How China Could Win the War against the Covid-19 Pandemic

(Art design: Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli)

As 2021 starts, Europe struggles again against a COVID-19 new wave and the spread of new SARS-CoV-2 variants. Japan strengthens its state of emergency against the COVID-19. The U.S. reports 4.462 deaths on 12 January 2021, i.e. almost precisely 1,5 time 9/11.

    Meanwhile, China also fights a rise in new symptomatic cases on the mainland. Yet, from 13 to 15 January, daily infections only increased respectively by 115, 127, and 89, then by 126 on 18 January. Nonetheless, China also reported its first COVID-19 related death in eight months (Mari Yamaguchi, “Japan widens virus emergency to 7 more areas as cases surge“, AP, 14 January 2021; COVID-19 Dashboard by JHU; Yew Lun Tian, “As China COVID-19 cases rise, millions more placed under lockdown“, Reuters, 13 January 2021; network dxy.cn).

    How can we explain this immense difference between various COVID-19 related situations? What allows China to control better the pandemic, when the possibility to see new waves develop is also there (Hélène Lavoix, Is the COVID-19 Second Wave coming to China?, The Red Team Analysis Society, 30 November 2020).

    We shall see how China envisions the COVID-19 world and its fight against the pandemic, from an overarching goal where lives must be saved first, to the mobilisation of all, through the objectives set and the related strategy. From these, result the anti-COVID-19 measures China takes and how it implements them, as we shall see in the second part. There, we shall explain that China’s guiding principle behind its policies against the COVID-19 may be characterised as an uncompromising pragmatism. To do so, we shall focus on three types of measures: quarantines and travels, genomic surveillance and, finally, environmental surveillance, which includes struggling against contamination from objects, goods and surfaces.

    Living in a different COVID-19 world

    In China, we are in a COVID-19 world that is very different from the world where Europe and the U.S., for example, live.

    An overarching goal – the precious lives of all first – and fighting a war to win

    China fights a war against the COVID-19 and it wants to win it. Its first and foremost goal is the safety of all. It does not solely aim at protecting hospitals from being overwhelmed and breaking down, which would be to confuse aims and means. China does not solely hope to slow down the virus or mitigate damages. It wants to win, to defeat the COVID-19. It has an enemy the SARS-CoV-2.

    As Xi Jiping put it in September 2020

    “We Chinese have fought this life-and-death battle against COVID-19 with tenacity and fortitude; we will not stop until victory is won. We have forged a great spirit of putting life above everything else…
    We will pay any price to protect people’s life and safety.

    (Highlights of President Xi Jinping’s remarks on fighting COVID-19, 2020/09/18)

    This goes hand in hand with the vision opening up the Chinese plan “Fighting Covid-19 – China in Action 2020/06/07”:

    “This is a war that humanity has to fight and win. Facing this unknown, unexpected, and devastating disease, China launched a resolute battle to prevent and control its spread. Making people’s lives and health its first priority, China adopted extensive, stringent, and thorough containment measures, and has for now succeeded in cutting all channels for the transmission of the virus”

    “Fighting Covid-19 – China in Action 2020/06/07“

    The benefits of victory

    China then emphasises that all actors will benefit from total victory. This means not ignoring the pandemic for the sake of financial markets, short-term profits, temporary “fun”, or whatever particular short-term interest. This also means accepting that a return to the past is impossible, what most actors try to do despite discourses:

    Those who refuse to take the easy path will succeed; those who meet challenges head on will prevail.
    A nation is great because it never yields, wavers or balks in the face of any difficulty or risk; it is because it keeps fighting for a bright future against all odds.

    (Highlights of President Xi Jinping’s remarks on fighting COVID-19, 2020/09/18)

    Objectives

    As a result, the COVID-19 world, for China, as for Australia and New Zealand, and in a lesser way for Japan or South Korea, is a world were one COVID-19 case is one too many, where one death is unacceptable. The aim is zero case and zero death.

    For example, China locked down the city of Langfang near Beijing on 12 January 2021 because it has reached 33 cases (dxy.cn network figures for 12 January 2021). Its “4.9 million residents would be put under home quarantine for seven days” and tested to make sure the virus would not spread (Reuters, “Chinese city of Langfang goes into lockdown amid new COVID-19 threat”, 12 January 2021). Previously, on 9 January, the cities of Shijiazhuang and Xingtai, in the Hebei province surrounding Beijing were “put under lockdown for seven days because more than 300 people were tested positive over the previous week” (Jason Slotkin, “Millions In China Under New Restrictions Amid COVID-19 Spike Near Beijing“, NPR, 9 January 2021).

    We find a similar situation in the northeastern province of Heilongjiang, where, on 11 January 2021 “all residential communities and villages in Wangkui county of Suihua city, Heilongjiang province, have been placed under lockdown management” (Zhou Huiying, “County in Heilongjiang under lockdown due to outbreak“, China Daily, 11 January 2021). The lockdown was organised because, on 9 January, one lady went for treatment to the hospital, was tested positive and consequently 20 out of the 500 tested contact cases were positive – and asymptomatic.

    By contrast, the UK imposed a relatively mild national lockdown on 5 November 2020 as it recorded 21,915 cases on 31 October (BBC News, “Covid-19: PM announces four-week England lockdown“, 31 October 2020). Finding out it was facing a new SARS-CoV-2 variant – known as 20B/501Y.V1, VOC 202012/01, or B.1.1.7 lineage (CDC) – it had to reinforce the anti-COVID-19 measures on 4 January 2021, as “on 29 December, more than 80,000 people tested positive for Covid across the UK – a new record” (Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s address to the nation on coronavirus on 4 January 2021). Sadly, as the epidemic is out of control, the UK will most probably have to reinforce the severity of its lockdown as positive cases remain above 50.000 a day (e.g. Alix Culbertson, “COVID-19: How could England’s lockdown restrictions get tougher?“, 12 January 2021).

    To take another European example, on 16 December 2020, in Germany, restrictions were introduced according to states to mitigate a second wave. The country had then a 7-days average of 26.092 infections a day. The number of positive cases had started reaching 25.252 tests on 2 November 2020. As a result, the epidemic could not be controlled and a national stricter lockdown started on 11 January 2021. Then, positive cases had started to decrease, but trying to prevent the spread of the new UK and South African SARS-CoV2 variants – the latter known 20C/501Y.V2 or B.1.351 lineage (CDC) – had become a concern (Coronavirus: Germany’s stricter lockdown starts nationwide, dw.de, 11 January 2021).

    Legitimacy, international influence and anti-COVID-19 objectives

    We thus have a very stark contrast between two types of objectives. On the one hand, in China, COVID-19 contagions are unacceptable. This makes sense in the framework of a pandemic. Indeed, considering what an epidemic is, and considering the epidemiological characteristics of the SARS-CoV-2, notably pre-symptomatic contagion and contagious asymptomatic cases, the only way to control the pandemic is to aim for zero contagion (see Helene Lavoix, Dynamics of contagion and the COVID-19 Second Wave, The Red Team Analysis Society, 3 June 2020).

    Numerous excess deaths because of a pandemic, are as unacceptable, for a host of reasons. Among these, first and foremost, such deaths would question the legitimacy of the political authorities. It would demonstrate their inability to rule properly as the fundamental mission of political authorities is to ensure the security of those who are rules (see Helene Lavoix, What is Political Risk?, The Red Team Analysis Society, 28 February 2020). Furthermore, in the case of China, it would also question their historically constructed legitimacy. Indeed, numerous deaths out of the COVID-19 could be understood as a vacillating “Mandate of Heaven” (天命 tianming) in the collective consciousness of people, which would mean a rising illegitimacy of political authorities (see John King Fairbank, Merle Goldman, China, a New History, Enlarged Edition, Harvard University Press, 1998; Andrea Janku, “‘Heaven-Sent Disasters’ in Late Imperial China: The Scope of the Stateand Beyond,” in Christ of Mauch and Christian Pfister, eds., Natural Disasters, Cultural Responses: Case Studies Toward a Global Environmental History, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books), 233–64; Chris Courtney, “The Dragon King and the 1931 Wuhan Flood: Religious Rumors and Environmental Disasters in Republican China,” in Twentieth-Century China , April 2015).

    Finally, it would diminish the influence China seeks to further develop internationally. Indeed, China seeks to shape a positive narrative regarding its excellency in managing the pandemic, which transforms the COVID-19 in a foreign policy tool for China (e.g. for early indications of the Chinese efforts Helene Lavoix, “COVID-19: Anticipation, Timing and Influence – From Mobility Restriction to Medicine Shortage“, The Red Team Analysis Society, 19 February 2020; Luke Patey, “COVID-19 pandemic is no soft power victory for China“, DIIS, 23 April 2020; Audrye Wong, “COVID-19 and China’s information diplomacy in Southeast Asia“, Brookings, 3 September 2020Gill Bates, “China in the COVID world: continued challenges for a rising power“, NDC Policy Brief – No. 20 – November 2020).

    The reasons for the very different objectives chosen in Europe and in the U.S., would need to be researched and analysed in detail, as their influence, power and even survival depend on them.

    China however tells us that winning over the COVID-19 starts first in our head, in the vision we have of ourselves and of the threat and in the way we set our overarching goals.

    A simple strategy

    Once the objectives are set, they define China’s anti COVID-19 strategy.

    The overall Chinese strategy is simple. They are fighting a pandemic, not any disease. Their real enemy is the virus. They seek to block its entrance into human beings residing in China, hence into the Chinese territory, as well as its access to all possible intermediate or vectors. And for those viruses that would get through, China will isolate them until they disappear while stopping them spreading (see chapter “A Tight Prevention and Control System Involving All Sectors of Society” in “Fighting Covid-19 – China in Action 2020/06/07“). Actions on hosts and vectors are then taken accordingly.

    It also means understanding the virus and its interactions with its hosts and vectors, hence the emphasis on science, as highlighted in “5.Science and Technology Underpin China’s Efforts” (Ibid.).

    Mobilising everyone

    Most crucially, the front line and the soldiers are not solely the medical staff as has been wrongly, and finally dangerously, promoted in Europe. The medical staff are heroes for China, but first and foremost each and every individual that could become prey to the virus or could have a role to play in blocking the virus is the front line. Indeed Chapter III of the Chinese action plan (Ibid.) is about “Assembling a Powerful Force to Beat the Virus”, through notably “2.Mobilizing the Whole Country to Fight the Epidemic” and “4.Uniting as One – China’s Billion People”, which is only possible because the safety of all is the overarching goal, and thus because “1.Lives Are Precious”.

    In other countries, when some refuse this or that measure for any reason, whatever the justifications given, what they say to their fellow citizens is that they don’t care if they fall ill, suffer, and die and lose their loved ones. As a result, common action becomes impossible and, worse, society may only head towards breaking down, which is an even worse situation than seeing the state fail. The SARS-CoV-2 has already won.

    The Chinese political authorities do not take this approach but, on the contrary, try to achieve the opposite. Xi Jiping’s September 2020 speech hammers the same message as found in the action plan, and it is worth quoting him at length:

    “Our people across the country closed ranks and were united as one. We knew what was at stake: the well-being of every one of us, the honor of us as a community and the security of our country. Doctors and nurses in white coat, military personnel in green uniform, police officers in blue gear and volunteers wearing red waistcoat all pitched in, and Party members rushed to the epicenter. Their pledge to keep fighting until the job was done is heart-stirring…

    Undaunted, we Chinese have confronted the raging virus head on in the spirit of going into the mountains well aware that tigers are roaming. Together, we have written a moving epic of fighting the virus.

    Our Chinese nation has gone through many trials and tribulations, but each time we have emerged stronger. This is not because any saviour has rescued us, but because hundreds of millions of ordinary Chinese have stepped forward to fight when disaster strikes.

    In fighting COVID-19, we the 1.4 billion Chinese have acted with a strong sense of responsibility, discipline, dedication and mutual support, thus creating a powerful defense of unity and solidarity against the virus.”

    [my emphasis] (Highlights of President Xi Jinping’s remarks on fighting COVID-19, 2020/09/18)

    Moreover, transforming all people into heroes who fight the COVID-19 gives a sense to sacrifice, which will lower resistance to measures. As sense is made, efforts can take place. People have reclaimed their power, they are not anymore passive victims. This is crucial when the efforts demanded involve being locked down and thus externally inactive.

    From the vision, the overarching goal, the objectives, the identification of the enemy and the mobilisation of everyone results the way China implements the various set of measures used to fight the pandemic, as we shall now see.

    An uncompromising pragmatism

    Chinese anti-COVID-19 measures can be best described as obeying a principle of uncompromising pragmatism. This includes characteristics such as measures being rapidly decided, flexible, adapted to the local situation, often heavy handed and lasting as long as needed. Above all, this means that Chinese anti-Covid-19 measures consider the reality of the pandemic and do not not fall prey to ideological wishful thinking, while including latest scientific approaches and technological innovations. In other words, the Chinese will do what they must to fulfil their objectives, using all available means.

    Travels and quarantines

    For example, China has an uncompromising policy regarding travels and quarantines be they international or domestic. Here, Chinese political authorities have recognised that one key component of the propagation of the virus – if not the key element – is mobility, be it international or domestic (for more on this point, see Helene Lavoix, The Hidden Origin of the COVID-19 and the Second Wave, The Red Team Analysis Society, 25 May 2020).

    For instance, considering the now demonstrated increased contagious power of the new UK SARS-CoV2 variant, on 24 December 2020 China banned all travels to and from the UK until further notice (Reuters). Starting 22 December, for Hong Kong, China, people are considered as entering this category if they have spent 2 hours in the UK within the last 21 days (Gardaworld). There is no question of upsetting the UK, tourism, difficulties for one or the other type of actor. The reality of the danger primes all.

    Quarantines at arrival used to last 14 days at centralised centers (e.g. Amcham Shanghai, “What to Expect for Travelers Returning to China Guide – Jan. 7 Update“). They are now increasingly evolving towards 21 days. Dalian and Beijing, for example set their quarantines to 21 days for all inbound travellers on 4 and 5 January 2021 (Wang Xuandi, “Beijing Institutes 21-Day Quarantine Policy Over Coronavirus Scare“, 6th Tone, 5 January 2021; Global Times, “New Dalian COVID-19 cases have longer incubation period, with some found to be positive after 11 tests“, 4 January 2021).

    Beijing even increased quarantines to 21 days in a quarantine center followed by 7 days health monitoring (“Beijing requires extra 7-day health monitoring for inbound travelers“, China Daily, 16 January 2021).

    Here, we should underline that a 21 days quarantine is in line with knowledge regarding the COVID-19 incubation (Stephen A. Lauer, MS, PhD et al., “The Incubation Period of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) From Publicly Reported Confirmed Cases: Estimation and Application“, Annals of Internal Medicine, 5 May 2020).

    The increased infectious power of the two variants may, furthermore, lengthen the incubation time, or change the number of people infected according to days after infection. It is thus twice wise to decide for a stringent 21 days quarantine.

    Quarantine must take place in centralised centers. China here uses the experience it developed in Wuhan. Throughout the first epidemic wave, China created 13 “hospitals” in public areas such as stadium to allow for the proper isolation of positive patients even with very mild symptoms (Talha Burki, “China’s successful control of COVID-19“, The Lancet, Newsdesk, Vol 20, Issue 11, Nov 01, 2020). This “network of Fangcang hospitals” had 13.000 beds available to isolate positive patients who did not need hospital treatment (Ibid.). As a result contagion, notably within the family, was stopped (Ibid.). China is thus able to use the lessons learned from the past, to build upon successes and correct mistakes.

    Furthermore, in China, the quarantine ought to be respected and people during these stays are forbidden to leave the quarantine premises. According to the UK Foreign travel advice for China, “Failure to comply with the quarantine conditions or testing put in place, or any attempts to deliberately conceal health conditions can result in being sentenced to up to three years in prison. This applies to both Chinese and foreign nationals.”

    The Chinese quarantine policy certainly contrasts with, for example, the 10 days of self-isolation demanded in Germany, where people can stop their quarantine if they test negative after 5 days (Federal Foreign Office, “Information on entry restrictions and quarantine regulations in Germany“, 11.01.2021).

    In terms of travels and mobility, China thus considers the reality of scientific studies and tests, as well as epidemiological evolution, and does what is necessary to see the right length quarantine applied. As a result, apart from travellers coming from strongly contaminated countries, less and less people need to go through very unpleasant indeed quarantines. We see here again being sketched the new COVID-19 international order we saw emerging progressively earlier (see The emergence of a COVID-19 international order, 15 June 2020).

    Genomic surveillance and beyond

    China has been very quick in sequencing the SARS-CoV-2 genome. On 11 and 12 January 2020, the Chinese authorities shared the full sequence of the coronavirus genome with the world (Institut Pasteur, “Institut Pasteur Sequences the whole genome of the coronavirus , 2019–NCOV“, 30 January 2020 – It thus became the first European institution to do so on 29 January 2020, 18 days after China).

    Since then, genomic surveillance, as well as phylogenetics, have become key state of the art means in the set of scientific tools available to human societies to control the pandemic (see, for example, Luke W Meredith, “Rapid implementation of SARS-CoV-2 sequencing to
    investigate cases of health-care associated COVID-19: a prospective genomic surveillance study    , Lancet Infect Dis 2020; 20: 1263–72, July 14, 2020; Pengcheng Du, Nan Ding, et al. “Genomic surveillance of COVID-19 cases in Beijing“, Nat Commun 11, 5503, 30 October 2020; Tsuyoshi Sekizuka, et al., “COVID-19 genome surveillance at international airport quarantine stations in Japan, Journal of Travel Medicine, 24 November 2020; The COVID-19 Genomics UK (COG-UK) consortium, “An integrated national scale SARS-CoV-2 genomic surveillance network“, The Lancet, Comments, June 2, 2020; Oude Munnink et al., “Rapid SARS-CoV-2 whole-genome sequencing and analysis for informed public health decision-making in the Netherlands“, Nat Med 26, 16 July 2020; for explanations on phylogenetics and possible use, Helene Lavoix, “The Hidden Origin of the COVID-19…”, ibid.)

    Genomic surveillance, considering statement by central and provincial health officials seems to be routinely used in China as means to control the pandemic (e.g. “Manzhouli coronavirus cases likely imported“; China Daily, November 27, 2020; CGTN, Chinese mainland reports first case of coronavirus variant detected in UK, 1 January 2021; Liu Wei, “East China’s Shandong confirmed its first imported coronavirus variant case“, 6 January 2021).

    Furthermore, China continues research in this direction, as shown, for example by Wang F. et al. article, which explores “the host genetic contribution to COVID-19 severity and susceptibility” (Initial whole-genome sequencing and analysis of the host genetic contribution to COVID-19 severity and susceptibility. Cell Discov., 2020 Nov 10). China has also opened its own repository, the National Gene Bank: cngb.org (COVID-19 section here). If it is not as visual and user friendly as German Gisaid – which is most often the case for anything Chinese on the web – it is, nonetheless, a genomes’ bank.

    Meanwhile, China also promotes genomic surveillance abroad, which may be seen as part of its “virus diplomacy”, but raises concern abroad (see for the whole paragraph Kirsty Needham, “Special Report: COVID opens new doors for China’s gene giant“, Reuters, 5 August 2020). The Chinese company BGI, which was the one that initially sequenced the SARS-CoV-2, not only classically exports its tests laboratories but also gives away the gene-sequencing equipment, through its philanthropic foundation, the Mammoth Foundation. Chinese embassies worldwide promote BGI equipment. This potentially goes much further than just diplomacy and U.S. officials notably see it as a national security issue because of the sensitivity of information on personal genetic material. Furthermore, this accentuates China’s global position in the high tech field, thus contributing to raise China’s profile – and capabilities – as superpower.

    Surveilling the environment, from hospitals to shipments, trucks and frozen foods

    Finally China is pragmatic in its way it considers the environment, i.e. all surfaces that could favour infections.

    Even though media and governments worldwide tend to largely downplay or ignore this aspect of contamination, China has adopted a much simpler approach. It surveils anything that could help the spread of the virus. This includes logically all surfaces and materials and leads to corresponding surveillance and warnings, as exemplified in this article of the Global Times: “Hospital environment in N China’s Inner Mongolia tests positive for COVID-19“, 14 January 2021.

    It is thus not only living beings that can test positive, but also things and areas. And of course, this also includes shipments.

    For instance, some of the 2020 clusters in China were related to food and frozen shipments. The origin of the contagion of the 9 June 2020 cluster in Beijing and Hebei was most likely a salmon vendor in Xinfadi and its chopping board (Bloomberg, “Xinjiang Covid Outbreak Is China’s Biggest Since Summer“, 2 Nov 2020; Bloomberg News, “China locks down county of 400,000 as COVID-19 cluster reemerges near Beijing“, 29 June 2020). The 22 July Dalian cluster began with “a worker at a local seafood processing company” (Xinhua, “Containing sporadic COVID-19 outbreaks the Chinese way“, Beijing Review, 27 November 2020; Xinhua, 29 August 2020). In Qingdao, Shandong province, on 11 October, the origin of the cluster was two port workers who had unloaded imported goods and were in contact with other ship workers (Xie Chuanjiao, “Source of Qingdao outbreak identified“, China Daily, 19 October 2020; Yuhan Xing, Gary W.K. Wong et al., Rapid Response to an Outbreak in Qingdao, China, The New England Journal of Medicine, 18 November 2020). A chain of contamination related to the late December 2020 Beijing cluster took probably place “via steamed bun packaging” and originated from Hong Kong (Global Times, 14 January 2021).

    For its part the cluster in Kashgar, Xinjiang, was traced to contaminated trucks (Zhao Jinzhao, Ma Danmeng and Denise Jia, “Exclusive: China Traces Covid-19 Cluster to Contaminated Trucks“, Caixin, 28 November 2020; William A. Haseltine, “These Forms Of Covid-19 Transmission May Be Rare, But Can’t Be Ignored“, Forbes, 3 December 2020).

    In December 2020, in the official Global Times, China’s Top epidemiologist Zhong Nanshan highlighted the potential key role environment-to-human COVID-19 transmission plays in the propagation of the pandemic (Liu Caiyu, 20 Dec 2020).

    China disregards here WHO recommendations that deny the possibility of contamination through foods and food packaging (see WHO, Coronavirus disease (COVID-19): Food safety for consumers, 14 August 2020). Note, however, the very cautious way the WHO answers its Q&A, thus protecting itself in advance, should the main doctrine change.

    The Chinese measures regarding imported goods show also that, when it is for the protection of its interests, China easily discards any ideological commitment to trade and globalisation. Indeed, if shipments start being seen as a vector of contagion, which they are if we follow Chinese surveillance, measures and events, and if we consider scientific studies on the SARS-CoV-2, surfaces, and materials, then it is the whole global trade paradigm that is impacted.

    A quick look at the very heavy demands put on meat exporters considering the COVID-19, as detailed by China Briefing, should they want to sell meat in China, better shows the strains the global trade system will have to bear. Furthermore, as people are afraid to be contaminated by foreign products, Chinese imports of meat products have started to fall (Global Times, “Chinese supermarkets, consumers seek domestic meats to cut contamination risks“, 3 January 2021).

    Thus, the capacities of the global trade system to cope with these various strains, as well as the likely change that will emerge are topics for further research. It is however highly certain that the system will have to change. Impacts on individual business actors and even whole sectors, according to countries, are also likely to be important.

    Similarly, China’s environmental surveillance emphasises – and to a point reveals for those who did not see it before – the threats the tourism industry, as well as business real estate, for example, face because of the COVID-19 pandemic and because of the importance of China for these sectors. Indeed, it is highly likely that China will make sure Chinese citizens and business people only go abroad if they are protected by the same kind of surveillance and measures as those implemented within China.

    China thus implements with an uncompromising pragmatism all the measures needed to control at best the pandemic and to fulfill its stringent corresponding objectives. It can do so because of strong political authorities, that dare to use their legitimate monopoly of violence when necessary, while also benefiting from their society’s compliance and support.* As a result, the legitimacy of the political authorities is further strengthens, which, in turn, allows for more support from people.

    Consequently too, and considering China’s economic and industrial way of development, willed by the industrial outsourcing promoted by globalisation and its proponents, China can boast to have seen its “exports gain 3.6 percent in 2020 amid virus-hit global supply chains” (Li Qiaoyi, “Goods trade growing in China only“, Global Times, 14 January 2021). It may also show huge celebrations taking place in Wuhan over the Summer thus highlighting its people can live normally… most of the time. Last but not least, China can also use its smart management of the pandemic to promote its international power.

    The latest evolution of the SARS-CoV-2 with the emergence of more contagious variants, the uncertainties and difficulties linked to the vaccines and vaccination, the mink-related mutation, other possible mutations, probably the need to better understand viruses in such global setting and other surprises the virus may create could challenge China. Pragmatism, intelligence and strength are, however, certainly the best assets to face such difficult possible unknowns.

    Notes and references

    *We are here considering the strength of the state. This must not be mistaken with dictatorship or authoritarianism, the latter being types of regimes. Such confusions are increasingly frequent in media and blog posts out of ignorance, of prejudice and ideology, or of interest.

    Bangura, M.S., Gonzalez, M.J., Ali, N.M. et al. “A collaborative effort of China in combating COVID-19“, glob health res policy 5, 47 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1186/s41256-020-00174-z

    Bates Gill  (2020); “China’s Global Influence: Post-COVID Prospects for Soft Power”; The Washington Quarterly; 43:2; 97-115; DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2020.1771041

    Burki, Talha, “China’s successful control of COVID-19”, The Lancet, Newsdesk, Vol 20, Issue 11, pp. 1240-1241, Nov 01, 2020, published: October 08, 2020, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30800-8.

    Cohen, Paul A., Paul A. Townsend, History in Three Keys, Columbia University Press, 1997.

    Courtney, Chris, “The Dragon King and the 1931 Wuhan Flood: Religious Rumors and Environmental Disasters in Republican China,” in Twentieth-Century China , April 2015 DOI: 10.1179/1521538515Z.00000000059

    COVID-19 Dashboard by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University (JHU)

    Du, P., Ding, N., Li, J. et al. Genomic surveillance of COVID-19 cases in Beijing. Nat Commun 11, 5503 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-19345-0

    Fairbank, John King, and Merle Goldman, China, a New History, Enlarged Edition, Harvard University Press, 1998.

    Hu, CS, “Analysis of COVID-19 Cases and Public Measures in China” SN Compr. Clin. Med. 2, 1306–1312 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42399-020-00426-6

    Janku, Andrea, “‘Heaven-Sent Disasters’ in Late Imperial China: The Scope of the Stateand Beyond,” in Christ of Mauch and Christian Pfister, eds., Natural Disasters, Cultural Responses: Case Studies Toward a Global Environmental History, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books), 233–64.

    Munnink, Oude, B.B., Nieuwenhuijse, D.F., Stein, M. et al. Rapid SARS-CoV-2 whole-genome sequencing and analysis for informed public health decision-making in the Netherlands. Nat Med 26, 1405–1410 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-020-0997-y

    Sekizuka, Tsuyoshi, PhD, Kentaro Itokawa, PhD, Koji Yatsu, BS, Rina Tanaka, BS, Masanori Hashino, MVD, PhD, Tetsuro Kawano-Sugaya, PhD, Makoto Ohnishi, MD, PhD, Takaji Wakita, MD, PhD, Makoto Kuroda, PhD, “COVID-19 genome surveillance at international airport quarantine stations in Japan”, Journal of Travel Medicine, 24 November 2020, https://doi.org/10.1093/jtm/taaa217

    Uretsky, Elanah, “China beat the coronavirus with science and strong public health measures, not just with authoritarianism“, The Conversation, 23 November 2020.

    Wang F, Huang S, Gao R, Zhou Y, Lai C, Li Z, Xian W, Qian X, Li Z, Huang Y, Tang Q, Liu P, Chen R, Liu R, Li X, Tong X, Zhou X, Bai Y, Duan G, Zhang T, Xu X, Wang J, Yang H, Liu S, He Q, Jin X, Liu L. Initial whole-genome sequencing and analysis of the host genetic contribution to COVID-19 severity and susceptibility. Cell Discov. 2020 Nov 10;6(1):83. doi: 10.1038/s41421-020-00231-4. PMID: 33298875; PMCID: PMC7653987.

    Is the West Losing the Warming Arctic?

    Art design: Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli

    The militarization of the Arctic – So what?

    Over the last few years, NATO, the U.S. and Scandinavian militaries have been multiplying national and regional manoeuvres in the Arctic. This is especially true in Norway and the Barents Sea, very close to the Norwegian and Russian land, air and sea frontiers.

    The number of air patrols and military exercises grows year after year. For example, on 20 October 2020, the U.S.S. Ross missile-guided destroyer sailed its third tour of the year in the Barents Sea (Thomas Nilsen, “Increase in NATO scrambled jets from Norway”, The Independent Barents Observer, and “US warship returns Barents Sea”, September 14, and October 2020).

    This follows the installation of the NATO Atlantic Command at the Norfolk Navy base, in September 2020. The area of responsibility of this new command is the protection of European and North American sea-lanes.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KIE_OrLzc_E

    Among them, we find the Greenland-Iceland-U.K. (GIUK) gap to and from the Arctic. In other words, the Joint Force Norfolk Command’s mission is to project U.S. and NATO power in the Arctic (Levon Sevuts, “NATO’s new Atlantic command to keep watch over the European Arctic”, The Independent Barents Observer, September 18, 2020).

    This current U.S. and NATO interest for the Arctic, especially as far as the European and Russian part is concerned, appears as being a response to the heightening economic and military development of the Arctic led by Russia and by a growing number of Asian countries, chiefly China among them.

    However, if the growing U.S. military and NATO presence increase the level of military gesticulation, we have to wonder if this military presence is really up to the Russia-China strategic development of the Arctic.

    From a Western point of view, some European, U.S. and Canadian private companies are developing their presence in the Arctic, but this does not amount at all to a strategy, be it from the U.S., from member states of the European Union nor from North Atlantic countries.

    In other terms, the Russian part of the warming Arctic is becoming a planetary attractor for the Asian great powerhouses. Thus, it is increasing the power and status of Russia and China (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Arctic China: Towards new Oil Wars in a Warming Arctic?”, The Red Team Analysis Society, September 14, 2020). As a result, a major geopolitical question is to ponder if Western powers are not missing their own “warming Arctic Axis”.

    The warming Arctic, cradle of the Russo-Asian block

    Who is developing the Arctic?

    As we have explained in The Red Team Analysis Society’s publications, and related conferences since 2014, the notably Russian, Chinese, Japanese, and Indian race towards the Arctic is driving the emergence of the continental Russo-Asian bloc.

    Indeed, the vast Arctic Russian economic exclusive zone is attracting Russian and Asian energy developpers (Jean-Michel Valantin, “The Warming Russian Arctic: Where Russian and Asian Strategies Interests Converge?”, The Red Team Analysis Society, November 23, 2016).

    The mammoth oil, gas, mineral and biological resources are becoming a giant economic attractor. Meanwhile, because of the effects of the Arctic warming, the Russian authorities open the “ Northern sea route”.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CBc_jnliYHk&t=224s

    This new sea lane follows the Siberian coast and connects the Bering Strait to Norway and the Northern Atlantic. Thus, it also connects the immense Asian basins of economic development to Northern Europe and to the Atlantic. In the same time, Moscow militarizes the Siberian coast, the archipelagos. In the same dynamic, the Russian Northern Fleet and Army multiply patrols and sea and land manoeuvres.

    The Arctic convergence of Russia and Asia

    The combination of these two dynamics is also driving a continent-wide process of integration. It drives the construction of railroads, river and land roads, from Siberia to central Asia and China. In other words, the development of the Arctic is one of the drivers of the coupling of the Russian Northern sea route with the Chinese inter-continental Belt and Road initiative (Atle Staalesen, “Arctic gas finds new way from Yamal to China”, The Independent Barents Observer, April 1, 2020).

    This massive shift of Asian and Russian societies towards the Arctic signals that this region is also becoming a convergence between states, economies and actors of different values, ideologies, and belief-systems, i.e. civilization (Norbert Elias, The civilizing process, vol.II, State formation and civilisation, 1982).

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MXpTGZK-BiM

    Hence, the Arctic Russo-Asian dynamic is nothing less than an adaptation strategy, at civilizational level, to the planetary upheaval of climate change (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Planetary Crisis Rules, (2)“, The Red Team Analysis Society, February 15, 2016).

    This begs the question of the place of the West in the new “Game of Thrones” of the changing Arctic.

    The Western Arctic non-strategy

    Militaries without a strategy

    If we compare the way Russia and Asian countries develop the Arctic, and the Western countries’ corresponding actions, it comes that the latter remain largely passive. It becomes increasingly obvious that Western Europe, as well as the U.S. and Canada do not know how to project themselves in this new planetary and geopolitical reality.

    This Western non-strategy results from an absence of real reaction by most Western countries to the warming of the Arctic (Edward Luttwak Strategy, the Logic of War and Peace, 2002). Indeed, these reactions become a geopolitical system of passivity.

    Actually, the most visible kind of reaction is the built-up of military forces, without any clear long term strategic statement.

    This is the case, for example, of the 2016 and 2018 massive Norway-Iceland exercises. Those added up to the multiplication of air patrols, and the growing presence of U.S. Navy war ships. This presence takes place along the air and maritime borders of Russia on the Barents Sea. The U.S. Navy manifests itself also by conducting manoeuvres around the Bering Strait (“Navy, Marine Corps conduct Arctic expeditionary capabilities exercise in Alaska”, CPF Navy Mil, 3 September, 2019”).

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dsNNuwjS4z4

    This naval and aerial military build up is a way for the U.S. to assert themselves as a sea power. And as such, they have to show their capabilities to disrupt the naval movements of land powers such as Russia and China. However, this capability does not support the definition of political aims and military goals (Luttwak, ibid). They are nothing but a presence that has no distinct effect on the Russian and Asian Arctic strategies.

    Western integration to Asian stategies

    The other category of Western Arctic “actors” embraces the countries that integrate and support Russian and Chinese strategies. For example, since 2014, China projects itself in the Arctic. Among other things, it obtained the status of “near Arctic nation” at the Arctic Council. In the same time, Beijing turned the “Northern sea route” into the Arctic segment of its “Belt and Road initiative”.

    Among others, the Chinese president Xi Jinping promotes this “Polar Silk Road”. Between 2014 and today, he signed bilateral trade and technology with Iceland, Greenland, Danemark, Finland, Sweden, and Norway. In the same time, Russia and China multiply joint trade, industrial, transport and military operations ( Jean-Michel Valantin, “Arctic Fusion: Russia and China convergent strategies, 2014)”, The Red Team Analysis Society, June 23, 2014).

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qcrTK1zfkEw

    In other words, the very members of the Arctic council, all of them Western countries, at the notable exception of Russia, are becoming stakeholders and supporters of the Chinese strategy in the Arctic.

    This means that, despite a growing military presence, Western powers are non-strategic actors in Russian and Asian Arctic strategies. At best, they are stakeholders. In other terms, Russia, China and other Asian countries are starting to dominate the warming Arctic, while Western powers are not (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Towards a US-China War? (1) and (2): Military Tensions in the Arctic”, The Red Team Analysis Society, September 16, 2019).

    Embracing the planetary crisis

    However, geophysically, what currently happens in the Arctic also signals the installation of a chronic and growing instability. This geophysical dynamic translates itself into geopolitics. It follows that the merging new politics of this region are also in a state of constant change.

    It is interesting to note that the nations that react rapidly to this situation are Russia and China. They have in common to have gone through decades upon decades of dramatic and extremely violent changes.

    That was the case for Russia and China since the start of the twentieth century, and even since the middle of the nineteenth century for China (Lucien Bianco, La Récidive, Révolution russe, révolution chinoise, 2014).

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zjp5ONYM_jc

    Adaptation and crisis

    One can also note that for Asian belief-systems, such as Taoism, the world is in a state of constant flow. And when it comes to Russia, one must remember its collective resiliency and adaptation capability.

    This capability emerges from the collective experience of centuries of social, climate and political harshness. Thus, those societies inherit from the collective experience of continuous rapid and necessary adaptation to extreme conditions (Giovanni Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing, 2007).

    Elsewhere, Western countries have been through a long cycle of social and economic development since World War II. This took place alongside a long period of political stability. This collective experience inclines certainly to maintain stability. In the same dynamic, it motivates to reject extreme situations that induce the necessity to adapt quickly (Arrighi, ibid).

    However, nowadays, climate change is hammering the whole world, i.e. Western countries, as well as Russia and Asia. In this context, the race to the Arctic is going to intensify. Indeed, accessing to the warming Arctic is becoming a major geo-economic concern. Indeed, during the next years, the destabilization of the Arctic is going to reinforce the global climate crisis.

    Towards a Western awakening in the Arctic?

    Paradoxically, change in the Arctic is also becoming a new template to support modern economies. Thus, it may also support their possible transition towards sustainability. Indeed, this transition, if it happens, will need arbitrations and settlements about who does what in this region.

    This new reality is a very powerful driver for the definition and projection of Western strategies in the Arctic. They need to do so in order to install a new system of checks and balances in this very unstable region. As it happens, “the roof of the world” is also the ultimate geopolitical high ground. You hold it, or you don’t.

    Is the COVID-19 Second Wave coming to China?

    The second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic is sweeping through the world. It reached first the U.S., Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. By mid-November 2020 it started being visible in Eastern Asia (e.g. Reuters Covid-19 Global Tracker: World and Asia and the Middle East).

    Japan (Reuters COVID-19 Tracker)
    South Korea (Reuters COVID-19 Tracker)

    By the end of November 2020, South Korea and Japan face a rising number of cases. Yet their outbreak bears, so far, no comparison whatsoever with what happens in Europe or the U.S..

      Meanwhile, international news on China tend to focus on the economy and economic recovery (e.g. James Hyerczyk, “Asia-Pacific Shares Down Across the Board; China Reports Upbeat Factory Activity“, Nasdaq, 30 November 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic appears to be almost forgotten, even though China was the place where the pandemic first broke out.

      The situation in China, besides notably the very positive outlook taken regarding soon forthcoming vaccines, is a key factor in the optimistic mood of many actors.

      What is thus truly happening in China as far as the COVID-19 pandemic is concerned? Has China truly become a much safer place than elsewhere, thanks to the way it now handles the pandemic? Can we estimate the prospects of the sanitary situation in China for the near future? What are the likely impacts of the way China will handle or mishandle a possible second wave? Does that truly matter considering the coming vaccines? How can we think the world both with the way China handled the pandemic and with the coming vaccines?

      This article addresses the first of these questions and looks at the situation in China in terms of contagion and clusters.

      China, an amazing control of the COVID-19 pandemic

      Since the COVID-19 broke out in China in December 2019 and January 2020, starting the global pandemic, and the drastic measures implemented ended on 8 April 2020 (e.g. CNN), China has been amazingly almost free of COVID-19.

      China registered COVID-19 4.750 deaths up to 28 November 2020. On 23 then 25 September China reported the death of one person for each date, then another one on 4 November, one on 5, one on 10 November and one (in Hong Kong) on 28 November (dxy network, 1point3acres).

      It registered 93.113 COVID-19 symptomatic cases since the beginning of the pandemic up to 26 November 2020 and 93.465 up to 30 November 2020 (dxy network).

      This is to compare with 62,57 million cases worldwide as of 30 November 2020, and notably the 18,02 million cases for Europe, and 13,38 million cases for the U.S. (ECDC). In other words in one day, between 29 and 30 November, there has been twice as many cases in Europe as since the beginning of the pandemic in China. In the U.S., for the same day there has been 1,5 times as many cases as since the start of the pandemic in China.

      Thus, so far, China does represent a negligible share of the cases, even though the first pandemic outbreak started with China.

      Learning by controlling clusters

      It is not that China is COVID-19-free out of a miracle. It obtains these incredibly results through an extremely rigorous and efficient control of the pandemic. Indeed, throughout the last months, when the prospects for possible clusters emerged, China took sweeping and efficient measures that allowed for controlling rapidly the new outbreak.

      For example, over the summer, on 9 June, a cluster started in Beijing, spread to Hebei’s nearby province and included more than 330 symptomatic cases (WHO A cluster of COVID-19 in Beijing, People’s Republic of China, 13 June 2020; Bloomberg, “Xinjiang Covid Outbreak Is China’s Biggest Since Summer“, 2 Nov 2020; Bloomberg News, “China locks down county of 400,000 as COVID-19 cluster reemerges near Beijing“, 29 June 2020). The origin of the contagion was most likely the contamination of a salmon vendor in Xinfadi, the biggest Beijing wholesale market, as the virus was detected on his chopping board (Ibid,). The authorities controlled the cluster in Beijing on 19 June, and cases had disappeared by the start of July.

      Then, in Dalian on 22 July, a new cluster began (Xinhua, “Containing sporadic COVID-19 outbreaks the Chinese way“, Beijing Review, 27 November 2020). Its origin was the contamination of “a worker at a local seafood processing company” (Xinhua, 29 August 2020). The Dalian cluster included 92 locally transmitted COVID-19 cases and 26 asymptomatic cases. It was fully cleared on 29 August (Ibid,).

      In Qingdao, Shandong province, on 11 October, three new COVID-19 cases were detected (Xie Chuanjiao, “Source of Qingdao outbreak identified“, China Daily, 19 October 2020; Yuhan Xing, Gary W.K. Wong et al., Rapid Response to an Outbreak in Qingdao, China, The New England Journal of Medicine, 18 November 2020). The cluster would count only 13 symptomatic cases and was considered as controlled on 16 October, as no new cases emerged (Ibid.). The origin of the cluster was two port workers who had unloaded imported goods (Xie Chuanjiao, ibid) and were in contact with other ship workers (Yuhan Xing, Gary W.K. Wong et al.). Both had tested positive on 24 September 2020 (Ibid.). Then, the virus spread through the hospital (Ibid.).

      On 24 October 2020, a new cluster started in Xinjiang with an asymptomatic case being detected. On 2 November, the autonomous region counted 57 mild cases of COVID-19 and 233 asymptomatic cases (Bloomberg, “Xinjiang Covid Outbreak Is China’s Biggest Since Summer“, 2 Nov 2020). Millions were tested in and around the city of Kashgar where the cases were detected, and all those who were positive were isolated (Ibid., BBC News, “Covid-19: China tests entire city of Kashgar in Xinjiang“, 26 October 2020).

      So far, thus, clusters have emerged and, each time, they have been successfully quelled. What is the current situation?

      Rising contaminations and an increasing number of clusters

      Rising daily contaminations

      Since 17 November, if we look at the country-wide situation in China, the number of daily newly diagnosed symptomatic cases has been increasing slightly, as shown in the daily figures below, displayed on a fortnightly graph. Note that the last graph changes scale and that the ordinate axis now goes up to 150 cases.

      Daily new symptomatic infections in China over a fortnight: ending 26 November 2020, 27 November 2020, 29 November 2020 – ncov.dxy.cn

      These increases, however seem to concern mainly Hong Kong and Taiwan, as both the daily reports of the Chinese National Health Commission and the Chinese network of medical doctors – dxy.cn – include them, alongside Macau, in their statistics.*

      As a result, the current number of ongoing infectious cases started rising again. Nonetheless, compared with the January 2020 outbreak the curve looks almost flat. This would be even more the case should we look at these figures in comparisons with other countries and continents.

      Ongoing infectious cases in China – ncov.dxy.cn

      In China the number of confirmed symptomatic COVID-19 patients reached 905 cases on 26 November 2020, 980 on 27 November, 1145 on 29 November 2020 and 1245 cases on 30 November according to the dxy.cn statistics. Out of these, detected asymptomatic cases went from 348 on 23 November to 279 on 28 November (National Health Commission). Thus, the number of asymptomatic cases decreases slightly.

      An increase of symptomatic cases is thus taking place, mainly in Hong Kong and, in a lesser way, in Taiwan.

      Let us now look at clusters and at the geographical spread on the Chinese territory

      A rising number of clusters

      Beyond rampant COVID-19 cases considered as identified and quarantined, on 27 November 2020, Chinese media singled out three main outbreaks taking place: in Tianjin – 15 symptomatic cases on 27 November 2020, Shanghai – 62 symptomatic cases on 27 November 2020, and in Inner Mongolia – 23 symptomatic cases on 27 November 2020), in the border city of Manzhouli (Xinhua, “Containing sporadic COVID-19 outbreaks the Chinese way“; “Manzhouli coronavirus cases likely imported“; China Daily, November 27, 2020).

      In Manzhouli, the outbreak started on 21 November 2020. On 27 November, it counted 11 cases, 1 asymptomatic case and a suspected case (“Manzhouli coronavirus cases likely imported“). Imported infections triggered the cluster (Ibid.). According to dxy.cn, the cluster there went from 23 symptomatic cases on 27 November 2020 to 18 symptomatic cases, out of which 4 were imported, on 29 November. This would let us assume the authorities control the cluster.

      Compared with the three clusters the media reported, the dxy.cn epidemic map for 27 November below shows higher numbers of COVID-19 cases in 7 provinces and cities (plus Taiwan and Hong Kong). These possibly could indicate future clusters, on top of the three identified. Indeed, considering a very nature of a pandemic, just one case represents a danger of contamination. This is even truer with the COVID-19 considering asymptomatic cases and pre-symptomatic contagion (see Helene Lavoix, Dynamics of contagion and the COVID-19 Second Wave, The Red Team Analysis Society, 3 June 2020). Hence, the extreme caution and care shown by the Chinese authorities.

      The next map, for 28 November, shows one province (Anhui – the blue arrow) now free of detected COVID-19 cases. In the meanwhile, a new province (Zhejiang) joined its sisters with a higher number of cases. The next day, on 29 November, one more province was added, Gansu with only one case (the red arrow). Here, note that we are still dealing with very low number of cases, from 10 cases in Zhejiang, 12 in Tianjin, and up to 51 (but decreasing number of cases) in Shanghai.

      We thus seem to have a rise in the number of possible clusters, compared with the previous six months. Yet, each time a rapid control leads to a decreasing number of cases.

      China’s epidemic maps – Ongoing confirmed symptomatic cases on 27 November 2020, 28 November 2020 and 29 November 2020 – Access the latest updated epidemic map on ncov.dxy.cn

      Interestingly, those provinces with more COVID-19 positive cases seem to surround China. This indicates once more the key importance of exchanges in the spread of the pandemic.

      Thus, it seems that China is facing indeed an increase in cases, as elsewhere. Yet, China’s measures also would seem, so far, to show efficiency and even mastery at controlling the pandemic. With the next article we shall look further at these measures to assess the possible scope and intensity of the second wave in China. Will it remain almost flat as is now the case? Or, on the contrary, should we expect surprises?

      *We should also note a discrepancy between the country-wide statistics of the Chinese National Health Commission and the dxy.cn network. The latter works with provincial statistics. The figures in this article rely mostly on the dxy.cn network.

      Featured image: Image par Roger Mosley de Pixabay – Public Domain

      France and 3 Scenarios for the COVID-19 Second Wave

      Design: Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli

      Eleven months into the COVID-19 pandemic the second wave spreads. More than 50 million people were contaminated globally by 9 November 2020 (COVID-19 Dashboard by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University). More than 1.25 million people had died by then (ibid.).

      On 10 November, Europe crossed the threshold of 300.000 deaths daily, i.e. almost a quarter of global daily deaths, when it only represents 10% of the world’s population (Reuters, COVID-19 Global tracker). On a 7-day average, Europe represents slightly more than 50% of global infections and slightly less than 50% of global deaths (Reuters, COVID-19 Global tracker).

      • Global COVID19 Infections per region
      • Global COVID19 Deaths per region
      The COVID 19 second wave per region

      The “geographic distribution of 14-day cumulative number of reported COVID-19 cases per 100 000 population, worldwide” for 10 November 2020 as given by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control also shows that Europe, with the U.S., are the worst hit regions in the world.

      Before the pandemic, France, a member of the G7 with a permanent seat at the Security Council of the United Nations ranked 7th globally in terms of GDP (“World Economic Outlook Database, October 2020“, International Monetary Fund).

      Global – Reuters COVID-19 TRACKER

      France also ranks high in the way the pandemic takes its toll on the country.

      In November 2020, France faces record figures. On 10 November, it has the second highest daily rate of infection worldwide, after the U.S. (7-day average reported – Reuters). It also has the third highest daily number of deaths worldwide, after the U.S. and India, despite a much smaller population.

      France – Reuters COVID-19 TRACKER

      However, when compared with its population, France is in the middle range of countries both in terms of contamination and death, as shown in the comparative graph by Reuters.

      Considering the worldwide place of France in terms of political, geopolitical and economic power and influence, what is happening and what shall we expect in the coming months?

      Some of the critical factors to assess the multiple impacts of the pandemic in the future and thus reduce uncertainty are the casualties in terms of death, the capacity of the care system to resist the onslaught, as well as the suffering and long term impacts of those having contracted the disease. Thus, this assessment of the near future for France focuses on casualties and the strain on the hospital system. It builds upon official statistics.

      First we shall briefly outline the pandemic situation in France and explain how we built the statistical forecasts.

      Then we shall focus on three scenarios. In the first scenario, the pandemic is controlled and contagion is progressively lowered. The second scenario considers that the measures are less efficient than thought and contagion stagnates at a relatively high level. Finally, a last scenario looks at a situation where contagion increases by only 2% a day. We added this scenario to highlight what could happen if things were going only slightly wrong.

      In a last part we shall present three more points and reflections that emerged out of this work and deserve being highlighted. We shall point out discrepancies in statistical series and possible impacts. We shall then underline two points that deserve further research and may lead to ethical debates as well as to future tensions. First, hospitalised patients may be increasingly sorted out for access to reanimation, without the population being fully conscious of this phenomenon. Finally, the fate of old-age pensioners in their last days facing COVID-19 sufferings may need to be debated.

      France faces the COVID-19 second wave

      From denial to mobilisation or explosion?

      As we saw with the comparative figures above, France is far from being in control of the pandemic and even further away from being exemplary in its handling of the COVID-19. As so many other countries, it muddles through.

      Yet, in France, efforts abound to minimise the seriousness of the pandemic, to deny any severity to the disease, as well as to refuse measures attempting to control the COVID-19, sometimes violently (e.g. France 3 Auvergne Rhône-Alpes, “C’est ça la réalité, si vous ne voulez pas l’entendre, sortez d’ici” : le coup de gueule d’Olivier Véran à l’Assemblée“, 4 November 2020; “Nicolas Bedos remonté contre Olivier Véran : “J’ai envie de le buter’“, Femmes Actuelles, 8 November 2020).

      The economy continues being opposed to sanitary security, when both must go hand in hand (e.g. franceinfo, “André Comte-Sponville : ‘Par souci de justice, on ne peut pas sacrifier toute l’économie pour des raisons sanitaires‘”, 10 November 2020; Valentin Deleforterie et AFP, “Reconfinement : qui plaide pour la mesure et qui s’y oppose ?“, RTL, 28 October 2020).

      Considering the acceleration of the second wave, French President Emmanuel Macron and its government played their role as political authorities with as primary mission the security of those who are ruled. They imposed a second lockdown on 30 October 2020, however, milder than the previous one (French President Emmanuel Macron, Adresse aux Français, 28 October 2020).

      Almost two weeks into the lockdown, at long last, French policy-makers, as well as the media, appear to start trying to find a middle ground between being too reassuring and being too frightening (e.g. Franceinfo, “Covid-19 : ‘Le pic de l’épidémie est devant nous’, prévient Jérôme Salomon“, 9 November 2020; Le Figaro avec AFP, “Covid-19 en France : il y a un «frémissement» dans les chiffres“, 8 November 2020; FranceInter, “Olivier Véran constate un “ralentissement de la progression de l’épidémie“, bilan en fin de semaine, 8 November 2020). To reassure people too much would favour dangerous careless behaviour. Frightening people too much would create hopelessness and thus generate collective defeatism and depression.

      Indeed, as we explained at the end of March, political authorities must fully ensure security, be it sanitary, economic, or related to civil disorders, to terrorist attacks and to foreign policy risks (Helene Lavoix, COVID-19 Antiviral Treatments and Scenarios, The Red Team Analysis Society, 30 March 2020). This is not a choice. An either/or situation is not an option. People cannot be asked to choose between one or the other type of security. An incapacity to deliver on all fronts will only lower the legitimacy of political authorities and then lead to even more difficulties in ensuring security. It is thus crucial to find the proper way to mobilise people in these difficult times.

      In order to be able to deliver and mobilise, it is vital to know what lays ahead. This is true actually for all actors, as each needs also to develop its own response to the pandemic, while evaluating the decisions and actions taken by political authorities. It is here, in that space, that mobilisation develops.

      Thus, are we truly seeing first signs of improvement in France? Will the lockdown truly end before Christmas? Which decisions should the French government take for the holiday season? Will they lead to an improvement of the situation and thus strengthen legitimacy or, on the contrary contribute to degrade both the overall security outlook and legitimacy?

      Statistical trends and forecasts

      Using the daily official statistics given by the French health authority (Prime Minsiter office and the data revised over time of Santé publique France and its observatory GEODES), we built a simple model that allows us to track data over time and forecast the trends ahead.

      This is not an epidemiological model considering all factors. We only sought to focus on the most severe cases of the disease and on deaths, as well as on the impact on the French care system, while preparing the ground to look at the possible impact of what is now called Long Covid.

      We built our model starting from the positive COVID19 cases, to which we apply first a rate to differentiate between asymptomatic and symptomatic cases. Then we apply the timeframe for incubation we identified in the scientific literature in a previous article (see Dynamics of contagion and the COVID-19 Second Wave). This gives us the daily number of symptomatic cases. Then, we apply rates we calculate out of the historical series as communicated by GEODES. We obtain first severe cases of COVID-19, i.e. those needing hospitalisation, which gives us the daily number of hospitalisation. Using the same system we work out the daily number of Intensive Care Units (ICUs), as well as daily deaths. As far as death outside the hospital system is concerned, i.e. in retirement home (EHPAD and EMS), we fully rely on the Prime Minister Office statistics and only project real death rates in the future.

      This forecasting model allows us to capture broad trends. We used it to create three scenarios.

      Three Scenarios for France, the COVID19 second wave and Christmas 2020

      The true meaning of Christmas – Scenario 1

      The first and most favourable scenario would be a world where a new spirit enters the population and where successfully fighting the COVID-19 becomes a shared objective. Meanwhile, innovation considering all aspects of security is actively sought. In that case, for one month we would have a 5% daily decrease of contagion. Seeing the positive results of their efforts, the population would feel vindicated in making even more efforts to further reduce contagion. As a result, the next month would see a daily 10% decrease of the number of positives cases.

      The results for this scenario are shown on the three following charts.

      The mass of people infected and then becoming symptomatic would still be very large.

      The peak of the second wave, in daily terms would be reached between 13 and 19 November. Note that the peak on 13 November comes from a very high rate of contagion on 7 November (more than 86.000 cases), but is uncertain. Indeed we do not know if this rate resulted from data flows’ problems or reflected reality.

      In cumulative terms, hospitalisations would peak around 19 November at approximately 38.500 beds and ICUs around 21 November at 5.846. The total expected cumulative deaths would reach 64.734 on 29 December 2020.

      The French hospital system would thus, in general terms, cope. Nonetheless, these national estimates hide widely different situations across regions, which may negatively impact the overall situation, as shown in the animated graph below by BFMTV.

      In this first scenario, and assuming there is no worsening of the situation in hospitals, and no increase in severity of the illness, it appears as possible to soften slightly the lockdown before Christmas. Yet, the French population would need to continue being extremely careful. Indeed it must not risk seeing again a worsening of the situation. Considering the characteristics of our scenario in terms of new collective understanding of the pandemic and related behaviour, this should not be a problem.

      The hospitals will nonetheless still have to cope with a relatively heavy burden.

      Many families will mourn over Christmas. Meanwhile the prospects for long covid illness need to be appraised. However, awareness to have once more overcome a pandemic wave, to have succeeded as a collective body creates the right conditions for mobilisation. French society can thus now boldly works towards truly innovating to live with the COVID-19, with other pandemics and even with the impacts of climate change.

      A dreary never-ending struggle – Scenario 2

      The second scenario considers that the lockdown is only partly effective considering the amount of denial and opposition in the country. In other terms, if a large majority of people respects the lockdown and the various sanitary measures, too many do not. That minority thus destroys the efforts of the majority.

      To portray these behaviours, we estimated the level of continuing infections as equal to the average number of positive cases between 28 October and 10 November 2020. Because we are in the case of a pandemic where the natural growth of contagion – i.e. without any measures – is exponential, this scenario still shows a measure of success as well as the efforts of the population.

      These efforts are, unfortunately, not sufficient, as shown on the three graphs below.

      The mass of people infected and then becoming symptomatic would be very large and stabilise at a high level.

      Here we do not have a peak for the second wave even though the oscillations of hospitalisations, ICUs and deaths are reduced over time around continuous lines at high levels. Daily, for as long as the contagion goes on, we would need to expect these high levels of hospitalisations, ICUs and deaths.

      In cumulative terms, considering exits, hospitalisations would stabilise around approximately 35.000 to 36.000 beds, permanently used for COVID-19 patients. Between 5.000 and 5.200 ICUs beds would permanently be used for COVID-19 patients.

      The system would be stretched thin but no explosion would take place during the period considered. Nonetheless, the total expected cumulative deaths would increase and reach 72.368 on 29 December 2020. What matters to understand here, compared with the previous scenario is that deaths would not stop but would continue rising with time, reaching approximately more than 80.000 deaths in mid-January.

      In that case, the lockdown could not be relaxed before Christmas. It could not be eased either after Christmas. Indeed, the constant high pressure on hospitals, in terms of ICUs, would make very hazardous indeed any further relaxation of any measure.

      This scenario may not be unlikely. It is also a very dangerous scenario.

      Indeed, both a large part of the population and the medical staff would have to consent a long and sustained effort, with no end in sight. Meanwhile, the only reward would be deaths and even more deaths. More families would be bereaved with time, while increasingly more people would know and be surrounded by people grieving.

      Most probably the resulting tension, grief, and disappointment too would make it increasingly unfeasible to sustain the type of efforts demanded. After a while, it is likely that people would give up making efforts, or become violent against those who do not. The medical staff would increasingly become unable to cope. As a result, contagion would spread again while the care system would start showing signs of breaking down. We would slide towards a situation looking increasingly more like the third scenario.

      Soylent Green* – Scenario 3

      This scenario looks at a situation where contagion is increasing by only 2% a day. There, those opposing the measures against the COVID-19 – whatever their rationale – have started taking the upper hand. Political authorities are either too weak to oppose creeping disobedience or finally decide to follow self-interested short-term lobbies with a policy of laissez-faire. Protective measures are still applied but increasingly less stringently. As a result, contagion slowly rises by what is thought initially to be something meaningless, 2% a day.

      However, with time, 2% a day leads to a high daily level of new positive cases.

      The mass of people infected and then becoming symptomatic would be very large and continue rising.

      Here again, obviously, we do not have a peak for the second wave. The wave swells and lengthens becoming a never ending tide. Daily hospitalisations rise accordingly, as the number of ICUs and deaths, for as long as people refuse to consider the pandemic and the need for continuous protective measures.

      In cumulative terms, hospitalisations never stabilise, but climb higher and higher. At the end of December around approximately 70.000 beds are used for COVID-19 patients, which represents 18% of the overall hospital beds in France (OECD (2020), Hospital beds (indicator). doi: 10.1787/0191328e-en – accessed on 11 November 2020). And the numbers keep rising.

      More than 8.400 ICUs are occupied by COVID-19 patients. Hospitals struggle and desperately try to find new beds, while other pathologies cannot be handled anymore. Everyone knows that it is now a question of weeks before the whole system collapses. Harsh and stringent measures need to be taken, but, even in that case, the damage will be terrible and the care system may not survive.

      The total cumulative deaths for the COVID-19 is expected to reach 78.724 on 29 December 2020. However, it only tells part of the story as deaths stemming from all other pathologies now have to be added to the count. What matters to understand here, compared with the two previous scenarios, is that first COVID-19 related deaths would not stop but would continue rising with time, while, second, pathologies that had been so far cured would become deadly again, adding to the overall number of deaths.

      In that case, because of the choice made by people and elite groups, Christmas would probably not be spent under lockdown. It would however be everything save a celebration of hope, joy and love.

      Hopefully, this scenario is unlikely. It is nonetheless useful as a scenario to remind people of why lockdown and other measures against the COVID-19 are necessary and must be embraced.

      Further reflections and questions

      Statistical updates and discrepancies on the number of COVID19 positive cases

      Working on the statistics, we noticed there is a discrepancy between the figures given daily by the French officials, including the Prime Minsiter office and the data revised over time by Santé publique France and Géodes.

      This is notably true on Sundays, when the numbers given by Geodes tend to be much smaller than those given by the PM office. We kept the data of Geodes for the sake of logic as we do not know how or why data are changed from one office to the other.

      More interestingly in terms of steering policies, we noticed that Geodes revises its data for positive cases of COVID19 with time, probably as it gets the results of the tests. Data are updated sometimes over more than a month.

      If changes are small, such as adding for example ten more positive cases on a specific day, this does not truly matter in terms of policy.

      However, if changes are large, then the discrepancy can create similarly large problems.

      We found out one such example. On 26 October 2020, 66.866 positive COVID cases were reported by Geodes, which showed a large increase (+23,28%) compared with the previous week, when the highest number of cases was 54.238 (on 23 October). After regular updates, these 66.866 cases became, on 9 November 2020, 68.453 cases.

      Yet, on the PM website, the number of positive cases given for 26 October 2020 is 26.771.

      The difference between 66.866 and 26.771 cases is immense. Such a huge discrepancy in figures makes it very difficult for external actors to steer their own policies.

      If ever such discrepancies are also incorporated in the data given at the highest level of the French government, then policies may become inadequate.

      Hopefully, this is only a problem of communication of data, but it does create doubts, which are unnecessary in these difficult times.

      COVID19 patients die when they are not in ICUs

      As we worked through our forecasts, considering what scientific papers, the WHO and medical doctors described about the course of the illness, we expected to see the daily number of deaths in hospital being more or less correlated with the number of patients having to be reanimated. We also expected that the number of deaths would be lower than the number of patients in ICUs. We knew, considering the variations in terms of length of intensive care that the correlation would most probably be imperfect.

      Yet, allowing for a 8 days lag between the daily ICU numbers and daily deaths, we found rates of death compared with past daily ICUs numbers that were much higher than expected and also relatively erratic.

      As a result, for the needs of a first crude statistical observation, we attempted to remove the lags between the different clinical events for which we had statistics. This would allow us to see for an hypothetical time the number of infections, the corresponding hospitalisations, reanimations and deaths. We obtain the following chart:

      What we see is that, with time, as more patients enter the ICUs, around the beginning of October, the curve of deaths starts increasingly to match closely the curve of ICUs.

      This would mean that all patients entering reanimation die. As this is not meant to be the case, one explanation we see for this phenomenon is that patients die as they are not in ICUs.

      This means that patients either are not transferred in ICUs on time or that they are sorted out for access to reanimation. Because the French hospital system is, by large, not meant to have collapsed, then the probable explanation is that patients are sorted out.

      Yet, despite the ethical considerations involved, there is no related debate in French society. Yet, the phenomenon was even more pronounced for the first wave.

      Old-age pensioners die in retirement homes

      As for the previous point this is an ethical concern that we feel compelled to highlight.

      Throughout countries, the death of old-age pensioners in retirement homes because of the COVID-19 is an issue.

      However, here, poring over statistics, time lags, the disease evolution and the sufferings it entails, we may only wonder about the way the physical sufferings of old-age pensioners are alleviated in retirement homes when these facilities were not designed to handle cases that in hospitals demand heavy treatment.

      France, as most Western countries, upholds human rights as constitutive values. Certainly, wondering about and acting justly on the sufferings of its elders faced with a severe disease is part of human rights.

      In one of the first articles we wrote on the COVID-19, we pointed out that a pandemic was not only about a virus but also about people and how they acted and reacted to the pandemic (Hélène Lavoix, “The Coronavirus COVID-19 Epidemic Outbreak is Not Only about a New Virus“, The Red Team Analysis Society, 12 February 2020). What increasingly emerges is that a pandemic also forces us to face who we are and who we want to be as individuals and, collectively, as a society. Only if we find pride in ourselves and in the justness of our actions and choices can we find the strength to live with the COVID-19.

      *Soylent Green is a 1973 American dystopian film directed by Richard Fleischer, Produced by Walter Seltzer and Russell Thacher, starring Charlton Heston and Leigh Taylor-Young and distributed by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer.

      Adapting to the Burning World?

      Design: Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli

      A Bright and Burning Future

      Over the last years, each summer, tsunamis of fire surge in North America, Russia, Africa, South Asia, and Europe. Each year, they break former records and spread wider, while becoming much more intense.

      These fires define the parts of the world that are going to become a place apart, i.e the “Burning World”. These mega wildfires are already pushing modern emergency services to the limits of their response capabilities.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dm7HLYI78nw

      In California, since 2017, those fire monsters have been directly endangering urban life (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Global Apocalypse Now, The California Way”, The Red Team Analysis Society, October 12, 2020).

      However, these mega wildfires are not only devastating the world. They also reveal the capabilities of societies to answer, or not, to the near future state of environmental incineration.

      As a result, a question arises: are modern societies able to adapt to this new state of affairs? And is a new “geopolitics of a “burning world” emerging from the capabilities to adapt, or not (Hélène Lavoix, “When Denial and Passivity Verge on Stupidity” – The Red Team Analysis Weekly – 9 January 2020)?

      One of the main challenges we face in answering these questions is the utter lack of baseline or historic frame of reference. Indeed, there are no recordings of such a long series of extreme burning events. Indeed, the Burning World is the present reality; it is also the “shadow of the future” (Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 1984).

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1xT6eSyet4E

      That is why we must include in our reflection and our scenario-building effort scenarii ideas found in fiction. Furthermore, waiting for proper and in-depth scenario-building, fiction can be useful to outline what the future could look like, if we read it through a strategic foresight framework.

      What is at stake here is of the utmost importance, because our modern societies have to answer with the utmost haste to the question: how can we adapt to the Burning World?

      In order to explore this hypothesis, we shall use disaster movies and science fiction as materials for strategic foresight. In a first part, we shall use The Towering Inferno in order to anticipate the consequence of the domination of human future by fire.

      Then, we shall use the movie Reign of Fire as a thought experience. Through this film, we shall look at the future of societies in a world where resources become fuel.

      Then, we shall re-read the novel Sunstorm by Stephen Baxter and Arthur C. Clark, to propose alternate ways to orient the future of the Burning World in a sustainable way.

      Anticipating our Burning World and the “End of (known) History“

      In order to anticipate how societies may, or not, adapt to the Burning World, it is important to identify the main features of a fire saturating a large scale inhabited and developed area.

      Indeed, a fire destroys buildings, infrastructure, the vegetation cover, part of wildlife and people. But more than that, it can consume huge amounts of resources (Jean-Michel Valantin,  (“The Global Wildfire (1)“, The Red Team Analysis Society, September 27,2020).

      When there is no past

      The problem is that using historic examples is going to be very misleading. For example, the bombing and burning of European cities during WWII, or of the jungle during the Vietnam war, were followed by an end of the “war burning era” (Richard Overy, The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945 and John Dower, Cultures of war, Pearl Harbor/Hiroshima, 9/11/ Iraq, 2010). Thus, it was followed by rebuilding through the injection of financial and building materials as well as thanks to natural regrowth.

      However, the very problem of the opening era of mega wildfires is that there will be no end to it. On the contrary, the singularity of the Burning World relates to something very difficult to accept about climate change.

      Climate events are not becoming extreme because we are far from the extremes; they are becoming extreme because of the sheer scale of their geography and because their intensity is changing (Ed Struzik, “The Age of Megafires: The World Hits a Climate Tipping Point”, Yale 360, September 17, 2020).

      The Towering Inferno and the flight up to survival … for a few chosen

      Thus, we need to use the “thought experiments” literature, movies and series offer as they are extrapolating from these kinds of issues. For example, The Towering Inferno (John Guillermin, 1974) is quite interesting in anticipating what could happen in California and Australia over the coming years.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nch1URmJvMA

      As it happens, the movie shows characters trapped in a burning skyscraper. As the fire starts in the middle of the skyscraper, it is too high for the fire department to intervene. From there, the fire spreads towards the roof. The inhabitants of the building are cut off from the ground by the raging fire. They have no other choice than to flee higher and higher, while mass dying.  

      We must understand that, for these characters, the time-scale of their future is totally determined by the fire and the rhythm of its inexorable extension. Their only hope to survive is to reach the water stored in reservoirs on the roof and to release it, in order to save some of the people.

      In other words, the “inferno” is a fire that spreads at the scale of a whole habitat. It forces the remaining population to gather around water, knowing that there is not enough of that very water to save everybody.

      The Reign of Fire and a world of ash

      Towards a world of ash and soot

      Normally, in ecosystems such as forests, wildfires can literally be “biological kickstarters”. However, mega wildfires are now signals as well as drivers of the “new abnormal”, i.e climate change (Mark Lynas, Our Last Warning: 6 Degrees of Climate Emergency, 2020). Indeed, we have to remember that fire is a chemical reaction. So, a fire only lasts as long as the fuel that feeds the chemical reaction.

      So, we have to anticipate how to adapt to a world where areas at continental scale are going to become fuel for longer and longer “mega fire season”. This means that they will burn again and again. And these regions will keep on burning until there is nothing left to fuel the fires, and thus until nothing can regrow.

      Thus, once the fuel will be exhausted, all that remains after the incineration will be a world of ash and soot. It will have very few resilience capabilities. There are very few research or fiction works that dare to rise to the challenge of “thinking the unthinkable”.

      The Reign of Fire

      As it happens, the 2002 movie Reign of Fire (Rob Bowman, 2002) explores what comes just after the “Burning world”. At the start of the 21st century a flight of dragons wakes up and escapes from the London underground.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xd2hHvq-SEA

      They are quite indestructible and they burn the whole world to the ground. A last community survives by living underground, in the caves of a medieval castle, near a river. Their crops are very fragile, and they must prevent their incineration by dragons.

      New characteristics for a Fiery Planet

      Towards a Geography of Fire

      The movie’s scenario tells us of the quasi-“transplantation” of a 21st century on an “alternate” planet. This “burning Earth” can barely sustain the most fragile form of human existence anymore. Indeed, its habitats and ecosystems are now fuel for the Burning World. 

      As a result, this helps us to understand the coming new geography of our Burning World.

      In a few years time, California, the West Coast of North America, the Amazon Basin, and Australia may risk becoming worlds of ash and soot.

      This would entail survival politics (David Wallace Wells, The Uninhabitable Earth, Life after Warming, 2019). Those would be based on the mixing of the biological and social imperatives of society while the Earth becomes another planet.

      An ethos for a fiery planet

      It also tells us that the kind of changes currently occurring has also a drastically important psychological and cognitive dimension. The latter are necessary to allow human beings coping with living through a permanent state of catastrophe, without choosing denial.

      On the contrary, a “peasant/warrior/fireman” mentality is going to be a meaningful way to adapt.

      Preventing the Firestorm?

      These tentative foresight scenarii extracted from fiction about the Burning World are definitely not enticing.

      They force us to understand that there will be a drastic degradation of collective sustainability. Habitats and resources are going to turn into fuel, heat, smoke, ash and soot. And what will remain of human life will be “poor, nasty, brutish and short” (Hobbes, The Leviathan, 1651).

      Given the near-impossibility for a large population to adapt to the Burning World, the sole other alternative seems to be to find ways to mitigate the Firestorm. What is being done to mitigate it through international negotiations and the development of the energy mix is certainly useful.

      However, in the same time, the mega wildfires are multiplying. And they are also intensifying and spreading at a larger scale (Michael Klare, All Hell Breaking Loose, The Pentagon’s Perspective on Climate Change, 2019). 

      Thus, we must explore yet another alternative, mixing mitigation and prevention.

      Sunstorm and alternative world politics

      The novel “Sunstorm”, by Stephen Baxter and Arthur C. Clark (2006), explores that family of scenarii.  In 2037, an astrophysicist and an artificial intelligence (AI) predict that an exceptional sun storm is going to incinerate the Earth in 2042. So, the “ultimate bonfire” becomes the “shadow of the future” for the entire human race (Axelrod, Ibid.).

      This triggers an international effort, minus China, to build a giant smart space mirror. It is designed in order to deflect the 24 hours “sun bombing”. The novel describes the political, scientific, industrial, diplomatic and psychological dimensions of this colossal endeavour. It also describes how it transforms world politics.

      The book is also a narrative of loss and sadness. Indeed, if the project is largely a success, the damages are immense. Nonetheless, this tremendous effort empowers modern societies to survive the passage of this “sun fire bottleneck”. 

      From Sunstorm to climate change

      Even more interesting is that the authors are clearly developing a metaphor about climate change and the Burning World. Indeed, the “space mirror” is one of the theoretical answers some scientists envision in order to “cool” the planet (Clive Hamilton, Earthmasters: the Dawn of the Age of Climate Engineering, 2013).

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K03cHnJY1qI

      The space mirror, as other geo-engineering speculations, would be deflecting a portion of the sun’s radiations.

      A global threat as a common good

      The novel says that it is possible to change the current climate and “firestorm” trajectory. However, success would demand to pool and coordinate the present political, scientific, financial and industrial resources.

      This would be possible through the collective understanding of a planetary threat recognized as an unintended “common” of the human race (Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 1968).

      It does absolutely not promote any kind of “degrowth” or of collapse, quite the opposite. The novel reveals that it is possible to re-orient modern societies. Outer space becomes the new place where they may reach towards sustainability and start searching for new resources.

      In other terms, it is time to use current resources and capabilities to mitigate and prevent the “Burning World”. In order to achieve this goal, decision-making needs to use foresight and early warning scenarios.

      Featured image: Image par sippakorn yamkasikorn de Pixabay

      What is an Issue in terms of Strategic Foresight & Warning and Horizon Scanning?

      An issue, in terms of warning and by extension SF&W, is “a situation, an objective, an opportunity, a danger, a threat or a risk, which is specific and defined.” (Grabo, 2004)

      For example, SF&W issues can be interstate and civil wars, fragile states, instability, energy security, oil, economic crisis, global water security, epidemics and pandemics such as the COVID-19, etc. We address them here in our section “Global Issues”.

      An issue can be explored through strategic foresight. During the warning process, it will be monitored, usually thanks to indicators based on models. The analyst will assess its potential developments (to obtain a judgment on the future).

      Monitoring issues will allow for the identification of warning problems, which will then be surveilled, again through adequate models and related indicators. If we use the example of energy as meta-issue, then issues could be “oil security,” “peak oil,” “peak uranium,” “the volatility of oil prices,” “coal security,” “the politics of energy between Europe and Russia,” space mining, etc. and problems the more specific “Gasprom policies,” “Nord Stream,”, “Oil and gas tensions in the eastern Mediterranean”, etc… If we look at resources as meta-issue, then deep-sea resources security is one of the issues.

      The collection of necessary information takes place during the monitoring and surveillance phases. The model and related indicators lead the collection of data and pieces of information.

      References

      Grabo, Cynthia M., Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, edited by Jan Goldman, (Lanham MD: University Press of America, May 2004).

      Featured Image par Fathromi Ramdlon de Pixabay 

      Global Apocalypse Now, the California Way

      Design: Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli

      Facing Apocalypse

      The Apocalypse literally means “the Book of Revelation”. From a theological as well as heuristic point of view, it means that the Apocalypse is the moment in history when entire societies are forced to lift the veils of illusions. Doing so, the revelation of the real state of things emerges, implacably.

      Golden State or burning state?

      That is why California’s burning is a truly apocalyptic situation. Indeed, the tsunami of fire that engulfs the “Golden State” reveals that California is reaching the limits of its sustainability.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VIyuz_6Nd_g

      However, in geopolitical terms, California is a major actor. Indeed, it is where Hollywood and the Silicon Valley are located. It is where they thrive, and it is from there they exert the U.S. technological and cultural influence on a global scale. California is also a major industrial and agricultural actor. Finally, California is also the trade and military interface between the U.S. and the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

      Hence, the burning and aridification of California also means a potential massive disruption of American power and influence. Actually, the strategic significance of these mega wildfires is even deeper. We can sum it up in a simple question: what are the geopolitics of a burning world? In other words, who will burn and who will access to water (“When Denial and Passivity Verge on Stupidity” – The Red (Team) Analysis Weekly – 9 January 2020) ?

      Fire Apocalypse, Now!

      An “apocalyptic moment” is nothing but a moment of revelation about the true state of things. Thus, qualifying the year 2020 as “apocalyptic” is indeed revealing some deep truth about California and the reality of its frailty.

      Over the last few years, with yearly wildfires, a historic part of the Californian landscape, ecology and development have been replaced by something else. This “something” is a singularity, i.e mega fires that are fuelled not by natural conditions, but by being part of the ecology of the New Frontier (Ed Struzik, “The Age of Megafires: The World Hits a Climate Tipping Point”, Yale 360, September 17, 2020).

      Climate as flamethrower

      This “Fire Frontier” emerges as if a continental flamethrower were devastating the whole west coast as well as the South West from British Columbia up north, Washington State, Oregon, to southern San Diego (2020 Western United States Wildfire Season, Wikipedia).

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e5b7yhBfW2Q

      In the meantime, during the whole summer, immense wildfires burnt through the neighbouring states of Arizona, Nevada and Idaho.

      The majority of the wildfires were, or are, of historic proportions. During the 2020 Summer, 5 million acres burnt, exceeding all other previous record. Knowing that 17 out of 20 of the largest wildfires in California happened since 2003, this new record is a signal of the events to come (Ed Struzik, “The Age of Megafires: The World Hits a Climate Tipping Point”, Yale 360, September 17, 2020).

      The violence of the 2020 fires is such that their heat triggers category F-2 and F-3 tornadoes as well as thunderstorms. The winds they generate expand the fires and generate lightning clouds. In turn the lightning create new fires. The winds accelerate the fires’ coalescence, turning the wildfires into monsters, which are impossible to control (Cynthia Gorney, “In lightning-struck California, the smoke is now scarier than the pandemic », National Geographic, August 21).

      Fire as the new wilderness

      The presence of immense swaths of dead forests end up being immense fire stocks. Indeed, those forests are suffering from the drying ground. They also die because of the invasion of mountain pine beetles, which larvae are no longer killed by winter because of too mild temperatures, and dry ground (Jean-Michel Valantin, “The Global Wildfire (1)“, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, January 27,2020).

      This fire violence is the bifurcation of California and world history into the singularity of climate change. Indeed, the causes of the current climate change are the interactions between carbon fuels’ use for the development of modern societies, and the geosphere. Those interactions are radically altering the planetary conditions out of which they emerge.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gN-T6NDWQ1g

      Such an event, with this rhythm and intensity, has never occurred in the history of our planet. This is why it is a singularity. The 2020 mega wildfires are a signal, among others, of the way the 21st century and totally unknown conditions will interpenetrate.

      In historic terms, it is fascinating to note that the conquest of the West and the closure of the Frontier are the consequences of the conquest of California. 150 years after the closing of the geographic frontier, a singularity frontier opens up in the very same space. What is at stake is knowing if the modern Californian cities and industries emerging from the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries are able to adapt to these new and hostile conditions?

      In this regard, the case of the California power grid is quite interesting.

      Burn, power grid, Burn!

      First of all, California’s power grid is 60 years old. Then, its design and construction belong to the climate prevailing in California 60 years ago, and not to the rapidly and violently changing current climate.

      However, this very grid transports electricity towards homes, cities, utilities. It also feeds places such as the Silicon Valley and its global internet pure players, from Google to Facebook.

      Some corporate and individual actors are choosing to get off the grid by acquiring solar panels, in order to be energetically autonomous. However, all over the state, massive ashes clouds, resulting from the fires, cover the panels, thus nullifying their efficiency (Editorial Board, « California’s wildfire power eclipse », The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 14, 2020).

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kdqovLjaETk

      Electric frailty

      As a result, the Californian electricity operators have to operate numerous rollbacks. They also ask people to use less energy at home, shutting off their air conditioning, for example.

      In the same time, during these tough times, California has to import more electricity from other states. Yet, multiple blackouts occurred. The power grid has been under massive stress, forcing power grid managers to “exchange” rollbacks and blackouts “against” overloading an aging and unsafe grid on the verge of collapse.

      In other terms, in a rapidly warming planet, California has to upgrade its overstressed power grid, while having growing electricity needs, because, among others, of the collective urban needs for air conditioning in a time of heat waves (Sammy Roth, “Why California’s power grid keep flirting with disaster? We’ve got answers”, Los Angeles Times, September 8, 2020). 

      On the Frontier of Burning world

      We must keep in mind that California is the 6th or 7th economy in the world. It is also one of the two main agricultural regions in the U.S. with the Middle West. However, modern economic development is totally dependent upon access to electricity.

      This is all the more true for California. Indeed, the electricity needs of the Silicon Valley, of the Hollywood studios and of megapoleis such as Los Angeles, San Francisco and San Diego are immense.

      Enter Burning World

      However the multiplication of mega wildfires threatens the electricity supply of California. The fires burn wooden poles and melting wires over hundreds of kilometres, while menacing utilities and renewable energy’s hardware. In other words, California is presently transporting itself on a new planet, the Burning World (David Wallace Wells, The Uninhabitable Earth, Life after Warming, 2019).

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QiBgEnPXVHg

      We could also say that the new reality is that the Burning World is becoming the new ecological reality of California. There, the current infrastructures have become inadequate.

      The Californian case begs the question: is adaptation possible, for modern societies, to and in the Burning world? This question will be at very heart of the next article of this series.

      Arctic China: Towards New Oil Wars in a Warming Arctic?

      Design: Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli

      The new geopolitics of the Arctic

      In the Arctic, the climate and the “New U.S./Russia/China Cold war” are both warming at a very rapid pace (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Towards a US-China War? (1) and (2): Military Tensions in the Arctic”, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, September 16, 2019). Indeed, since 2016, Russia is multiplying massive military manoeuvres. This includes militarization, nuclear war, and hypersonic weapons exercises in Northern Siberia, as well as in the Russian Arctic archipelago.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=299pbdH9XhY

      In the meantime, China is heightening its oil and gas operations in the Barents Sea, while the number of convoys that use the Northern sea route keeps on growing (Atle Staalesen, “Arctic gas finds new way from Yamal to China”, The Independent Barents Observer, April 1, 2020). Meanwhile, the U.S. and NATO also regularly deploy large military exercises including air power show of force.

      From a warming Arctic to warming geopolitics

      In other terms, the very complex cooperation between Russia and China in the Arctic is becoming a driver of tensions with the U.S., which are also feeling the attraction of the warming North (Valantin, ibid). Because of the rapid warming of this region, the strategic driver of these tensions is the opening of the Arctic to the international competition for energy, mineral, and biological resources (Michael Klare, All Hell Breaking Loose, The Pentagon’s Perspective on Climate Change, 2019). However, this strategic evolution must not hide the emergence of a fundamentally new geopolitical situation.

      This new situation is nothing but the turning of the Arctic Siberian littoral into the continental launch pad towards the Arctic of the Russo-Asian powers that dominate the gigantic landmass of Eastern, Southern and Central Asia and Russia (Jean-Michel Valantin, “The Warming Russian Arctic: Where Russian and Asian Strategies Interests Converge?”, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, November 23, 2016).

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FzVvhoP7AaA

      Arctic Covid-19

      This continental dynamic holds a deep geopolitical meaning because of the accelerating destabilization of the Arctic ice cover. However, another dynamic haunts the Arctic and disrupts its emerging geopolitics, i.e the Covid-19 pandemic (Hélène Lavoix, “The Emergence of an International Covid Order”, The Red Team Analysis Society, June 15, 2020).

      In this new series, we shall see how these new tensions are escalating and how the new geophysics of the Arctic disrupts the deepest geopolitical equilibriums of our world. This disruption emerges from this new frontier of sea power.

      The first stage of this massive geopolitical shift is the structuration of the Arctic through the same kind of competitions and tensions that are organizing the Middle East or the South China Sea. Those competitions result from the conflicting national and private interests fighting to access natural resources. In the same dynamic, these tensions restrain the ability of the actors to reach those resources.

      The Arctic as a new South China Sea…

      The New American and Chinese frontier

      On 6 May 2019, the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo addressed in Finland the participants to the Arctic Council, the international body of all the nations of the Arctic region. During his speech, he declared that:

      “The Arctic is at the forefront of opportunity and abundance, … It houses 13 per cent of the world’s undiscovered oil, 30 per cent of its undiscovered gas, an abundance of uranium, rare earth minerals, gold, diamonds, and millions of square miles of untapped resources, fisheries galore… Steady reductions in sea ice are opening new passageways and new opportunities for trade, … This could potentially slash the time it takes to travel between Asia and the West by as much as 20 days … Arctic sea lanes could become the 21st century Suez and Panama Canals”.

      However, Mike Pompeo also added:

      “Do we want the Arctic Ocean to transform into a new South China Sea, fraught with militarization and competing territorial claims? » (Mike Pompeo from Jennifer Anslen, “Pompeo: Melting sea ice “presents new trade opportunities”, CNN, May 7, 2019.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Bk8PeRBYcg

      This geopolitical and strategic statement unveils the way the highest U.S. federal authorities are particularly aware of the new geopolitical reality: with the support of Russia, China is becoming an Arctic power. As it happens, a growing number of Chinese cargo convoys use the new Russian Northern Sea Route.

      This sea route joins the Bering Strait to the Norwegian Sea, as well as the Pacific, the Arctic Ocean and the Atlantic. Thus, using the Northern Sea Route allows the Chinese merchant fleet to reach the commercial ports of Scandinavia, northern Europe and of the North Atlantic, including Iceland (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Arctic China (1) – The Dragon and the Vikings”, The Red Team Analysis Society, 26 May, 2014).

      The Chinese presence in the Arctic is also scientific. A growing number of Chinese expeditions are mapping the sea floor in order to identify oil and gas resources. In the same time, others study the consequences of climate change on the Arctic environment.

      Those scientific missions aim at identifying potential new sea lanes and biological resources (Thomas Nilsen, “China seeks a more active role in the Arctic”, The Independent Barents Observer, May 11, 2019). In the same dynamic, major Chinese energy companies are investing in Russian oil and gas operations. They also develop their own off-shore operations in the Russian exclusive economic zone.

      Towards a Chinese and American Arctic “South China Sea”?

      In other terms, the Russian Arctic sees the deployment of the same kind of commercial, fishing and energy developments as those taking place in the South China Sea. However, the comparison that Mike Pompeo draws is also of a geopolitical nature. Indeed, the South China Sea is a historic theatre of rivalries between China and other riparian states, as well as and relatedly between China and the U.S. (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Militarizing the Chinese New Silk Road part 1 – The South China Sea”, The Red Team Analysis Society, March 13, 2017).

      Thus, when Mike Pompeo utters such warnings, he as well implies that the U.S. presence in the Arctic is also going to ramp up. And that it will become an active competitor of China in the Artic region.

      Those mounting tensions between the U.S., Russia, and China in a warming Arctic also reveal a deeper trend: the transformation of the warming Arctic into a multi-scale theatre of competitions and conflicts. Those are driven by the competition between great powers for access to and control of vital resources. Then, the competition created turbocharges tensions between regional actors. Yet, the South China Sea is not the only analogy for this kind of international politics.

      … Or as a new Middle east?

      Actually, we find also here the very drivers of geopolitics and dynamics that can be observed in the Middle East ( Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East, 2017).

      An Arctic “Middle Easternization”?

      One of the distinctive features of Middle Eastern geopolitics is the way it inherited regional tensions. International politics there is also rooted in a multimillenial history and in challenging geographic, hydric and climate conditions. This geo-historic context meets recent international tensions centred on oil and gas. This cross-over of civilizational and energy tensions are forcing cascading political and military shifts. Furthermore, this happens in a very rapidly socially and ecologically changing region (Fred Pearce, “MidEast Water Wars: In Iraq, a Battle for Control of water”,Yale 360°, 25 august 2014).

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yr-LaMhvro

      It is interesting to note that, currently, the warming Arctic becomes an imbrication of different geopolitical levels. From this point of view, one could say that Norway is going through a “Middle Easternization” process. It is a small country, independent, while being an important oil producer. It is also an immediate land and marine neighbour of Russia.

      Norway is also a NATO member, and the Norwegian ports are harbours for the numerous Chinese scientific and commercial ships. It is also an active candidate to host the northern Europe end of the intercontinental fibre optic cable planned by China. That cable could extend from China, and could be laid down along the Siberian coast to Norway. There, Norway would connect this cable to European fibre optic networks.

      This project is feasible because of the warming of the Arctic and the accelerating decrease of the summer and winter ice cover (Maija Mylella, Arctic Finland “Data cables are the new trading routes, Finland wants data highway to Asia via Arctic waters”, The Independent Barents Observer, June 15, 2017 and Thomas Nilsen, « Major step towards a Euro-Asia Arctic cable-link », The Independent Barents Observer, June 6, 2019).

      A warming cold war?

      However, in October 2018, Norway was host to the most important NATO naval exercise since the end of the Cold war in 1990. This exercise was meant to deter the “unnamed adversary”, i.e. Russia. It also allowed for the deployment of enormous air and sea capabilities at the North Atlantic Northern sea route gateway. Those military deployments are a warning sent to Russia and China ( Jean-Michel Valantin, “Militarizing the Warming Arctic – The Road to Neo-Mercantilism(s)“, The Red Team Analysis Society, November 12, 2018).

      As we can see, Norway is a “hub of geopolitical scales imbrications”. It is as complex as any Middle Eastern country. In the meantime, climate change supports the access to the massive energy and biological resources of the zone. In the meanwhile the Northern sea route becomes an alternative solution to the Suez canal.

      The Arctic enters the Covid19 World

      Both the “South China Sea” and “Middle-East” comparisons help us understanding how the warming Arctic is rapidly changing. The latter becomes an attractor of interlocked local, regional, international and global geopolitics and resources competitions. This new reality is becoming more obvious and pregnant since March 2020. Indeed, the new Arctic geopolitics is also becoming a powerful vector of the Covid-19 pandemic (Hélène Lavoix, “The Emergence of a International Covid Order”, The Red Team Analysis Society, June 15, 2020).

      The “Covid World” Rules

      Those geopolitics, nonetheless, bow to the domineering geopolitical situation that Helene Lavoix qualifies as the “Covid World”. In other words, nowadays, the Covid-19 pandemic is becoming the main and the most powerful geopolitical force in the world. This can verified through the mammoth and world-wide geo-economic disruption it brings in its wake. Because of its cascading effects, the Covid-19 leads the world economy towards the mother of all depressions.

      Indeed, the pandemic affects all the Arctic countries, and also the strategic energy and military sectors. Furthermore, the “Covid World” also absorbs the Arctic through the possible infection of different military units.

      For example, the Murmansk region is badly impacted by the virus. This is particularly important, because Murmansk is the most important civil Russian harbour on the Arctic coast.

      The Murmansk oblast is also the headquarters of the Russian Northern Fleet. The latter plays a growing role in securing the immense economic exclusive zone. It also hosts the mammoth construction site of Novatek, the second Russian oil and gas company. Those constructions support the development of the massive liquid natural gas of the Yamal Peninsula, as well as other projects.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V9n6tu35chg

      Meanwhile, for example, in June, the Murmansk Oblast suffered a higher number of contaminations than neighbouring Norway. This slowed down and disrupted the workings of the civil industries, with more than 2000 workers infected on the Novatek site of Belokamenka, as well as on those of the Northern fleet (Atle Staalesen, “After infection of more than 2000 workers, situation comes under control at Belokamenka construction site”, The independent Barents Observer, June 16, 2020 and “The City hat builds Russia’s nuclear submarines has more than 2000 Covid-19 cases”, The Independent Barents Observer, June 23, 2020). 

      Thus, the pandemic disrupts the rhythm of the civil and military development plans of the warming Arctic . 

      Covid disruption

      This situation is not trivial. Novatek is a major developer of the Yamal I and II operations. Those attract massive foreign investment, from China, India, and Japan, among others. Those developments are deeply dependent on the warming of the region that allows access to new resources. Those extraction operations are of great interest for Asian nations. They work at diversifying their energy sector, in order to use less coal, while supporting their economic development.

      Thus, the delays that the virus imposes to these operations are a potential constraint for the economic development of Asia. Reciprocally, this unveils how Asia links itself to the development of the Russian warming Arctic. It also unveils the way those massive geo-economic strategies on a warming planet are currently absorbed by the “Covid World”

      Thus, we now have to look at the way those public and private actors adapt both to climate change and to the “Covid World”’.

      Featured Image: Design by Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli for The Red Team Analysis Society

      Scenarios to Navigate the COVID-19 Pandemic and its Possible Futures (1)

      This article presents nested scenarios to handle the uncertainty created by the COVID-19 pandemic. Our aim is to provide an organised framework to foresee the future of our world as it lives through the pandemic, while easing understanding. Such a comprehension, which brings together the past, the present and possible futures is necessary to allow for proper preparedness, innovation, planning and action.

        The scenarios can be used as the basis to build more specific scenarios answering precise questions and looking at the future of particular actors, countries, geographical regions or even cities.

        If scenarios are a key tool to handle uncertainty, the sheer number of unknowns we must face with the COVID-19 pandemic also presents challenges for scenarios to be actionable. To handle properly the uncertainty and cover the whole range of possible futures, we need to multiply scenarios. But then, when presented with too many scenarios, decision-makers may be at a loss to know how to use them. Ideally, they may aim at creating response strategies that are resilient and robust against all scenarios. However, that may be difficult, if not impossible. We thus need to find a way to articulate our scenarios so that they become even more useful.

        The nested approach we created allows for tying things together and for navigation among a possibly long list of various scenarios. As a result, decision-makers are offered a coherent whole within which they can navigate. Furthermore, that approach handles a particularity of scenarios for pandemic: improving the account of time and timelines. Time, in pandemic, becomes a factor that needs also to be monitored, including for warning. As a result, the actionability of the set of scenarios for decision-makers is further improved.

        You can find the bibliography and detailed articles related to the scenarios in our COVID19 section.

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        1 – Three Meta-Scenarios

        Explanation

        • The 3 meta-scenarios are organised around the fundamental critical uncertainty that determines our futures and indeed, somehow, the history of human evolution and progress: 
        • Do we have any power against the new threat that is the SARS-CoV-2?
        • In other terms, is it in our power to make the SARS-CoV-2 fade away? Alternatively, will it disappear – or be reinforced – as it appeared, without our intervention?
        • As a result, and considering the necessity to cover all possible futures, we obtain three meta-scenarios:

        1- “The Miracle” – a very favorable scenario where everything is solved finally without human intervention and where things can continue or rather go back to the pre-COVID-19 world.

        2 – “Human Genius” – This is the meta-scenario that we shall focus and detail.

        3- “Towards extinction” – The less palatable option, which is not detailed. Here, the initial COVID-19 pandemic threat could reinforce and, possibly added to other negative factors, such as climatic events, and other pandemics, finally lead to our extinction. 

        “The Miracle”

        Improbable

        Narrative

        The SARS-CoV-2 surprises us once more, but this time positively. It has suddenly disappeared. 

        Scientists wonder why. They knew that, considering our lack of exhaustive knowledge on coronaviruses in general and in particular on a virus discovered only a couple of months ago, surprise could happen. 

        They had pondered about the possibility that the virus could loose either its infectious power or its lethality. They did not dare to hope that it could just disappear, for reasons not well understood yet, as happened for the SARS-CoV outbreak in 2003 (1). They had also wondered if, alternatively, a strong immunity could not also develop naturally and finally very quickly among human beings.

        But here we are, the miracle has happened. The SARS-CoV-2 and the COVID-19 have disappeared. The pandemic ends. 

        (1)  Yvonne CF Su et al. ‘Discovery of a 382-nt deletion during the early evolution of SARS-CoV-2”, bioRxiv 2020.03.11.987222; doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.03.11.987222

        Explanation

        What is critical here is our powerlessness as human beings. The happenstance of this scenario is not in our control. Nonetheless, the factors influencing the probability of this scenario must be monitored and due warnings delivered, if warranted.

        Until this miracle takes place, the dynamics and impacts are similar to those of the “human genius” scenario.

        Considering current knowledge on epidemics and on coronaviruses, this scenario is improbable, in the short to medium term (between 20% and 50% – closer to 20% than to 50%), but not impossible. The factors influencing the probability of this scenario must be monitored.

        “Human Genius”

        Probable

        Narrative

        Faced with the unbearable costs that letting the pandemic run wild would create, because uncertainty forbids the hope to reach a natural immunity rapidly and without harm, human beings have no other choice than to work to show their genius. 

        As they have most often done throughout the course of evolution, they rise to the challenge. They work to understand the threat and to find how to overcome it. 

        They know they will need time to find out a definitive solution.

        Thus, in the meantime, they find alternative ways to allow for the time necessary to find the solution against the SARS-CoV-2 threat, whatever the complexity of this solution. 

        Explanation

        This “meta-scenario” is both the most likely of the three meta-scenarios and also the only one upon which and within which we can act. 

        Thus, it is within this meta-scenario, that our scenarios will be located. This is thus our first and largest “nested world”.

        2 – Human Genius and its three Scenarios

        Explanation

        • The 3  major scenarios of Human Genius are organised around the critical uncertainty regarding immunisation. Indeed, immunisation is so far the best if not only way we know to overcome infectious and deadly diseases. 
        • The key question is:
          When shall we be immunised against the SARS-CoV-2, without having to face the unbearable costs and uncertainty of hoping to reach a natural immunity?
        • This translates in three scenarios. The first two scenarios are organised according to time and around vaccines. They answer the question: When shall we have a vaccine available (i.e. discovered, manufactured and delivered to the various countries needing it)? The first scenario then forks around the question of mass vaccination.
        1. “The Long awaited Christmas 2022“: This scenario subdivides in two to consider two possible courses of action regarding competition over vaccine. The timeframe considers the needs for a worldwide immunisation (see further details, bibliography and references in different articles considering vaccines in our COVID19 section)
        2. “A little bit longer…”
        3. “A new path opens“: This scenario takes into account new potential discoveries that would allow us obtaining immunisation with something different from current vaccination or treatments. This scenario and the two focused on vaccination are not mutually exclusive. They may evolve along parallel avenues. It is shown here with the vaccine scenarios for the sake of presentation.

        “The Long Awaited Christmas 2022”

        Probable

        Narrative – up to March 2021

        Considering the SARS-CoV-2 threat, the search to discover a vaccine is unprecedented and progresses at a speed so far unequaled in human history. The number of candidate vaccines being developed went from between 15 and 20 in mid-February to 70 in mid April 2020 and continued growing to more than 130 candidates. Many of them are successfully moving through the trial stages, which have been changed and shortened to satisfy the urgency of the situation.

        As a result of this enormous effort, while all insist the new way to organise the trials is safe, in March 2021 a vaccine against the COVID-19 is licensed.

        Luckily, only one shot of the vaccine is necessary for immunisation of at least one year (note that some candidates vaccines seem to need two shots).

        Now manufacturing must start. The herd immunity for the COVID-19 that needs to be reached considers Sanche et al. study, and is thus of 82.4% of the population. 6.35 billion doses must be manufactured, and then delivered to all the countries of the planet.

        “Merry Christmas 2022”

        Likely

        Narrative – from March 2021 – to Winter 2022

        Fortunately, production capabilities are sufficient. They are organised well ahead of time. All components necessary to produce the vaccine and inject it are available. The doses of vaccine are safely delivered to each national administration for Christmas 2022. 

        The mass vaccination campaign can start.

        Explanation

        This scenario then sub-divides into two main scenarios according to the willingness of people to accept the vaccine.

        “A most precious Christmas present”

        Improbable

        Narrative – Starting Winter 2022

        The mass vaccination campaign, although complex, has been well prepared ahead of time. It proceeds at a speedy pace throughout the world.

        Because of the very early planning, in a record time herd immunity is reached, for now.

        The world succeeds in overcoming the COVID-19 pandemic, for the time being.

        Explanation

        This scenario should be used as the basis for the creation of a new set of scenario allowing for handling all the uncertainties linked to immunisation. It should also be used to plan ahead the mass vaccination campaign.

        “A failed Christmas”

        Likely

        Narrative – Starting Winter 2022

        The efforts and successes of vaccines labs and manufacturers has been daily hailed throughout the period leading to the mass immunisation in the media, notably financial ones. The speed with which the vaccines has been developed has been continuously highlighted. Each new announcement of success was followed by rises on the stock exchange.

        However, meanwhile, the impact on the general public has been neglected. What many understand, rightly or wrongly, is that the typical process of trials has not been safely followed. Conspiracy theories have started to abound regarding a real hidden aim of manufacturers to seek ever more profit.

        Meanwhile, the very novelty of some vaccines has hardly been explained to the population at large.

        As, since the beginning of the pandemic, people throughout the globe have witnessed the uncertainty of science and quarrels linked to ego and career rather than to a real appetite for understanding, trust in science has diminished.

        Meanwhile, many political authorities have, also lost part of their legitimacy.

        As a result, added to the previously already growing distrust of vaccines, many refuse vaccination. Too many to allow for herd immunity.

        After months of inadequate efforts to entice the population in being vaccinated that were too little and too late, less than 50% of the population in many countries accepts the vaccine.

        The pandemic is there to last.

        Explanation

        The likelihood to see this second, unfavourable, scenario taking place will depend upon the the way the period leading to the start of mass immunisation.

        The way political authorities in each country and internationally will handle the pandemic is critical.

        The scientific community, the media, vaccine manufacturers as well as financial players will also play a very important role.

        “Free-for-all”

        Likely

        Narrative – from March 2021 – to Winter 2022

        Governments and pharmaceutical companies could not foresee early enough the way to manufacture the doses needed for the whole world.

        Many factors foster tension and bitter competition between governments as each want to make sure they will be able to immunise their own population.

        The whole world has to face many drivers of instability and tension: the dire impacts of the pandemic, including economically, the period of transition into which the international system stands, the tensions for supremacy notably between the U.S. and China, the refusal by other powers to become subservient to the too mega-powers considering the risks they just lived in terms of survival, Erdogan and Turkey’s attempt at taking advantage of the international situation to create a new sphere of influence in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East, etc.

        How hight can tension run? Can we now have to face a war? 

        Explanation

        A “war”scenario is one possibile scenario to follow from the “free for all” scenario but will not be developed here.

        A crucial factor that will make the tension more likely is the capability of governments to move towards collaboration or conflict between the start of the pandemic and the date of discovery of a vaccine.

        By June 2020, the U.S. international attitude regarding face masks, vaccines and treatments would tend to increase the likelihood to see tension rising rather than collaboration. On the contrary, successful efforts of other countries to adopt a collaborative approach would lower the likelihood to see conflict settling in.

        Further specific scenarios would need to be built to precisely account for these cases.

        “A little bit longer…”

        Improbable

        Narrative

        The scientific community has made tremendous efforts to discover a vaccine against the SARS-CoV-2.

        Yet, with time, one after the other candidate fails, at one stage or another of the process.

        We are now past March 2021, and new vaccine candidates continue being developed. One has to succeed… one day. 

        Covid-19, scenario, Antiviral Treatment, monitoring

        Explanation

        This scenario will become active only if the previous one fails (all candidate vaccines fail).

        It is thus an alternative scenario that would be triggered around March 2021 if the trials have failed. 

        “A new path opens”

        Probability: Unknown

        Narrative

        Scientists explore new paths towards understanding better the SARS-CoV-2, notably, but not only, in the field of genetics, phylogenetics, evolutionary epidemiology, genomics, genomics epidemiology, etc.

        New findings open completely new avenues of thoughts to handle diseases and viral infections.

        A new way to fight the COVID-19 pandemic is now possible.

        Explanation

        This scenario may be a completely unexpected way to fight the COVID-19. 

        Its complete novelty, however, forbids estimation of probability or timeframe.

        It is nonetheless important to keep it in mind as research in these areas must continue and as it may constitute a revolutionary way out of the pandemic.

        3 – Easing the pain

        Explanation

        • The next layer of critical uncertainty is focused on the search for antiviral prophylaxis and treatment. 
        • As soon as a treatment exists and is fully efficient, whatever the stage of the illness – preventing the development of the disease as well as death – and as soon as it is widely available, then the pandemic will end.
        • Even more so than with the previous layer, considering the number of ongoing clinical trials, monitoring must be ongoing.
        • As long as we have not found a completely ideal treatment, even if partly efficient treatments exist, we shall remain in a scenario where we have to live with the COVID-19 pandemic. This scenario sub-divides as follows:

        1- ““The ideal medicine chest” – The first type of treatment may result from known drugs. In that case, as for the vaccine, the discovery may lead to either collaboration or tension. It is impossible to give a date as many trials are ongoing.

        2 – “See you in 15 years…” – If the trials of all the known medicines fail, then one must hope to find a completely new treatment. Then, the minimal amount of time to safely develop a new drug is 15 years. In that case, the hope and timeline of the vaccine will take precedence. Vaccines will then become even more important.

        3- “The Age of Reckoning” – In this scenario, we look at the way we live with the COVID-19 pandemic, because no full treatment has yet been discovered. The possible treatments found in this scenario may alleviate pain and reduce fatality, but not in a way that would impact the dynamics of the pandemic. It is the scenario we shall further develop.
        This last scenario also takes place as the previous two are ongoing. Thus, they are not mutually exclusive along the whole timeline, but presented as such for the sake of convenience.

        “The Age of Reckoning”

        Almost Certain

        Narrative

        We live with the SARS-CoV2, this virus that triggered the start of the COVID-19 epidemic in China, probably sometime during the year 2019.

        The disease is highly contagious, we do not have a treatment, we do not have a vaccine, we still know little about this coronavirus and the disease it entails.

        scenario, covid-19, pandemic, epidemic

        Explanation

        This scenario is organised according to the way major actors want to see the socio-political system adapt and change. Do they truly consider the COVID-19? Do they want to make sure that safety for all citizens comes first? Or do they want to go back to the pre-COVID-19 world?

        Some of the major critical factors which are furthermore involved are the way the disease itself evolves, the dynamics of the pandemic, and how political authorities handle the pandemic and manage, or not, to ensure security on all fronts. As a result legitimacy becomes foremost. Indeed, legitimacy can be reinforced – in the case of rather successful actions – or, on the contrary, weakened – in the case of suboptimal governance. The quality of legitimacy will then hinder or favour the actions of political authorities.

        Then, the actions of elite groups are also considered as fundamental.

        The scenarios are organised in three periods: the shock, denial and fundamental change (forthcoming).

        “The shock”

        Certain – Past

        Narrative

        We remember when we started to understand we had to face a new disease. Strangely enough, it feels like it was both ages ago and yesterday.

        The pandemic developed first in China then in South Korea and Singapore.

        With hindsight, the rest of the world showed a complete disbelief and inability to even think we could have to face a global pandemic. Then it hit us. Not only were we all rather unprepared, with the exception mainly of the two first hist countries, but we also probably went into shock. This just could not be true, it was not true. A real pandemic was impossible in the 21st century.

        As countries were hit and finally had to witness exponentially rising numbers of infections and hospitalisations, as they were suddenly faced with the possibility to see their health system exploding, as the ghost of past pandemics such as the Black Death settled, political authorities reacted in various ways. Their actions were function of two priorities: saving life while also preserving livelihoods. And their actions met with varying success along these two axes.

        Globally, lives were saved by millions for the time-being, even though half a million died in what was dubbed the first wave. Meanwhile, the economic toll was terrible.

        Explanation

        This past period is crucial in then determining the trajectory of countries, as well as the way they will be able to relate to each other. Groups of countries according to their actions and performance along the two main axes, health safety and all other types of security can be created.

        “Denial”

        Almost Certain

        Narrative

        The first shock is now past. Thanks to a very active scientific community, we have started gathering knowledge on this virus and its disease, even though many unknowns remain.

        Some countries are still handling a first wave, while others have started meeting a rebound. Some have not yet truly started their first wave, as they benefited from the decisions and actions from others. All other countries who managed to more or less control the pandemic are on the razor’s edge.

        As a result from their position on the pandemic timeline and on the way they handled this period, political authorities, the scientific communities and, in general, elite groups have seen their legitimacy being reinforced – few countries – or weakened – many countries.

        Those countries where the legitimacy of political authorities has fallen and continues to do so have become everyday more difficult to govern.

        Yet, this goes unnoticed.

        Throughout the world, the master objective is to come back to the world ante, to the world that existed before the COVID-19, despite claims to the contrary.

        Measures are taken when the COVID-19 forces them, but they are still piecemeal measures. They are created within the mindset of the old past world. They are designed to allow us to go back to the past.

        The system and elite groups benefitting from that system are very vocal and they benefit from power and resources accumulated over the last decades. Yet, this power and these resources may not be as solid as they think. Part of this might is only as strong as the system to which it relates.

        Other voices warn that something different must be created, that the pandemic is not over yet, that even the countries most successful in controlling the pandemic are on the razor’s edge.

        These voices suggest that the COVID-19 could be turned into an opportunity to create a novel system better adapted to the 21st century and the many challenges it must face, from climate change to new technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum information sciences, nano-technologies etc.

        Explanation

        Seen from the Summer 2020, this is the current period.

        This sub-scenario is subdivided into three typical scenarios and their archetypal actors’ groups: Towards a Pre-COVID-19 World 3.0 and the Hamartians, Muddling through and the Muddlers, Fortitude and the Changers.

        “Towards a Pre-COVID-19 World 3.0”
        The Hamartians

        Likelihood to assess according to countries

        Narrative

        As few as possible measures are taken to control the COVID-19. Furthermore they are as superficial as possible.

        Hubris and the past govern political authorities and societies.

        The system and elite groups benefitting from the pre-COVID-19 system are stronger than all other voices suggesting otherwise or differently.

        To be continued…

        “Muddling through”
        The Muddlers

        Likelihood to assess according to countries

        Narrative

        Many measures, on all front, are taken but they are chaotic and do not show any real reflection, any innovation nor any coherence.

        Political authorities and elite groups think they want to control the pandemic at best while also learning to live with the COVID-19. Yet, they are still prisoners of the past, of their old mindset and of old structures and interest groups.

        Citizens alike are divided. Some of them think anew, while others want to resist change.

        Some groups start exhibiting extreme ways and cathartic collective behaviour, thus acting out the deep malaise and fear of societies without proper legitimate and adequate governance.

        The system and many elite groups benefitting from the pre-COVID-19 system remain short-sighted and insisting on their old privileges, whatever the price they will make others bear.

        Yet, some new elite groups, including some from the old elite, are also starting to develop a new awareness and understanding of the situation. They start thinking that something different could be done.

        To be continued…

        “Fortitude”
        The Changers

        Likelihood to assess according to countries

        Narrative

        Many measures, on all fronts, are taken. Much thought is given to the pandemic and new knowledge is favoured and considered.

        Political authorities and elite groups know they are far from knowing everything and that the situation is both terribly challenging and completely novel. They know it is extremely difficult to both try to control the pandemic while ensuring all types of security.

        They are very cautious in progressing, yet very strong in implementing measures.

        They succeed in mobilising their citizens to face this new challenge and to try creating a new system better adapted to the reality of the 21st century.

        To be continued…

        Credits images

        Featured image: PIRO4D – Pixabay
        Miracle: Fathromi Ramdlon – Pixabay  
        New Path: Manfred Antranias Zimmer – Pixabay 

        Beyond “the Looking-Glass”?- The Red (Team) Analysis Weekly – 16 July 2020

        This is the 16 July 2020 issue of our weekly scan for political and geopolitical risks (open access).

        Editorial: As a very short editorial, we highlight two articles which are extremely interesting, not only because of their content but also because of the publishing platform considering the content, namely Reuters. Content and publisher together make these articles unusual and as a result they become significant signals.

        Continue reading “Beyond “the Looking-Glass”?- The Red (Team) Analysis Weekly – 16 July 2020″
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