Are your Strategic Foresight Scenarios Valid?

Scenario building, also known as scenario analysis, is a crucial methodology to anticipate and prepare for the future. This is a method used from risk management to strategic foresight through early warning systems. More broadly, it is a key tool for all anticipation that needs to be actionable.

The higher the uncertainty, the more important it is to be able to mitigate risks to develop winning responses. Thence, it is crucial to use good scenarios to be truly prepared. It is thus key to build valid scenarios.

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Check our new online course on scenario-building for Geopolitical Risk and Crisis Anticipation

Good scenarios are sound methodologically and include knowledge and understanding of the issue at hand.

In this article, you will find a list of points – necessary conditions for the validity of scenarios – that you can easily check to verify the scenarios you are about to use are correct methodologically. If they are not, if they include methodological errors, then this means that the scenarios are flawed. Thus, you cannot use them to build robust answers, even if the content of the scenarios shows state of the art knowledge of the issue. For example, you can have invalid scenarios that nonetheless reflect great understanding of China, the U.S., quantum technologies, the Islamic State or the COVID-19 pandemic. Even though the understanding related to the subject matter is good, the scenarios may be useless if they are incorrect methodologically.

Below you will find first an online test for evaluating the methodological validity of your scenarios. We shall suggest possible ways forward according to the test result.

Second, you will find each point of the check list explained. We shall highlight why each point matters to users. Then, we shall explicate why making sure that each necessary condition is respected is most often a guarantee of methodological soundness, or, alternatively, why not respecting a condition is a warning signal for users.

This check list will be useful to both users and practitioners.

If you are a user of scenario

As user of scenarios, if you did not build the scenarios, and especially if you do not master the intricacies of scenario-building, the check list will help you evaluating easily the methodological validity of the scenarios.

If you are a scenario-builder

As practitioner, this check list will help you verify your work as early as possible in the process of scenario-building. As a result you will make sure you are building proper, state of the art scenarios.

What if you do not use scenarios?

Your strategy, policies, actually the whole array of your responses, depend on scenarios. This is true even if you think you are not using scenarios. When you decide upon something, it is because you already have and use, mentally, a model of how the future will unfold (eg. Epstein, ‘Why Model?‘, 2008). This model is a set of scenarios of a sort. It is, however, implicit and created without any methodology. Notably, being implicit, it may be prey to many biases (see online course on modeling, module 2).

As implicitly you use a kind of set of scenarios for the decisions you are taking, then you may also use the test for your vision of the future.

Test your scenarios

Nota: We only take your email address so that you can receive the test results by email. We do not use them for anything else. If you want to subscribe to know when we publish new article, use this form. If you want to become a member, access is here. We shall use anonymised statistics about results to improve understanding on scenarios and their use.

Once you have completed the test, click on submit and read the answers for each question. We suggest what to do with your set of scenarios if it is not valid, according to the type of problem met. You will also get your overall score.

Check list for valid scenarios

1- Are the scenarios covering the whole range of possible futures?

Scenarios must cover the whole range of possible futures. Rutz, McEldowney and Taylor depicted this very well in the drawing on the right hand side (1986, quoted in Taylor, 1993: chapter 1 & fn 7).

Plausible or possible futures?

Rutz, McEldowney and Taylor in Taylor, 1993: chapter 1 & fn 7

Taylor focuses on plausible futures. We prefer looking at possibility rather than plausibility.

Indeed, the idea of plausibility incorporates many biases (see online course on modeling, module 2). In other words, if you focus on what appears to you as plausible, you may very well fall prey, for example, to political correctness, to group think or to normative judgements, among others.

As a result, your scenarios could depict how you would like the future to be rather than consider all futures. This would then increase the likelihood of surprise, when our aim is to reduce the odds of surprise.

Why does it matter to you?

It is truly crucial for you that your scenarios cover the whole range of possible futures, because you do not want to prepare responses that would completely forget one scenario or more.

If we take the example of the Brexit before the vote, imagine that your experts considered that Brexit was impossible. As a result, they gave you a set of scenarios that did not include the possibility for Brexit (e.g. it was thought as implausible). They could have built a couple of scenarios focusing on new rules between Britain and the EU (they could create more than one scenarios), another scenario describing similar rules between Britain and the EU, and finally a last scenario depicting a new love story between Britain and the EU. As a result, you started creating a whole range of answers, made corresponding investments, developed policies etc.

Then, the vote took place, and people chose… Brexit. And you found yourself completely unprepared.

This anecdote is exactly the reverse of what we want to obtain with scenarios.

The brief history of scenarios on the COVID-19 pandemic is also replete with instances of scenarios that did not consider the whole range of possible futures. Indeed, the people and firms creating the scenarios at the time focused wrongly on what they thought was possible. As a result, many times, governments and actors were given invalid scenarios that forbid preparedness.

We want to have scenarios that show us the whole range of possible futures so that we can be ready for any future.

Why is it a methodological guarantee?

As you know, scenarios are built from the combination of the values or attributes of the variables selected to “represent” your initial question. The why and how these variables are selected is outside the scope of this article (see our course on scenario-building).

Mathematically, the attributes or values of a variable must be exhaustive, i.e. cover all the possible values the variable can take in reality, as in the quantitative example on oil prices on the right hand side.We covered this in detail in the online course on modeling, module 4, explaining how to identify factors and drivers for a question and how to make sure these were variables.

Thus, if you build scenarios out of a combination of values (of variables), which are exhaustive, and if you selected properly your variables in a way that is representative, then, as a result, the set of scenarios you obtain covers the whole range of possible futures.

If the experts that built the scenarios use a proper methodology, automatically, the scenarios they obtain covers the whole range of possible futures.

If the scenarios do not cover the range of possible futures, then you may ask them why it is not so. They may have a very sound answer, but it is better to check with them. If they do not have a sound answer, then be wary.

At best this set of scenarios will help you think out of the box, and provide you with new ideas. However, you have to be very careful before using the set of scenarios to develop strategy and policies.

The potential for surprise is not as mitigated as it could have been.

2- Are the scenarios mutually exclusive?

Mutually exclusive scenarios mean scenarios that cannot take place at the same time. You can have one or another, but not both at the same time.

Why does it matter to you?

This condition is necessary to cover the range of possible futures. This is necessary so that you are prepared across uncertainty.

Imagine that you are an emergency NGO preparing your budget and material for the next year for, say Afghanistan. If experts, in the set of scenarios they give you, present you with one scenario for war, one for epidemic, and one for earthquake, but not with one scenario for epidemic and earthquake, one for war and epidemic, one for earthquake and war, and one for war, epidemic and earthquake, then you may run into serious problems. You will not be prepared for complex emergencies. You will have neither the material nor the funding for such cases.

On the contrary, what we want to achieve with scenarios is to be ready for any circumstances, including complex emergencies. We want to be able to develop policies that are robust across all possible futures.

Why is it a methodological guarantee?

As previously, this characteristics of scenarios derives from those of the attributes of the variables. The attributes of a variable must be mutually exclusive. As a result, your scenarios will also be.

If the experts use a proper methodology, then their scenarios will, automatically, be mutually exclusive.

If their scenarios are not mutually exclusive, then it means that there is a serious flaw with their methodology. Actually, I cannot truly imagine a way to salvage such scenarios.

At best this set of scenarios will help you think out of the box, and provide you with new ideas.
It would, however, be dangerous to use exclusively this set of scenarios to guide strategy and policies.
The potential for surprise is not truly as mitigated as it could have been.

3- Are the scenarios dynamic?

Scenarios, to be more easily actionable, i.e. to allow you to develop a proper set of responses and actions to handle coming changes, must respect the previous characteristics – exhaustivity and mutual exclusivity – and ideally should also be dynamic.

Why does it matter to you?

Scenarios are also there to help you identify crucial key points, where decisions are needed. In these cases, scenarios may develop into sub-scenarios.

“A scenario is a story with plausible cause and effect links that connects a future condition with the present, while illustrating key decisions, events, and consequences throughout the narrative”.

Glenn, Jerome C. and The Futures Group International, “Scenarios,”

As a result, scenarios unfold as a story about the world, which is often presented as a narrative (see Scenarios: Improving the Impact of Foresight thanks to Biases). Stories and narratives are essentially dynamic.

Why is it a methodological plus?

Here we are less in the realm of a methodological necessity and guarantee. Dynamic scenarios enhance the actionability characteristics of scenarios.

If your scenarios’ expert was able to point out causal dynamics, then this is a guarantee of his or her skill at scenarios building and knowledge and understanding of the issue at hand. It means that those who built the scenarios truly thought through them, stress-tested their understanding and endeavoured to explore as many areas as possible.

If your set of scenarios does not explicitly show dynamics, even though this set of scenario may not be as actionable as hoped for, it may nonetheless, according to other answers, be used to guide strategy and policies.

4- Are the scenarios on the same time horizon?

In a valid set of scenarios, you should get scenarios that each depict the same period of time. The authors of the scenarios may choose to develop more or less this or that part, but, nonetheless, all timeframes must be covered for each scenario of your set of scenarios.

Sometimes, you will be given scenarios that are not on the same “time plane”. This is not right.

Why does it matter to you?

If scenario A, for example, depicts a situation starting from now until the end of year 2, and scenario B depicts what happens between year 2 and year 4, and you are given only these two scenarios, then you have no way to know if you are given two scenarios… or just one.

Scenario B may just be the continuation, in time, of scenario A.

What you should get, in this example, is scenario A and scenario A1 (and probably A2), the last two portraying what is happening in the case of scenario A from year 2 to 4. You should also be given scenario B0 that tells the story of what is happening from now to year 2 and led to scenario B. This would be a proper set of scenarios time-wise.

Why is it a methodological guarantee?

It shows that your experts truly master both methodology and subject matter. They are able to articulate processes and causal links.

Incidentally, this is why having a proper model for your issue is so important for scenario-building (see online course on modeling).

If the scenarios are not all on the same timeframe, you have to be very careful before using this set of scenarios to develop strategy and policies.
This set may be completely useless, or it can help you think out of the box, and provide you with new ideas.
The potential for surprise is not as well mitigated as it could have been.

5- Is there a likelihood estimate provided for each scenario?

This means an evaluation of likelihood accompanies each of the scenarios of the set. As a result, you should know which scenario is more or less likely.

We are here, of course, in the realm of estimates. Furthermore, these estimates will vary with time, with your decisions and your actions. Yet, it does matter that each scenario has an estimate of its likelihood.

Why does it matter to you?

Knowing if scenario A has a 80% chance of being actualised, scenario B has a 19% chance of being actualised and scenario C a 1% chance of occurring is a crucial information for you.

It does not mean that you should disregard scenario C, especially if it is a high impact scenario. In that case, you should make sure you have hedged against this scenario, or developed policies that are robust enough across all scenarios.

One of the rationale behind scenario-building is that it should help actors envisioning the future beyond “business as usual” trends. Thus, presenting all scenarios (including, if relevant, a “business as usual” one) with likelihoods that are spelled out will help actors considering all possibilities. With likelihoods, scenarios-builders do not have to hide a scenario – the “business as usual one” – because they fear that biases will lead users to discard other, less comfortable, scenarios, even though those are more likely. Thus, ethically, this is much better for everyone as scenarios-builders do not end up taking decisions for scenarios-users.

As a user, you should always be aware of what is likely and unlikely. Knowing this will allow you to design proper responses, according to what you want to achieve. It may imply that you would need to deploy an immense amount of power to achieve an unlikely scenario, for example. Ultimately this is up to you to decide, and knowing what to expect is crucial for success.

Finally, with probabilities, if ever you were offered a set of indicators for each of your scenario and sub-scenarios, then you could also use the scenarios for monitoring, for early warning and for steering policy. As a result, your scenarios would be even more useful and they would also last longer.

If you are not given likelihoods for your scenarios, then to be able to use this set of scenarios to develop strategies and policies, you need to make sure these strategies and policies are robust across all scenarios.

Without probabilities, a set of scenarios is less actionable than with probabilities.

6- Did I provide the right means for the building of this set of scenarios?

Here the question is about you and not about the set of scenarios you received.

Scenarios-building is a demanding methodology. It demands “deep understanding and knowledge” of the issue at hand (Mietzner and Reger, 2005: 236). It also asks to master the methodology and to know how to apply it. As a result, it is also considered as “time-consuming” (Ibid.). Actually, obtaining not only valid but also good scenarios is an investment, as scenarios can – and should – be used over time. Scenarios are more than a consumer good.

Thus, if ever you asked an expert or a team of experts, be they external or internal, to develop scenarios without giving them the means to do so in terms of resources (time and money), then it is highly likely that you will get bad scenarios.

The conditions you set frame the outcome you obtain.

Global Result and score

If you have answered yes to each and every question above, your set of scenarios is most probably methodologically sound as well as actionable.

Assuming the knowledge of and understanding on the subject matter is also good, then you can use it to develop strategies and policies.

You should however not forget that foresight, what we do with scenarios, is not prediction. There is always a possibility for a black swan event, for example (see Taleb’s Black Swans: The End of Foresight? and Useful Rules for Strategic Foresight and Risk Management from Taleb’s The Black Swan).

With this set of scenarios, nonetheless, you can be quite confident that, methodologically, you will mitigate as best as possible the risk for surprise.

On the contrary, the lower the score the more wary you should be of your set of scenarios. Questions 1,2,4 (60 points all together) are the most important methodologically and negative answers there should make you very cautious indeed. Questions 3 and 5 (30 points) are necessary for scenarios being truly actionable.

Some references

Epstein, Joshua M. (2008). ‘Why Model?‘, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 11(4)12.

Glenn, Jerome C. and The Futures Group International, “Scenarios,” The Millennium Project: Futures Research Methodology, Version 3.0, Ed. Jerome C. Glenn and Theodore J. 2009, Ch 19.

Ritchey, Tom “General Morphological Analysis as a
Basic Scientific Modelling Method“, Technological Forecasting & Social Change: Special Issue on General Morphological Analysis, 2018.

Taylor, Charles, Alternative world scenarios for a new order of nations, US Army War College, 1993.

COVID-19 Vaccinations, Hope or Mirage?

(Art design: Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli
Photo: torstensimon)

The world has started a race for immunisation against the COVID-19. Vaccines are now perceived as the universal panacea, the miracle that will save us all from the pandemic. We shall, finally, be able to find back our old life. Are we right to hope? Or are we likely to discover it was a mirage?

Our objective here is to estimate roughly when, considering current vaccination rates, the countries most advanced in terms of immunisation campaigns could reach herd immunity. In other words, when will our hopes become reality?

First, we highlight that our hopes are grounded in reality because of the success of past vaccination campaigns. However, our perception of the timeframe necessary for vaccination success is likely distorted. Second, we highlight six major uncertainties we still face regarding the vaccination against the COVID-19. We use here a “red team” approach, i.e. we ask all questions, even or rather especially disruptive ones.



Number of months needed to achieve herd immunity for COVID-19 – using daily vaccinations – 7 days rolling average 25/26 January 2021 – See below for a larger image – Data from: “Our world in data“

Finally, we estimate how long selected countries, from the U.S. to Israel through Russia, China or the U.K., Germany and France, need to reach herd immunity at current daily vaccination rates. Results are very contrasted, and for many countries, the time to herd immunity must be counted in years rather than in months.

This estimate tells us if it is realistic to hope or, on the contrary, if we are facing a mirage. Different strategies and planning will need to be designed accordingly.

A hope grounded in reality

Vaccination successes

    Certainly proper vaccines, those to which we are used and stemmed from the research of Jenner, Pasteur and Koch over the 18th and 19th century have done exactly what we hope. They saved humanity from some deadly diseases (Agnes Ullmann, “Louis Pasteur“, Encyclopedia Britannica, 15 Jan. 2021).

    Vaccination eradicated smallpox (Edward A. Belongia and Allison L Naleway, “Smallpox vaccine: the good, the bad, and the ugly”, Clinical medicine & research vol. 1,2, 2003). Poliomyelitis is almost also a disease of the past. In 2020, the wild poliovirus type 1 only still affects two countries, Pakistan and Afghanistan, while type 2 and 3 are apparently eradicated (WHO/OMS Poliomyelitis (polio)).

    Thus, our hope is grounded in this vision of vaccines and immunisation and their real success.

    Eradication campaigns are long processes

    Our hope seems also, implicitly, to think that the return to normal will happen tomorrow. At worst, we think we shall move back to our old life within maybe six months.

    Yet, as far as eradication is concerned, decades were needed for the mass vaccinations’ campaigns achievements, not months.

    The modern vaccine against smallpox was developed in the 1950s and the first global eradication effort started in 1950. In 1966, smallpox still remained endemic in 33 countries (DA Henderson, “The eradication of smallpox“, Sci Am. 1976 Oct; 235(4):25-33). The WHO launched a new global effort in the early 1970s (Belongia and Naleway, Ibid.). The last case of smallpox occurred in 1977 in Somalia (Belongia and Naleway, Ibid.). Thus, it took 27 years to eradicate smallpox.

    The vaccine against polio was licensed in 1955, after a massive trial in the U.S. involving 1.3 million children in 1954 (Immunology and Vaccine-Preventable Diseases – Pink Book – Polio – U.S. CDC). In the U.S., immunisation started in 1955 (Ibid.). The last outbreak in America occurred in 1979 (Ibid.). By 1994 polio was eliminated from Western countries (Ibid.). Thus, in this case, and only for Western countries, it took 40 years to eliminate polio.

    Mass immunisation and eradication campaigns are not small matters but, on the contrary, complex endeavours (e.g. WHO “Aide Mémoire – To ensure the efficiency and safety of mass immunization campaigns with injectable vaccines“).

    Furthermore, up until the COVID-19 pandemic, to develop a new safe vaccine – i.e. also considering as much as possible longer term effects – demanded between 10 and 15 years (The History of Vaccines by The College of Physicians of Philadelphia: “Vaccine Development, Testing, and Regulation“, January 2018).

    Now, faced with the COVID-19 pandemic, a threat with completely novel characteristics, we want the disease to disappear very quickly. We want to go back to business as usual. So, we rush and we hope, regardless of reality. And we rush so much that we run the risk of reaching a mirage rather than salvation.

    Certainties and uncertainties

    Here, we shall consider the various major certainties and uncertainties we face regarding the vaccine. They constitute our framework.

    We set aside the critical question regarding the middle and long term safety of the vaccines. This question cannot be answered with certainty. Indeed, humanity does not have the temporal depth necessary to give such an answer. The precautionary principle should certainly have demanded that time be allowed to consider safety. The early twenty-first century globalised, financialized, and libertarian consumerist society chose otherwise.

    Certainty: Number of injections required

    Approved vaccines protect with various efficacy against severe forms of COVID-19, if the tested posology is respected (number of doses and time between two shots). Details on the various vaccines used at the start of 2021 can be found on various official websites, such as the WHO, the European Medicines Agency (EMA).

    In the estimate below, we shall not differentiate between vaccines according to efficacy. We shall consider the two doses required in the original posology. Indeed, all COVID-19 vaccines used at the start of 2021 demand two injections: Pfizer and BioNTech, Moderna, AstraZeneca, Russian Sputnik V, Chinese CoronaVac (note that the latter shows mixed results, including a low 50.4% effectiveness, Smriti Mallapaty, “China COVID vaccine reports mixed results — what does that mean for the pandemic?“, Nature, 15 January 2021). Further studies should definitely include variations in terms of efficacy, according to the types of vaccine delivered.

    Uncertainties

    1/ Delay between required injections

    If the delay between the required two injections is increased, we do not know what can happen. We could only make hypotheses and scenarios, each with different likelihoods. Nothing may change regarding efficacy, but efficacy may also be lowered. Other less palatable scenarios can be imagined, according to which people may become more susceptible to other variants, or the delay may favour the occurence of variants.

    Here, we shall consider that the time required between two injections, as planned by the laboratory, is not stretched but respected.

    2/ It is likely that the vaccines do not stop contamination.

    We do not know with certainty if the vaccines stop infection. However, because it does not seem that most vaccines stop asymptomatic types of COVID-19, then it is likely that contamination will continue, even after vaccination (e.g. EMA, “COVID-19 : Le vaccin rend asymptomatique mais rend-il moins infectieux ?” Santélog, 4 January 2021).

    A study from Israel, which is massively vaccinating its population, gives us further indications, for the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine (Clalit study: decreased infection in the corona due to the vaccine. 13 January 2021; Elisabeth Mahase, “Covid-19: Reports from Israel suggest one dose of Pfizer vaccine could be less effective than expected“, BMJ 2021;372:n217). People over 60 who received one dose remained as susceptible to infections for 13 days. Then the likelihood to become infected dropped by 33% between day 14 and day 17. In other words, after one vaccine shot and after 13 days, the likelihood to become positive to the COVID-19 is 67% of what it was without vaccination. Thus, after one dose, the potential for contagion remains unchanged for almost two weeks, then remains very high compared with no vaccination.

    We do not have further indication about what happens after the second dose.

    Vaccines may reduce infection but, fundamentally, we do not yet know.

    Thus, for the time being, people who will have been vaccinated will need to go on wearing masks, and using protective social distanciation, at least until the famous herd immunity is reached.

    As a result, if your main interest is to go back to the global world we knew before the COVID-19 pandemic, you need to wonder when all countries in the world will reach herd immunity thanks to developed vaccines. Because, for the time being and considering current vaccines, before then there will be no return to “normal”.

    You may be more modest – as well as cynical – and only hope to see some countries, yours and these countries that are your major partners – to reach herd immunity. You would then start creating this international COVID-19 world with COVID-19 safe bubbles that we see possibly emerging (Helene Lavoix, “The emergence of a COVID-19 international order“, 15 June 2021). You may even change partners according to their sanitary situation, of course to a point, the point to which you need specific countries for various reasons.

    3/ Immunity

    We know more on immunity than we knew at the start of the pandemic in January 2020. According to a large study the British NHS carried out, people who have had the COVID-19 have a 83% lower risk of infection for at least 5 months and a 94% lower odds of symptomatic infection (Public Health England, Press release, “Past COVID-19 infection provides some immunity but people may still carry and transmit virus“, 14 January 2021; V Hall, et al., “… Large multi-centre prospective cohort study (the SIREN study), England: June to November 2020“, medRxiv 2021.01.13; Heidi Ledford, “COVID reinfections are unusual — but could still help the virus to spread“, Nature, 14 January 2021).

    However, the next stage of the study also shows that it is likely that the reinfected individuals can also continue infecting others.

    Unfortunately, we do not know if the immunity obtained with one variant of the virus protects from another variant, and if this varies according to variants.

    We may hope that the immunity induced by vaccines is better than natural immunity, but again this is an unknown.

    Thus, considering this still imperfect knowledge, if we want to stop or, more humbly, control the pandemic with certainty, we would need to obtain a herd immunity in 5 months. If a longer lasting immunity can be obtained, then the time to reach herd immunity can be lengthened.

    4/ Herd immunity and the SARS-CoV-2

    If we use the WHO definition,

    “‘Herd immunity’, also known as ‘population immunity’, is the indirect protection from an infectious disease that happens when a population is immune either through vaccination or immunity developed through previous infection.

    …Vaccines train our immune systems to create proteins that fight disease, known as ‘antibodies’, just as would happen when we are exposed to a disease but – crucially – vaccines work without making us sick. Vaccinated people are protected from getting the disease in question and passing on the pathogen, breaking any chains of transmission.”

    WHO, “Coronavirus disease (COVID-19): Herd immunity, lockdowns and COVID-19“, 31 December 2021

    Thus here, a critical unknown appears considering what we saw on immunity and contamination after vaccination. It would indeed appear that, for the COVID-19, neither natural immunity nor vaccines fully break the chain of transmission. The efficacy of the way the chain of transmission is stopped seems to be varying and complex.

    In other words, considering contamination is not stopped or imperfectly stopped by the vaccine, do we need to rephrase statement of the WHO according to which “We think it needs at least 60 to 70% of the population to have immunity to really break the chain of transmission”? Indeed, in the case of the SARS-CoV-2 the chain of transmission is not broken or imperfectly broken by the vaccines.

    If we contrast, for example with the vaccine against polio, here is what we read from the WHO website, contrasting between two types of vaccines, IPV and OPV:

    “Inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) … prevents infection, but it does not stop transmission of the virus….The oral polio vaccine (OPV)… After three doses of OPV, a person becomes immune for life and can no longer transmit the virus to others if exposed again. Thanks to this “gut immunity”, OPV is the only effective weapon to stop transmission of the poliovirus when an outbreak is detected. “

    WHO Europe, “Poliomyelitis (polio) and the vaccines used to eradicate it – questions and answers“, 8 April 2016

    IPV is increasingly used only in countries where eradication of polio has taken place (Ibid.).

    To come back to the COVID-19, the vaccines we develop are similar, everything being equal to the IPV. And thus not that good for outbreaks…

    Hence, is the way herd immunity is planned to be applied still valid? Can we apply the same objectives as thought?

    We shall still use the current approach to herd immunity in our rough assessment below but it is critical to think that a different approach may be sought.

    5/ Manufacturing and delivery

    Manufacturing and delivery problems, as well as logistical difficulties are a major uncertainty. This is all the more so that competing interests exist. For example, we may wonder if the American policy promoted by new President Biden, with first his pledge to administer 100 million shots in his first 100 days then his willingness to boost further vaccination in the U.S., did not have and will not have direct consequences on European delivery problems (e.g. Josh Wingrove and Mario Parker, “Biden Team to Buy 200 Million More Doses, Speed Up Vaccinations“, Bloomberg, 26 January 2021; Raf Casert, “EU demands that vaccine makers honor their commitments“, AP, 25 January 2021).

    Manufacturing and delivery challenges are partly included in the current daily rates of vaccination we use below. Further detailed research would, of course, be needed to improve estimates, to finely identify specific chokepoints and thus to design efficient strategies and vaccination campaigns.

    6/ Vaccines and SARS-CoV-2 variants

    Variants and Vaccines efficacy

    Some of the vaccines currently injected may not be efficient or as efficient as expected against some variants.

    It would seem that the UK variant – known as 20B/501Y.V1, VOC 202012/01, or B.1.1.7 lineage (CDC) does not question the current vaccines, to the least those by Pfizer and BioNTech, Moderna, and AstraZeneca. However these tests have been carried out mainly in vitro.

    Things look less good for the South African variant – 20C/501Y.V2 or B.1.351 lineage (CDC). For example, Moderna, after in vitro tests, found that “The samples’ neutralizing antibodies were … only about one-fifth to one-tenth as effective at neutralizing 501YV.2” (Nature News, “COVID research updates: Moderna vaccine vanquishes viral variants“, 26 January 2021 update).

    We do not know for the Brazilian variants – one, known as P.1 (CDC), while another variant could exist too.

    Another study, carried out by the Rockefeller University and not by vaccines manufacturers, looking at main vaccines and various possible mutations found that “Some of these neutralizing antibodies [produced after injections] … were only one-third as effective at blocking the mutated variants” (Ibid., 21 January 2021 update).

    In the middle of these uncertainties, what we know is that if three identified and challenging variants could emerge, then others will too. We must thus include these emergence in the way we plan ahead. For example, the speed with which variants appear and become prevalent would be a key data to obtain for immunisation campaigns. According to the ECDC, the UK and South African variants needed between 1 and 4 months to spread and become prevalent (Risk related to the spread of new SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern in the EU/EEA – first update, 21 January 2021). But how often will how many variants appear per year and where?

    Furthermore, we may wonder if the way and the speed with which the current vaccines will be injected within the population could possibly favour new variations of the SARS-CoV2. We are here in the classical action-reaction dynamic.

    Multiple vaccines injections?

    If new versions of the vaccines are necessary against new variants, we do not know what could happen to the immune system of people having received the “old” vaccines. Can they receive the new vaccine? Will it be dangerous? Will it be efficient? What could be the long term side-effect? How many different injections and how often can be safely handled by people’s systems?

    Increased manufacturing challenges

    Companies developing ARN messenger vaccines may assert that they can change their formula rapidly to adapt to the new variants if need be. Nonetheless, this means throwing away doses already produced and starting manufacturing everything from the start. The manufacturing challenges are thus heightened.

    Manufacturing boosters, as Moderna suggested may be a way forward, but only if this is a sufficiently efficient approach (Nature, 26 January, Ibid).

    How long to obtain herd immunity?

    Now we have all these uncertainties in mind, let us look at the time needed to vaccinate the population of various countries to obtain herd immunity.

    Using “Our world in data: Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations“, we obtained the number of months that would be needed to reach herd immunity, considering cumulated vaccinations and current daily rates of vaccination. We look at three hypotheses for herd immunity: 70%, 75% and 80%, to consider potential changes stemming from variants.

    Number of months needed to achieve herd immunity for COVID-19 – using daily vaccinations – 7 days rolling average 25/26 January 2021 – Data from: “Our world in data: Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations“

    Incidentally, as is obvious from the chart above, the sheer size of population matters. The countries faring the best are also those with a small or smaller population, apart from the U.K. and the U.S.. The price the world must possibly pay to see the U.S. being able to vaccinate its population relatively rapidly needs however to be pondered.

    Nonetheless, at current rates, i.e. assuming there is no supply problems, and considering all the uncertainties above, only Israel and the U.A.E. can reach herd immunity within 6 months. The U.K. will have to wait between 8 an 10 months, while the U.S. will need between 13 and 16 months to reach herd immunity. This is easier to see on the following figure enlarged to focus on 24 months only.

    Number of months needed to achieve herd immunity for COVID-19 – using daily vaccinations – 7 days rolling average 25/26 January 2021 – with a focus on 24 months – Data from: “Our world in data: Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations“

    If ever immunity were to drop after 6 months, or if a new variant defeating current vaccines were to appear within 6 months from the start of the vaccination campaign, then, at current vaccination rates, all countries apart from Israel and the U.A.E. would see their efforts reduced to naught. They most probably would have to restart everything without have time for respite. Those countries that would have reached immunity would have had some time with a normal life, until they too had to start vaccinating everyone.

    Furthermore, it is likely that to see variants stop emerging, then we would need to stop contagion globally and see herd immunity taking place worldwide. We are obviously even further away from this goal. Thus, most probably, new variants will go on emerging. We are thus in a vicious circle where inability to stop contagion increases the likelihood to see variants appearing, which, in turn lowers our ability to stop contagion.

    If disrupting variants were to appear every six months, then daily vaccination rates would have to be greatly increased to reach herd immunity for one variant.

    If we do not find vaccines that stop contagion, and if new variants appear every six months, then we may find ourselves in the case shown in the figure below. We may have to vaccinate a staggering amount of people daily forever, or rather until a better solution is found.


    Number of people to vaccinate per day forever to reach herd immunity for the COVID-19 for a 6 months immunity – Data from: “Our world in data: Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations“

    The cost to societies, just in terms of vaccines, would be considerable. The logistics and organisation needed may also involve deep changes.

    It would thus seem that, with the current approach, considering the SARS-CoV2 variants, the specificities of the vaccines available, and all the known uncertainties, we may not be close to find our old life back.

    If we do not want our hopes dissolving into a mirage, we need to further innovate strategically and supplement vaccination with other measures, waiting for better and more efficient vaccines to be found.

    Further detailed reference

    V Hall, S Foulkes, A Charlett, A Atti, EJM Monk, R Simmons, E Wellington, MJ Cole, A Saei, B Oguti, K Munro, S Wallace, PD Kirwan, M Shrotri, A Vusirikala, S Rokadiya, M Kall, M Zambon, M Ramsay, T Brooks, SIREN Study Group, CS Brown, MA Chand, S Hopkins, “Do antibody positive healthcare workers have lower SARS-CoV-2 infection rates than antibody negative healthcare workers? Large multi-centre prospective cohort study (the SIREN study), England: June to November 2020“, medRxiv 2021.01.13.21249642; doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/2021.01.13.21249642

    Featured image: Design by Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli – Photo by torstensimon, Pixabay – Public Domain.

    How China Could Win the War against the Covid-19 Pandemic

    (Art design: Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli)

    As 2021 starts, Europe struggles again against a COVID-19 new wave and the spread of new SARS-CoV-2 variants. Japan strengthens its state of emergency against the COVID-19. The U.S. reports 4.462 deaths on 12 January 2021, i.e. almost precisely 1,5 time 9/11.

      Meanwhile, China also fights a rise in new symptomatic cases on the mainland. Yet, from 13 to 15 January, daily infections only increased respectively by 115, 127, and 89, then by 126 on 18 January. Nonetheless, China also reported its first COVID-19 related death in eight months (Mari Yamaguchi, “Japan widens virus emergency to 7 more areas as cases surge“, AP, 14 January 2021; COVID-19 Dashboard by JHU; Yew Lun Tian, “As China COVID-19 cases rise, millions more placed under lockdown“, Reuters, 13 January 2021; network dxy.cn).

      How can we explain this immense difference between various COVID-19 related situations? What allows China to control better the pandemic, when the possibility to see new waves develop is also there (Hélène Lavoix, Is the COVID-19 Second Wave coming to China?, The Red Team Analysis Society, 30 November 2020).

      We shall see how China envisions the COVID-19 world and its fight against the pandemic, from an overarching goal where lives must be saved first, to the mobilisation of all, through the objectives set and the related strategy. From these, result the anti-COVID-19 measures China takes and how it implements them, as we shall see in the second part. There, we shall explain that China’s guiding principle behind its policies against the COVID-19 may be characterised as an uncompromising pragmatism. To do so, we shall focus on three types of measures: quarantines and travels, genomic surveillance and, finally, environmental surveillance, which includes struggling against contamination from objects, goods and surfaces.

      Living in a different COVID-19 world

      In China, we are in a COVID-19 world that is very different from the world where Europe and the U.S., for example, live.

      An overarching goal – the precious lives of all first – and fighting a war to win

      China fights a war against the COVID-19 and it wants to win it. Its first and foremost goal is the safety of all. It does not solely aim at protecting hospitals from being overwhelmed and breaking down, which would be to confuse aims and means. China does not solely hope to slow down the virus or mitigate damages. It wants to win, to defeat the COVID-19. It has an enemy the SARS-CoV-2.

      As Xi Jiping put it in September 2020

      “We Chinese have fought this life-and-death battle against COVID-19 with tenacity and fortitude; we will not stop until victory is won. We have forged a great spirit of putting life above everything else…
      We will pay any price to protect people’s life and safety.

      (Highlights of President Xi Jinping’s remarks on fighting COVID-19, 2020/09/18)

      This goes hand in hand with the vision opening up the Chinese plan “Fighting Covid-19 – China in Action 2020/06/07”:

      “This is a war that humanity has to fight and win. Facing this unknown, unexpected, and devastating disease, China launched a resolute battle to prevent and control its spread. Making people’s lives and health its first priority, China adopted extensive, stringent, and thorough containment measures, and has for now succeeded in cutting all channels for the transmission of the virus”

      “Fighting Covid-19 – China in Action 2020/06/07“

      The benefits of victory

      China then emphasises that all actors will benefit from total victory. This means not ignoring the pandemic for the sake of financial markets, short-term profits, temporary “fun”, or whatever particular short-term interest. This also means accepting that a return to the past is impossible, what most actors try to do despite discourses:

      Those who refuse to take the easy path will succeed; those who meet challenges head on will prevail.
      A nation is great because it never yields, wavers or balks in the face of any difficulty or risk; it is because it keeps fighting for a bright future against all odds.

      (Highlights of President Xi Jinping’s remarks on fighting COVID-19, 2020/09/18)

      Objectives

      As a result, the COVID-19 world, for China, as for Australia and New Zealand, and in a lesser way for Japan or South Korea, is a world were one COVID-19 case is one too many, where one death is unacceptable. The aim is zero case and zero death.

      For example, China locked down the city of Langfang near Beijing on 12 January 2021 because it has reached 33 cases (dxy.cn network figures for 12 January 2021). Its “4.9 million residents would be put under home quarantine for seven days” and tested to make sure the virus would not spread (Reuters, “Chinese city of Langfang goes into lockdown amid new COVID-19 threat”, 12 January 2021). Previously, on 9 January, the cities of Shijiazhuang and Xingtai, in the Hebei province surrounding Beijing were “put under lockdown for seven days because more than 300 people were tested positive over the previous week” (Jason Slotkin, “Millions In China Under New Restrictions Amid COVID-19 Spike Near Beijing“, NPR, 9 January 2021).

      We find a similar situation in the northeastern province of Heilongjiang, where, on 11 January 2021 “all residential communities and villages in Wangkui county of Suihua city, Heilongjiang province, have been placed under lockdown management” (Zhou Huiying, “County in Heilongjiang under lockdown due to outbreak“, China Daily, 11 January 2021). The lockdown was organised because, on 9 January, one lady went for treatment to the hospital, was tested positive and consequently 20 out of the 500 tested contact cases were positive – and asymptomatic.

      By contrast, the UK imposed a relatively mild national lockdown on 5 November 2020 as it recorded 21,915 cases on 31 October (BBC News, “Covid-19: PM announces four-week England lockdown“, 31 October 2020). Finding out it was facing a new SARS-CoV-2 variant – known as 20B/501Y.V1, VOC 202012/01, or B.1.1.7 lineage (CDC) – it had to reinforce the anti-COVID-19 measures on 4 January 2021, as “on 29 December, more than 80,000 people tested positive for Covid across the UK – a new record” (Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s address to the nation on coronavirus on 4 January 2021). Sadly, as the epidemic is out of control, the UK will most probably have to reinforce the severity of its lockdown as positive cases remain above 50.000 a day (e.g. Alix Culbertson, “COVID-19: How could England’s lockdown restrictions get tougher?“, 12 January 2021).

      To take another European example, on 16 December 2020, in Germany, restrictions were introduced according to states to mitigate a second wave. The country had then a 7-days average of 26.092 infections a day. The number of positive cases had started reaching 25.252 tests on 2 November 2020. As a result, the epidemic could not be controlled and a national stricter lockdown started on 11 January 2021. Then, positive cases had started to decrease, but trying to prevent the spread of the new UK and South African SARS-CoV2 variants – the latter known 20C/501Y.V2 or B.1.351 lineage (CDC) – had become a concern (Coronavirus: Germany’s stricter lockdown starts nationwide, dw.de, 11 January 2021).

      Legitimacy, international influence and anti-COVID-19 objectives

      We thus have a very stark contrast between two types of objectives. On the one hand, in China, COVID-19 contagions are unacceptable. This makes sense in the framework of a pandemic. Indeed, considering what an epidemic is, and considering the epidemiological characteristics of the SARS-CoV-2, notably pre-symptomatic contagion and contagious asymptomatic cases, the only way to control the pandemic is to aim for zero contagion (see Helene Lavoix, Dynamics of contagion and the COVID-19 Second Wave, The Red Team Analysis Society, 3 June 2020).

      Numerous excess deaths because of a pandemic, are as unacceptable, for a host of reasons. Among these, first and foremost, such deaths would question the legitimacy of the political authorities. It would demonstrate their inability to rule properly as the fundamental mission of political authorities is to ensure the security of those who are rules (see Helene Lavoix, What is Political Risk?, The Red Team Analysis Society, 28 February 2020). Furthermore, in the case of China, it would also question their historically constructed legitimacy. Indeed, numerous deaths out of the COVID-19 could be understood as a vacillating “Mandate of Heaven” (天命 tianming) in the collective consciousness of people, which would mean a rising illegitimacy of political authorities (see John King Fairbank, Merle Goldman, China, a New History, Enlarged Edition, Harvard University Press, 1998; Andrea Janku, “‘Heaven-Sent Disasters’ in Late Imperial China: The Scope of the Stateand Beyond,” in Christ of Mauch and Christian Pfister, eds., Natural Disasters, Cultural Responses: Case Studies Toward a Global Environmental History, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books), 233–64; Chris Courtney, “The Dragon King and the 1931 Wuhan Flood: Religious Rumors and Environmental Disasters in Republican China,” in Twentieth-Century China , April 2015).

      Finally, it would diminish the influence China seeks to further develop internationally. Indeed, China seeks to shape a positive narrative regarding its excellency in managing the pandemic, which transforms the COVID-19 in a foreign policy tool for China (e.g. for early indications of the Chinese efforts Helene Lavoix, “COVID-19: Anticipation, Timing and Influence – From Mobility Restriction to Medicine Shortage“, The Red Team Analysis Society, 19 February 2020; Luke Patey, “COVID-19 pandemic is no soft power victory for China“, DIIS, 23 April 2020; Audrye Wong, “COVID-19 and China’s information diplomacy in Southeast Asia“, Brookings, 3 September 2020Gill Bates, “China in the COVID world: continued challenges for a rising power“, NDC Policy Brief – No. 20 – November 2020).

      The reasons for the very different objectives chosen in Europe and in the U.S., would need to be researched and analysed in detail, as their influence, power and even survival depend on them.

      China however tells us that winning over the COVID-19 starts first in our head, in the vision we have of ourselves and of the threat and in the way we set our overarching goals.

      A simple strategy

      Once the objectives are set, they define China’s anti COVID-19 strategy.

      The overall Chinese strategy is simple. They are fighting a pandemic, not any disease. Their real enemy is the virus. They seek to block its entrance into human beings residing in China, hence into the Chinese territory, as well as its access to all possible intermediate or vectors. And for those viruses that would get through, China will isolate them until they disappear while stopping them spreading (see chapter “A Tight Prevention and Control System Involving All Sectors of Society” in “Fighting Covid-19 – China in Action 2020/06/07“). Actions on hosts and vectors are then taken accordingly.

      It also means understanding the virus and its interactions with its hosts and vectors, hence the emphasis on science, as highlighted in “5.Science and Technology Underpin China’s Efforts” (Ibid.).

      Mobilising everyone

      Most crucially, the front line and the soldiers are not solely the medical staff as has been wrongly, and finally dangerously, promoted in Europe. The medical staff are heroes for China, but first and foremost each and every individual that could become prey to the virus or could have a role to play in blocking the virus is the front line. Indeed Chapter III of the Chinese action plan (Ibid.) is about “Assembling a Powerful Force to Beat the Virus”, through notably “2.Mobilizing the Whole Country to Fight the Epidemic” and “4.Uniting as One – China’s Billion People”, which is only possible because the safety of all is the overarching goal, and thus because “1.Lives Are Precious”.

      In other countries, when some refuse this or that measure for any reason, whatever the justifications given, what they say to their fellow citizens is that they don’t care if they fall ill, suffer, and die and lose their loved ones. As a result, common action becomes impossible and, worse, society may only head towards breaking down, which is an even worse situation than seeing the state fail. The SARS-CoV-2 has already won.

      The Chinese political authorities do not take this approach but, on the contrary, try to achieve the opposite. Xi Jiping’s September 2020 speech hammers the same message as found in the action plan, and it is worth quoting him at length:

      “Our people across the country closed ranks and were united as one. We knew what was at stake: the well-being of every one of us, the honor of us as a community and the security of our country. Doctors and nurses in white coat, military personnel in green uniform, police officers in blue gear and volunteers wearing red waistcoat all pitched in, and Party members rushed to the epicenter. Their pledge to keep fighting until the job was done is heart-stirring…

      Undaunted, we Chinese have confronted the raging virus head on in the spirit of going into the mountains well aware that tigers are roaming. Together, we have written a moving epic of fighting the virus.

      Our Chinese nation has gone through many trials and tribulations, but each time we have emerged stronger. This is not because any saviour has rescued us, but because hundreds of millions of ordinary Chinese have stepped forward to fight when disaster strikes.

      In fighting COVID-19, we the 1.4 billion Chinese have acted with a strong sense of responsibility, discipline, dedication and mutual support, thus creating a powerful defense of unity and solidarity against the virus.”

      [my emphasis] (Highlights of President Xi Jinping’s remarks on fighting COVID-19, 2020/09/18)

      Moreover, transforming all people into heroes who fight the COVID-19 gives a sense to sacrifice, which will lower resistance to measures. As sense is made, efforts can take place. People have reclaimed their power, they are not anymore passive victims. This is crucial when the efforts demanded involve being locked down and thus externally inactive.

      From the vision, the overarching goal, the objectives, the identification of the enemy and the mobilisation of everyone results the way China implements the various set of measures used to fight the pandemic, as we shall now see.

      An uncompromising pragmatism

      Chinese anti-COVID-19 measures can be best described as obeying a principle of uncompromising pragmatism. This includes characteristics such as measures being rapidly decided, flexible, adapted to the local situation, often heavy handed and lasting as long as needed. Above all, this means that Chinese anti-Covid-19 measures consider the reality of the pandemic and do not not fall prey to ideological wishful thinking, while including latest scientific approaches and technological innovations. In other words, the Chinese will do what they must to fulfil their objectives, using all available means.

      Travels and quarantines

      For example, China has an uncompromising policy regarding travels and quarantines be they international or domestic. Here, Chinese political authorities have recognised that one key component of the propagation of the virus – if not the key element – is mobility, be it international or domestic (for more on this point, see Helene Lavoix, The Hidden Origin of the COVID-19 and the Second Wave, The Red Team Analysis Society, 25 May 2020).

      For instance, considering the now demonstrated increased contagious power of the new UK SARS-CoV2 variant, on 24 December 2020 China banned all travels to and from the UK until further notice (Reuters). Starting 22 December, for Hong Kong, China, people are considered as entering this category if they have spent 2 hours in the UK within the last 21 days (Gardaworld). There is no question of upsetting the UK, tourism, difficulties for one or the other type of actor. The reality of the danger primes all.

      Quarantines at arrival used to last 14 days at centralised centers (e.g. Amcham Shanghai, “What to Expect for Travelers Returning to China Guide – Jan. 7 Update“). They are now increasingly evolving towards 21 days. Dalian and Beijing, for example set their quarantines to 21 days for all inbound travellers on 4 and 5 January 2021 (Wang Xuandi, “Beijing Institutes 21-Day Quarantine Policy Over Coronavirus Scare“, 6th Tone, 5 January 2021; Global Times, “New Dalian COVID-19 cases have longer incubation period, with some found to be positive after 11 tests“, 4 January 2021).

      Beijing even increased quarantines to 21 days in a quarantine center followed by 7 days health monitoring (“Beijing requires extra 7-day health monitoring for inbound travelers“, China Daily, 16 January 2021).

      Here, we should underline that a 21 days quarantine is in line with knowledge regarding the COVID-19 incubation (Stephen A. Lauer, MS, PhD et al., “The Incubation Period of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) From Publicly Reported Confirmed Cases: Estimation and Application“, Annals of Internal Medicine, 5 May 2020).

      The increased infectious power of the two variants may, furthermore, lengthen the incubation time, or change the number of people infected according to days after infection. It is thus twice wise to decide for a stringent 21 days quarantine.

      Quarantine must take place in centralised centers. China here uses the experience it developed in Wuhan. Throughout the first epidemic wave, China created 13 “hospitals” in public areas such as stadium to allow for the proper isolation of positive patients even with very mild symptoms (Talha Burki, “China’s successful control of COVID-19“, The Lancet, Newsdesk, Vol 20, Issue 11, Nov 01, 2020). This “network of Fangcang hospitals” had 13.000 beds available to isolate positive patients who did not need hospital treatment (Ibid.). As a result contagion, notably within the family, was stopped (Ibid.). China is thus able to use the lessons learned from the past, to build upon successes and correct mistakes.

      Furthermore, in China, the quarantine ought to be respected and people during these stays are forbidden to leave the quarantine premises. According to the UK Foreign travel advice for China, “Failure to comply with the quarantine conditions or testing put in place, or any attempts to deliberately conceal health conditions can result in being sentenced to up to three years in prison. This applies to both Chinese and foreign nationals.”

      The Chinese quarantine policy certainly contrasts with, for example, the 10 days of self-isolation demanded in Germany, where people can stop their quarantine if they test negative after 5 days (Federal Foreign Office, “Information on entry restrictions and quarantine regulations in Germany“, 11.01.2021).

      In terms of travels and mobility, China thus considers the reality of scientific studies and tests, as well as epidemiological evolution, and does what is necessary to see the right length quarantine applied. As a result, apart from travellers coming from strongly contaminated countries, less and less people need to go through very unpleasant indeed quarantines. We see here again being sketched the new COVID-19 international order we saw emerging progressively earlier (see The emergence of a COVID-19 international order, 15 June 2020).

      Genomic surveillance and beyond

      China has been very quick in sequencing the SARS-CoV-2 genome. On 11 and 12 January 2020, the Chinese authorities shared the full sequence of the coronavirus genome with the world (Institut Pasteur, “Institut Pasteur Sequences the whole genome of the coronavirus , 2019–NCOV“, 30 January 2020 – It thus became the first European institution to do so on 29 January 2020, 18 days after China).

      Since then, genomic surveillance, as well as phylogenetics, have become key state of the art means in the set of scientific tools available to human societies to control the pandemic (see, for example, Luke W Meredith, “Rapid implementation of SARS-CoV-2 sequencing to
      investigate cases of health-care associated COVID-19: a prospective genomic surveillance study      , Lancet Infect Dis 2020; 20: 1263–72, July 14, 2020; Pengcheng Du, Nan Ding, et al. “Genomic surveillance of COVID-19 cases in Beijing“, Nat Commun 11, 5503, 30 October 2020; Tsuyoshi Sekizuka, et al., “COVID-19 genome surveillance at international airport quarantine stations in Japan, Journal of Travel Medicine, 24 November 2020; The COVID-19 Genomics UK (COG-UK) consortium, “An integrated national scale SARS-CoV-2 genomic surveillance network“, The Lancet, Comments, June 2, 2020; Oude Munnink et al., “Rapid SARS-CoV-2 whole-genome sequencing and analysis for informed public health decision-making in the Netherlands“, Nat Med 26, 16 July 2020; for explanations on phylogenetics and possible use, Helene Lavoix, “The Hidden Origin of the COVID-19…”, ibid.)

      Genomic surveillance, considering statement by central and provincial health officials seems to be routinely used in China as means to control the pandemic (e.g. “Manzhouli coronavirus cases likely imported“; China Daily, November 27, 2020; CGTN, Chinese mainland reports first case of coronavirus variant detected in UK, 1 January 2021; Liu Wei, “East China’s Shandong confirmed its first imported coronavirus variant case“, 6 January 2021).

      Furthermore, China continues research in this direction, as shown, for example by Wang F. et al. article, which explores “the host genetic contribution to COVID-19 severity and susceptibility” (Initial whole-genome sequencing and analysis of the host genetic contribution to COVID-19 severity and susceptibility. Cell Discov., 2020 Nov 10). China has also opened its own repository, the National Gene Bank: cngb.org (COVID-19 section here). If it is not as visual and user friendly as German Gisaid – which is most often the case for anything Chinese on the web – it is, nonetheless, a genomes’ bank.

      Meanwhile, China also promotes genomic surveillance abroad, which may be seen as part of its “virus diplomacy”, but raises concern abroad (see for the whole paragraph Kirsty Needham, “Special Report: COVID opens new doors for China’s gene giant“, Reuters, 5 August 2020). The Chinese company BGI, which was the one that initially sequenced the SARS-CoV-2, not only classically exports its tests laboratories but also gives away the gene-sequencing equipment, through its philanthropic foundation, the Mammoth Foundation. Chinese embassies worldwide promote BGI equipment. This potentially goes much further than just diplomacy and U.S. officials notably see it as a national security issue because of the sensitivity of information on personal genetic material. Furthermore, this accentuates China’s global position in the high tech field, thus contributing to raise China’s profile – and capabilities – as superpower.

      Surveilling the environment, from hospitals to shipments, trucks and frozen foods

      Finally China is pragmatic in its way it considers the environment, i.e. all surfaces that could favour infections.

      Even though media and governments worldwide tend to largely downplay or ignore this aspect of contamination, China has adopted a much simpler approach. It surveils anything that could help the spread of the virus. This includes logically all surfaces and materials and leads to corresponding surveillance and warnings, as exemplified in this article of the Global Times: “Hospital environment in N China’s Inner Mongolia tests positive for COVID-19“, 14 January 2021.

      It is thus not only living beings that can test positive, but also things and areas. And of course, this also includes shipments.

      For instance, some of the 2020 clusters in China were related to food and frozen shipments. The origin of the contagion of the 9 June 2020 cluster in Beijing and Hebei was most likely a salmon vendor in Xinfadi and its chopping board (Bloomberg, “Xinjiang Covid Outbreak Is China’s Biggest Since Summer“, 2 Nov 2020; Bloomberg News, “China locks down county of 400,000 as COVID-19 cluster reemerges near Beijing“, 29 June 2020). The 22 July Dalian cluster began with “a worker at a local seafood processing company” (Xinhua, “Containing sporadic COVID-19 outbreaks the Chinese way“, Beijing Review, 27 November 2020; Xinhua, 29 August 2020). In Qingdao, Shandong province, on 11 October, the origin of the cluster was two port workers who had unloaded imported goods and were in contact with other ship workers (Xie Chuanjiao, “Source of Qingdao outbreak identified“, China Daily, 19 October 2020; Yuhan Xing, Gary W.K. Wong et al., Rapid Response to an Outbreak in Qingdao, China, The New England Journal of Medicine, 18 November 2020). A chain of contamination related to the late December 2020 Beijing cluster took probably place “via steamed bun packaging” and originated from Hong Kong (Global Times, 14 January 2021).

      For its part the cluster in Kashgar, Xinjiang, was traced to contaminated trucks (Zhao Jinzhao, Ma Danmeng and Denise Jia, “Exclusive: China Traces Covid-19 Cluster to Contaminated Trucks“, Caixin, 28 November 2020; William A. Haseltine, “These Forms Of Covid-19 Transmission May Be Rare, But Can’t Be Ignored“, Forbes, 3 December 2020).

      In December 2020, in the official Global Times, China’s Top epidemiologist Zhong Nanshan highlighted the potential key role environment-to-human COVID-19 transmission plays in the propagation of the pandemic (Liu Caiyu, 20 Dec 2020).

      China disregards here WHO recommendations that deny the possibility of contamination through foods and food packaging (see WHO, Coronavirus disease (COVID-19): Food safety for consumers, 14 August 2020). Note, however, the very cautious way the WHO answers its Q&A, thus protecting itself in advance, should the main doctrine change.

      The Chinese measures regarding imported goods show also that, when it is for the protection of its interests, China easily discards any ideological commitment to trade and globalisation. Indeed, if shipments start being seen as a vector of contagion, which they are if we follow Chinese surveillance, measures and events, and if we consider scientific studies on the SARS-CoV-2, surfaces, and materials, then it is the whole global trade paradigm that is impacted.

      A quick look at the very heavy demands put on meat exporters considering the COVID-19, as detailed by China Briefing, should they want to sell meat in China, better shows the strains the global trade system will have to bear. Furthermore, as people are afraid to be contaminated by foreign products, Chinese imports of meat products have started to fall (Global Times, “Chinese supermarkets, consumers seek domestic meats to cut contamination risks“, 3 January 2021).

      Thus, the capacities of the global trade system to cope with these various strains, as well as the likely change that will emerge are topics for further research. It is however highly certain that the system will have to change. Impacts on individual business actors and even whole sectors, according to countries, are also likely to be important.

      Similarly, China’s environmental surveillance emphasises – and to a point reveals for those who did not see it before – the threats the tourism industry, as well as business real estate, for example, face because of the COVID-19 pandemic and because of the importance of China for these sectors. Indeed, it is highly likely that China will make sure Chinese citizens and business people only go abroad if they are protected by the same kind of surveillance and measures as those implemented within China.

      China thus implements with an uncompromising pragmatism all the measures needed to control at best the pandemic and to fulfill its stringent corresponding objectives. It can do so because of strong political authorities, that dare to use their legitimate monopoly of violence when necessary, while also benefiting from their society’s compliance and support.* As a result, the legitimacy of the political authorities is further strengthens, which, in turn, allows for more support from people.

      Consequently too, and considering China’s economic and industrial way of development, willed by the industrial outsourcing promoted by globalisation and its proponents, China can boast to have seen its “exports gain 3.6 percent in 2020 amid virus-hit global supply chains” (Li Qiaoyi, “Goods trade growing in China only“, Global Times, 14 January 2021). It may also show huge celebrations taking place in Wuhan over the Summer thus highlighting its people can live normally… most of the time. Last but not least, China can also use its smart management of the pandemic to promote its international power.

      The latest evolution of the SARS-CoV-2 with the emergence of more contagious variants, the uncertainties and difficulties linked to the vaccines and vaccination, the mink-related mutation, other possible mutations, probably the need to better understand viruses in such global setting and other surprises the virus may create could challenge China. Pragmatism, intelligence and strength are, however, certainly the best assets to face such difficult possible unknowns.

      Notes and references

      *We are here considering the strength of the state. This must not be mistaken with dictatorship or authoritarianism, the latter being types of regimes. Such confusions are increasingly frequent in media and blog posts out of ignorance, of prejudice and ideology, or of interest.

      Bangura, M.S., Gonzalez, M.J., Ali, N.M. et al. “A collaborative effort of China in combating COVID-19“, glob health res policy 5, 47 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1186/s41256-020-00174-z

      Bates Gill  (2020); “China’s Global Influence: Post-COVID Prospects for Soft Power”; The Washington Quarterly; 43:2; 97-115; DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2020.1771041

      Burki, Talha, “China’s successful control of COVID-19”, The Lancet, Newsdesk, Vol 20, Issue 11, pp. 1240-1241, Nov 01, 2020, published: October 08, 2020, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30800-8.

      Cohen, Paul A., Paul A. Townsend, History in Three Keys, Columbia University Press, 1997.

      Courtney, Chris, “The Dragon King and the 1931 Wuhan Flood: Religious Rumors and Environmental Disasters in Republican China,” in Twentieth-Century China , April 2015 DOI: 10.1179/1521538515Z.00000000059

      COVID-19 Dashboard by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University (JHU)

      Du, P., Ding, N., Li, J. et al. Genomic surveillance of COVID-19 cases in Beijing. Nat Commun 11, 5503 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-19345-0

      Fairbank, John King, and Merle Goldman, China, a New History, Enlarged Edition, Harvard University Press, 1998.

      Hu, CS, “Analysis of COVID-19 Cases and Public Measures in China” SN Compr. Clin. Med. 2, 1306–1312 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42399-020-00426-6

      Janku, Andrea, “‘Heaven-Sent Disasters’ in Late Imperial China: The Scope of the Stateand Beyond,” in Christ of Mauch and Christian Pfister, eds., Natural Disasters, Cultural Responses: Case Studies Toward a Global Environmental History, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books), 233–64.

      Munnink, Oude, B.B., Nieuwenhuijse, D.F., Stein, M. et al. Rapid SARS-CoV-2 whole-genome sequencing and analysis for informed public health decision-making in the Netherlands. Nat Med 26, 1405–1410 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-020-0997-y

      Sekizuka, Tsuyoshi, PhD, Kentaro Itokawa, PhD, Koji Yatsu, BS, Rina Tanaka, BS, Masanori Hashino, MVD, PhD, Tetsuro Kawano-Sugaya, PhD, Makoto Ohnishi, MD, PhD, Takaji Wakita, MD, PhD, Makoto Kuroda, PhD, “COVID-19 genome surveillance at international airport quarantine stations in Japan”, Journal of Travel Medicine, 24 November 2020, https://doi.org/10.1093/jtm/taaa217

      Uretsky, Elanah, “China beat the coronavirus with science and strong public health measures, not just with authoritarianism“, The Conversation, 23 November 2020.

      Wang F, Huang S, Gao R, Zhou Y, Lai C, Li Z, Xian W, Qian X, Li Z, Huang Y, Tang Q, Liu P, Chen R, Liu R, Li X, Tong X, Zhou X, Bai Y, Duan G, Zhang T, Xu X, Wang J, Yang H, Liu S, He Q, Jin X, Liu L. Initial whole-genome sequencing and analysis of the host genetic contribution to COVID-19 severity and susceptibility. Cell Discov. 2020 Nov 10;6(1):83. doi: 10.1038/s41421-020-00231-4. PMID: 33298875; PMCID: PMC7653987.

      Is the West Losing the Warming Arctic?

      Art design: Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli

      The militarization of the Arctic – So what?

      Over the last few years, NATO, the U.S. and Scandinavian militaries have been multiplying national and regional manoeuvres in the Arctic. This is especially true in Norway and the Barents Sea, very close to the Norwegian and Russian land, air and sea frontiers.

      The number of air patrols and military exercises grows year after year. For example, on 20 October 2020, the U.S.S. Ross missile-guided destroyer sailed its third tour of the year in the Barents Sea (Thomas Nilsen, “Increase in NATO scrambled jets from Norway”, The Independent Barents Observer, and “US warship returns Barents Sea”, September 14, and October 2020).

      This follows the installation of the NATO Atlantic Command at the Norfolk Navy base, in September 2020. The area of responsibility of this new command is the protection of European and North American sea-lanes.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KIE_OrLzc_E

      Among them, we find the Greenland-Iceland-U.K. (GIUK) gap to and from the Arctic. In other words, the Joint Force Norfolk Command’s mission is to project U.S. and NATO power in the Arctic (Levon Sevuts, “NATO’s new Atlantic command to keep watch over the European Arctic”, The Independent Barents Observer, September 18, 2020).

      This current U.S. and NATO interest for the Arctic, especially as far as the European and Russian part is concerned, appears as being a response to the heightening economic and military development of the Arctic led by Russia and by a growing number of Asian countries, chiefly China among them.

      However, if the growing U.S. military and NATO presence increase the level of military gesticulation, we have to wonder if this military presence is really up to the Russia-China strategic development of the Arctic.

      From a Western point of view, some European, U.S. and Canadian private companies are developing their presence in the Arctic, but this does not amount at all to a strategy, be it from the U.S., from member states of the European Union nor from North Atlantic countries.

      In other terms, the Russian part of the warming Arctic is becoming a planetary attractor for the Asian great powerhouses. Thus, it is increasing the power and status of Russia and China (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Arctic China: Towards new Oil Wars in a Warming Arctic?”, The Red Team Analysis Society, September 14, 2020). As a result, a major geopolitical question is to ponder if Western powers are not missing their own “warming Arctic Axis”.

      The warming Arctic, cradle of the Russo-Asian block

      Who is developing the Arctic?

      As we have explained in The Red Team Analysis Society’s publications, and related conferences since 2014, the notably Russian, Chinese, Japanese, and Indian race towards the Arctic is driving the emergence of the continental Russo-Asian bloc.

      Indeed, the vast Arctic Russian economic exclusive zone is attracting Russian and Asian energy developpers (Jean-Michel Valantin, “The Warming Russian Arctic: Where Russian and Asian Strategies Interests Converge?”, The Red Team Analysis Society, November 23, 2016).

      The mammoth oil, gas, mineral and biological resources are becoming a giant economic attractor. Meanwhile, because of the effects of the Arctic warming, the Russian authorities open the “ Northern sea route”.

      This new sea lane follows the Siberian coast and connects the Bering Strait to Norway and the Northern Atlantic. Thus, it also connects the immense Asian basins of economic development to Northern Europe and to the Atlantic. In the same time, Moscow militarizes the Siberian coast, the archipelagos. In the same dynamic, the Russian Northern Fleet and Army multiply patrols and sea and land manoeuvres.

      The Arctic convergence of Russia and Asia

      The combination of these two dynamics is also driving a continent-wide process of integration. It drives the construction of railroads, river and land roads, from Siberia to central Asia and China. In other words, the development of the Arctic is one of the drivers of the coupling of the Russian Northern sea route with the Chinese inter-continental Belt and Road initiative (Atle Staalesen, “Arctic gas finds new way from Yamal to China”, The Independent Barents Observer, April 1, 2020).

      This massive shift of Asian and Russian societies towards the Arctic signals that this region is also becoming a convergence between states, economies and actors of different values, ideologies, and belief-systems, i.e. civilization (Norbert Elias, The civilizing process, vol.II, State formation and civilisation, 1982).

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MXpTGZK-BiM

      Hence, the Arctic Russo-Asian dynamic is nothing less than an adaptation strategy, at civilizational level, to the planetary upheaval of climate change (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Planetary Crisis Rules, (2)“, The Red Team Analysis Society, February 15, 2016).

      This begs the question of the place of the West in the new “Game of Thrones” of the changing Arctic.

      The Western Arctic non-strategy

      Militaries without a strategy

      If we compare the way Russia and Asian countries develop the Arctic, and the Western countries’ corresponding actions, it comes that the latter remain largely passive. It becomes increasingly obvious that Western Europe, as well as the U.S. and Canada do not know how to project themselves in this new planetary and geopolitical reality.

      This Western non-strategy results from an absence of real reaction by most Western countries to the warming of the Arctic (Edward Luttwak Strategy, the Logic of War and Peace, 2002). Indeed, these reactions become a geopolitical system of passivity.

      Actually, the most visible kind of reaction is the built-up of military forces, without any clear long term strategic statement.

      This is the case, for example, of the 2016 and 2018 massive Norway-Iceland exercises. Those added up to the multiplication of air patrols, and the growing presence of U.S. Navy war ships. This presence takes place along the air and maritime borders of Russia on the Barents Sea. The U.S. Navy manifests itself also by conducting manoeuvres around the Bering Strait (“Navy, Marine Corps conduct Arctic expeditionary capabilities exercise in Alaska”, CPF Navy Mil, 3 September, 2019”).

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dsNNuwjS4z4

      This naval and aerial military build up is a way for the U.S. to assert themselves as a sea power. And as such, they have to show their capabilities to disrupt the naval movements of land powers such as Russia and China. However, this capability does not support the definition of political aims and military goals (Luttwak, ibid). They are nothing but a presence that has no distinct effect on the Russian and Asian Arctic strategies.

      Western integration to Asian stategies

      The other category of Western Arctic “actors” embraces the countries that integrate and support Russian and Chinese strategies. For example, since 2014, China projects itself in the Arctic. Among other things, it obtained the status of “near Arctic nation” at the Arctic Council. In the same time, Beijing turned the “Northern sea route” into the Arctic segment of its “Belt and Road initiative”.

      Among others, the Chinese president Xi Jinping promotes this “Polar Silk Road”. Between 2014 and today, he signed bilateral trade and technology with Iceland, Greenland, Danemark, Finland, Sweden, and Norway. In the same time, Russia and China multiply joint trade, industrial, transport and military operations ( Jean-Michel Valantin, “Arctic Fusion: Russia and China convergent strategies, 2014)”, The Red Team Analysis Society, June 23, 2014).

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qcrTK1zfkEw

      In other words, the very members of the Arctic council, all of them Western countries, at the notable exception of Russia, are becoming stakeholders and supporters of the Chinese strategy in the Arctic.

      This means that, despite a growing military presence, Western powers are non-strategic actors in Russian and Asian Arctic strategies. At best, they are stakeholders. In other terms, Russia, China and other Asian countries are starting to dominate the warming Arctic, while Western powers are not (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Towards a US-China War? (1) and (2): Military Tensions in the Arctic”, The Red Team Analysis Society, September 16, 2019).

      Embracing the planetary crisis

      However, geophysically, what currently happens in the Arctic also signals the installation of a chronic and growing instability. This geophysical dynamic translates itself into geopolitics. It follows that the merging new politics of this region are also in a state of constant change.

      It is interesting to note that the nations that react rapidly to this situation are Russia and China. They have in common to have gone through decades upon decades of dramatic and extremely violent changes.

      That was the case for Russia and China since the start of the twentieth century, and even since the middle of the nineteenth century for China (Lucien Bianco, La Récidive, Révolution russe, révolution chinoise, 2014).

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zjp5ONYM_jc

      Adaptation and crisis

      One can also note that for Asian belief-systems, such as Taoism, the world is in a state of constant flow. And when it comes to Russia, one must remember its collective resiliency and adaptation capability.

      This capability emerges from the collective experience of centuries of social, climate and political harshness. Thus, those societies inherit from the collective experience of continuous rapid and necessary adaptation to extreme conditions (Giovanni Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing, 2007).

      Elsewhere, Western countries have been through a long cycle of social and economic development since World War II. This took place alongside a long period of political stability. This collective experience inclines certainly to maintain stability. In the same dynamic, it motivates to reject extreme situations that induce the necessity to adapt quickly (Arrighi, ibid).

      However, nowadays, climate change is hammering the whole world, i.e. Western countries, as well as Russia and Asia. In this context, the race to the Arctic is going to intensify. Indeed, accessing to the warming Arctic is becoming a major geo-economic concern. Indeed, during the next years, the destabilization of the Arctic is going to reinforce the global climate crisis.

      Towards a Western awakening in the Arctic?

      Paradoxically, change in the Arctic is also becoming a new template to support modern economies. Thus, it may also support their possible transition towards sustainability. Indeed, this transition, if it happens, will need arbitrations and settlements about who does what in this region.

      This new reality is a very powerful driver for the definition and projection of Western strategies in the Arctic. They need to do so in order to install a new system of checks and balances in this very unstable region. As it happens, “the roof of the world” is also the ultimate geopolitical high ground. You hold it, or you don’t.

      Is the COVID-19 Second Wave coming to China?

      The second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic is sweeping through the world. It reached first the U.S., Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. By mid-November 2020 it started being visible in Eastern Asia (e.g. Reuters Covid-19 Global Tracker: World and Asia and the Middle East).

      Japan (Reuters COVID-19 Tracker)
      South Korea (Reuters COVID-19 Tracker)

      By the end of November 2020, South Korea and Japan face a rising number of cases. Yet their outbreak bears, so far, no comparison whatsoever with what happens in Europe or the U.S..

        Meanwhile, international news on China tend to focus on the economy and economic recovery (e.g. James Hyerczyk, “Asia-Pacific Shares Down Across the Board; China Reports Upbeat Factory Activity“, Nasdaq, 30 November 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic appears to be almost forgotten, even though China was the place where the pandemic first broke out.

        The situation in China, besides notably the very positive outlook taken regarding soon forthcoming vaccines, is a key factor in the optimistic mood of many actors.

        What is thus truly happening in China as far as the COVID-19 pandemic is concerned? Has China truly become a much safer place than elsewhere, thanks to the way it now handles the pandemic? Can we estimate the prospects of the sanitary situation in China for the near future? What are the likely impacts of the way China will handle or mishandle a possible second wave? Does that truly matter considering the coming vaccines? How can we think the world both with the way China handled the pandemic and with the coming vaccines?

        This article addresses the first of these questions and looks at the situation in China in terms of contagion and clusters.

        China, an amazing control of the COVID-19 pandemic

        Since the COVID-19 broke out in China in December 2019 and January 2020, starting the global pandemic, and the drastic measures implemented ended on 8 April 2020 (e.g. CNN), China has been amazingly almost free of COVID-19.

        China registered COVID-19 4.750 deaths up to 28 November 2020. On 23 then 25 September China reported the death of one person for each date, then another one on 4 November, one on 5, one on 10 November and one (in Hong Kong) on 28 November (dxy network, 1point3acres).

        It registered 93.113 COVID-19 symptomatic cases since the beginning of the pandemic up to 26 November 2020 and 93.465 up to 30 November 2020 (dxy network).

        This is to compare with 62,57 million cases worldwide as of 30 November 2020, and notably the 18,02 million cases for Europe, and 13,38 million cases for the U.S. (ECDC). In other words in one day, between 29 and 30 November, there has been twice as many cases in Europe as since the beginning of the pandemic in China. In the U.S., for the same day there has been 1,5 times as many cases as since the start of the pandemic in China.

        Thus, so far, China does represent a negligible share of the cases, even though the first pandemic outbreak started with China.

        Learning by controlling clusters

        It is not that China is COVID-19-free out of a miracle. It obtains these incredibly results through an extremely rigorous and efficient control of the pandemic. Indeed, throughout the last months, when the prospects for possible clusters emerged, China took sweeping and efficient measures that allowed for controlling rapidly the new outbreak.

        For example, over the summer, on 9 June, a cluster started in Beijing, spread to Hebei’s nearby province and included more than 330 symptomatic cases (WHO A cluster of COVID-19 in Beijing, People’s Republic of China, 13 June 2020; Bloomberg, “Xinjiang Covid Outbreak Is China’s Biggest Since Summer“, 2 Nov 2020; Bloomberg News, “China locks down county of 400,000 as COVID-19 cluster reemerges near Beijing“, 29 June 2020). The origin of the contagion was most likely the contamination of a salmon vendor in Xinfadi, the biggest Beijing wholesale market, as the virus was detected on his chopping board (Ibid,). The authorities controlled the cluster in Beijing on 19 June, and cases had disappeared by the start of July.

        Then, in Dalian on 22 July, a new cluster began (Xinhua, “Containing sporadic COVID-19 outbreaks the Chinese way“, Beijing Review, 27 November 2020). Its origin was the contamination of “a worker at a local seafood processing company” (Xinhua, 29 August 2020). The Dalian cluster included 92 locally transmitted COVID-19 cases and 26 asymptomatic cases. It was fully cleared on 29 August (Ibid,).

        In Qingdao, Shandong province, on 11 October, three new COVID-19 cases were detected (Xie Chuanjiao, “Source of Qingdao outbreak identified“, China Daily, 19 October 2020; Yuhan Xing, Gary W.K. Wong et al., Rapid Response to an Outbreak in Qingdao, China, The New England Journal of Medicine, 18 November 2020). The cluster would count only 13 symptomatic cases and was considered as controlled on 16 October, as no new cases emerged (Ibid.). The origin of the cluster was two port workers who had unloaded imported goods (Xie Chuanjiao, ibid) and were in contact with other ship workers (Yuhan Xing, Gary W.K. Wong et al.). Both had tested positive on 24 September 2020 (Ibid.). Then, the virus spread through the hospital (Ibid.).

        On 24 October 2020, a new cluster started in Xinjiang with an asymptomatic case being detected. On 2 November, the autonomous region counted 57 mild cases of COVID-19 and 233 asymptomatic cases (Bloomberg, “Xinjiang Covid Outbreak Is China’s Biggest Since Summer“, 2 Nov 2020). Millions were tested in and around the city of Kashgar where the cases were detected, and all those who were positive were isolated (Ibid., BBC News, “Covid-19: China tests entire city of Kashgar in Xinjiang“, 26 October 2020).

        So far, thus, clusters have emerged and, each time, they have been successfully quelled. What is the current situation?

        Rising contaminations and an increasing number of clusters

        Rising daily contaminations

        Since 17 November, if we look at the country-wide situation in China, the number of daily newly diagnosed symptomatic cases has been increasing slightly, as shown in the daily figures below, displayed on a fortnightly graph. Note that the last graph changes scale and that the ordinate axis now goes up to 150 cases.

        Daily new symptomatic infections in China over a fortnight: ending 26 November 2020, 27 November 2020, 29 November 2020 – ncov.dxy.cn

        These increases, however seem to concern mainly Hong Kong and Taiwan, as both the daily reports of the Chinese National Health Commission and the Chinese network of medical doctors – dxy.cn – include them, alongside Macau, in their statistics.*

        As a result, the current number of ongoing infectious cases started rising again. Nonetheless, compared with the January 2020 outbreak the curve looks almost flat. This would be even more the case should we look at these figures in comparisons with other countries and continents.

        Ongoing infectious cases in China – ncov.dxy.cn

        In China the number of confirmed symptomatic COVID-19 patients reached 905 cases on 26 November 2020, 980 on 27 November, 1145 on 29 November 2020 and 1245 cases on 30 November according to the dxy.cn statistics. Out of these, detected asymptomatic cases went from 348 on 23 November to 279 on 28 November (National Health Commission). Thus, the number of asymptomatic cases decreases slightly.

        An increase of symptomatic cases is thus taking place, mainly in Hong Kong and, in a lesser way, in Taiwan.

        Let us now look at clusters and at the geographical spread on the Chinese territory

        A rising number of clusters

        Beyond rampant COVID-19 cases considered as identified and quarantined, on 27 November 2020, Chinese media singled out three main outbreaks taking place: in Tianjin – 15 symptomatic cases on 27 November 2020, Shanghai – 62 symptomatic cases on 27 November 2020, and in Inner Mongolia – 23 symptomatic cases on 27 November 2020), in the border city of Manzhouli (Xinhua, “Containing sporadic COVID-19 outbreaks the Chinese way“; “Manzhouli coronavirus cases likely imported“; China Daily, November 27, 2020).

        In Manzhouli, the outbreak started on 21 November 2020. On 27 November, it counted 11 cases, 1 asymptomatic case and a suspected case (“Manzhouli coronavirus cases likely imported“). Imported infections triggered the cluster (Ibid.). According to dxy.cn, the cluster there went from 23 symptomatic cases on 27 November 2020 to 18 symptomatic cases, out of which 4 were imported, on 29 November. This would let us assume the authorities control the cluster.

        Compared with the three clusters the media reported, the dxy.cn epidemic map for 27 November below shows higher numbers of COVID-19 cases in 7 provinces and cities (plus Taiwan and Hong Kong). These possibly could indicate future clusters, on top of the three identified. Indeed, considering a very nature of a pandemic, just one case represents a danger of contamination. This is even truer with the COVID-19 considering asymptomatic cases and pre-symptomatic contagion (see Helene Lavoix, Dynamics of contagion and the COVID-19 Second Wave, The Red Team Analysis Society, 3 June 2020). Hence, the extreme caution and care shown by the Chinese authorities.

        The next map, for 28 November, shows one province (Anhui – the blue arrow) now free of detected COVID-19 cases. In the meanwhile, a new province (Zhejiang) joined its sisters with a higher number of cases. The next day, on 29 November, one more province was added, Gansu with only one case (the red arrow). Here, note that we are still dealing with very low number of cases, from 10 cases in Zhejiang, 12 in Tianjin, and up to 51 (but decreasing number of cases) in Shanghai.

        We thus seem to have a rise in the number of possible clusters, compared with the previous six months. Yet, each time a rapid control leads to a decreasing number of cases.

        China’s epidemic maps – Ongoing confirmed symptomatic cases on 27 November 2020, 28 November 2020 and 29 November 2020 – Access the latest updated epidemic map on ncov.dxy.cn

        Interestingly, those provinces with more COVID-19 positive cases seem to surround China. This indicates once more the key importance of exchanges in the spread of the pandemic.

        Thus, it seems that China is facing indeed an increase in cases, as elsewhere. Yet, China’s measures also would seem, so far, to show efficiency and even mastery at controlling the pandemic. With the next article we shall look further at these measures to assess the possible scope and intensity of the second wave in China. Will it remain almost flat as is now the case? Or, on the contrary, should we expect surprises?

        *We should also note a discrepancy between the country-wide statistics of the Chinese National Health Commission and the dxy.cn network. The latter works with provincial statistics. The figures in this article rely mostly on the dxy.cn network.

        Featured image: Image par Roger Mosley de Pixabay – Public Domain

        France and 3 Scenarios for the COVID-19 Second Wave

        Design: Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli

        Eleven months into the COVID-19 pandemic the second wave spreads. More than 50 million people were contaminated globally by 9 November 2020 (COVID-19 Dashboard by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University). More than 1.25 million people had died by then (ibid.).

        On 10 November, Europe crossed the threshold of 300.000 deaths daily, i.e. almost a quarter of global daily deaths, when it only represents 10% of the world’s population (Reuters, COVID-19 Global tracker). On a 7-day average, Europe represents slightly more than 50% of global infections and slightly less than 50% of global deaths (Reuters, COVID-19 Global tracker).

        • Global COVID19 Infections per region
        • Global COVID19 Deaths per region
        The COVID 19 second wave per region

        The “geographic distribution of 14-day cumulative number of reported COVID-19 cases per 100 000 population, worldwide” for 10 November 2020 as given by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control also shows that Europe, with the U.S., are the worst hit regions in the world.

        Before the pandemic, France, a member of the G7 with a permanent seat at the Security Council of the United Nations ranked 7th globally in terms of GDP (“World Economic Outlook Database, October 2020“, International Monetary Fund).

        Global – Reuters COVID-19 TRACKER

        France also ranks high in the way the pandemic takes its toll on the country.

        In November 2020, France faces record figures. On 10 November, it has the second highest daily rate of infection worldwide, after the U.S. (7-day average reported – Reuters). It also has the third highest daily number of deaths worldwide, after the U.S. and India, despite a much smaller population.

        France – Reuters COVID-19 TRACKER

        However, when compared with its population, France is in the middle range of countries both in terms of contamination and death, as shown in the comparative graph by Reuters.

        Considering the worldwide place of France in terms of political, geopolitical and economic power and influence, what is happening and what shall we expect in the coming months?

        Some of the critical factors to assess the multiple impacts of the pandemic in the future and thus reduce uncertainty are the casualties in terms of death, the capacity of the care system to resist the onslaught, as well as the suffering and long term impacts of those having contracted the disease. Thus, this assessment of the near future for France focuses on casualties and the strain on the hospital system. It builds upon official statistics.

        First we shall briefly outline the pandemic situation in France and explain how we built the statistical forecasts.

        Then we shall focus on three scenarios. In the first scenario, the pandemic is controlled and contagion is progressively lowered. The second scenario considers that the measures are less efficient than thought and contagion stagnates at a relatively high level. Finally, a last scenario looks at a situation where contagion increases by only 2% a day. We added this scenario to highlight what could happen if things were going only slightly wrong.

        In a last part we shall present three more points and reflections that emerged out of this work and deserve being highlighted. We shall point out discrepancies in statistical series and possible impacts. We shall then underline two points that deserve further research and may lead to ethical debates as well as to future tensions. First, hospitalised patients may be increasingly sorted out for access to reanimation, without the population being fully conscious of this phenomenon. Finally, the fate of old-age pensioners in their last days facing COVID-19 sufferings may need to be debated.

        France faces the COVID-19 second wave

        From denial to mobilisation or explosion?

        As we saw with the comparative figures above, France is far from being in control of the pandemic and even further away from being exemplary in its handling of the COVID-19. As so many other countries, it muddles through.

        Yet, in France, efforts abound to minimise the seriousness of the pandemic, to deny any severity to the disease, as well as to refuse measures attempting to control the COVID-19, sometimes violently (e.g. France 3 Auvergne Rhône-Alpes, “C’est ça la réalité, si vous ne voulez pas l’entendre, sortez d’ici” : le coup de gueule d’Olivier Véran à l’Assemblée“, 4 November 2020; “Nicolas Bedos remonté contre Olivier Véran : “J’ai envie de le buter’“, Femmes Actuelles, 8 November 2020).

        The economy continues being opposed to sanitary security, when both must go hand in hand (e.g. franceinfo, “André Comte-Sponville : ‘Par souci de justice, on ne peut pas sacrifier toute l’économie pour des raisons sanitaires‘”, 10 November 2020; Valentin Deleforterie et AFP, “Reconfinement : qui plaide pour la mesure et qui s’y oppose ?“, RTL, 28 October 2020).

        Considering the acceleration of the second wave, French President Emmanuel Macron and its government played their role as political authorities with as primary mission the security of those who are ruled. They imposed a second lockdown on 30 October 2020, however, milder than the previous one (French President Emmanuel Macron, Adresse aux Français, 28 October 2020).

        Almost two weeks into the lockdown, at long last, French policy-makers, as well as the media, appear to start trying to find a middle ground between being too reassuring and being too frightening (e.g. Franceinfo, “Covid-19 : ‘Le pic de l’épidémie est devant nous’, prévient Jérôme Salomon“, 9 November 2020; Le Figaro avec AFP, “Covid-19 en France : il y a un «frémissement» dans les chiffres“, 8 November 2020; FranceInter, “Olivier Véran constate un “ralentissement de la progression de l’épidémie“, bilan en fin de semaine, 8 November 2020). To reassure people too much would favour dangerous careless behaviour. Frightening people too much would create hopelessness and thus generate collective defeatism and depression.

        Indeed, as we explained at the end of March, political authorities must fully ensure security, be it sanitary, economic, or related to civil disorders, to terrorist attacks and to foreign policy risks (Helene Lavoix, COVID-19 Antiviral Treatments and Scenarios, The Red Team Analysis Society, 30 March 2020). This is not a choice. An either/or situation is not an option. People cannot be asked to choose between one or the other type of security. An incapacity to deliver on all fronts will only lower the legitimacy of political authorities and then lead to even more difficulties in ensuring security. It is thus crucial to find the proper way to mobilise people in these difficult times.

        In order to be able to deliver and mobilise, it is vital to know what lays ahead. This is true actually for all actors, as each needs also to develop its own response to the pandemic, while evaluating the decisions and actions taken by political authorities. It is here, in that space, that mobilisation develops.

        Thus, are we truly seeing first signs of improvement in France? Will the lockdown truly end before Christmas? Which decisions should the French government take for the holiday season? Will they lead to an improvement of the situation and thus strengthen legitimacy or, on the contrary contribute to degrade both the overall security outlook and legitimacy?

        Statistical trends and forecasts

        Using the daily official statistics given by the French health authority (Prime Minsiter office and the data revised over time of Santé publique France and its observatory GEODES), we built a simple model that allows us to track data over time and forecast the trends ahead.

        This is not an epidemiological model considering all factors. We only sought to focus on the most severe cases of the disease and on deaths, as well as on the impact on the French care system, while preparing the ground to look at the possible impact of what is now called Long Covid.

        We built our model starting from the positive COVID19 cases, to which we apply first a rate to differentiate between asymptomatic and symptomatic cases. Then we apply the timeframe for incubation we identified in the scientific literature in a previous article (see Dynamics of contagion and the COVID-19 Second Wave). This gives us the daily number of symptomatic cases. Then, we apply rates we calculate out of the historical series as communicated by GEODES. We obtain first severe cases of COVID-19, i.e. those needing hospitalisation, which gives us the daily number of hospitalisation. Using the same system we work out the daily number of Intensive Care Units (ICUs), as well as daily deaths. As far as death outside the hospital system is concerned, i.e. in retirement home (EHPAD and EMS), we fully rely on the Prime Minister Office statistics and only project real death rates in the future.

        This forecasting model allows us to capture broad trends. We used it to create three scenarios.

        Three Scenarios for France, the COVID19 second wave and Christmas 2020

        The true meaning of Christmas – Scenario 1

        The first and most favourable scenario would be a world where a new spirit enters the population and where successfully fighting the COVID-19 becomes a shared objective. Meanwhile, innovation considering all aspects of security is actively sought. In that case, for one month we would have a 5% daily decrease of contagion. Seeing the positive results of their efforts, the population would feel vindicated in making even more efforts to further reduce contagion. As a result, the next month would see a daily 10% decrease of the number of positives cases.

        The results for this scenario are shown on the three following charts.

        The mass of people infected and then becoming symptomatic would still be very large.

        The peak of the second wave, in daily terms would be reached between 13 and 19 November. Note that the peak on 13 November comes from a very high rate of contagion on 7 November (more than 86.000 cases), but is uncertain. Indeed we do not know if this rate resulted from data flows’ problems or reflected reality.

        In cumulative terms, hospitalisations would peak around 19 November at approximately 38.500 beds and ICUs around 21 November at 5.846. The total expected cumulative deaths would reach 64.734 on 29 December 2020.

        The French hospital system would thus, in general terms, cope. Nonetheless, these national estimates hide widely different situations across regions, which may negatively impact the overall situation, as shown in the animated graph below by BFMTV.

        In this first scenario, and assuming there is no worsening of the situation in hospitals, and no increase in severity of the illness, it appears as possible to soften slightly the lockdown before Christmas. Yet, the French population would need to continue being extremely careful. Indeed it must not risk seeing again a worsening of the situation. Considering the characteristics of our scenario in terms of new collective understanding of the pandemic and related behaviour, this should not be a problem.

        The hospitals will nonetheless still have to cope with a relatively heavy burden.

        Many families will mourn over Christmas. Meanwhile the prospects for long covid illness need to be appraised. However, awareness to have once more overcome a pandemic wave, to have succeeded as a collective body creates the right conditions for mobilisation. French society can thus now boldly works towards truly innovating to live with the COVID-19, with other pandemics and even with the impacts of climate change.

        A dreary never-ending struggle – Scenario 2

        The second scenario considers that the lockdown is only partly effective considering the amount of denial and opposition in the country. In other terms, if a large majority of people respects the lockdown and the various sanitary measures, too many do not. That minority thus destroys the efforts of the majority.

        To portray these behaviours, we estimated the level of continuing infections as equal to the average number of positive cases between 28 October and 10 November 2020. Because we are in the case of a pandemic where the natural growth of contagion – i.e. without any measures – is exponential, this scenario still shows a measure of success as well as the efforts of the population.

        These efforts are, unfortunately, not sufficient, as shown on the three graphs below.

        The mass of people infected and then becoming symptomatic would be very large and stabilise at a high level.

        Here we do not have a peak for the second wave even though the oscillations of hospitalisations, ICUs and deaths are reduced over time around continuous lines at high levels. Daily, for as long as the contagion goes on, we would need to expect these high levels of hospitalisations, ICUs and deaths.

        In cumulative terms, considering exits, hospitalisations would stabilise around approximately 35.000 to 36.000 beds, permanently used for COVID-19 patients. Between 5.000 and 5.200 ICUs beds would permanently be used for COVID-19 patients.

        The system would be stretched thin but no explosion would take place during the period considered. Nonetheless, the total expected cumulative deaths would increase and reach 72.368 on 29 December 2020. What matters to understand here, compared with the previous scenario is that deaths would not stop but would continue rising with time, reaching approximately more than 80.000 deaths in mid-January.

        In that case, the lockdown could not be relaxed before Christmas. It could not be eased either after Christmas. Indeed, the constant high pressure on hospitals, in terms of ICUs, would make very hazardous indeed any further relaxation of any measure.

        This scenario may not be unlikely. It is also a very dangerous scenario.

        Indeed, both a large part of the population and the medical staff would have to consent a long and sustained effort, with no end in sight. Meanwhile, the only reward would be deaths and even more deaths. More families would be bereaved with time, while increasingly more people would know and be surrounded by people grieving.

        Most probably the resulting tension, grief, and disappointment too would make it increasingly unfeasible to sustain the type of efforts demanded. After a while, it is likely that people would give up making efforts, or become violent against those who do not. The medical staff would increasingly become unable to cope. As a result, contagion would spread again while the care system would start showing signs of breaking down. We would slide towards a situation looking increasingly more like the third scenario.

        Soylent Green* – Scenario 3

        This scenario looks at a situation where contagion is increasing by only 2% a day. There, those opposing the measures against the COVID-19 – whatever their rationale – have started taking the upper hand. Political authorities are either too weak to oppose creeping disobedience or finally decide to follow self-interested short-term lobbies with a policy of laissez-faire. Protective measures are still applied but increasingly less stringently. As a result, contagion slowly rises by what is thought initially to be something meaningless, 2% a day.

        However, with time, 2% a day leads to a high daily level of new positive cases.

        The mass of people infected and then becoming symptomatic would be very large and continue rising.

        Here again, obviously, we do not have a peak for the second wave. The wave swells and lengthens becoming a never ending tide. Daily hospitalisations rise accordingly, as the number of ICUs and deaths, for as long as people refuse to consider the pandemic and the need for continuous protective measures.

        In cumulative terms, hospitalisations never stabilise, but climb higher and higher. At the end of December around approximately 70.000 beds are used for COVID-19 patients, which represents 18% of the overall hospital beds in France (OECD (2020), Hospital beds (indicator). doi: 10.1787/0191328e-en – accessed on 11 November 2020). And the numbers keep rising.

        More than 8.400 ICUs are occupied by COVID-19 patients. Hospitals struggle and desperately try to find new beds, while other pathologies cannot be handled anymore. Everyone knows that it is now a question of weeks before the whole system collapses. Harsh and stringent measures need to be taken, but, even in that case, the damage will be terrible and the care system may not survive.

        The total cumulative deaths for the COVID-19 is expected to reach 78.724 on 29 December 2020. However, it only tells part of the story as deaths stemming from all other pathologies now have to be added to the count. What matters to understand here, compared with the two previous scenarios, is that first COVID-19 related deaths would not stop but would continue rising with time, while, second, pathologies that had been so far cured would become deadly again, adding to the overall number of deaths.

        In that case, because of the choice made by people and elite groups, Christmas would probably not be spent under lockdown. It would however be everything save a celebration of hope, joy and love.

        Hopefully, this scenario is unlikely. It is nonetheless useful as a scenario to remind people of why lockdown and other measures against the COVID-19 are necessary and must be embraced.

        Further reflections and questions

        Statistical updates and discrepancies on the number of COVID19 positive cases

        Working on the statistics, we noticed there is a discrepancy between the figures given daily by the French officials, including the Prime Minsiter office and the data revised over time by Santé publique France and Géodes.

        This is notably true on Sundays, when the numbers given by Geodes tend to be much smaller than those given by the PM office. We kept the data of Geodes for the sake of logic as we do not know how or why data are changed from one office to the other.

        More interestingly in terms of steering policies, we noticed that Geodes revises its data for positive cases of COVID19 with time, probably as it gets the results of the tests. Data are updated sometimes over more than a month.

        If changes are small, such as adding for example ten more positive cases on a specific day, this does not truly matter in terms of policy.

        However, if changes are large, then the discrepancy can create similarly large problems.

        We found out one such example. On 26 October 2020, 66.866 positive COVID cases were reported by Geodes, which showed a large increase (+23,28%) compared with the previous week, when the highest number of cases was 54.238 (on 23 October). After regular updates, these 66.866 cases became, on 9 November 2020, 68.453 cases.

        Yet, on the PM website, the number of positive cases given for 26 October 2020 is 26.771.

        The difference between 66.866 and 26.771 cases is immense. Such a huge discrepancy in figures makes it very difficult for external actors to steer their own policies.

        If ever such discrepancies are also incorporated in the data given at the highest level of the French government, then policies may become inadequate.

        Hopefully, this is only a problem of communication of data, but it does create doubts, which are unnecessary in these difficult times.

        COVID19 patients die when they are not in ICUs

        As we worked through our forecasts, considering what scientific papers, the WHO and medical doctors described about the course of the illness, we expected to see the daily number of deaths in hospital being more or less correlated with the number of patients having to be reanimated. We also expected that the number of deaths would be lower than the number of patients in ICUs. We knew, considering the variations in terms of length of intensive care that the correlation would most probably be imperfect.

        Yet, allowing for a 8 days lag between the daily ICU numbers and daily deaths, we found rates of death compared with past daily ICUs numbers that were much higher than expected and also relatively erratic.

        As a result, for the needs of a first crude statistical observation, we attempted to remove the lags between the different clinical events for which we had statistics. This would allow us to see for an hypothetical time the number of infections, the corresponding hospitalisations, reanimations and deaths. We obtain the following chart:

        What we see is that, with time, as more patients enter the ICUs, around the beginning of October, the curve of deaths starts increasingly to match closely the curve of ICUs.

        This would mean that all patients entering reanimation die. As this is not meant to be the case, one explanation we see for this phenomenon is that patients die as they are not in ICUs.

        This means that patients either are not transferred in ICUs on time or that they are sorted out for access to reanimation. Because the French hospital system is, by large, not meant to have collapsed, then the probable explanation is that patients are sorted out.

        Yet, despite the ethical considerations involved, there is no related debate in French society. Yet, the phenomenon was even more pronounced for the first wave.

        Old-age pensioners die in retirement homes

        As for the previous point this is an ethical concern that we feel compelled to highlight.

        Throughout countries, the death of old-age pensioners in retirement homes because of the COVID-19 is an issue.

        However, here, poring over statistics, time lags, the disease evolution and the sufferings it entails, we may only wonder about the way the physical sufferings of old-age pensioners are alleviated in retirement homes when these facilities were not designed to handle cases that in hospitals demand heavy treatment.

        France, as most Western countries, upholds human rights as constitutive values. Certainly, wondering about and acting justly on the sufferings of its elders faced with a severe disease is part of human rights.

        In one of the first articles we wrote on the COVID-19, we pointed out that a pandemic was not only about a virus but also about people and how they acted and reacted to the pandemic (Hélène Lavoix, “The Coronavirus COVID-19 Epidemic Outbreak is Not Only about a New Virus“, The Red Team Analysis Society, 12 February 2020). What increasingly emerges is that a pandemic also forces us to face who we are and who we want to be as individuals and, collectively, as a society. Only if we find pride in ourselves and in the justness of our actions and choices can we find the strength to live with the COVID-19.

        *Soylent Green is a 1973 American dystopian film directed by Richard Fleischer, Produced by Walter Seltzer and Russell Thacher, starring Charlton Heston and Leigh Taylor-Young and distributed by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer.

        Adapting to the Burning World?

        Design: Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli

        A Bright and Burning Future

        Over the last years, each summer, tsunamis of fire surge in North America, Russia, Africa, South Asia, and Europe. Each year, they break former records and spread wider, while becoming much more intense.

        These fires define the parts of the world that are going to become a place apart, i.e the “Burning World”. These mega wildfires are already pushing modern emergency services to the limits of their response capabilities.

        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dm7HLYI78nw

        In California, since 2017, those fire monsters have been directly endangering urban life (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Global Apocalypse Now, The California Way”, The Red Team Analysis Society, October 12, 2020).

        However, these mega wildfires are not only devastating the world. They also reveal the capabilities of societies to answer, or not, to the near future state of environmental incineration.

        As a result, a question arises: are modern societies able to adapt to this new state of affairs? And is a new “geopolitics of a “burning world” emerging from the capabilities to adapt, or not (Hélène Lavoix, “When Denial and Passivity Verge on Stupidity” – The Red Team Analysis Weekly – 9 January 2020)?

        One of the main challenges we face in answering these questions is the utter lack of baseline or historic frame of reference. Indeed, there are no recordings of such a long series of extreme burning events. Indeed, the Burning World is the present reality; it is also the “shadow of the future” (Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 1984).

        That is why we must include in our reflection and our scenario-building effort scenarii ideas found in fiction. Furthermore, waiting for proper and in-depth scenario-building, fiction can be useful to outline what the future could look like, if we read it through a strategic foresight framework.

        What is at stake here is of the utmost importance, because our modern societies have to answer with the utmost haste to the question: how can we adapt to the Burning World?

        In order to explore this hypothesis, we shall use disaster movies and science fiction as materials for strategic foresight. In a first part, we shall use The Towering Inferno in order to anticipate the consequence of the domination of human future by fire.

        Then, we shall use the movie Reign of Fire as a thought experience. Through this film, we shall look at the future of societies in a world where resources become fuel.

        Then, we shall re-read the novel Sunstorm by Stephen Baxter and Arthur C. Clark, to propose alternate ways to orient the future of the Burning World in a sustainable way.

        Anticipating our Burning World and the “End of (known) History“

        In order to anticipate how societies may, or not, adapt to the Burning World, it is important to identify the main features of a fire saturating a large scale inhabited and developed area.

        Indeed, a fire destroys buildings, infrastructure, the vegetation cover, part of wildlife and people. But more than that, it can consume huge amounts of resources (Jean-Michel Valantin,  (“The Global Wildfire (1)“, The Red Team Analysis Society, September 27,2020).

        When there is no past

        The problem is that using historic examples is going to be very misleading. For example, the bombing and burning of European cities during WWII, or of the jungle during the Vietnam war, were followed by an end of the “war burning era” (Richard Overy, The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945 and John Dower, Cultures of war, Pearl Harbor/Hiroshima, 9/11/ Iraq, 2010). Thus, it was followed by rebuilding through the injection of financial and building materials as well as thanks to natural regrowth.

        However, the very problem of the opening era of mega wildfires is that there will be no end to it. On the contrary, the singularity of the Burning World relates to something very difficult to accept about climate change.

        Climate events are not becoming extreme because we are far from the extremes; they are becoming extreme because of the sheer scale of their geography and because their intensity is changing (Ed Struzik, “The Age of Megafires: The World Hits a Climate Tipping Point”, Yale 360, September 17, 2020).

        The Towering Inferno and the flight up to survival … for a few chosen

        Thus, we need to use the “thought experiments” literature, movies and series offer as they are extrapolating from these kinds of issues. For example, The Towering Inferno (John Guillermin, 1974) is quite interesting in anticipating what could happen in California and Australia over the coming years.

        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nch1URmJvMA

        As it happens, the movie shows characters trapped in a burning skyscraper. As the fire starts in the middle of the skyscraper, it is too high for the fire department to intervene. From there, the fire spreads towards the roof. The inhabitants of the building are cut off from the ground by the raging fire. They have no other choice than to flee higher and higher, while mass dying.  

        We must understand that, for these characters, the time-scale of their future is totally determined by the fire and the rhythm of its inexorable extension. Their only hope to survive is to reach the water stored in reservoirs on the roof and to release it, in order to save some of the people.

        In other words, the “inferno” is a fire that spreads at the scale of a whole habitat. It forces the remaining population to gather around water, knowing that there is not enough of that very water to save everybody.

        The Reign of Fire and a world of ash

        Towards a world of ash and soot

        Normally, in ecosystems such as forests, wildfires can literally be “biological kickstarters”. However, mega wildfires are now signals as well as drivers of the “new abnormal”, i.e climate change (Mark Lynas, Our Last Warning: 6 Degrees of Climate Emergency, 2020). Indeed, we have to remember that fire is a chemical reaction. So, a fire only lasts as long as the fuel that feeds the chemical reaction.

        So, we have to anticipate how to adapt to a world where areas at continental scale are going to become fuel for longer and longer “mega fire season”. This means that they will burn again and again. And these regions will keep on burning until there is nothing left to fuel the fires, and thus until nothing can regrow.

        Thus, once the fuel will be exhausted, all that remains after the incineration will be a world of ash and soot. It will have very few resilience capabilities. There are very few research or fiction works that dare to rise to the challenge of “thinking the unthinkable”.

        The Reign of Fire

        As it happens, the 2002 movie Reign of Fire (Rob Bowman, 2002) explores what comes just after the “Burning world”. At the start of the 21st century a flight of dragons wakes up and escapes from the London underground.

        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xd2hHvq-SEA

        They are quite indestructible and they burn the whole world to the ground. A last community survives by living underground, in the caves of a medieval castle, near a river. Their crops are very fragile, and they must prevent their incineration by dragons.

        New characteristics for a Fiery Planet

        Towards a Geography of Fire

        The movie’s scenario tells us of the quasi-“transplantation” of a 21st century on an “alternate” planet. This “burning Earth” can barely sustain the most fragile form of human existence anymore. Indeed, its habitats and ecosystems are now fuel for the Burning World. 

        As a result, this helps us to understand the coming new geography of our Burning World.

        In a few years time, California, the West Coast of North America, the Amazon Basin, and Australia may risk becoming worlds of ash and soot.

        This would entail survival politics (David Wallace Wells, The Uninhabitable Earth, Life after Warming, 2019). Those would be based on the mixing of the biological and social imperatives of society while the Earth becomes another planet.

        An ethos for a fiery planet

        It also tells us that the kind of changes currently occurring has also a drastically important psychological and cognitive dimension. The latter are necessary to allow human beings coping with living through a permanent state of catastrophe, without choosing denial.

        On the contrary, a “peasant/warrior/fireman” mentality is going to be a meaningful way to adapt.

        Preventing the Firestorm?

        These tentative foresight scenarii extracted from fiction about the Burning World are definitely not enticing.

        They force us to understand that there will be a drastic degradation of collective sustainability. Habitats and resources are going to turn into fuel, heat, smoke, ash and soot. And what will remain of human life will be “poor, nasty, brutish and short” (Hobbes, The Leviathan, 1651).

        Given the near-impossibility for a large population to adapt to the Burning World, the sole other alternative seems to be to find ways to mitigate the Firestorm. What is being done to mitigate it through international negotiations and the development of the energy mix is certainly useful.

        However, in the same time, the mega wildfires are multiplying. And they are also intensifying and spreading at a larger scale (Michael Klare, All Hell Breaking Loose, The Pentagon’s Perspective on Climate Change, 2019). 

        Thus, we must explore yet another alternative, mixing mitigation and prevention.

        Sunstorm and alternative world politics

        The novel “Sunstorm”, by Stephen Baxter and Arthur C. Clark (2006), explores that family of scenarii.  In 2037, an astrophysicist and an artificial intelligence (AI) predict that an exceptional sun storm is going to incinerate the Earth in 2042. So, the “ultimate bonfire” becomes the “shadow of the future” for the entire human race (Axelrod, Ibid.).

        This triggers an international effort, minus China, to build a giant smart space mirror. It is designed in order to deflect the 24 hours “sun bombing”. The novel describes the political, scientific, industrial, diplomatic and psychological dimensions of this colossal endeavour. It also describes how it transforms world politics.

        The book is also a narrative of loss and sadness. Indeed, if the project is largely a success, the damages are immense. Nonetheless, this tremendous effort empowers modern societies to survive the passage of this “sun fire bottleneck”. 

        From Sunstorm to climate change

        Even more interesting is that the authors are clearly developing a metaphor about climate change and the Burning World. Indeed, the “space mirror” is one of the theoretical answers some scientists envision in order to “cool” the planet (Clive Hamilton, Earthmasters: the Dawn of the Age of Climate Engineering, 2013).

        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K03cHnJY1qI

        The space mirror, as other geo-engineering speculations, would be deflecting a portion of the sun’s radiations.

        A global threat as a common good

        The novel says that it is possible to change the current climate and “firestorm” trajectory. However, success would demand to pool and coordinate the present political, scientific, financial and industrial resources.

        This would be possible through the collective understanding of a planetary threat recognized as an unintended “common” of the human race (Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 1968).

        It does absolutely not promote any kind of “degrowth” or of collapse, quite the opposite. The novel reveals that it is possible to re-orient modern societies. Outer space becomes the new place where they may reach towards sustainability and start searching for new resources.

        In other terms, it is time to use current resources and capabilities to mitigate and prevent the “Burning World”. In order to achieve this goal, decision-making needs to use foresight and early warning scenarios.

        Featured image: Image par sippakorn yamkasikorn de Pixabay

        What is an Issue in terms of Strategic Foresight & Warning and Horizon Scanning?

        An issue, in terms of warning and by extension SF&W, is “a situation, an objective, an opportunity, a danger, a threat or a risk, which is specific and defined.” (Grabo, 2004)

        For example, SF&W issues can be interstate and civil wars, fragile states, instability, energy security, oil, economic crisis, global water security, epidemics and pandemics such as the COVID-19, etc. We address them here in our section “Global Issues”.

        An issue can be explored through strategic foresight. During the warning process, it will be monitored, usually thanks to indicators based on models. The analyst will assess its potential developments (to obtain a judgment on the future).

        Monitoring issues will allow for the identification of warning problems, which will then be surveilled, again through adequate models and related indicators. If we use the example of energy as meta-issue, then issues could be “oil security,” “peak oil,” “peak uranium,” “the volatility of oil prices,” “coal security,” “the politics of energy between Europe and Russia,” space mining, etc. and problems the more specific “Gasprom policies,” “Nord Stream,”, “Oil and gas tensions in the eastern Mediterranean”, etc… If we look at resources as meta-issue, then deep-sea resources security is one of the issues.

        The collection of necessary information takes place during the monitoring and surveillance phases. The model and related indicators lead the collection of data and pieces of information.

        References

        Grabo, Cynthia M., Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, edited by Jan Goldman, (Lanham MD: University Press of America, May 2004).

        Featured Image par Fathromi Ramdlon de Pixabay 

        Global Apocalypse Now, the California Way

        Design: Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli

        Facing Apocalypse

        The Apocalypse literally means “the Book of Revelation”. From a theological as well as heuristic point of view, it means that the Apocalypse is the moment in history when entire societies are forced to lift the veils of illusions. Doing so, the revelation of the real state of things emerges, implacably.

        Golden State or burning state?

        That is why California’s burning is a truly apocalyptic situation. Indeed, the tsunami of fire that engulfs the “Golden State” reveals that California is reaching the limits of its sustainability.

        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VIyuz_6Nd_g

        However, in geopolitical terms, California is a major actor. Indeed, it is where Hollywood and the Silicon Valley are located. It is where they thrive, and it is from there they exert the U.S. technological and cultural influence on a global scale. California is also a major industrial and agricultural actor. Finally, California is also the trade and military interface between the U.S. and the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

        Hence, the burning and aridification of California also means a potential massive disruption of American power and influence. Actually, the strategic significance of these mega wildfires is even deeper. We can sum it up in a simple question: what are the geopolitics of a burning world? In other words, who will burn and who will access to water (“When Denial and Passivity Verge on Stupidity” – The Red (Team) Analysis Weekly – 9 January 2020) ?

        Fire Apocalypse, Now!

        An “apocalyptic moment” is nothing but a moment of revelation about the true state of things. Thus, qualifying the year 2020 as “apocalyptic” is indeed revealing some deep truth about California and the reality of its frailty.

        Over the last few years, with yearly wildfires, a historic part of the Californian landscape, ecology and development have been replaced by something else. This “something” is a singularity, i.e mega fires that are fuelled not by natural conditions, but by being part of the ecology of the New Frontier (Ed Struzik, “The Age of Megafires: The World Hits a Climate Tipping Point”, Yale 360, September 17, 2020).

        Climate as flamethrower

        This “Fire Frontier” emerges as if a continental flamethrower were devastating the whole west coast as well as the South West from British Columbia up north, Washington State, Oregon, to southern San Diego (2020 Western United States Wildfire Season, Wikipedia).

        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e5b7yhBfW2Q

        In the meantime, during the whole summer, immense wildfires burnt through the neighbouring states of Arizona, Nevada and Idaho.

        The majority of the wildfires were, or are, of historic proportions. During the 2020 Summer, 5 million acres burnt, exceeding all other previous record. Knowing that 17 out of 20 of the largest wildfires in California happened since 2003, this new record is a signal of the events to come (Ed Struzik, “The Age of Megafires: The World Hits a Climate Tipping Point”, Yale 360, September 17, 2020).

        The violence of the 2020 fires is such that their heat triggers category F-2 and F-3 tornadoes as well as thunderstorms. The winds they generate expand the fires and generate lightning clouds. In turn the lightning create new fires. The winds accelerate the fires’ coalescence, turning the wildfires into monsters, which are impossible to control (Cynthia Gorney, “In lightning-struck California, the smoke is now scarier than the pandemic », National Geographic, August 21).

        Fire as the new wilderness

        The presence of immense swaths of dead forests end up being immense fire stocks. Indeed, those forests are suffering from the drying ground. They also die because of the invasion of mountain pine beetles, which larvae are no longer killed by winter because of too mild temperatures, and dry ground (Jean-Michel Valantin, “The Global Wildfire (1)“, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, January 27,2020).

        This fire violence is the bifurcation of California and world history into the singularity of climate change. Indeed, the causes of the current climate change are the interactions between carbon fuels’ use for the development of modern societies, and the geosphere. Those interactions are radically altering the planetary conditions out of which they emerge.

        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gN-T6NDWQ1g

        Such an event, with this rhythm and intensity, has never occurred in the history of our planet. This is why it is a singularity. The 2020 mega wildfires are a signal, among others, of the way the 21st century and totally unknown conditions will interpenetrate.

        In historic terms, it is fascinating to note that the conquest of the West and the closure of the Frontier are the consequences of the conquest of California. 150 years after the closing of the geographic frontier, a singularity frontier opens up in the very same space. What is at stake is knowing if the modern Californian cities and industries emerging from the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries are able to adapt to these new and hostile conditions?

        In this regard, the case of the California power grid is quite interesting.

        Burn, power grid, Burn!

        First of all, California’s power grid is 60 years old. Then, its design and construction belong to the climate prevailing in California 60 years ago, and not to the rapidly and violently changing current climate.

        However, this very grid transports electricity towards homes, cities, utilities. It also feeds places such as the Silicon Valley and its global internet pure players, from Google to Facebook.

        Some corporate and individual actors are choosing to get off the grid by acquiring solar panels, in order to be energetically autonomous. However, all over the state, massive ashes clouds, resulting from the fires, cover the panels, thus nullifying their efficiency (Editorial Board, « California’s wildfire power eclipse », The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 14, 2020).

        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kdqovLjaETk

        Electric frailty

        As a result, the Californian electricity operators have to operate numerous rollbacks. They also ask people to use less energy at home, shutting off their air conditioning, for example.

        In the same time, during these tough times, California has to import more electricity from other states. Yet, multiple blackouts occurred. The power grid has been under massive stress, forcing power grid managers to “exchange” rollbacks and blackouts “against” overloading an aging and unsafe grid on the verge of collapse.

        In other terms, in a rapidly warming planet, California has to upgrade its overstressed power grid, while having growing electricity needs, because, among others, of the collective urban needs for air conditioning in a time of heat waves (Sammy Roth, “Why California’s power grid keep flirting with disaster? We’ve got answers”, Los Angeles Times, September 8, 2020). 

        On the Frontier of Burning world

        We must keep in mind that California is the 6th or 7th economy in the world. It is also one of the two main agricultural regions in the U.S. with the Middle West. However, modern economic development is totally dependent upon access to electricity.

        This is all the more true for California. Indeed, the electricity needs of the Silicon Valley, of the Hollywood studios and of megapoleis such as Los Angeles, San Francisco and San Diego are immense.

        Enter Burning World

        However the multiplication of mega wildfires threatens the electricity supply of California. The fires burn wooden poles and melting wires over hundreds of kilometres, while menacing utilities and renewable energy’s hardware. In other words, California is presently transporting itself on a new planet, the Burning World (David Wallace Wells, The Uninhabitable Earth, Life after Warming, 2019).

        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QiBgEnPXVHg

        We could also say that the new reality is that the Burning World is becoming the new ecological reality of California. There, the current infrastructures have become inadequate.

        The Californian case begs the question: is adaptation possible, for modern societies, to and in the Burning world? This question will be at very heart of the next article of this series.

        Arctic China: Towards New Oil Wars in a Warming Arctic?

        Design: Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli

        The new geopolitics of the Arctic

        In the Arctic, the climate and the “New U.S./Russia/China Cold war” are both warming at a very rapid pace (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Towards a US-China War? (1) and (2): Military Tensions in the Arctic”, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, September 16, 2019). Indeed, since 2016, Russia is multiplying massive military manoeuvres. This includes militarization, nuclear war, and hypersonic weapons exercises in Northern Siberia, as well as in the Russian Arctic archipelago.

        In the meantime, China is heightening its oil and gas operations in the Barents Sea, while the number of convoys that use the Northern sea route keeps on growing (Atle Staalesen, “Arctic gas finds new way from Yamal to China”, The Independent Barents Observer, April 1, 2020). Meanwhile, the U.S. and NATO also regularly deploy large military exercises including air power show of force.

        From a warming Arctic to warming geopolitics

        In other terms, the very complex cooperation between Russia and China in the Arctic is becoming a driver of tensions with the U.S., which are also feeling the attraction of the warming North (Valantin, ibid). Because of the rapid warming of this region, the strategic driver of these tensions is the opening of the Arctic to the international competition for energy, mineral, and biological resources (Michael Klare, All Hell Breaking Loose, The Pentagon’s Perspective on Climate Change, 2019). However, this strategic evolution must not hide the emergence of a fundamentally new geopolitical situation.

        This new situation is nothing but the turning of the Arctic Siberian littoral into the continental launch pad towards the Arctic of the Russo-Asian powers that dominate the gigantic landmass of Eastern, Southern and Central Asia and Russia (Jean-Michel Valantin, “The Warming Russian Arctic: Where Russian and Asian Strategies Interests Converge?”, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, November 23, 2016).

        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FzVvhoP7AaA

        Arctic Covid-19

        This continental dynamic holds a deep geopolitical meaning because of the accelerating destabilization of the Arctic ice cover. However, another dynamic haunts the Arctic and disrupts its emerging geopolitics, i.e the Covid-19 pandemic (Hélène Lavoix, “The Emergence of an International Covid Order”, The Red Team Analysis Society, June 15, 2020).

        In this new series, we shall see how these new tensions are escalating and how the new geophysics of the Arctic disrupts the deepest geopolitical equilibriums of our world. This disruption emerges from this new frontier of sea power.

        The first stage of this massive geopolitical shift is the structuration of the Arctic through the same kind of competitions and tensions that are organizing the Middle East or the South China Sea. Those competitions result from the conflicting national and private interests fighting to access natural resources. In the same dynamic, these tensions restrain the ability of the actors to reach those resources.

        The Arctic as a new South China Sea…

        The New American and Chinese frontier

        On 6 May 2019, the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo addressed in Finland the participants to the Arctic Council, the international body of all the nations of the Arctic region. During his speech, he declared that:

        “The Arctic is at the forefront of opportunity and abundance, … It houses 13 per cent of the world’s undiscovered oil, 30 per cent of its undiscovered gas, an abundance of uranium, rare earth minerals, gold, diamonds, and millions of square miles of untapped resources, fisheries galore… Steady reductions in sea ice are opening new passageways and new opportunities for trade, … This could potentially slash the time it takes to travel between Asia and the West by as much as 20 days … Arctic sea lanes could become the 21st century Suez and Panama Canals”.

        However, Mike Pompeo also added:

        “Do we want the Arctic Ocean to transform into a new South China Sea, fraught with militarization and competing territorial claims? » (Mike Pompeo from Jennifer Anslen, “Pompeo: Melting sea ice “presents new trade opportunities”, CNN, May 7, 2019.

        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Bk8PeRBYcg

        This geopolitical and strategic statement unveils the way the highest U.S. federal authorities are particularly aware of the new geopolitical reality: with the support of Russia, China is becoming an Arctic power. As it happens, a growing number of Chinese cargo convoys use the new Russian Northern Sea Route.

        This sea route joins the Bering Strait to the Norwegian Sea, as well as the Pacific, the Arctic Ocean and the Atlantic. Thus, using the Northern Sea Route allows the Chinese merchant fleet to reach the commercial ports of Scandinavia, northern Europe and of the North Atlantic, including Iceland (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Arctic China (1) – The Dragon and the Vikings”, The Red Team Analysis Society, 26 May, 2014).

        The Chinese presence in the Arctic is also scientific. A growing number of Chinese expeditions are mapping the sea floor in order to identify oil and gas resources. In the same time, others study the consequences of climate change on the Arctic environment.

        Those scientific missions aim at identifying potential new sea lanes and biological resources (Thomas Nilsen, “China seeks a more active role in the Arctic”, The Independent Barents Observer, May 11, 2019). In the same dynamic, major Chinese energy companies are investing in Russian oil and gas operations. They also develop their own off-shore operations in the Russian exclusive economic zone.

        Towards a Chinese and American Arctic “South China Sea”?

        In other terms, the Russian Arctic sees the deployment of the same kind of commercial, fishing and energy developments as those taking place in the South China Sea. However, the comparison that Mike Pompeo draws is also of a geopolitical nature. Indeed, the South China Sea is a historic theatre of rivalries between China and other riparian states, as well as and relatedly between China and the U.S. (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Militarizing the Chinese New Silk Road part 1 – The South China Sea”, The Red Team Analysis Society, March 13, 2017).

        Thus, when Mike Pompeo utters such warnings, he as well implies that the U.S. presence in the Arctic is also going to ramp up. And that it will become an active competitor of China in the Artic region.

        Those mounting tensions between the U.S., Russia, and China in a warming Arctic also reveal a deeper trend: the transformation of the warming Arctic into a multi-scale theatre of competitions and conflicts. Those are driven by the competition between great powers for access to and control of vital resources. Then, the competition created turbocharges tensions between regional actors. Yet, the South China Sea is not the only analogy for this kind of international politics.

        … Or as a new Middle east?

        Actually, we find also here the very drivers of geopolitics and dynamics that can be observed in the Middle East ( Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East, 2017).

        An Arctic “Middle Easternization”?

        One of the distinctive features of Middle Eastern geopolitics is the way it inherited regional tensions. International politics there is also rooted in a multimillenial history and in challenging geographic, hydric and climate conditions. This geo-historic context meets recent international tensions centred on oil and gas. This cross-over of civilizational and energy tensions are forcing cascading political and military shifts. Furthermore, this happens in a very rapidly socially and ecologically changing region (Fred Pearce, “MidEast Water Wars: In Iraq, a Battle for Control of water”,Yale 360°, 25 august 2014).

        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yr-LaMhvro

        It is interesting to note that, currently, the warming Arctic becomes an imbrication of different geopolitical levels. From this point of view, one could say that Norway is going through a “Middle Easternization” process. It is a small country, independent, while being an important oil producer. It is also an immediate land and marine neighbour of Russia.

        Norway is also a NATO member, and the Norwegian ports are harbours for the numerous Chinese scientific and commercial ships. It is also an active candidate to host the northern Europe end of the intercontinental fibre optic cable planned by China. That cable could extend from China, and could be laid down along the Siberian coast to Norway. There, Norway would connect this cable to European fibre optic networks.

        This project is feasible because of the warming of the Arctic and the accelerating decrease of the summer and winter ice cover (Maija Mylella, Arctic Finland “Data cables are the new trading routes, Finland wants data highway to Asia via Arctic waters”, The Independent Barents Observer, June 15, 2017 and Thomas Nilsen, « Major step towards a Euro-Asia Arctic cable-link », The Independent Barents Observer, June 6, 2019).

        A warming cold war?

        However, in October 2018, Norway was host to the most important NATO naval exercise since the end of the Cold war in 1990. This exercise was meant to deter the “unnamed adversary”, i.e. Russia. It also allowed for the deployment of enormous air and sea capabilities at the North Atlantic Northern sea route gateway. Those military deployments are a warning sent to Russia and China ( Jean-Michel Valantin, “Militarizing the Warming Arctic – The Road to Neo-Mercantilism(s)“, The Red Team Analysis Society, November 12, 2018).

        As we can see, Norway is a “hub of geopolitical scales imbrications”. It is as complex as any Middle Eastern country. In the meantime, climate change supports the access to the massive energy and biological resources of the zone. In the meanwhile the Northern sea route becomes an alternative solution to the Suez canal.

        The Arctic enters the Covid19 World

        Both the “South China Sea” and “Middle-East” comparisons help us understanding how the warming Arctic is rapidly changing. The latter becomes an attractor of interlocked local, regional, international and global geopolitics and resources competitions. This new reality is becoming more obvious and pregnant since March 2020. Indeed, the new Arctic geopolitics is also becoming a powerful vector of the Covid-19 pandemic (Hélène Lavoix, “The Emergence of a International Covid Order”, The Red Team Analysis Society, June 15, 2020).

        The “Covid World” Rules

        Those geopolitics, nonetheless, bow to the domineering geopolitical situation that Helene Lavoix qualifies as the “Covid World”. In other words, nowadays, the Covid-19 pandemic is becoming the main and the most powerful geopolitical force in the world. This can verified through the mammoth and world-wide geo-economic disruption it brings in its wake. Because of its cascading effects, the Covid-19 leads the world economy towards the mother of all depressions.

        Indeed, the pandemic affects all the Arctic countries, and also the strategic energy and military sectors. Furthermore, the “Covid World” also absorbs the Arctic through the possible infection of different military units.

        For example, the Murmansk region is badly impacted by the virus. This is particularly important, because Murmansk is the most important civil Russian harbour on the Arctic coast.

        The Murmansk oblast is also the headquarters of the Russian Northern Fleet. The latter plays a growing role in securing the immense economic exclusive zone. It also hosts the mammoth construction site of Novatek, the second Russian oil and gas company. Those constructions support the development of the massive liquid natural gas of the Yamal Peninsula, as well as other projects.

        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V9n6tu35chg

        Meanwhile, for example, in June, the Murmansk Oblast suffered a higher number of contaminations than neighbouring Norway. This slowed down and disrupted the workings of the civil industries, with more than 2000 workers infected on the Novatek site of Belokamenka, as well as on those of the Northern fleet (Atle Staalesen, “After infection of more than 2000 workers, situation comes under control at Belokamenka construction site”, The independent Barents Observer, June 16, 2020 and “The City hat builds Russia’s nuclear submarines has more than 2000 Covid-19 cases”, The Independent Barents Observer, June 23, 2020). 

        Thus, the pandemic disrupts the rhythm of the civil and military development plans of the warming Arctic . 

        Covid disruption

        This situation is not trivial. Novatek is a major developer of the Yamal I and II operations. Those attract massive foreign investment, from China, India, and Japan, among others. Those developments are deeply dependent on the warming of the region that allows access to new resources. Those extraction operations are of great interest for Asian nations. They work at diversifying their energy sector, in order to use less coal, while supporting their economic development.

        Thus, the delays that the virus imposes to these operations are a potential constraint for the economic development of Asia. Reciprocally, this unveils how Asia links itself to the development of the Russian warming Arctic. It also unveils the way those massive geo-economic strategies on a warming planet are currently absorbed by the “Covid World”

        Thus, we now have to look at the way those public and private actors adapt both to climate change and to the “Covid World”’.

        Featured Image: Design by Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli for The Red Team Analysis Society

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