the world in March, i.e. at the same time as the crops are planted, thus increasing demand and prices (Charlotte Hebebrand and David Laborde, “High fertilizers prices contribute to rising global food security concerns“, International Food Policy Institute, April 25, 2022).

Furthermore, it gets worse, because of the combination of these factors with the massive impact of climate change on major agricultural areas, such as the U.S. Midwest. Indeed, the “mega drought” that impacts that American region as well as its Southwest is in itself a major factor of agricultural crisis.

In other words, the war in Ukraine is literally “chaining” different factors of agricultural crisis, from cereal production through exports to climate change”. As it happens, the war in Ukraine turns this chain of factors and variables into a gigantic systemic global agricultural crisis.

We shall see how this systemic crisis is becoming its own driver, each factor driving the others. We shall also look at the way the agricultural crisis “meets” the global energy crisis. Finally, we shall see how this systemic crisis becomes the “continuation of the war in Ukraine by other means”.

The war in Ukraine and the agri-exports crisis

The war in Ukraine is triggering a worldwide and systemic agricultural crisis. Since the start of Russia’s invasion on 24 February 2022, the war and the international sanctions block the usual exports of Ukrainian and Russian cereal crops (FAO, ibid).

The missing Ukrainian and Russian exports

As it happens, in 2019, these exports represented 23 % of the global wheat exports, 19% of barley, 18% of maize, and 64% of sunflower oil, an essential cooking ingredient globally (Hannah Ritchie, “How could the war in Ukraine impact global food supplies?”, Our World in Data, 24 March 2022). The agricultural prices were already on the rise before the start of the war. Now, the blocking of the Ukrainian and Russian exports is driving powerful inflation on these commodities.

The prices war

For example, on 13 April 2022, the price of the wheat bushel was at a historical high of $11.13. One must remember that, year on year, that price was $6.29 on 13 April 2021. On 1 February 2022, it was $7,5. On 22 February 2022 and, on the eve of the war, it was $8.4. Hence, in 48 days, the price of wheat skyrocketed to $11.13 (“40 Year Historical Chart”, Macrotrends, April 13 2022).

So the increase rate for wheat prices almost doubled from one month to the other since the start of the war and the disruption of the Russian and Ukrainian export.

Furthermore, as we shall see now, this agricultural crisis is not only quantitative. It also takes a systemic dimension

Meet the US megadrought

Megadrought in Continental U.S.

The current megadrought affecting the American Midwest and SouthWest is becoming another driver of this systemic agricultural crisis. NOAA’s U.S. Drought Outlook establishes that more than 60% of the continental U.S. experiences minor to exceptional drought conditions (NOAA, “Spring Outlook: Drought to Expand in Warmer conditions, flood risk for Upper Midwest, Midwest, South East”, 17 March 202).

It must also be noted that there is a high risk of above than normal temperature during the coming spring and summer, which will combine with the 2022 La Nina. This means that, in the main U.S. agricultural regions, soils are going to be too dry, while water is and will be particularly expensive for farmers.

It also means that vegetation growth is going to slow down, while the risks of diminishing crop will be important (Karl Plume, “Plains drought to curb U.S wheat harvest, adding to global supplies worries, Reuters, 14 March 2022).

The War and the fertilizers

This risk is heightened by the pressure exerted by the war in Ukraine on the production, exports and prices of fertilizers, because of the blocking of the Belarus and Russian fertilizers exports in March, that triggered global prices hikes in March and April. For example, Belarus produces 16,5% and Russia produces 16,1% of the potassium potash global supply (Shelby Myers, Veronica Nigh, “Too Many to Count – Factors Driving Fertilizers Prices higher and Higher”, Market Intel, and Charlotte Hebebrand and David Laborde, “High fertilizers prices contribute to rising global food security concerns“, International Food Policy Institute, April 25, 2022 ).

Even more importantly, Russia represents 16,1% of the global exports of nitrogen. Belarus represents 18,5% of the global potassium potash exports, while Russia’s share is 16,5%. Following the sanctions in February and March, as well as the Russian export restrictions during the same period, the shortage of their fertilizers production has impacted agricultural giants such as the U.S., India, Egypt, China, while triggering a violent price hike (“America’s largest Farm Cooperative Warns Sanctions May Spark Fertilizers Shortages”, ZeroHedge, 07 April, 2022).

Combination

This overall situation is worsened by the harsh 2021-2022 U.S. winter season. The polar vortex and harsh winds episode that hammered the “wheat belt” was so violent that the winds swept away some of the rich top soils that ensure the success of crops (Karl Plume, ibid). As it happens, those episodes also signal the dryness of soils.

Those different extreme weather events, such as the intensity of the megadrought and of the polar vortex, also signal the worsening of climate change and combine themselves with the economic consequences of the war in Ukraine (Jean-Michel Valantin, “What are Climate Wars ?”, The Red Team Analysis Society, 2 November 2021).

The war-U.S. megadrought nexus also drives a global geopolitical risk, because of the lasting global food prices crisis it may trigger.

Towards the great destabilization?

Wheat prices and revolution

One must keep in mind that wheat prices have a social and political crucial importance. This is especially true in countries where bread is the basic staple of the population. It defines the ability of families and individuals to feed themselves, or not. It is the case, for example, of the Arab countries .

In this context, it is important to remember that the 2011 “Arab springs” were preceded by serious wheat and bread price hikes. Those were triggered by two to three years of extreme weather events combined with financial speculation (Werrell and Femia, The Arab Spring and Climate Change, 2013).

Indeed, on 10 January 2011, when bread riots started in Tunisia, the price of wheat was $7.73. The riots spread to Egypt, Lebanon, Syria. They became the trigger for massive political opposition movements to the regimes in power. Nowadays, the current price hikes are higher and climb more quickly (“40 Year Historical Chart”, Macrotrends, April 13, 2022).

The War in Ukraine and oil prices

The problem is that this agricultural products prices inflation happens while energy prices also rise. The “post” Covid economic recovery drives a rapid growth in oil and gas demand, thus driving energy prices higher.

As it happens, the war in Ukraine triggers an overheating of oil prices. The prices err between $96 and $120 since the start of the war. (Scott Patterson and Sam Goldfarb, “Why are gasoline prices so high? Ukraine-Russia  War Sparks Increases Across the U.S“, Wall Street Journal, 1 April, 2022).

So, the energy-agricultural prices are taking societies into a “pincer movement” that puts under pressure entire societies. This “pincer” amplifies dynamics of political polarization in numerous and major countries.

Indeed, the basic function of a state and its rulers is to protect their nations and people. If they fail, their legitimacy, power and authority decrease and the level of domestic violence rise (Norbert Elias, The Civilizing process, vol.II, State Formation and Civilization, 1982).

Food Riots

That is precisely what happened at the start of the Arab Springs and that appears to be starting again. For example, since March 2022, riots and protests have taken place in Iran and Iraq. Riots also took place in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Peru, against the prices of bread and energy. (Bamo Nouri, “Iraq food protests against spiralling prices echo early stages of Arab Spring”, 16 March 2022, Kayhan-London, “Protests in Iran risk spreading as Ukraine war triggers global food crisis”, Worldcrunch, April 11 2022, Julia Horowitz, “From Pakistan to Peru, Soaring food and fuel prices are tipping countries over the edge”, CNN Business, April 9, 2022 )

In Egypt, food prices are soaring as the government seeks to replace wheat imports from Ukraine and Russia. At the beginning of March, Egypt had only four months of stocks of wheat (Michael Tanchum, “The Russia-Ukraine War has turned Egypt’s food crisis into an existential threat to the economy”, Middle East Institute-MEI@75, March 3, 2022).

Furthermore, the current situation is also pitting nations against one another in order to access agricultural goods, fertilizers and food. Indeed, in order to weather the global agricultural-energy-food crisis, China is hoarding 51% of the world wheat reserves.

It is also hoarding all other sorts of cereals, while the Chinese winter wheat crop is dramatically bad. This China’s food security policy puts India, the other giant consumer of wheat, under pressure, as well as the rest of the world. (Andrew Whitelaw, “Big Wheat Trouble in Big China”, Thomas Elder Market, 14 March 2022)

The Time Issue

A major hurdle is the duration of this crisis. The longer it will last, the more the domestic and international tensions will grow. The problem is that the war in Ukraine may last beyond the next plantation and harvest cycle.

In the meantime, there is a very strong probability that extreme weather events are going to keep on hammering agricultural regions all around the world (“How will La Nina impact 2022 agricultural production?”, Feed and Grain, Feb 17, 2022).

For example, since the beginning of March 2022, India (1,3 billion people strong) and Pakistan (207,7 millions people strong) are going through the worst and longest heatwave in a century. On 30 April, temperatures reached 49 °C in Jacobabad in Pakistan, getting very close to the limits of human biological tolerance. This heatwave is already causing massive damages to the wheat harvest that could be 20% lower than in 2021 (Manavi Kapur, “India’s extreme heatwave is already thwarting Modi’s plan to “feed the world”“, Quartz, 28 April 2022).

Symmetrically, the raging war in Ukraine may have dramatic effects on the 2022 crops in this country. Those result, for example, from the mobilization of some farmers to fight against the Russian troops. They also result from the degradation of numerous fields by the battles, and from the destruction of farms and of numerous roads and bridges.

To add insult to injury, the Ukrainian farmers also suffer from the fuels and fertilizers prices rise triggered in March and April (Tyler Durden, “Shocking estimates shows Ukraine crop harvest could be halved”, ZeroHedge, April 10, 2022).

This chronic and drastic mitigation of the Ukraine and Russian agricultural exports is also going to combine with the coming effects of the 2022 La Nina. This cyclic weather phenomenon, amplified by climate change, may degrade the Brazilian and Argentinian crops through floods and drought (John Barany, DTN Meteorologist, “South American corns, soybeans: La Nina continues to affect crops”, AgFax, February 11, 2022).

Hunger Wars on the Horizon?

Hence, numerous governments may face a physical impossibility to feed their populations. Those situations are most likely to unleash severe unrest as well as important migrations. Those, in turn, will be politically polarizing in attractor countries. We may even wonder if this is not already the case in Europe or in the United States.

It becomes perfectly possible that we may have to face large scale international food competition, if not hunger wars, in the near future. Those will oppose societies with access to food to those with less capabilities.


Featured image: Photo military journalist Taras Gren, 12 September 2015, Anti-terrorist operation in eastern Ukraine (War Ukraine)- Ministry of Defense of Ukraine – CC BY-SA 2.0


Advanced Training in Early Warning Systems & Indicators – ESFSI in Tunisia

(Art design: Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli)

At the end of March 2022, the Ecole Supérieure des Forces de Sécurité Intérieure (ESFSI) of the Home Ministry of Tunisia organised its fourth intensive training on early warning systems & indicators. It is part of its programme on the “management of social conflict.”

This time, we set up with the management of the ESFSI an advanced course. It followed on the training delivered in October. Dr Hélène Lavoix trained the officers in an intensive 40-hour programme focusing on tutorials and the use of early warning software, with lots of practice on domestic security issues.

Congratulations to all the trainees for their ability to quickly master a software that many others found difficult and for their commitment. Thanks to the many in-depth and extremely interesting discussions with the trainees and the executive management of the ESFSI, to say nothing of their amazing hospitality, this week was a high level, high quality workshop.

For the first time, considering the improvement of the sanitary context, the program was live and not through Zoom. If virtual training is indeed convenient, it was nonetheless easier and more pleasant to have a direct contact with trainees. The mix between real life sessions and virtual ones could truly become a real asset to keep in the years to come.

The programme was supported by the European project “Counter-terrorism in Tunisia” via CIVIPOL. The first session took place in August 2020, the second in March 2021 and the third in October 2021.

Nuclear Battlefields in Ukraine – Anthropocene Wars (2)

A nuclear theatre of operations

(Art Direction: Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli
Image: Recognize Productions via Pexels).

On 24 February 2022, at the very start of Russian offensive against Ukraine, after a two days battle, the Russian forces took over the Chernobyl power plant, where the historic nuclear accident occurred in 1986 (Mary Kekatos, “Seizure of Chernobyl plant by Russian troops sparks health concerns for people near the nuclear plant”, ABC News, 26 February, 2022 and Adam Higginbotham, Midnight in Chernobyl, 2019).

Then, on 4 March 2022, the Russian forces shot shells at an administrative building of the huge Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant. Zaporizhzhia is the biggest nuclear power plant in Europe and the ninth in the world. It produces 20% of the Ukraine’s electricity (“Ukraine: nuclear plant fire extinguished, Russia seizes site”, DW, 4-03-22).

These two conventional battles signal a singular state of things, because they intersect military situations with nuclear power plants landscapes. As it happens, these situations reveal the way nuclear power creates a caesura in the biophysical history of our planet.

So, these battles raise the question of their operational and strategic meaning. Why did the Russian troops seized a nuclear power plant? How and why controlling the production and the flows of electricity in Ukraine is an important war aim? And what does it reveal about the Russian strategy in Ukraine? Finally, and more generally, what do these battle reveal about the state of our changing planet, in a time when “novel entities” such as nuclear products are transgressing planetary boundaries ?

Nuclear power plants battles: what is it good for ?

Assault

On 24 February, the first day of the Russian attack on Ukraine, the Russian forces seized the Chernobyl exclusion zone. They also took the neighbouring ghost city of Pripyat. It appears that this operation was part of the opening of corridors by the Russian forces. Those corridors led the Russian forces towards Kiev.

This news came as a shock. Indeed, the Chernobyl exclusion zone corresponds to the area primarily affected by the 1986 historic nuclear accident. This area is still going through a fifty years long decommissioning progress. There, numerous sites still know important radio nucleides levels.

One hypothesis we can make is that settling temporarily in this region allowed the Russian forces, for a time, to dissuade any strike against them, because such strikes could mean the release of clouds of radiative dust. It could also trigger forest fires in the “Red Forest” around the decommissioned plant. That would generate radiative smoke (Michael Kodas, “Chernobyl is not the only nuclear threat Russia’s invasion has sparked in Ukraine”, Inside Climate News, February 26, 2022). However, since 1 April 2022, the Russian troops left Chernobyl and no forest fire was detected (“Unprotected Russian soldiers disturbed radioactive dust in Chernobyl’s Red Forest, workers say“, Reuters, March 29, 2022).

One week later, on 3 March 2022, Russian troops took control of the Zapporizhzhia nuclear power plant. The plant’s location is on the Dniepr, in the south-east of Ukraine. The Zapporizhzhia plant produces 20% of Ukraine electricity and is part of the Kherson oblast (“district”). Its location is part of one of the main axis for the Russian forces in the south east (“Russia troops take control of the Zapporizhzhyia nuclear plant in Ukraine”, Power Technology, 4 March 2022).

The administrative buildings were the main target of the shelling and assault. No structural damage occurred as far as the reactor part of the plant is concerned. The fire that started in the administrative building  was quickly extinguished. No nuclear material was released release (Charles S. Davis and Sinoad baker, “Ukraine says Russia seized its largest nuclear power plant, but radiation levels are stable”, Business Insider, March 4, 2022) .

In the meantime, on 3 March , the Russian Army seized Kherson, the district capital (“Russian troops seize key Ukrainian port city of Kherson”, The Quint, 3 March 2022).

Strange warfare in a strange place

While Zapporizhzhia is active, the Chernobyl area is still the dangerous site of a major civil nuclear accident.

For example, the forests, fields and soils around the Chernobyl plant are ecosystems that have integrated the 1986 massive release of radio nucleides in a very complex way. Hence the “exclusion zone” status (Kate Brown, Manual for Survival: a Chernobyl guide to the future, 2020).

According to the Ukraine Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency, the consequence of the assault was a spike in gamma ray emissions. However, there has been no clear description of this release since the assault (Agencies, “ Chernobyl radiation rise detected, as Russian military kicks up dust, says nuke agency”, Times of Israel, 25 February 2022).

The Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency International Atomic observed a spike of 9,46 micro sieverts per hour on 25 February: this very low level of radiation remained well in the “safe operating level” (1000 micro sivierts equal 1 millisierts. One millisieverts is a safe level for population, Safety Standards, IAEA).

In addition to this confusing situation, the Russian troops stopped the transfer of the daily datas necessary for measuring radioactivity. Thus, this situation worried the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA says it loses contact with Chernobyl Nuclear data system“, France 24, 9 March 2022).

The International body will send a mission to investigate the situation on the site after the departure of the Russian troops (“IAEA says it a preparing a mission to Chernobyl after the Russian pull-out”, Reuters, Mach 31, and (Kate Brown, Manual for Survival: a Chernobyl guide to the future, 2020, Mari Saito and Ju Min Park, “Seizure of Chernobyl nuclear plant sparks worries about radiation monitoring”, Reuters, March 4, 2022).

For its part, the seizure of the Zapporizhzhya has a strategic meaning, if we look at it within the context of the Russian strategic framework, as we shall now see.

Renewing the Russian operative strategy

The Russian angle

Starting in the 1920s, then during World War II and the Cold War the Russian defence ministry has developed strategic notions that integrate military means with other ones, such as economic ones, in what is called “operative strategy” frameworks (“Transformation in Russian and Soviet military History, Proceedings of the Twelfth military Symposium“, USAF Academy, 1986 and David Glantz, Soviet Military operational Art: in pursuit of deep battle – Military theory and practice, 2012 ). 

War is a competition not only between armies, but between the economic, industrial and political national systems behind these armies. The goal is to dramatically degrade the cohesion of the opposite system, in order to make it incapable to wage war.

In this perspective, the use of military forces is to fragment the enemy forces and territory (Stephen Covington, The culture of strategic thought behind Russia’s approaches to warfare, Belfer Center – Harvard University, 2016). Meanwhile, the Russian strategy uses other kinds of forces to disorganize the economic depth of the adversary. The goal is to degrade the enemy’s fighting means as well as its fighting will.

Indeed, the recent report “Russian military strategy: core tenets and operational concepts” reminds of the fluidity between defense and offense in an operative strategy perspective (Michael Kofman et al., Russian military strategy: core tenets and operational concepts, CNA, 2021).

It also highlights that:

“The theory of victory [of the Russian strategy] is premised on degrading the military-economic potential of opponents, focusing on critically important objects, to affect the ability and will of an adversary to sustain a fight, as opposed to ground offensives to seize territory or key terrain.

The calculus is that the center of gravity lies in degrading a state’s military and economic potential, not seizing territory”

War by other means

If we use that framework, the assaults on both nuclear power plants take on a strategic meaning. Putting the Zapporizhzhya plant under Russian control confers to the Russian military the power to “switch off” electricity distribution.

So, the Russian authorities have the “power” to deprive of electricity millions of homes, industries, and sanitary infrastructures. Thus, controlling the plant is tantamount to degrade the economic potential as well as the life conditions of millions of people, and thus the Ukrainian capability to wage war. In other terms, it fragments the Ukrainian economic and social life.

It also triggers a territorial fragmentation, between zones with or without electricity distribution.

However, if this whole situation emerges from strategic conditions, it also has a deeper meaning related to the new condition of our planet.

Battles of the “novel entity”

The Anthropocene and nuclear warfare

As we saw, the singular aspect of these battles is rooted in the association between warfare and the nuclear dimension of the contemporary world. This singular dimension is inherent to the development of the nuclear military and civil power since the implementation of the Manhattan project and the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagazaki.

Indeed, as the geologist Jan Zalasiewic and his team established, there is micron thin and ubiquitous sliver of artificial nuclear material that covers emerged land. This layer results from the multiple nuclear essays that took place since the first test explosion in 1944 in New Mexico. (Sarah Griffiths, “Dawn of the Anthropocene era: new geological epoch began with testing of the atomic bomb, experts claim”, Mail On Line, 16 January 2015). It is a definitive signal of the emergence of a new geological era, the “Anthropocene era” (Waters, Zalasiewicz et al., “The Anthropocene is functionally and stratigraphically distinct from the Holocene”, Science, 08 January 2016).

Since 1945 the convergence of warfare and nuclear power plants has occurred several times. For example, in 1980, the Israeli Air Force destroyed Osirak, the nuclear power plant that the Saddam Hussein government was building (Or Rabinowitz and Giordana Pulcini, “The Israeli raid against the Iraq reactor – 40 years later: new insights from the archives”, Woodrow Wilson Centre, June 3, 2021). 

Indeed, “Anthropocene warfare” is a twofold warfare condition. On one hand, it is warfare waged since the emergence of the Anthropocene. On the other hand, and in the same dynamic, some ways of warfare induce a transgression of the “planetary boundaries” (Kate Brown, Chapter 8 – Very recent history and the nuclear Anthropocene, Cambridge University Press, 24 March 2022).

Nuclear power and the transgression of planetary boundaries

Those are defined by the report: “Planetary boundaries: Exploring the safe operating space for humanity”. This report, led by Johann Rockstrom, director of the Stockholm Resilience Center was a conceptual breakthrough ( Ecology and Society, 2009) and The Nine Planetary Boundaries, Stockholm Resiliency Centre.

The research team defined nine “planetary boundaries”, which must not be overstepped. Indeed, overstepping them would fundamentally alter the collective life conditions of humanity. If crossed, these thresholds would be nothing but “tipping points” towards deeply changed life conditions on Earth (“Avoid Tipping over, Human activity could give rise to planetary-scale ecological regime shifts”, Stockholm Resiliency Centre).

The nine boundaries are “climate change; rate of biodiversity loss (terrestrial and marine); interference with the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles; stratospheric ozone depletion; ocean acidification; global freshwater use; change in land use; chemical pollution; and atmospheric aerosol loading” (Ibid).

The report warned that three of these thresholds, i.e. climate change, the biodiversity crisis and the interferences with the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, are already crossed (Hélène Lavoix, “Climate Change, Planetary Boundaries and Geopolitical Change”, The Red Team Analysis Society) .

Since then, research centers, especially the Stockholm Resiliency centre, have built upon these initial concepts. Among these boundaries, there is the injection in the injection of “novel entities”, i.e pollution by transformed or artificial products.

As it happens, industrial radio nucleides are typical of the “novel entity” family and their injection in the environment crosses planetary boundaries (The Nine Planetary Boundaries and Claire Asher, “Novel chemical entities: Are we sleepwalking through a planetary boundary ?“, Mongabay, 23 September 2021).

Hence, the Ukraine war integration of nuclear plants to a conventional battlefield is a new signal of the convergence of war with the “novel entity” constituted by nuclear power and materials on our rapidly changing planet. In other words, these battles are a new signal for the “anthropocene warfare” era that started with the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in by the US Army in 1945.

As such, they are also a reminder of the risks induced by the ongoing process of overstepping one of the “planetary boundaries”.

The East Seas Security Sigils

The aim of the East Seas Security Sigils is to be a daily scan focusing on security in the East Seas, as explained below.

We are currently investigating new AI ways to deliver an even better East Seas Security Sigils. The original complimentary version ran from May 2012 to April 2023.

A brief presentation

The East Seas Security Sigils aims to allow monitoring easily with open source what is happening in the East Seas, beyond an exclusive focus on Taiwan. As a scan, it helps following impacts of actions, and their potential for escalation and stabilisation (read Horizon Scanning and Monitoring for Warning: Definition and Practice).

Considering the risk of spill-over from one problem onto the other, the East Seas Security Sigils focuses on potential and actual tensions in the East China Sea, the East Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk, thus taking Northeast Asia as unit of analysis. Northeast Asia, then, should also be considered in its larger regional and global dimension.

In these three “East Seas”, we find territorial disputes involving Japan*, and stemming from history, which are, namely:

  • The dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (China and Taiwan/Japan) – Read also Helene Lavoix, “From the Diaoyu Islands, with Warning
  • The dispute over the Liancourt Rocks (Japan/South Korea)
  • The dispute over the Southern Kuril Islands (Japan/Russia)
map of the disputed areas around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Liancourt Rocks, Kuril Islands

The Sigils are a series of scans exploring the horizon for weak signals related to various issues relevant to the security of societies, polities, nations and citizens.

*China/Taiwan and South Korea/North Korea issues are not here the prime focus of interest. Understanding the other stakes in the region is nonetheless key for a better comprehension of tensions around Taiwan, and more generally in the region.

Featured image: A map of the capitals of the past dynasties – Modern Signature Honil Gangri Yeokdae National Road Map Call Code 假108 Author (Chinese) 權近 外 … [等著] Compilation (Hangul) Kwon Geun et al. ] Year of publication 1402 (Taejong 2) Publisher [Unknown publisher] Number of books 1 book Size 158 x 168 cmThe original material is the director of Ryukoku University in Japan, and the Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies is a colored copy of Professor Lee Chan. Original: Quan Jinwai Prof. Chan Lee’s color reproduction., Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

From the Diaoyu Islands, with Warning

The problem

The disputed area Diaoyu Islands / Senkaku Islands

The sea area around the Diaoyu Islands, including islets around the island located at 25° 44′ 41.49″ N, 123° 28′ 29.79″ E, constitutes a disputed territory as China, with Taiwan, and Japan claim sovereignty over it. The Japanese call those Islands Senkaku, while in Chinese their name is Diao (ou Tiao) Yu Tai (meaning “fishing platform”), and the very name one chooses for those islands is already a quasi-acknowledgement of one or the other claim.

Regularly, Chinese and Japanese authorities, as well as Taiwanese ones, denounce incursion in the area of vessels and airplanes of a contending country, while themselves asserting their claims by penetrating the zone. An instance of a case of escalating tension took place on 10 September 2012. Then, Japan announced its purchase of part of the Diaoyu Islands to a family that had claimed ownership on them in the 1970s. The Japanese nationalisation led to strong protests at various levels from China, which considers the Islands to be part of its territory, indeed part of Taiwan. The situation became rapidly tense and grew worse, as each time a move is made in one of the disputed sea areas in the region.

With each action in these areas, we are faced with escalation, which depends upon each player’s perceptions, actions, interpretations of others’ actions and reactions.

The players

The players, in terms of countries, are China, including Taiwan, Japan, the US, the two Koreas, Russia. For each of them, we must not only consider strategic and bilateral actions and interactions at classical official level (Prime Minister, Foreign Ministry, Defence, Military, Parties, etc.), but also dynamics of domestic (and local) politics, including citizens and socio-political mobilization. Meanwhile, the overall systemic global and regional strategic context, must not be forgotten.

We shall here solely focus on China and on a single but absolutely determining aspect of its perceptions.

A key to China’s perceptions

Norms and beliefs constitute the lenses through which a society or group comprehend the world (Scott, 1985; Elias, 1989; Anderson, 1991; Pye, 1996;  Camroux, 1997). Understanding them is crucial to evaluate future interpretations, positions and thus actions (as well as to explain the past and the present), as shown by Jervis (1970, 1976) with his studies of images, perception and misperception in international politics. Those norms and beliefs are historically constructed (Elias, 1989); each can interact with all the others, creating complex systems – indeed we can call them complexes (Lavoix, 2005).

Regarding the problem of the Diaoyu Islands, two sets of norms or complexes are crucial in the Chinese perception and are highly likely to strongly contribute to determine what will happen next.

A norm of sovereignty constructed during the “century of shame and humiliation”

First and foremost, there is the Chinese perception of sovereignty, that comes with the will, indeed the perceived imperative necessity for survival, to overcome the “century of shame and humiliation.”

This dark period of Chinese history, when the Chinese World Order of the time collapsed and, worse, when the very foundation of what it means to be Chinese was questioned and had to be reinvented (Lin Yü-Sheng, 1979; Elvin, 1990; Yu Keping, 1994), started with the 1839 Opium War and the 1842 treaty of Nanking (Nanjing). In November 1839 the British defeated the Chinese at the battle of Chuenpi. They threatened to bombard Nanking and thus led the Chinese to sign the first treaty settlements. From then on evolved the imposition by “the West”* upon China of the (unequal) Treaty Port system. Under this system the number of cities and towns that opened to foreign trade under one legal status or another rose from five in 1842 to ninety-two in 1917; among them, foreign settlements where the sovereignty was attributed to the foreign power were established in 16 treaty ports (Feuerwerker 1983: 128-129).

As a result, considering the pre-existing Chinese values, world-view and system, China had to face a long agony implying a deep re-evaluation of its society. It experienced inner turmoil from the Taiping rebellion (1851-1864) to nationalism and the establishment of the 1912 Republic of China under the backdrop of increasing political upheavals. Paralleling external changes occurred that were, in the Chinese view, expressions of the crumbling of an order. Notably, the “loss of Japan” took place with the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 and marked the necessity to re-conceptualize the Chinese world-view (Howland, 1996:240-241). The Chinese defeat resulted in the 1895 treaty of Maguan with Japan and implied also the “loss of Korea,” while Japan started benefiting from the treaty port system. Japan rose as new power, changing the regional – and soon global – strategic configuration (Iryie, 1965, 1974).

While China was still struggling to see the treaties revised and extra-territoriality abrogated, it had to face an increasingly hostile and encroaching Japan, actualized with the 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria. Despite all its efforts, despite even the 1937 Nanjing massacre at the hands of the Imperial Japanese army, China could not obtain support from the international society, then represented by the League of Nations, because its status was not recognised; China’s acceptation in the “Family of Civilized Nations” would only be granted, finally, in 1942 (Gong, 1984a).

As the construction, for China, of the norms of sovereignty, territoriality and independence (the normative attributes of statehood in the current of international society of states) was done through the historical experience of the “century of shame and humiliation,” which included experiences of threat to survival, any related issue will bring to the fore perceptions of extreme danger. In the case of the Diaoyu islands, the fact that the perceived aggression – in 2012 or in any other similar case – is done by Japan may only increase this feeling, notably considering the often tense relations between Japan and China and repeated denials of history by some Japanese actors.

Geography as narrative: historical iconography and mapping

The second crucial element of perception that is operating in the problem of the Diaoyu Islands is the fact that Chinese geography was, traditionally, not only and not so much constituted of iconography, as for modern geography, but of narratives (Howland, 1996). Those narratives, be they “poetic” or “expository” (Howland, 1996), tell history and, as geography was transformed into mapping and maps, it may only continue to be imbued with its original content (Thongchai, 1994), thus, in the case of China, with history. Thus the geographical aspect of the Diaoyu Islands problem will only enhance its historical dimension, and immediately be linked to beliefs related to sovereignty and territoriality.

Indeed, taking the 2012 case as example, if we follow the Chinese actions for establishing their rights to the eyes of the world on the Diaoyu islands, we can see that it is partly done through a mix of modern mapping, history and historical iconography, using the medium of the virtual world of the world wide web. The special coverage done online at the time by China Central Television (CCTV.com) is an example in kind of this approach as shown in the picture below:

Chinese Proofs that the Diaoyu Islands belong to China - CCTV

Meanwhile, more classical official “thematic maps” were being issued (Xinhua, 18 Sept 2012) and any official statement, including the 25 September 2012 White Paper – Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China, abundantly used history as evidence.

As a conclusion: Warning

With confidence, we can thus estimate that China (and Chinese people) will remain strong on their positions and never abandon their sovereignty on what they perceive as part of their territory.

Any action, including in terms of statements, that would try to force them to do otherwise, or would seem to go in this direction, or that would appear to favour Japan and Japanese actors’ assertions could only be perceived as aggressive moves and thus generate escalating actions.

On the contrary, China could and can accommodate existing status quo as they do not question its sovereignty, thus do not threaten its survival. As a result, actions that would prompt a return to status quo, when escalation starts would be stabilizing. This is the opposite of the failure of appeasement when faced with a territorially aggressive and expansionist actor.

———-

* “The West” is a shorthand, as the nations who benefited from the Treaty Port System were not only the initial powers (France, the U.K. and the U.S.) and most of European countries (Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Prussia then Germany, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, Norway, Russia, etc.) but also, most importantly, Japan from 1895.

———–

Featured image: The China Marine Surveillance cutter “Haijian 66” and the Japan Coast Guard cutter “Kiso” confronted each other near the Diaoyu Islands. 24 September 2012, By 中国海监总队/China Marine Surveillance (中国海监总队/China Marine Surveillance) [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

References

Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities, (London: Verso, 1991).

Beijing Review Timeline, Special coverage on the Diaoyu Islands.

Camroux, David, “Des nations imaginées à la région rêvée,” (From the Imagined Nations to the Dreamed Region) in L’Asie Retrouvée, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1997).

Cheng-China Huang, Diaoyu Islands Dispute, ICE Case Studies, June 1997.

Cohen, Paul A, History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience and Myth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

Elias, Norbert The Germans: Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed. By Michael Schröter, (first published in Germany in 1989 as Studien über die Deutschen, translated from German by Eric Dunning and Stephen Mennell), (Cambridge UK: Polity Press, 1989, [1996]).

Fairbank, John K. and Goldman, Merle, China: a New History, (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1998).

Fairbank, John K., “A Preliminary Framework” in The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations, ed. by Fairbank John K. and Co. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 1- 19.

Fairbank, John K., “The Early Treaty System in the Chinese World Order” in The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations, ed. by Fairbank John K. and Co. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 257 – 275.

Fairbank, John K., ed. 1983. The Cambridge History of China Vol.12: Republican China 1912-1949, Part 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Feuerwerker, Albert, “The Foreign Presence in China,” In Fairbank, ed. 1983, 128-207.

Gong, Gerrit W., “China’s Entry into International Society,” in The Expansion of International Society, ed. by Bull Hedley and Watson Adam, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984a).

Gong, Gerrit W., The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984b).

Howland, D. R., Borders of Chinese Civilization: Geography and History at Empire’s End, (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1996).

Iriye, Akira, After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965). Reprinted: (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1990).

Iriye, Akira, The Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1974).

Ito, Masami, “Owner OK with metro bid to buy disputed Senkaku Islands,” The Japan Times Online, Friday, May 18, 2012

Jia, Ruixue, The Legacies of Forced Freedom: Chinai’s Treaty Ports, IIES, Stockholm University, Review of Economics and Statistics, January 20, 2011.

Lavoix, Helene, ‘Nationalism’ and ‘genocide’ : the construction of nation-ness, authority, and opposition – the case of Cambodia (1861-1979) – PhD Thesis – School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London), 2005.

Lin Yü-Sheng, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Antitraditionalism in the May Fourth Era, (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin press, 1979).

Mark Elvin, “The Double Disavowal: The attitudes of the Radical Thinkers to the Chinese Tradition,” in China and the West: Ideas and Activists ed. by David S. G. Goodman, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990).

Pye, Lucien W., “Memory, Imagination and National Myths,” in Remembering and Forgetting: The Legacy of War and Peace in East Asia, Ed. by Gerrit W. Gong, (Washington D.C.: CSIS, 1996).

Scott, James C., Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

Shambaugh, David,  China’s Identity as a Major Power, George Washington University.

So, Yip et al, “Modern China’s Treaty-port Economy in Institutional Perspective,” Paper presented at the Panel on The Legacy of Treaty Ports, Asia-Pacific Economic and Business History Conference, jointly organized by All-University of California Group in Economic History and the Economic History Society of Australia and New Zealand, held at Berkeley, CA, February 18-20, 2011.

Tongchai Wichinakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation, (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1994).

Xinhua, China issues thematic map on Diaoyu Islands, September 18, 2012.

Yu Keping, “Culture and Modernity in Chinese Thought in the 1930’s: Comments on two Approaches to Modernization in China,” Working Papers in Asian/Pacific Studies, (Beijing: Institute of Contemporary Marxism, 1994).

A FAQ on Geopolitics, Strategic Foresight, Early Warning… and more

What is strategic foresight?

Strategic Foresight is a process and a methodology of analysis. It seeks to anticipate the future, and to reduce the potential for surprise in an actionable way. It is crucial for preparedness.

What is the process of strategic foresight?

Strategic Foresight and Warning is an organized and systematic process to reduce uncertainty regarding the future that aims at allowing policy-makers and decision-makers to take decisions with sufficient lead time to see those decisions implemented at best.
It is now very similar to risk management.

What is strategic foresight analysis?

SF&W analysis is an analysis that will use all valid methodologies to develop an understanding, grounded in reality, of the future, useful to decision-makers and policy-makers for carrying out their mission. The objective is to avoid surprise, and thus to be prepared.

What is foresight analysis?

Foresight analysis is an analysis that seeks to anticipate the future.
Stricto sensu, in the English-speaking world, “foresight” tends to be used for issues that are technical, for R&D, and for technical innovation. It is a part of the larger strategic foresight family of anticipatory activities.
In French, “foresight”, which is translated by “prospective”, corresponds to the scientific activity concerned with the anticipation of the future. It relies on various methodologies and emphasises causality.

What is forecasting?

Forecasting refers to the use of quantitative techniques, notably statistics, to anticipate the future.

Why is foresight important?

Foresight is crucial to avoid surprises, as these may have catastrophic impacts on objectives. Foresight allows us to anticipate threats and dangers. As a result we can take timely adequate actions to mitigate the impact of these dangers. Foresight is the only tool that allows for preparedness, especially when uncertainty abounds. Foresight, finally, allows turning uncertainty and the future into opportunities. Foresight is crucial for survival and for success.

What is risk management?

Risk management is the management of “The effect of uncertainty on objectives”, according to the definition of the International Standard Organisation (ISO 31000:2018). It notably includes the steps of contextualising the risk, assessing the risk and treating the risk.

What is horizon scanning?

Horizon scanning is the same as strategic foresight, and similar to risk management. It is a process to reduce uncertainty regarding the future for decision-makers and policy-makers. It is a label that is especially used in the U.K., as well as in Singapore.

What is red team analysis?

Red team analysis, red teaming or red teaming activity was used initially in the U.S. Army to simulate the activity of opponents in war-gaming and strategic simulations
By extension, Red Team Analysis aims at promoting a strategic foresight analysis grounded in science that struggles against our many cognitive, normative and emotional biases through various tools and methodologies, including not being limited by “politically correct” approaches.
Interestingly in the Soviet Union, during the Cold War, similar activities were called Blue or Green Team activity.

What is political risk?

Political risks are all events that are linked to the political system of a country and may impact the objectives of an actor notably through uncertainty and change.
Most consultancy and experts take a narrow approach to political risks and focus exclusively on elections, political parties, elite politics and legal system. This is a very partial approach as much is missed, thus increasing the risks for the actors. Check our video explaining in detail what is political risk.

What is geopolitical risk?

Geopolitical risks is a term used to cover all risks related to the impact of international politics and international relations on the objectives of actors, notably through change and uncertainty. For example, we have risks related to interstate wars, diplomatic raws, sanctions, as well as competition for international influence, competition for power among international actors. More broadly, from the point of view of an actor, every event external to the society (country) of this actor can be seen as potentially generating a “geopolitical” or external risk. Furthermore, internal or domestic events may also potentially generate events which are external and then, in turn, create a “geopolitical” risk for a country.
Global risks, such as those linked to pandemic and epidemic, energy security, water security, climate change etc. can be seen as having geopolitical dimensions.

The Water Sigils

The aim of the Water Sigils is to be a daily scan focusing on water security.

We are currently investigating new AI ways to deliver an even better Water Sigils. The original complimentary version ran from May 2012 to April 2023.

The Sigils are a series of scans exploring the horizon for weak signals related to various issues relevant to the security of societies, polities, nations and citizens.

——–

Images: Shui (Eau) Sigil by Diderot, GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.2 or Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license; Featured image: Impact of drops of water in a water-surface by Marlon Felippe (Own work) [GFDL or CC-BY-SA-3.0-2.5-2.0-1.0], via Wikimedia Commons.

China, With or Against Russia?

(Art design: Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli)

Russia’s attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022 is profoundly changing the international order.

The shock is notably hard for countries such as the members of the European Union, who thought they would be at peace for ever. Suddenly, these countries, their economic actors and their citizens rediscover war and the pertinence of geopolitics. It is also the ideological basis of the creation and promotion of the European Union, that it brought and brings peace, that is under threat (see European Union, “Key European Union achievements and tangible benefits“, “Aims and Values“). The liberal paradigm of international relations is similarly deeply questioned (among many, Jonathan Cristol, “Liberalism“, Oxford Bibliographies, November 2019).

The spectre of nuclear war and MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction), i.e. the doctrine of deterrence, is again upon us, following Russian President Putin speech according to which he was “moving Russia’s nuclear deterrent to ‘special alert'”(e.g. Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. “mutual assured destruction“, Encyclopedia Britannica, 20 Dec. 2021; Nota: at the time of writing it was impossible to access normally the website of the President of Russia, hence we had to rely on secondary sources, BBC News, “Putin puts nuclear deterrent on ‘special alert’ during Ukraine conflict“, 27 February 2022).

Actually, these international changes have been slowly building up (e.g. Helene Lavoix, Towards a New Paradigm?, The Red Team Analysis Society, 2012; Graham Allison, “Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?“, Harvard Belfer Center project, 2015; Helene Lavoix, “The Paradox of U.S. Decline”, part 1, 2, 3, The Red Team Analysis Society, Oct and Nov 2017). Yet, for most, such tragic and upsetting changes were not imaginable. They probably remain actually impossible to truly fathom, despite posture and discourse. Deep down, many believe nothing will change and that we shall come back to the world ante.

How China responds to the Russian war in Ukraine and handles the evolution is one key element in what will come next.

On 25 February, China abstained but did not veto a U.S. and Albania sponsored draft resolution at the UN Security Council “intended to end the Russian Federation’s military offensive” (U.N. “Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Ending Ukraine Crisis, as Russian Federation Wields Veto“, Security Council, 8979th meeting, SC/14808; William Mauldin, “Russia Blocks U.N. Bid to End Ukraine Conflict; China Abstains From Vote“, Wall Street Journal, 25 February 22). India and the U.A.E also abstained, while obviously Russia vetoed the draft resolution (e.g, Zainab Fattah, “UAE Joined China, India in Abstaining on UN Ukraine Vote, Bloomberg, 26 Feb 22, The Indian express).

The U.S. and their allies, through media analysis interposed, were quick to hail China’s vote as a win and as an evidence of Russia’s growing isolation: “a move Western countries view as a win for showing Russia’s international isolation” (Michelle Nichols and Humeyra Pamuk, “Russia vetoes U.N. Security action on Ukraine as China abstains“, Reuters, 26 February 2022; Mauldin, WSJ, Ibid.).

Below are two short videos explaining better China’s current position on Ukraine and Russia. The first consists in the answers Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson gave to media after the invasion, on 25 February 22. The second, no less important published 23 February 22, shows the perception of the unfolding tension, as expressed by the Chinese Government’s sponsored international media Global Times. This vision is what China’s transmits to the world.

“Watch how Chinese FM spokesperson Hua Chunying reacted to the flood of questions on Ukraine Tensions at a press conference. It is the first time Hua Chunying has hosted a regular press conference since she was promoted to Assistant Foreign Minister.” – 25 February 2022 – Global Times
“The root cause of the sharp confrontation at the global strategic level is the US. The US has adopted an aggressive policy toward both China and Russia, which has driven global divisions. This is how the world is today” – Global Times – 23 February 22.

These videos show that it is unwise to assume that China is turning its back on Russia. For China, the U.S. are the real culprit behind the tragic evolution in Ukraine. China also highlights similarities of strategy between the way the U.S. handles Ukraine and Russia on the one hand, China and Taiwan on the other, while paying attention to stress the difference for the two situations.

As a result, it is highly likely that changes in the international order and related tension will not stop at Ukraine. In terms of influence, it is uncertain that the U.S. and the EU will see an improvement of their relative position.

Resources to Follow the War in Ukraine

(Last updated 28 Feb 22 20:50 CET: added access to UN General Assembly Live)
At 3:00 GMT Russia launched an attack on Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin dubbed it a “special military operation”. Immediately, part of the international community condemned this attack.

What is happening on the ground? How are events unfolding? How is the war evolving? What are the facts?

What most commentators seem to miss is that to understand what is happening and to anticipate what will happen, one needs:

  • To consider sources that must be as diverse as possible, and to know where information comes from, what news and statements mean, etc.
  • To take into account all actors and to look precisely at the chronology of interactions.

Then to be able to understand what is said or written, to comprehend the dynamics is part of the knowledge, skill and intelligence of the analyst.

To rely blindly on only one source of information and to rehash ad nauseam the same discourse is a recipe for disaster and self-fulfilling prophecies.

Here are a couple of resources (far from being exhaustive – we shall add new sources progressively), which will contribute to help you following events as seen and perceived from various side (with an effort to consider non-Western sources, as is at the core of a “red team” approach).

UN

WATCH LIVE (28 February 2022): United Nations General Assembly meets to debate Russia’s attack on Ukraine (by PBS on Youtube)

News

Maps and positions

  • LiveUAmap Ukraine (down at time of publishing) – Available as an app for smartphones (see FB page). Turn on notifications for being warned about each development gathered mainly from twitter or facebook. Check sources quality nonetheless, as pieces of information are automatically included.
Map of Ukraine by LiveUAmap 25 Feb 2022 12/27 CET.png
  • MilitaryMaps (on VK) – A crowdsourced initiative – Probably pro Russia / Ukrainian separatist Republics
MilitaryMaps – Ukraine 24 feb 22 6:59 am – showing some of the Russian attacks

Russia

Here are the terms used by President Putin (in a very long and interesting speech) to qualify the action in Ukraine:

“In this context, in accordance with Article 51 (Chapter VII) of the UN Charter, with permission of Russia’s Federation Council, and in execution of the treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Lugansk People’s Republic, ratified by the Federal Assembly on February 22, I made a decision to carry out a special military operation.
The purpose of this operation is to protect people who, for eight years now, have been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kiev regime. To this end, we will seek to demilitarise and denazify Ukraine, as well as bring to trial those who perpetrated numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including against citizens of the Russian Federation.
It is not our plan to occupy the Ukrainian territory….”

Address by the President of the Russian Federation, February 24, 2022, 06:00
The Kremlin, Moscow
  • Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation

Website – News (down since the start of the offensive against Ukraine)

Twitter: Министерство обороны Российской Федерации | Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation @mod_russia

Facebook – Минобороны России @mod.mil.rus  · Organisme gouvernemental

Briefing by Russian Defence Ministry spokesperson – 25 Feb 15:30 CET – For the text of the briefing, see directly the FB page

Ukraine

  • Ministry of defence of Ukrainenews

Today, on 24 of February, at 5.00 AM the armed forces of the Russian Federation launched an intensive shelling of our units on east, delivered missile/bomb strikes on airfields in Boryspil, Ozerne, Kulbakino, Chuhuiv, Kramatorsk, Chornobaivka, as well as on military infrastructure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. At the same time the aggressor started artillery shelling of the areas and settlements along the state border and administrative boundary with temporarily occupied territory of Crimea.

National Defence Forces, using the right for self-defence  according to the article 51 of the United Nations Charter are countering with dignity the enemy`s attempts to break through the state border. Situation is controlled. The Russian troops are suffering losses.

In the Joined Forces Operation area 5 aircraft and 2 helicopters of Russian Aerospace Forces were shot, two tanks were damaged, several trucks of the armed forces of the Russian Federation were destroyed.

The Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine gave orders to inflict the maximum losses to the aggressor.

There are no losses among the defenders of Ukraine.

We are on our land and we will not give it up!

Together to the Victory!

Address by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Lieutenant General Valery Zaluzhnyi, 2022-02-24 10:17:00 | ID: 66662

Twitter account: Defence of Ukraine @DefenceU

Facebook Page DPS Ukraine

China

GLOBALink | Latest footages taken by Chinese in Ukraine

U.S. and NATO

The prayers of the entire world are with the people of Ukraine tonight as they suffer an unprovoked and unjustified attack by Russian military forces….
I will be monitoring the situation from the White House this evening and will continue to get regular updates from my national security team. Tomorrow, I will meet with my G7 counterparts in the morning and then speak to the American people to announce the further consequences the United States and our Allies and partners will impose on Russia for this needless act of aggression against Ukraine and global peace and security. We will also coordinate with our NATO Allies to ensure a strong, united response that deters any aggression against the Alliance. Tonight, Jill and I are praying for the brave and proud people of Ukraine.

Statement by President Biden on Russia’s Unprovoked and Unjustified Attack on Ukraine, FEBRUARY 23, 2022 – nd

Nota: If we use the source of the message, we obtain the exact date and time: datetime=”2022-02-23T21:57:29-05:00″. An exactly similar information is not available on the Russian side, but the time given by the Russians is 6:00 Moscow Time, i.e. 3:00 GMT).
Hence, interestingly, President Biden statement was published 2,5 minutes before President Putin speech.

FACT SHEET: Joined by Allies and Partners, the United States Imposes Devastating Costs on Russia – 24 February 2022

President Biden to address Russia attacks Ukraine 24 February 22 –

I strongly condemn Russia’s reckless and unprovoked attack on Ukraine, which puts at risk countless civilian lives. Once again, despite our repeated warnings and tireless efforts to engage in diplomacy, Russia has chosen the path of aggression against a sovereign and independent country.

This is a grave breach of international law, and a serious threat to Euro-Atlantic security. I call on Russia to cease its military action immediately and respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. NATO Allies will meet to address the consequences of Russia’s aggressive actions. We stand with the people of Ukraine at this terrible time. NATO will do all it takes to protect and defend all Allies. 

NATO Secretary General statement on Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine
24 Feb. 2022 – Last updated: 24 Feb. 2022 04:42

UK

  • Ministry of Defence (MOD) of the United Kingdom

Facebook Page with regular updates on Ukraine situation

EU

Sanctions

U.S. Treasury Imposes Sanctions on Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov

U.S. Treasury Announces Unprecedented & Expansive Sanctions Against Russia, Imposing Swift and Severe Economic Costs

OFAC has also issued several general licenses in connection with these actions. In particular, payments for energy are from production to consumption. The sanctions and license package has been constructed to account for the challenges high energy prices pose to average citizens and doesn’t prevent banks from processing payments for them.

Specifically, OFAC issued eight general licenses authorizing certain transactions related to:

international organizations and entities;
agricultural and medical commodities and the COVID-19 pandemic;
overflight and emergency landings;
energy;
dealings in certain debt or equity;
derivative contracts;
the wind down of transactions involving certain blocked persons; and
the rejection of transactions involving certain blocked persons.

See the various ministries and presidencies of each member state.


A Short FAQ on Scenarios for Strategic Foresight, Early Warning and Risk Management

What is a scenario for strategic foresight, early warning and risk management?

For strategic foresight, early warning, risk management or any anticipatory methodology, a scenario is a fictionalized narrative set at a specific time in the future.
It answers a question about the future.
It is grounded in a detailed analysis of this question.

Can I use scenario for preparedness?

Yes, indeed. Scenarios are the best tools to be fully ready and prepared for the future and for uncertainty.
The highest the level of uncertainty, the most important scenarios become.

What is the use of scenarios?

Scenarios allow you to plan ahead, implement your responses and thus to be prepared for the changes to come.
They are the ideal tool to make sure preparedness is optimal.

What is scenario analysis in risk management?

Scenario analysis is a methodology through which you analyse a question regarding the future, notably its key uncertainties.
Through this method you build a set of fictionalised narratives that outline the cone of possible futures. Scenario analysis is similar to scenario building.

Is there a way to know if scenarios are good?

Yes, if your scenarios are built according to a proper methodology then they will be valid.
There are points to check to evaluate if scenarios are valid or not, as explained in this article: “Are your Strategic Foresight Scenarios Valid?“.

Do you need a methodology to develop valid scenarios?

Yes. If you want to develop detailed valid scenarios, then you need to follow a correct methodology. Some methodologies are stronger than others. You need to make sure the methodology you use leads to valid and good scenarios, as explained above.
This is why we created a course focused on scenario-building.
Scenarios are also part of the section on methodology in our publications.

What are the main disadvantages of scenario-building

Building proper scenarios is resource intensive in terms of time and knowledge. However, because properly created scenarios last, this is an investment.

Are there other types of “scenarios”, that may be done quickly?

Yes there are. Ideally we should give them other names not to create confusion.
For example, you can name “scenario” any fictionalised story about the future (or for that matter the past or the present).
These types of scenarios are useful in the context of brainstorming, to try to find wild cards, to foster imagination.
However, they will not be as useful as fully detailed scenarios for preparedness. Notably, they will likely not help you be ready across the range of possible futures. They may also not be used for early warning. Thus surprises remain likely.

What are “What if scenarios”?

What if scenarios are fictionalised narratives, where you question an assumption, what comes right after the “what if”.
These often short scenarios are truly useful to make the effort of imagination necessary to break prejudice, false beliefs, biaises, etc.
They are however, as explained in the previous point” not sufficient on their own to develop strong and exhaustive preparedness across all possibles for the future.

Featured image par PIRO4D on Pixabay 

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