“Shooting the messenger” is a popular metaphor to highlight that those who deliver warnings most often are blamed, as if they were responsible for the reason for the warning. Meanwhile and as a result, warnings are also not considered.
This saying underlines that the norm is the exact opposite of the objectives of early warning and strategic foresight. Moreover, it shows that we, practitioners of early warning and strategic foresight, may be blamed. We could be blamed even though we have at heart to improve the situation and even though listening to us would indeed allow for preparedness and best response.
Faced with such a conundrum, how can we improve the odds to see decision makers pay heed to our early warning and strategic foresight products. Accessorily, how can we also protect ourselves from “being shot”?
We saw previously that if we were carefully following necessary steps to deliver and communicate our early warnings and strategic foresight, then we were improving the likelihood to see decision-makers taking our warnings into account (Helene Lavoix, “Communication of Strategic Foresight and Early Warning“, The Red Team Analysis Society, 3 March 2021).
We also underlined that this apparently simple process was fraught with challenges. Among these hurdles, we find the many biases that may affect the cognition of decision makers and that potentially impact all steps of the delivery and communication process, and even the very delivery of warnings and strategic foresight.
In this article we thus focus on and explore a bias identified as “motivated ignorance” or “active information avoidance” (Daniel Williams, “Motivated Ignorance, Rationality, and Democratic Politics“, Synthese, 2020; Golman, R.et al. “Information Avoidance“, Journal of Economic Literature, 2017). This bias, alongside others, could contribute to derail early warning and strategic foresight or more broadly anticipation. Indeed, it could even prevent the very delivery and communication of warning and foresight products. We shall first explain this bias and the way it could operate in our case. Then, assuming it is at work, we shall suggest ways to mitigate it to improve the delivery of our warnings and foresight.
What is motivated ignorance?
When knowing is felt as too costly
According to Williams (Ibid), “motivated ignorance” means that an individual will purposefully refuse to know because the cost of knowing is too high. Here, we are concerned with the very act of getting and accessing the information. Thus, instances of “motivated ignorance” or “active information avoidance” can be: not opening a letter, not taking a test, not reading something, not listening to certain types of news. In some cases, it could be “shooting the messenger”. This refusal to know or intentional non-action can be both conscious and unconscious (Williams, ibid).
“Active information avoidance” (Golman et al., 2017, p. 97) must satisfy two conditions:
“(1) the individual is aware that the information is available, and
(2) the individual has free access to the information or would avoid the information even if access were free.”
The objective of the individuals engaged in motivated ignorance is to make sure they will not have to reach certain conclusions that they perceive as detrimental (Williams, Ibid).
How Tigranes came to cut off the head of the messenger
In the case of early warning and strategic foresight, motivated ignorance would mean that decision-makers make sure, consciously or not, they do not listen or do not have to listen to people who could give them knowledge, information and analysis they are seeking to ignore.
In the most extreme cases, decision-makers could decide to not-set up early warning systems or more broadly anticipation processes. If these systems already exist, then motivated ignorance could lead decision-makers to find various ways to not-listen to what they produce. Early warning systems and strategic foresight capabilities could even be destroyed, either directly or indirectly by making sure they cannot function properly.
More broadly, at the level of society, motivated ignorance could mean that those who may be perceived as holding knowledge, understanding or simply information one wishes to avoid will be excluded, whatever the way to achieve the exclusion can take. The knowledge, understanding and information produced will similarly be discarded through all possible means.
This goes a long way to explain the “Cassandra curse”, as well as ancient and popular metaphor such as “shooting the messenger”. We may recall here what Greek philosopher Plutarch told us in his Life of Lucullus:
“[25] Since the first messenger who told Tigranes that Lucullus was coming had his head cut off for his pains, no one else would tell him anything, and so he sat in ignorance while the fires of war were already blazing around him, giving ear only to those who flattered him…”
Plutarch, “The Life of Lucullus“, The Parallel Lives, published in Vol. II of the Loeb Classical Library edition, 1914, University 0f Chicago, p. 551.
The story does not stop there. Plutarch let us know about the fate of Tigranes, and of those unfortunate enough to serve such rulers, even those who struggle against their leaders’ motivated ignorance with the best possible intention:
“The first of his friends who ventured to tell him the truth was Mithrobarzanes, and he, too, got no very excellent reward for his boldness of speech. He was sent at once against Lucullus with three thousand horsemen and a large force of infantry, under orders to bring the general alive, but to trample his men under foot. … A battle ensued, in which Mithrobarzanes fell fighting, and the rest of his forces took to flight and were cut to pieces, all except a few. Upon this, Tigranes abandoned Tigranocerta, that great city which he had built, withdrew to the Taurus, and there began collecting his forces from every quarter….”
Plutarch, “The Life of Lucullus“, The Parallel Lives, published in Vol. II of the Loeb Classical Library edition, 1914, University 0f Chicago, p. 553.
Repeating many times the same mistake, Tigranes is vanquished. On the contrary, Lucullus, the Roman aristocrat, General and Consul, listens to the advice of those who understand and warn him and synthesise them. Lucullus then adds to these analysis his own genius and is victorious.
From our perspective, Plutarch’s story highlights the importance of proper early warning and strategic foresight contrasted to what happens if motivated ignorance comes into play.
Knowing little enough for avoidance and the Dunning-Kruger effect
Furthermore, the deleterious impact of motivated ignorance can become even worse and more entrenched, as motivated ignorance ends up favouring motivated ignorance. Let us see how this vicious cercle can take place.
To be able to engage in motivated ignorance, individuals must have an idea of what they want to ignore. They need to know enough to know what to avoid. Thus, individuals who are engaged in motivated ignorance have a general knowledge and understanding of the issue of concern. Yet, most of the time, their knowledge will remain generic and superficial. If they had a specific and detailed knowledge then they could not claim ignorance, or if they did, then we would be in the realm of lies, which is a different phenomenon.
As a result, in instances of motivated ignorance, another bias can come into play, the Dunning-Kruger effect. According to this bias, “the skills that engender competence in a particular domain are often the very same skills necessary to evaluate competence in that domain” (Kruger and Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It…”, 1999). In other words, the less one knows about something, the best one thinks one is in this field.
The Dunning-Kruger effect could thus act as a factor reinforcing motivated ignorance. Indeed, by practicing motivated ignorance, individuals would make sure their knowledge remains superficial and thus both ignore inconvenient truth while strengthening their beliefs in their superiority in this field. As a way to mitigate the Dunning-Kruger effect is likely to increase the knowledge of individuals prey to the effect, motivated ignorance would forbid this solution.
Are we thus faced with an inescapable fate? Are those who, as Plutarch’s Tigranes, engage on the path of motivated ignorance doomed to remain ignorant and then finally succumb to their enemy or whatever threat and surprise they proudly ignore? As practitioners of early warning and strategic foresight are we doomed to fail and be shot if destiny or lack of fortune gives us as decision-makers individuals favouring motivated ignorance, or locate us in a time and civilization where motivated ignorance reign?
Let us explore further motivated ignorance, looking at the causes that lead people to engage in such behaviour. We may then try to devise strategies to act on causes. Note, however, that because we are facing active ignorance, our means to reduce this bias are singularly small. We certainly need to make sure we do not provoke motivated ignorance for our next warning or our next foresight product, while going on “speaking truth to power”. However, more difficult, if it is our very activity that is actively avoided, we need to work around it. Thus it will not be so much our products that must have specific characteristics, but other things outside them, these other things remaining to be determined according to specific cases. We shall again build upon Williams’ research (Ibid.).
The reasons for motivated ignorance
As exemplified in Plutarch’s story about Lucullus’ victory and Tigranes’ fate, motivated ignorance is a bias that can be extremely dangerous in terms of consequences, both at individual and collective level. To struggle against this bias, we need to understand why people would wish to ignore something, even though it would appear, from an external point of view, that knowing and understanding would be best.
Avoiding negative emotional states and countering strategies
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Lloyd, Sharon A. and Susanne Sreedhar, “Hobbes’s Moral and Political Philosophy“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed.
Nerdahl, Michael, Bowdoin College, Review of Manuel Tröster, Themes, character, and politics in Plutarch’s Life of Lucullus : the construction of a Roman aristocrat. Historia. Einzelschriften, Heft 201. Stuttgart: Steiner, 2008, Bowdoin College, Bryn Mawr Classical Review, 2008.
Pham, Michel Tuan “Emotion and Rationality: A Critical Review and Interpretation of Empirical Evidence,” Review of General Psychology, 2007, Vol. 11, No. 2, 155–178, DOI: 10.1037/1089-2680.11.2.155.
Plutarch, “The Life of Lucullus“, The Parallel Lives, published in Vol. II of the Loeb Classical Library edition, 1914, University 0f Chicago.
We just finished providing one week intensive training on early warning systems & indicators, part of this year programme on “management of social conflict” of the Ecole Supérieure des Forces de Sécurité Intérieure (ESFSI) of the Home Ministry of Tunisia. This programme is supported by the European project “Counter-terrorism in Tunisia” via CIVIPOL. This is the second time we have the pleasure and honour to deliver training for the ESFSI, the first instance was in August 2020.
It was a great week, with incredibly rich and interesting discussions.
We could do everything with Zoom from classical lectures to practice and group work sessions through software tutorials. It worked perfectly well – we could even receive the awards and presents for trainers – thanks to the ESFSI, the great team operating for CIVIPOL in Tunis, and of course, to fantastic trainees!
During the two-week dire cold snap, more than 4 million households, i.e. 15 million people, lost electric power. The same cold front froze innumerable collective and domestic water pipes Their explosions triggered dozens of thousands of domestic inundations, as well as state-wide water transport problems (Hannah Dellinger, “Plumbers “haven’t seen the worst of it yet” as cold weather bursts pipes across Texas”, Houston Chronicle, 16 February 2021).
The Winter 2021 extreme weather event is not an isolated instance. It belongs to the chain of consequences of the climate hyper siege that hammers the very living conditions of Texas. This cold front is itself part of the cascading effects of the destabilization of the polar jet stream, resulting from the rapid warming of the Arctic (Jeff Berardelli, “Climate change and cold front: what’s behind the Arctic extreme in Texas”, CBS News, 20 February 2021).
Thus, this very strange catastrophe reveals the growing probability that Texas could become incrementally uninhabitable. That could emerge from the cumulative interactions between infrastructures, living conditions and climate change in this state. The Winter 2021 extreme event also has momentous international consequences, because Texas plays a major role in energy geopolitics.
A winter of mass destruction
Turning home into a trap
From prehistoric times, the defining character of a home, the place where the family lives, is artificial heat and protection. Fire generates heat. Walls are providing protection, while also keeping some of the warmth inside. These two conditions are the basic life support system of sedentary families (Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel, The Fates of Human Societies, 1999).
The extremely violent cold snap that hammered Texas in February 2021 deeply subverts this multi-millennial order of things. The wave of Arctic air that cut across the United States and that froze Texas was so cold that millions of houses, built for the warm climate of Texas, consumed far more electricity for heating.
This collective drain on the grid generated immense power outages. The freezing cold did also impact the gas pipes that were feeding several power plants, shutting them down. This heightened the pressure on the power grid and had a multiplying effect on the outages.Those outages stopped house heating.
In other words, the Texan “Suburbia” became a gigantic trap because of its fundamental vulnerability to a freezing extreme weather event.
This means that the very paradigm of the U.S. urban development induces a very large set of “invisible” vulnerabilities, such as the state-wide mass destruction of plumbing and of warmth keeping.
My kingdom for a plumber
Furthermore this domestic mass destruction event becomes a longer term issue with a wider scope.
For instance, first, it led to a massive need for plumbers in Texas with consequences elsewhere.
The Texan government called for skilled workers from all around the United States. The government even accelerated the validation of the out-of-state plumbers’ application documents (Tyler Durden, “Texas desperate for out-of-state plumbers amid broken water pipe chaos”, Zero Hedge, 26 February, 2021).
This was all the more urgent that the plumbing crisis was rapidly becoming a massive and lasting water crisis. As it happens, millions of Texas citizens were thus deprived of access to fresh water for daily domestic and sanitary uses.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-dYgcXEqAsU
However, attracting thousands of plumbers from all over the U.S. is also likely to trigger a national tension in the plumbing field. When plumbers leave their own cities and states, needed repairs will be delayed and thus will worsen (Chaffin Mitchell, “Accuweather estimates economic impact of winter storms to approach 50 billions“, Accuweather, 18 February, 2021) . This will impact in turn insurance companies.
Then, back in frozen Texas, domestic electricity consumption skyrocketed. The direct consequence was a rapid and steep increase in electricity prices, because of the growing demand in a deregulated energy market. Then, because of automated payments, people lost hundreds or thousands dollars in a few days.
In other terms, in a few days, millions of people lost their domestic, water and financial security because of a jet of Arctic air. Furthermore, the financial toll is certainly going to worsen, because homeowners are going to have to pay for repairs, while their property is losing value. Meanwhile, a lot of them are also going to have to keep on reimbursing their mortgage.
In the same time, insurance companies are also going to have to pay for damages.
Overall, these dynamics show that the Texan plumbing, water and home crisis is literally propagating all over the U.S.. Entire sections of the U.S. urban and suburban network will feel the impact of the 2021 February cold snap on Texas.
Texas Hyper Siege
From a strategic point of view, this winter sequence is in the continuation of the “hyper siege” that climate change imposes on Texas. This means that Texas is being literally “immersed” into the new and adverse geophysical conditions that are besieging it. (Jean-Michel Valantin “Hyper Siege: Climate change versus U.S National security”, The Red Team Analysis Society, March 31 2014, and Clive Hamilton, Defiant Earth, The fate of the Humans in the Anthropocene, 2017).
Geophysics under steroids
This new condition was highlighted, for example, in 2017, when the titanic hurricane Harvey surged in Texas. From 29 August to 5 September 2017, hurricane Harvey poured a staggering 22 cubic kilometres of rainwater across the South Eastern littoral of the U.S. It inundated also the coast and the hinterland of Texas.
The sheer weight of the quantity of water could create a two centimetres depression on the affected region. It took more than five weeks for all this extra water to flow to the sea (Mark Lynas, Our Last Warning: 6 Degrees of Climate Emergency, 2020).
This extreme event imposed immense economic costs, because of the direct damages to the infrastructures, cities, homes, fields and industries. To these costs one must add those of repairs and of business interruption. Indeed, for example, a lot of oil extraction and transaction operations were suspended by the hurricane, with impact on related companies (Matt Egan and Chris Isidore, “Tropical storm Harvey threatens vital Texas energy hub”, CNN Money, August 26).
If we take a look at just the counties of Harris and Galveston in Texas, for example, we see that “Hurricane Harvey has damaged at least 23 billion dollars of property…” (Reuters, Fortune, 30 August 2017). 26% of this sum is land value, the remaining part is being constituted by dozens of thousands of houses, buildings and infrastructures. This means that, potentially, millions of people found themselves brutally projected in very precarious situations.
In other terms, the very conditions of life in Texas become the medium for vulnerability to climate change. This has profound geopolitical implications, because of the importance of Texas on the international energy markets, in a Covid-19 world.
Texas and the shale oil revolution in a Covid-19 world
A plague in Texas
The turning of Texan infrastructures and urban development into a medium for social vulnerabilities combines itself with other cascading effects, those of the Covid-19 pandemic. Since March 2020, 44.000 out of 29 million Texans died of the Covid-19. The Texas Government attitude went from delegating decisions about masks and lockdown to city councils to state government measures, often reversed. However, each easing of the sanitary measures induced a contamination spike.
In the context of the global pandemic and, as Hélène Lavoix puts it, of the emergent international Covid-19 order (Hélène Lavoix, “The emergence of a Covid-19 International Order”, The Red Team Analysis Society, June 15, 2020), Texas installs itself in the Covid-19 World.
This takes a direct toll on the economy. Consequently, the unemployment rates reaches 8%. The slowing down of the economy is also deeply altering the trade and service activities. This situation triggers numerous public anti-masks and anti-lockdown protests.
Those certainly result from the combination of the collective economic and social anguish specific to pandemic economics and of the fiercely individualistic and liberal culture of the “Lonely Star state” (David R. Baker, Brian Heckhouse, David Wette, “California and Texas fought Covid their own, suffered just the same”, Bloomberg Business Week, 18 January 2021).
The Texas economic woes have a deeper layer. They are related to the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic on the Texas energy “renaissance” through the extraction of shale oil and gas.
All revolutions end
Since the beginning of the 2000s, Texas is the centre of the unconventional U.S. shale oil and gas revolution. This revolution is made possible by the fracking technology breakthrough. So, the exploitation of the huge Permian basin went from a paltry 850.000 barrels in 2007 to 2 million barrels in output in 2014. This was then almost 25% of the U.S. crude oil output (Daniel Yergin, The New Map, Energy, Climate, and the Clash of Nations, 2020).
Since 2014, Texas is a major oil and gas producer. The two Permian basin Spraberry and Wolfcamp giant fields are among the five first oil fields in the world. The shale revolution turned again the U.S. in a net and major oil and gas producer, as it was until the end of the 1970s. (Michael Klare, Blood and oil, the dangers and consequences of America’s growing dependency on imported petroleum, 2004). This reinstates the U.S. at the table of the oil and gas producers, alongside the OPEC and Russia. This U.S. oil and gas resurgence also generates important tensions on the international energy market (Yergin, ibid).
However, with the COVID-19, oil and gas prices have known a brutal contraction during the 2020 Spring. They even plunge to -37$ during a few hours in April 2020. Since then, the U.S. shale oil and gas industry is in dire straits. Indeed, its massive costs and weak profits makes it very sensitive to energy low prices (“Oil price crashes below 0$ for the first time in history amid pandemic”, CGTN, 21 April 2020).
This deep fragility became a massive loss of 60.000 jobs in the Texas oil industry (David R. Baker, Brian Heckhouse, David Wette, ibid). So, the Covid-catastrophe turns the Texas shale oil and gas extraction into a major economic and financial vulnerability.
Texas as a warning to the World
In other words, through hurricane and winter extreme weather events, climate change is transforming the very development of Texas into unlivable conditions. In the same time, the Covid-19 World literally ruins the shale revolution and Texan workers and activities networks that depend on it.
As a result, from a strategic foresight and warning point of view, Texas and its situation underline serious questions that need to be asked about the near future of the United States.
Indeed, if climate change and the Covid-19 pandemic keep on hammering the Texan infrastructures, urban and economic development and sanitary conditions, the state will rapidly become literally unlivable for its 29 million strong population. However, if people start leaving Texas, where they will go? And where will such a large population be welcome? This is all the more complex that numerous U.S. states are also under their own version of the hyper siege.
The Texas hyper siege has also an international dimension. Indeed, the risk of a wreckage of the shale oil and gas U.S. revolution will rewrite the international energy order. But, at a more fundamental level, what can happen in such a very rich and developed region as Texas shows that the famous “resiliency” capability of an old industrialised region may have very real limits.
This should be a very strong warning for each and every country, especially in the rich, developed, and astonishingly vulnerable, Western world.
A warning does not exist if it is not delivered. This is a key lesson highlighted by the famous expert in warning Cynthia Grabo, who worked as an intelligence analyst for the U.S. government from 1942 to 1980 (Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, Editor’s Preface). Similarly, a foresight product such as scenarios, for example, has to be delivered or communicated. Actually, Cynthia Grabo’s point is true for any anticipatory activity, whatever its name, from risk management to horizon scanning.
Furthermore, if strategic foresight and early warning are to be actionable, if they are to allow for true preparedness, then clients – the decision-makers and policy-makers to whom the product has been delivered and communicated – must pay heed to the foresight, or to the warning. What decision-makers then decide to do with those warnings is another story.
Thus, from our point of view – i.e. the perspective of those who are in charge of doing early warning and foresight – decision-makers must receive the warning or foresight product, know they have received them and, as much as possible, consider them.
This part of the process of early warning, strategic foresight, futurism or more broadly anticipation, which handles delivery and communication, tends to receive less attention than other dimensions such as analysis or collect of information. Yet, if we want decision-makers to pay heed to our work, if we want societies to move from reaction to anticipation and action, then delivery and communication are as important as analysis and collect.
This article presents fundamentals for the delivery of early warning and strategic foresight products and the origin of this knowledge. It then suggests that if we were adding a user-centric approach to our understanding of delivery and communication, then we could improve this part of the strategic foresight and early warning process.
Lessons learned
The most famous strategic surprise or warning failure is the attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941. This attack was indeed a surprise that dealt a devastating blow to the American fleet, even though the fleet recovered. It also overcome the reluctance of the U.S. to enter World War II beyond support of allies. War was formally declared against Japan on 8 December, bringing truly America into World War II (e.g. a Bibliography on Pearl Harbour, from the point of view of strategic surprise, Imperial War Museum, “What happened at Pearl Harbour“).
This event may be considered as the starting point for the study of warning. Indeed, Pearl Harbour and other strategic surprises led intelligence officers and analysts to study how surprise could happen, so as to avoid these very warning failures. Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962) is considered as the first famous instance of such studies. Cynthia Grabo’s classified A Handbook of Warning Intelligence (three volumes published in 1972 and 1974), which gave the unclassified 2003 Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, is another fundamental textbook for understanding and avoiding warning failures.
We can thus use more than fifty to sixty years of knowledge and understanding gathered in the field of indications and warning, that became strategic warning and early warning. Utilising these lessons learned from strategic surprise and warning failure we can highlight key points for delivery and communication of strategic warning and foresight.
“Clients” or “customers” for our warning or foresight must be identified. We can actually map these clients.
Warning officers and more broadly early warning and strategic foresight practitioners must learn to know their decision-makers, their “clients”. They must develop, overtime, a trusting relationship with them.
Warning and foresight products can, as a result, be adapted to customers in terms of:
format: making sure the format is right for each decision-maker receiving the product
understanding: making sure each decision-maker can understand the product (I mean really understand it fully, not getting only a superficial vision of it).
Products must be delivered to customers. Related necessary channels of communication must be created if need be.
Feedback on delivery and products must be asked from customers, hoping the latter will have time to provide them.
If we pay attention to these steps and follow them, then we have improved the likelihood to see our customers pay heed to foresight and early warning products.
Many challenges, however, are lurking behind those apparently simple steps, potentially hindering the best completion of each of them. Here we shall focus on an approach that could constructively help us in carrying out these steps.
Moving from classical customers to users?
Usually, chains of command and hierarchical structures define who gets early warnings and strategic foresight products, such as scenarios, for example. They have been established over time, exist and are either necessary or inescapable or both. Most of the time, those who receive warnings and foresight analysis are set policy-makers and decision-makers.
Yet, it could be also of interest to move from the idea of existing pre-determined “customers” or “clients” to a slightly different notion, the idea of users.
Meteorologist at work at the Storm Prediction Centre de Norman, Oklahoma Source: NOAA
A user-centric approach would imply, for example, that we provide those receiving the results of our warning or foresight analysis with tools and instruments, be they concrete or immaterial, that are first and foremost useful and of value to them. This could be any device – including in terms of format – that would be helpful to users for moving from the reception of our products to action and the accomplishment of their mission.
With the idea of users, the emphasis is set on a long-term relationship, on the consideration of the other and his or her needs.
If we adopt a user-centric approach, then we can start our process of identification of the recipient of our early warning and strategic foresight analysis again, with a fresh mind:
Are we sure that all the necessary, actual and potential users have been identified?
Would other people, potentially not belonging to the usual chain of command or hierarchy benefit from using the early warning or the foresight product?
For each type of users and even each user, we would then need to follow the steps related to the delivery and communication of warnings identified above. Each user could receive specific warning products tailored to its needs.
This approach would certainly be most useful, for example, in the case of the COVID-19 pandemic for example, as each and every human being is a whole theatre of operation and entire battlefield for the virus and where actions must be taken by each individual very quickly in series of instants. It would deserve further detailed research as we could find more efficient approaches that only considering if a person is positive or not, contact case or not and needs to isolate or not. Again, this would help moving from reaction to anticipation.
However attractive a user-centric approach may appear, it may also be difficult to implement because, for most actors, having foresight, being able to anticipate, also touches upon hierarchy and ultimately upon power. Thus, within an organisation, care will be taken to clear the question first at the highest level of decision-making.
Moving from “product” and “delivery” to “tools” and “reception”
Classically, once all policy-makers and decision-makers are known, then, ideally, the final result of the analysis is formatted to be adapted to policy-makers and decision-makers and delivered. The aim is to get their attention and raise their awareness.
By National Weather Service Aviation Weather Center (http://aviationweather.gov/products/swm/), Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons
If we move to the user centric approach, we can start thinking about usage of early warning or foresight analysis rather than just products and switch from an emphasis on delivery to reception.
We could ask questions such as:
In which circumstances and how would users use the warning or foresight analysis?
What are the best channels of communication for transmitting efficiently and timely the warnings or strategic foresight analysis that will give the best possible reception by the user?
Which form should the early warning and the foresight analysis have for best usage by each user or type of user?
The questions above are particularly important as they will also lead us to find out how users think, the dynamics behind cognition, the opportune moments for communication, what and who has influence on the users’ thinking. They will demand we consider the various biases that alter the understanding of any human being (e.g. Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 1999). These indeed do not only affect analysts and analysis, as usually considered. They also impact people receiving our foresight and early warnings and, as Woocher points out, the relationship between analysts, officers and to customers. Answering these questions properly thus will help us changing mind-sets a difficult and constant hurdle strategic foresight and early warning must always overcome.
If we keep in mind that useful recipients of early warning and strategic foresight analysis are not only set clients in a hierarchy but also, first and foremost, users, then we can imagine, design and implement an overall strategy centred on the actionable use of early warning and strategic foresight, for best delivery and communication of our analyses.
A short bibliography
Grabo, Cynthia M., and Jan Goldman. Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning. [Washington, D.C.?]: Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, Joint Military Intelligence College, 2002.
Meyer, Christoph O., et al. “Recasting the Warning-Response Problem: Persuasion and Preventive Policy.” International Studies Review, vol. 12, no. 4, 2010, pp. 556–578. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40931357.
Nolan, Janne E., and MacEachin, Douglas, with Kristine Tockman, Discourse, Dissent and Strategic Surprise Formulating U.S. Security Policy in an Age of Uncertainty. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 2007.
Wohlstetter, Roberta. Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962.
Woocher, Lawrence, “The Effects of Cognitive Biases on Early Warning,” Presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention (2008).
Featured image: by ArtTower, Pixabay, Public Domain.
On 14 January, Hungary’s government signed an agreement with the giant company Sinopharm in order to purchase millions of doses of the Chinese CoronaVac (CCV) (“In EU first, Sinopharm Coronavirus vaccine approved by Hungary”, Nikkei Asia, 31 January, 2021). One week before, it had made a deal with Russia to buy doses of the vaccine Sputnik V.
Turkey, Serbia, and Bosnia, for example, signed similar agreements (Hamdi Firat Buyuk, Danijel Kovacevic, Edit Inotal and Milica Stojanovic, “Turkey, Serbia, Bosnia, Hungary put trust in Russian, Chinese vaccines”, Balkan Insight, January 22, 2021). Their health authorities are approving the Russian and Chinese vaccines, while deploring the too slow imports of the Pfizer vaccine by the EU.
In Lebanon and Morocco, governments are also buying dozens of millions of doses of the Chinese vaccine. In Iran, health authorities are importing the Russian Sputnik V, while exploring the possibility to buy the Chinese CoronaVac (CCV) (Reid Standish, “Appeal grows for Russian, Chinese serums, as Western vaccine effort get bogged down”, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, February 4, 2021).
The emergence of a new pattern… and its correlated risks?
A pattern emerges here. The countries of the Middle East and the Balkans that are buying the Chinese and Russian vaccines are members of the “Chinese Belt and Road initiative / New Silk Road”.
In other words, as we shall see, numerous member-states of the Chinese Belt and Road initiative are going to vaccinate their population or part of it with the CCV. This fact bestows new layers of geopolitical meaning to this “Health Silk Road” (HSR). In fact, the HSR appears as a mean to insure the continuity of the countries that are part of the B&R.
It also appears as a driver of the “international Covid order” that Hélène Lavoix identifies and defines (“The emergence of a Covid-19 International Order”, The Red Team Analysis Society, June 15, 2020).
Then, we shall see how the international distribution of the Chinese vaccine may turn China into a strange new kind of “sanitary power”. Reciprocally, China needs to support the health of its partner countries.
However, the Health Silk Road is also potentially dangerous for China, because it could backfire, if the Chinese CoronaVac was not efficient enough, especially on the British, South-African and Brazilian variants that are rapidly spreading .
From the “Health Silk Road” to the “Belt and Road Initiative”
Since Fall 2020, the Chinese medical supplies exports are also dubbed as the “Health Silk Road” (HSR). As it happens, this notion of “Health Silk Road” has been a dimension of the “Belt & Road initiative” since 2015 (Elizabeth Chen, “Chinese vaccine diplomacy revamps the Health Silk Road amid Covid-19”, The Jamestown Foundation, 12 November 2020).
At first, it was a fluid and inclusive notion. It was aiming at qualifying bilateral talks and deals about the exports of Chinese traditional medicine to B&R members. But the recent exports of the Sinopharm vaccine literally transcend this notion.
From the Covid-19 pandemic to the full Health Silk Road
The “Health Silk Road” truly materialised with the transition from a Covid-19 Chinese epidemic to a worldwide pandemic, during the first quarter of 2020 (Hélène Lavoix, “Dynamics of Contagion and Covid-19 Second wave”, The Red Team Analysis Society, June 3, 2020).
Those exports travel along the land and sea transport infrastructures that incarnate the B&R (Jean-Michel Valantin, “China and the New Silk Road – From oil wells to the moon … and beyond”, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, July 6 2015). Since March 2020, those exports are notably made of masks, gloves, surgical gowns, pharmaceutics, etc.. They reach more than 120 countries. Among them many are members of the Belt and Road initiative, such as Pakistan, Egypt or Italy (Elizabeth Chen, ibid).
Then, as we write this article, numerous African countries are considering buying the Chinese vaccine. This decision process is gearing up because of the difficulty for African countries to buy significant quantities of the American and Americano-German vaccines, such as Pfizer-BioNTech’s and Moderna’s. This is the consequence of the massive purchases made by the U.S. and the EU (John Campbell, “Vaccine Diplomacy: China and Sinopharm in Africa”, Council on Foreign Relations, January 6, 2021).
The Chinese vaccine as a “global public good”
As it happens, China proposes massive discounts on its Sinopharm vaccine. This follows the May address by president Xi Jinping, stating that Covid-19 vaccines should be a “global public good” (“China’s Covid-19 vaccine to become global public good when available: Xi”, Xinhuanet, 2020-05-18).
Consequently, China would propose it at an affordable price. This offer is all the more alluring that the Chinese vaccine is the result of the decades-old vaccination method of injection of an inactivated virus. Thus, it does not need the impressive logistics that necessitates the recent ARN messenger technologies (Hélène Lavoix, “Covid-19 Vaccinations, Hope or Mirage?”, The Red Team Analysis Society, January 27, 2021).
We must also note that more than 42 African countries out of 54 are part, at a degree or another, of the B&R. As such, they integrate the multiple transportation infrastructures that constitute the different segments of the “Road” (Jean-Michel Valantin, “The Chinese New Silk Road in East Africa”, The Red team Analysis Society, 30 January 2017). The development of these infrastructures is making it easier for the countries to import their purchases of medical supplies from China.
One may note that the multiple medical supplies that China sends to African, Arab, Asian and European countries since March 2020 are obviously going hand in hand with a massive diplomatic and “soft power” effort. It was especially true during the 2020 spring. That was when the U.S. Donald Trump administration was particularly vocal about the responsibility of China in the pandemic (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Chimerica 3: the Geopolitics of the US-China Turbo-Recession”, The Red Team Analysis Society, June 29, 2020).
From the Health Silk Road to China’s geo-economic security
The HSR and the Covid-19 World
However, we must keep in mind that the “Health Silk Road” is not “simply” a geopolitical opportunity for China, forcefully seized by Beijing in the midst of a profound global crisis. As it happens, it is a necessity for the “Middle Kingdom”, because its rapid and mammoth development generates immense needs.
In the context of the global pandemic and, as Hélène Lavoix puts it, of the emergent international Covid-19 order, the “Health Silk Road” appears to many commentators as a diplomatic tool. It may even be a new form of soft power (Hélène Lavoix, “The emergence of a Covid-19 International Order”, The Red Team Analysis Society, June 15, 2020).
Indeed, this international system of exports is a powerful display of the Chinese industrial and biopharmaceutical capabilities. Furthermore, the Sinopharm vaccine provides China with a formidable mean to create a sphere of “health geopolitics”.
The Chinese CoronaVac and China’s geo-economic security
However, from a Chinese point of view, the “Health Silk Road” has a deeper geopolitical function.
Indeed, it is an extension of the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). This grand strategy aims at ensuring a constant flow of energy resources, commodities and products towards China. As it happens, those flows are necessary to the current industrial and capitalist development of the 1,4 billion strong “Middle Kingdom” (Jean-Michel Valantin, “China and the New Silk Road – From oil wells to the moon … and beyond”, The Red Team Analysis Society, July 6 2015).
Since 2013, China has been deploying this “initiative”. Its success attracts the interest and commitment of numerous African, Asian, European and Middle Eastern countries.
The B&R is de facto a new expression of the Chinese philosophical and strategic thought (Valantin, “China and the New Silk Road: the Pakistani strategy”, The Red Team Analysis, May 18, 2015). It is grounded in an understanding of the spatial dimension of China.
The HSR as a “safe bubble”
In this civilizational context, space is conceived not only as a surface, but also as a support. The Chinese influence and power spreads from this support to the “outside”. It also allows the Middle Kingdom to “aspirate” what it needs from the “outside” to the “inside” (Quynh Delaunay, Naissance de la Chine moderne, L’Empire du Milieu dans la globalisation, 2014).
This is why we qualify some spaces as being “useful” to the deployment of the BRI. It is also why each “useful space” is related, and “useful” to other “useful spaces”. In the same dynamic, the different countries involved in the B&R deployment are “useful spaces” for the Chinese “Initiative”.
Thus, the Chinese vaccine could turn the members of the “B&R” into a chain of what Hélène Lavoix qualifies as “safe bubbles”. Thus, these “safe bubbles” would define the new international hierarchy of the “Covid-19 World” (Hélène Lavoix, “The emergence of a Covid-19 International Order”, Ibid.).
The Health Silk Road: grand strategy and high strategic risk
Grand strategy and the creation of useful spaces
Hence, the string of member-states of the “Health Silk Road / B&R” vaccine distribution system constitutes a “geographic useful space” for China. As a result, supporting the health condition of these countries is of paramount importance for China. Indeed, China needs its partners to be “in good health” in order to answer the gigantic “China’s need”. Thus, the B&R member-states will remain “useful spaces”. As such, they will be able to maintain the flow of resources that the “China’s Empire of Need” attracts.
In other terms, the “Vaccine Silk Road” is also the equivalent of an international life support system for China. This means that the vaccine is now part of a new definition of national security, or national safety (Hélène Lavoix, “Covid-19 Vaccinations, Hope or Mirage?”, The Red Team Analysis Society, January 27, 2021).
It also means that the international system of interdependency it creates is all the more important in a time of deep geopolitical crisis between China and the U.S. This system may help to alleviate the effects of this crisis. And reciprocally, providing vaccines to Arab, African, Asian and European countries will also reinforce the international legitimacy of China.
Backfire and the paradoxical logic of the Chinese vaccine success
However, the Health Silk Road is also carrying a high potential of backfiring. As it happens, the Chinese vaccine needs to be sufficiently efficient to contain the pandemic in the different nations that buy it (note that the latter shows mixed results, including a low 50.4% effectiveness, Smriti Mallapaty, “China COVID vaccine reports mixed results — what does that mean for the pandemic?“, Nature, 15 January 2021). It also has to be efficient against the new variants, especially the British, South-African and Brazilian ones.
If not, the “Health Silk Road” may become a case study in “the paradoxical logic of strategy”.
Indeed, developing a project, be it political, commercial, military, or of any other nature, creates the emergence of situations that are driven by a paradoxical logic: the implementation of a given project attracts opposing forces, which can even use violence, or difficulties. Those opposing forces threaten with failure the very project that created them (Edward Luttwak, Strategy, the Logic of War and Peace, 2002).
Failure, in this case, would have several intertwined dimensions. It would mean a continuous state of pandemic for the concerned countries, and probably a high level of resentment. A weakening of the international status of China would follow that would certainly become an opportunity for its adversaries, especially the U.S..
And, at a fundamental level, it would undercut the ability of numerous countries to answer the mammoth “Chinese needs”. This would have massively dangerous economic, social and political repercussions in China. Indeed, the current regime could loose “the Mandate of Heaven”, i.e. its legitimacy.
In this context, we shall (soon) have to see the geopolitical role that Russia and its Sputnik V vaccine are going to play alongside China, in the midst of the evolving pandemic.
Scenario building, also known as scenario analysis, is a crucial methodology to anticipate and prepare for the future. This is a method used from risk management to strategic foresight through early warning systems. More broadly, it is a key tool for all anticipation that needs to be actionable.
The higher the uncertainty, the more important it is to be able to mitigate risks to develop winning responses. Thence, it is crucial to use good scenarios to be truly prepared. It is thus key to build valid scenarios.
Good scenarios are sound methodologically and include knowledge and understanding of the issue at hand.
In this article, you will find a list of points – necessary conditions for the validity of scenarios – that you can easily check to verify the scenarios you are about to use are correct methodologically. If they are not, if they include methodological errors, then this means that the scenarios are flawed. Thus, you cannot use them to build robust answers, even if the content of the scenarios shows state of the art knowledge of the issue. For example, you can have invalid scenarios that nonetheless reflect great understanding of China, the U.S., quantum technologies, the Islamic State or the COVID-19 pandemic. Even though the understanding related to the subject matter is good, the scenarios may be useless if they are incorrect methodologically.
Below you will find first an online test for evaluating the methodological validity of your scenarios. We shall suggest possible ways forward according to the test result.
Second, you will find each point of the check list explained. We shall highlight why each point matters to users. Then, we shall explicate why making sure that each necessary condition is respected is most often a guarantee of methodological soundness, or, alternatively, why not respecting a condition is a warning signal for users.
This check list will be useful to both users and practitioners.
If you are a user of scenario
As user of scenarios, if you did not build the scenarios, and especially if you do not master the intricacies of scenario-building, the check list will help you evaluating easily the methodological validity of the scenarios.
If you are a scenario-builder
As practitioner, this check list will help you verify your work as early as possible in the process of scenario-building. As a result you will make sure you are building proper, state of the art scenarios.
What if you do not use scenarios?
Your strategy, policies, actually the whole array of your responses, depend on scenarios. This is true even if you think you are not using scenarios. When you decide upon something, it is because you already have and use, mentally, a model of how the future will unfold (eg. Epstein, ‘Why Model?‘, 2008). This model is a set of scenarios of a sort. It is, however, implicit and created without any methodology. Notably, being implicit, it may be prey to many biases (see online course on modeling, module 2).
As implicitly you use a kind of set of scenarios for the decisions you are taking, then you may also use the test for your vision of the future.
Test your scenarios
Nota: We only take your email address so that you can receive the test results by email. We do not use them for anything else. If you want to subscribe to know when we publish new article, use this form. If you want to become a member, access is here.We shall use anonymised statistics about results to improve understanding on scenarios and their use.
Once you have completed the test, click on submit and read the answers for each question. We suggest what to do with your set of scenarios if it is not valid, according to the type of problem met. You will also get your overall score.
Check list for valid scenarios
1- Are the scenarios covering the whole range of possible futures?
Scenarios must cover the whole range of possible futures. Rutz, McEldowney and Taylor depicted this very well in the drawing on the right hand side (1986, quoted in Taylor, 1993: chapter 1 & fn 7).
Plausible or possible futures?
Rutz, McEldowney and Taylor in Taylor, 1993: chapter 1 & fn 7
Taylor focuses on plausible futures. We prefer looking at possibility rather than plausibility.
Indeed, the idea of plausibility incorporates many biases (see online course on modeling, module 2). In other words, if you focus on what appears to you as plausible, you may very well fall prey, for example, to political correctness, to group think or to normative judgements, among others.
As a result, your scenarios could depict how you would like the future to be rather than consider all futures. This would then increase the likelihood of surprise, when our aim is to reduce the odds of surprise.
Why does it matter to you?
It is truly crucial for you that your scenarios cover the whole range of possible futures, because you do not want to prepare responses that would completely forget one scenario or more.
If we take the example of the Brexit before the vote, imagine that your experts considered that Brexit was impossible. As a result, they gave you a set of scenarios that did not include the possibility for Brexit (e.g. it was thought as implausible). They could have built a couple of scenarios focusing on new rules between Britain and the EU (they could create more than one scenarios), another scenario describing similar rules between Britain and the EU, and finally a last scenario depicting a new love story between Britain and the EU. As a result, you started creating a whole range of answers, made corresponding investments, developed policies etc.
Then, the vote took place, and people chose… Brexit. And you found yourself completely unprepared.
This anecdote is exactly the reverse of what we want to obtain with scenarios.
The brief history of scenarios on the COVID-19 pandemic is also replete with instances of scenarios that did not consider the whole range of possible futures. Indeed, the people and firms creating the scenarios at the time focused wrongly on what they thought was possible. As a result, many times, governments and actors were given invalid scenarios that forbid preparedness.
We want to have scenarios that show us the whole range of possible futures so that we can be ready for any future.
Why is it a methodological guarantee?
As you know, scenarios are built from the combination of the values or attributes of the variables selected to “represent” your initial question. The why and how these variables are selected is outside the scope of this article (see our course on scenario-building).
Mathematically, the attributes or values of a variable must be exhaustive, i.e. cover all the possible values the variable can take in reality, as in the quantitative example on oil prices on the right hand side.We covered this in detail in the online course on modeling, module 4, explaining how to identify factors and drivers for a question and how to make sure these were variables.
Thus, if you build scenarios out of a combination of values (of variables), which are exhaustive, and if you selected properly your variables in a way that is representative, then, as a result, the set of scenarios you obtain covers the whole range of possible futures.
If the experts that built the scenarios use a proper methodology, automatically, the scenarios they obtain covers the whole range of possible futures.
If the scenarios do not cover the range of possible futures, then you may ask them why it is not so. They may have a very sound answer, but it is better to check with them. If they do not have a sound answer, then be wary.
At best this set of scenarios will help you think out of the box, and provide you with new ideas. However, you have to be very careful before using the set of scenarios to develop strategy and policies.
The potential for surprise is not as mitigated as it could have been.
2- Are the scenarios mutually exclusive?
Mutually exclusive scenarios mean scenarios that cannot take place at the same time. You can have one or another, but not both at the same time.
Why does it matter to you?
This condition is necessary to cover the range of possible futures. This is necessary so that you are prepared across uncertainty.
Imagine that you are an emergency NGO preparing your budget and material for the next year for, say Afghanistan. If experts, in the set of scenarios they give you, present you with one scenario for war, one for epidemic, and one for earthquake, but not with one scenario for epidemic and earthquake, one for war and epidemic, one for earthquake and war, and one for war, epidemic and earthquake, then you may run into serious problems. You will not be prepared for complex emergencies. You will have neither the material nor the funding for such cases.
On the contrary, what we want to achieve with scenarios is to be ready for any circumstances, including complex emergencies. We want to be able to develop policies that are robust across all possible futures.
Why is it a methodological guarantee?
As previously, this characteristics of scenarios derives from those of the attributes of the variables. The attributes of a variable must be mutually exclusive. As a result, your scenarios will also be.
If the experts use a proper methodology, then their scenarios will, automatically, be mutually exclusive.
If their scenarios are not mutually exclusive, then it means that there is a serious flaw with their methodology. Actually, I cannot truly imagine a way to salvage such scenarios.
At best this set of scenarios will help you think out of the box, and provide you with new ideas. It would, however, be dangerous to use exclusively this set of scenarios to guide strategy and policies. The potential for surprise is not truly as mitigated as it could have been.
3- Are the scenarios dynamic?
Scenarios, to be more easily actionable, i.e. to allow you to develop a proper set of responses and actions to handle coming changes, must respect the previous characteristics – exhaustivity and mutual exclusivity – and ideally should also be dynamic.
Why does it matter to you?
Scenarios are also there to help you identify crucial key points, where decisions are needed. In these cases, scenarios may develop into sub-scenarios.
“A scenario is a story with plausible cause and effect links that connects a future condition with the present, while illustrating key decisions, events, and consequences throughout the narrative”.
Glenn, Jerome C. and The Futures Group International, “Scenarios,”
Here we are less in the realm of a methodological necessity and guarantee. Dynamic scenarios enhance the actionability characteristics of scenarios.
If your scenarios’ expert was able to point out causal dynamics, then this is a guarantee of his or her skill at scenarios building and knowledge and understanding of the issue at hand. It means that those who built the scenarios truly thought through them, stress-tested their understanding and endeavoured to explore as many areas as possible.
If your set of scenarios does not explicitly show dynamics, even though this set of scenario may not be as actionable as hoped for, it may nonetheless, according to other answers, be used to guide strategy and policies.
4- Are the scenarios on the same time horizon?
In a valid set of scenarios, you should get scenarios that each depict the same period of time. The authors of the scenarios may choose to develop more or less this or that part, but, nonetheless, all timeframes must be covered for each scenario of your set of scenarios.
Sometimes, you will be given scenarios that are not on the same “time plane”. This is not right.
Why does it matter to you?
If scenario A, for example, depicts a situation starting from now until the end of year 2, and scenario B depicts what happens between year 2 and year 4, and you are given only these two scenarios, then you have no way to know if you are given two scenarios… or just one.
Scenario B may just be the continuation, in time, of scenario A.
What you should get, in this example, is scenario A and scenario A1 (and probably A2), the last two portraying what is happening in the case of scenario A from year 2 to 4. You should also be given scenario B0 that tells the story of what is happening from now to year 2 and led to scenario B. This would be a proper set of scenarios time-wise.
Why is it a methodological guarantee?
It shows that your experts truly master both methodology and subject matter. They are able to articulate processes and causal links.
Incidentally, this is why having a proper model for your issue is so important for scenario-building (see online course on modeling).
If the scenarios are not all on the same timeframe, you have to be very careful before using this set of scenarios to develop strategy and policies. This set may be completely useless, or it can help you think out of the box, and provide you with new ideas. The potential for surprise is not as well mitigated as it could have been.
5- Is there a likelihood estimate provided for each scenario?
This means an evaluation of likelihood accompanies each of the scenarios of the set. As a result, you should know which scenario is more or less likely.
We are here, of course, in the realm of estimates. Furthermore, these estimates will vary with time, with your decisions and your actions. Yet, it does matter that each scenario has an estimate of its likelihood.
Why does it matter to you?
Knowing if scenario A has a 80% chance of being actualised, scenario B has a 19% chance of being actualised and scenario C a 1% chance of occurring is a crucial information for you.
It does not mean that you should disregard scenario C, especially if it is a high impact scenario. In that case, you should make sure you have hedged against this scenario, or developed policies that are robust enough across all scenarios.
One of the rationale behind scenario-building is that it should help actors envisioning the future beyond “business as usual” trends. Thus, presenting all scenarios (including, if relevant, a “business as usual” one) with likelihoods that are spelled out will help actors considering all possibilities. With likelihoods, scenarios-builders do not have to hide a scenario – the “business as usual one” – because they fear that biases will lead users to discard other, less comfortable, scenarios, even though those are more likely. Thus, ethically, this is much better for everyone as scenarios-builders do not end up taking decisions for scenarios-users.
As a user, you should always be aware of what is likely and unlikely. Knowing this will allow you to design proper responses, according to what you want to achieve. It may imply that you would need to deploy an immense amount of power to achieve an unlikely scenario, for example. Ultimately this is up to you to decide, and knowing what to expect is crucial for success.
Finally, with probabilities, if ever you were offered a set of indicators for each of your scenario and sub-scenarios, then you could also use the scenarios for monitoring, for early warning and for steering policy. As a result, your scenarios would be even more useful and they would also last longer.
If you are not given likelihoods for your scenarios, then to be able to use this set of scenarios to develop strategies and policies, you need to make sure these strategies and policies are robust across all scenarios.
Without probabilities, a set of scenarios is less actionable than with probabilities.
6- Did I provide the right means for the building of this set of scenarios?
Here the question is about you and not about the set of scenarios you received.
Scenarios-building is a demanding methodology. It demands “deep understanding and knowledge” of the issue at hand (Mietzner and Reger, 2005: 236). It also asks to master the methodology and to know how to apply it. As a result, it is also considered as “time-consuming” (Ibid.). Actually, obtaining not only valid but also good scenarios is an investment, as scenarios can – and should – be used over time. Scenarios are more than a consumer good.
Thus, if ever you asked an expert or a team of experts, be they external or internal, to develop scenarios without giving them the means to do so in terms of resources (time and money), then it is highly likely that you will get bad scenarios.
The conditions you set frame the outcome you obtain.
Global Result and score
If you have answered yes to each and every question above, your set of scenarios is most probably methodologically sound as well as actionable.
Assuming the knowledge of and understanding on the subject matter is also good, then you can use it to develop strategies and policies.
With this set of scenarios, nonetheless, you can be quite confident that, methodologically, you will mitigate as best as possible the risk for surprise.
On the contrary, the lower the score the more wary you should be of your set of scenarios. Questions 1,2,4 (60 points all together) are the most important methodologically and negative answers there should make you very cautious indeed. Questions 3 and 5 (30 points) are necessary for scenarios being truly actionable.
Some references
Epstein, Joshua M. (2008). ‘Why Model?‘, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 11(4)12.
The world has started a race for immunisation against the COVID-19. Vaccines are now perceived as the universal panacea, the miracle that will save us all from the pandemic. We shall, finally, be able to find back our old life. Are we right to hope? Or are we likely to discover it was a mirage?
Our objective here is to estimate roughly when, considering current vaccination rates, the countries most advanced in terms of immunisation campaigns could reach herd immunity. In other words, when will our hopes become reality?
First, we highlight that our hopes are grounded in reality because of the success of past vaccination campaigns. However, our perception of the timeframe necessary for vaccination success is likely distorted. Second, we highlight six major uncertainties we still face regarding the vaccination against the COVID-19. We use here a “red team” approach, i.e. we ask all questions, even or rather especially disruptive ones.
Number of months needed to achieve herd immunity for COVID-19 – using daily vaccinations – 7 days rolling average 25/26 January 2021 – See below for a larger image – Data from: “Our world in data“
Finally, we estimate how long selected countries, from the U.S. to Israel through Russia, China or the U.K., Germany and France, need to reach herd immunity at current daily vaccination rates. Results are very contrasted, and for many countries, the time to herd immunity must be counted in years rather than in months.
This estimate tells us if it is realistic to hope or, on the contrary, if we are facing a mirage. Different strategies and planning will need to be designed accordingly.
A hope grounded in reality
Vaccination successes
Certainly proper vaccines, those to which we are used and stemmed from the research of Jenner, Pasteur and Koch over the 18th and 19th century have done exactly what we hope. They saved humanity from some deadly diseases (Agnes Ullmann, “Louis Pasteur“, Encyclopedia Britannica, 15 Jan. 2021).
Vaccination eradicated smallpox (Edward A. Belongia and Allison L Naleway, “Smallpox vaccine: the good, the bad, and the ugly”, Clinical medicine & research vol. 1,2, 2003). Poliomyelitis is almost also a disease of the past. In 2020, the wild poliovirus type 1 only still affects two countries, Pakistan and Afghanistan, while type 2 and 3 are apparently eradicated (WHO/OMS Poliomyelitis (polio)).
Thus, our hope is grounded in this vision of vaccines and immunisation and their real success.
Eradication campaigns are long processes
Our hope seems also, implicitly, to think that the return to normal will happen tomorrow. At worst, we think we shall move back to our old life within maybe six months.
Yet, as far as eradication is concerned, decades were needed for the mass vaccinations’ campaigns achievements, not months.
The modern vaccine against smallpox was developed in the 1950s and the first global eradication effort started in 1950. In 1966, smallpox still remained endemic in 33 countries (DA Henderson, “The eradication of smallpox“, Sci Am. 1976 Oct; 235(4):25-33). The WHO launched a new global effort in the early 1970s (Belongia and Naleway, Ibid.). The last case of smallpox occurred in 1977 in Somalia (Belongia and Naleway, Ibid.). Thus, it took 27 years to eradicate smallpox.
The vaccine against polio was licensed in 1955, after a massive trial in the U.S. involving 1.3 million children in 1954 (Immunology and Vaccine-Preventable Diseases – Pink Book – Polio – U.S. CDC). In the U.S., immunisation started in 1955 (Ibid.). The last outbreak in America occurred in 1979 (Ibid.). By 1994 polio was eliminated from Western countries (Ibid.). Thus, in this case, and only for Western countries, it took 40 years to eliminate polio.
Now, faced with the COVID-19 pandemic, a threat with completely novel characteristics, we want the disease to disappear very quickly. We want to go back to business as usual. So, we rush and we hope, regardless of reality. And we rush so much that we run the risk of reaching a mirage rather than salvation.
Certainties and uncertainties
Here, we shall consider the various major certainties and uncertainties we face regarding the vaccine. They constitute our framework.
We set aside the critical question regarding the middle and long term safety of the vaccines. This question cannot be answered with certainty. Indeed, humanity does not have the temporal depth necessary to give such an answer. The precautionary principle should certainly have demanded that time be allowed to consider safety. The early twenty-first century globalised, financialized, and libertarian consumerist society chose otherwise.
Certainty: Number of injections required
Approved vaccines protect with various efficacy against severe forms of COVID-19, if the tested posology is respected (number of doses and time between two shots). Details on the various vaccines used at the start of 2021 can be found on various official websites, such as the WHO, the European Medicines Agency (EMA).
In the estimate below, we shall not differentiate between vaccines according to efficacy. We shall consider the two doses required in the original posology. Indeed, all COVID-19 vaccines used at the start of 2021 demand two injections: Pfizer and BioNTech, Moderna, AstraZeneca, Russian Sputnik V, Chinese CoronaVac (note that the latter shows mixed results, including a low 50.4% effectiveness, Smriti Mallapaty, “China COVID vaccine reports mixed results — what does that mean for the pandemic?“, Nature, 15 January 2021). Further studies should definitely include variations in terms of efficacy, according to the types of vaccine delivered.
Uncertainties
1/ Delay between required injections
If the delay between the required two injections is increased, we do not know what can happen. We could only make hypotheses and scenarios, each with different likelihoods. Nothing may change regarding efficacy, but efficacy may also be lowered. Other less palatable scenarios can be imagined, according to which people may become more susceptible to other variants, or the delay may favour the occurence of variants.
Here, we shall consider that the time required between two injections, as planned by the laboratory, is not stretched but respected.
2/ It is likely that the vaccines do not stop contamination.
We do not know with certainty if the vaccines stop infection. However, because it does not seem that most vaccines stop asymptomatic types of COVID-19, then it is likely that contamination will continue, even after vaccination (e.g. EMA, “COVID-19 : Le vaccin rend asymptomatique mais rend-il moins infectieux ?” Santélog, 4 January 2021).
A study from Israel, which is massively vaccinating its population, gives us further indications, for the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine (Clalit study: decreased infection in the corona due to the vaccine. 13 January 2021; Elisabeth Mahase, “Covid-19: Reports from Israel suggest one dose of Pfizer vaccine could be less effective than expected“, BMJ 2021;372:n217). People over 60 who received one dose remained as susceptible to infections for 13 days. Then the likelihood to become infected dropped by 33% between day 14 and day 17. In other words, after one vaccine shot and after 13 days, the likelihood to become positive to the COVID-19 is 67% of what it was without vaccination. Thus, after one dose, the potential for contagion remains unchanged for almost two weeks, then remains very high compared with no vaccination.
We do not have further indication about what happens after the second dose.
Vaccines may reduce infection but, fundamentally, we do not yet know.
Thus, for the time being, people who will have been vaccinated will need to go on wearing masks, and using protective social distanciation, at least until the famous herd immunity is reached.
As a result, if your main interest is to go back to the global world we knew before the COVID-19 pandemic, you need to wonder when all countries in the world will reach herd immunity thanks to developed vaccines. Because, for the time being and considering current vaccines, before then there will be no return to “normal”.
You may be more modest – as well as cynical – and only hope to see some countries, yours and these countries that are your major partners – to reach herd immunity. You would then start creating this international COVID-19 world with COVID-19 safe bubbles that we see possibly emerging (Helene Lavoix, “The emergence of a COVID-19 international order“, 15 June 2021). You may even change partners according to their sanitary situation, of course to a point, the point to which you need specific countries for various reasons.
However, the next stage of the study also shows that it is likely that the reinfected individuals can also continue infecting others.
Unfortunately, we do not know if the immunity obtained with one variant of the virus protects from another variant, and if this varies according to variants.
We may hope that the immunity induced by vaccines is better than natural immunity, but again this is an unknown.
Thus, considering this still imperfect knowledge, if we want to stop or, more humbly, control the pandemic with certainty, we would need to obtain a herd immunity in 5 months. If a longer lasting immunity can be obtained, then the time to reach herd immunity can be lengthened.
4/ Herd immunity and the SARS-CoV-2
If we use the WHO definition,
“‘Herd immunity’, also known as ‘population immunity’, is the indirect protection from an infectious disease that happens when a population is immune either through vaccination or immunity developed through previous infection.
…Vaccines train our immune systems to create proteins that fight disease, known as ‘antibodies’, just as would happen when we are exposed to a disease but – crucially – vaccines work without making us sick. Vaccinated people are protected from getting the disease in question and passing on the pathogen, breaking any chains of transmission.”
Thus here, a critical unknown appears considering what we saw on immunity and contamination after vaccination. It would indeed appear that, for the COVID-19, neither natural immunity nor vaccines fully break the chain of transmission. The efficacy of the way the chain of transmission is stopped seems to be varying and complex.
In other words, considering contamination is not stopped or imperfectly stopped by the vaccine, do we need to rephrase statement of the WHO according to which “We think it needs at least 60 to 70% of the population to have immunity to really break the chain of transmission”? Indeed, in the case of the SARS-CoV-2 the chain of transmission is not broken or imperfectly broken by the vaccines.
If we contrast, for example with the vaccine against polio, here is what we read from the WHO website, contrasting between two types of vaccines, IPV and OPV:
“Inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) … prevents infection, but it does not stop transmission of the virus….The oral polio vaccine (OPV)… After three doses of OPV, a person becomes immune for life and can no longer transmit the virus to others if exposed again. Thanks to this “gut immunity”, OPV is the only effective weapon to stop transmission of the poliovirus when an outbreak is detected. “
IPV is increasingly used only in countries where eradication of polio has taken place (Ibid.).
To come back to the COVID-19, the vaccines we develop are similar, everything being equal to the IPV. And thus not that good for outbreaks…
Hence, is the way herd immunity is planned to be applied still valid? Can we apply the same objectives as thought?
We shall still use the current approach to herd immunity in our rough assessment below but it is critical to think that a different approach may be sought.
5/ Manufacturing and delivery
Manufacturing and delivery problems, as well as logistical difficulties are a major uncertainty. This is all the more so that competing interests exist. For example, we may wonder if the American policy promoted by new President Biden, with first his pledge to administer 100 million shots in his first 100 days then his willingness to boost further vaccination in the U.S., did not have and will not have direct consequences on European delivery problems (e.g. Josh Wingrove and Mario Parker, “Biden Team to Buy 200 Million More Doses, Speed Up Vaccinations“, Bloomberg, 26 January 2021; Raf Casert, “EU demands that vaccine makers honor their commitments“, AP, 25 January 2021).
Manufacturing and delivery challenges are partly included in the current daily rates of vaccination we use below. Further detailed research would, of course, be needed to improve estimates, to finely identify specific chokepoints and thus to design efficient strategies and vaccination campaigns.
6/ Vaccines and SARS-CoV-2 variants
Variants and Vaccines efficacy
Some of the vaccines currently injected may not be efficient or as efficient as expected against some variants.
It would seem that the UK variant – known as 20B/501Y.V1, VOC 202012/01, or B.1.1.7 lineage (CDC) does not question the current vaccines, to the least those by Pfizer and BioNTech, Moderna, and AstraZeneca. However these tests have been carried out mainly in vitro.
Things look less good for the South African variant – 20C/501Y.V2 or B.1.351 lineage (CDC). For example, Moderna, after in vitro tests, found that “The samples’ neutralizing antibodies were … only about one-fifth to one-tenth as effective at neutralizing 501YV.2” (Nature News, “COVID research updates: Moderna vaccine vanquishes viral variants“, 26 January 2021 update).
We do not know for the Brazilian variants – one, known as P.1 (CDC), while another variant could exist too.
Another study, carried out by the Rockefeller University and not by vaccines manufacturers, looking at main vaccines and various possible mutations found that “Some of these neutralizing antibodies [produced after injections] … were only one-third as effective at blocking the mutated variants” (Ibid., 21 January 2021 update).
In the middle of these uncertainties, what we know is that if three identified and challenging variants could emerge, then others will too. We must thus include these emergence in the way we plan ahead. For example, the speed with which variants appear and become prevalent would be a key data to obtain for immunisation campaigns. According to the ECDC, the UK and South African variants needed between 1 and 4 months to spread and become prevalent (Risk related to the spread of new SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern in the EU/EEA – first update, 21 January 2021). But how often will how many variants appear per year and where?
Furthermore, we may wonder if the way and the speed with which the current vaccines will be injected within the population could possibly favour new variations of the SARS-CoV2. We are here in the classical action-reaction dynamic.
Multiple vaccines injections?
If new versions of the vaccines are necessary against new variants, we do not know what could happen to the immune system of people having received the “old” vaccines. Can they receive the new vaccine? Will it be dangerous? Will it be efficient? What could be the long term side-effect? How many different injections and how often can be safely handled by people’s systems?
Increased manufacturing challenges
Companies developing ARN messenger vaccines may assert that they can change their formula rapidly to adapt to the new variants if need be. Nonetheless, this means throwing away doses already produced and starting manufacturing everything from the start. The manufacturing challenges are thus heightened.
Manufacturing boosters, as Moderna suggested may be a way forward, but only if this is a sufficiently efficient approach (Nature, 26 January, Ibid).
How long to obtain herd immunity?
Now we have all these uncertainties in mind, let us look at the time needed to vaccinate the population of various countries to obtain herd immunity.
Using “Our world in data: Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations“, we obtained the number of months that would be needed to reach herd immunity, considering cumulated vaccinations and current daily rates of vaccination. We look at three hypotheses for herd immunity: 70%, 75% and 80%, to consider potential changes stemming from variants.
Incidentally, as is obvious from the chart above, the sheer size of population matters. The countries faring the best are also those with a small or smaller population, apart from the U.K. and the U.S.. The price the world must possibly pay to see the U.S. being able to vaccinate its population relatively rapidly needs however to be pondered.
Nonetheless, at current rates, i.e. assuming there is no supply problems, and considering all the uncertainties above, only Israel and the U.A.E. can reach herd immunity within 6 months. The U.K. will have to wait between 8 an 10 months, while the U.S. will need between 13 and 16 months to reach herd immunity. This is easier to see on the following figure enlarged to focus on 24 months only.
Number of months needed to achieve herd immunity for COVID-19 – using daily vaccinations – 7 days rolling average 25/26 January 2021 – with a focus on 24 months – Data from: “Our world in data: Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations“
If ever immunity were to drop after 6 months, or if a new variant defeating current vaccines were to appear within 6 months from the start of the vaccination campaign, then, at current vaccination rates, all countries apart from Israel and the U.A.E. would see their efforts reduced to naught. They most probably would have to restart everything without have time for respite. Those countries that would have reached immunity would have had some time with a normal life, until they too had to start vaccinating everyone.
Furthermore, it is likely that to see variants stop emerging, then we would need to stop contagion globally and see herd immunity taking place worldwide. We are obviously even further away from this goal. Thus, most probably, new variants will go on emerging. We are thus in a vicious circle where inability to stop contagion increases the likelihood to see variants appearing, which, in turn lowers our ability to stop contagion.
If disrupting variants were to appear every six months, then daily vaccination rates would have to be greatly increased to reach herd immunity for one variant.
If we do not find vaccines that stop contagion, and if new variants appear every six months, then we may find ourselves in the case shown in the figure below. We may have to vaccinate a staggering amount of people daily forever, or rather until a better solution is found.
The cost to societies, just in terms of vaccines, would be considerable. The logistics and organisation needed may also involve deep changes.
It would thus seem that, with the current approach, considering the SARS-CoV2 variants, the specificities of the vaccines available, and all the known uncertainties, we may not be close to find our old life back.
If we do not want our hopes dissolving into a mirage, we need to further innovate strategically and supplement vaccination with other measures, waiting for better and more efficient vaccines to be found.
As 2021 starts, Europe struggles again against a COVID-19 new wave and the spread of new SARS-CoV-2 variants. Japan strengthens its state of emergency against the COVID-19. The U.S. reports 4.462 deaths on 12 January 2021, i.e. almost precisely 1,5 time 9/11.
How can we explain this immense difference between various COVID-19 related situations? What allows China to control better the pandemic, when the possibility to see new waves develop is also there (Hélène Lavoix, Is the COVID-19 Second Wave coming to China?, The Red Team Analysis Society, 30 November 2020).
We shall see how China envisions the COVID-19 world and its fight against the pandemic, from an overarching goal where lives must be saved first, to the mobilisation of all, through the objectives set and the related strategy. From these, result the anti-COVID-19 measures China takes and how it implements them, as we shall see in the second part. There, we shall explain that China’s guiding principle behind its policies against the COVID-19 may be characterised as an uncompromising pragmatism. To do so, we shall focus on three types of measures: quarantines and travels, genomic surveillance and, finally, environmental surveillance, which includes struggling against contamination from objects, goods and surfaces.
Living in a different COVID-19 world
In China, we are in a COVID-19 world that is very different from the world where Europe and the U.S., for example, live.
An overarching goal – the precious lives of all first – and fighting a war to win
China fights a war against the COVID-19 and it wants to win it. Its first and foremost goal is the safety of all. It does not solely aim at protecting hospitals from being overwhelmed and breaking down, which would be to confuse aims and means. China does not solely hope to slow down the virus or mitigate damages. It wants to win, to defeat the COVID-19. It has an enemy the SARS-CoV-2.
As Xi Jiping put it in September 2020
“We Chinese have fought this life-and-death battle against COVID-19 with tenacity and fortitude; we will not stop until victory is won. We have forged a great spirit of putting life above everything else… We will pay any price to protect people’s life and safety.
This goes hand in hand with the vision opening up the Chinese plan “Fighting Covid-19 – China in Action 2020/06/07”:
“This is a war that humanity has to fight and win. Facing this unknown, unexpected, and devastating disease, China launched a resolute battle to prevent and control its spread. Making people’s lives and health its first priority, China adopted extensive, stringent, and thorough containment measures, and has for now succeeded in cutting all channels for the transmission of the virus”
China then emphasises that all actors will benefit from total victory. This means not ignoring the pandemic for the sake of financial markets, short-term profits, temporary “fun”, or whatever particular short-term interest. This also means accepting that a return to the past is impossible, what most actors try to do despite discourses:
Those who refuse to take the easy path will succeed; those who meet challenges head on will prevail. A nation is great because it never yields, wavers or balks in the face of any difficulty or risk; it is because it keeps fighting for a bright future against all odds.
As a result, the COVID-19 world, for China, as for Australia and New Zealand, and in a lesser way for Japan or South Korea, is a world were one COVID-19 case is one too many, where one death is unacceptable. The aim is zero case and zero death.
For example, China locked down the city of Langfang near Beijing on 12 January 2021 because it has reached 33 cases (dxy.cn network figures for 12 January 2021). Its “4.9 million residents would be put under home quarantine for seven days” and tested to make sure the virus would not spread (Reuters, “Chinese city of Langfang goes into lockdown amid new COVID-19 threat”, 12 January 2021). Previously, on 9 January, the cities of Shijiazhuang and Xingtai, in the Hebei province surrounding Beijing were “put under lockdown for seven days because more than 300 people were tested positive over the previous week” (Jason Slotkin, “Millions In China Under New Restrictions Amid COVID-19 Spike Near Beijing“, NPR, 9 January 2021).
We find a similar situation in the northeastern province of Heilongjiang, where, on 11 January 2021 “all residential communities and villages in Wangkui county of Suihua city, Heilongjiang province, have been placed under lockdown management” (Zhou Huiying, “County in Heilongjiang under lockdown due to outbreak“, China Daily, 11 January 2021). The lockdown was organised because, on 9 January, one lady went for treatment to the hospital, was tested positive and consequently 20 out of the 500 tested contact cases were positive – and asymptomatic.
By contrast, the UK imposed a relatively mild national lockdown on 5 November 2020 as it recorded 21,915 cases on 31 October (BBC News, “Covid-19: PM announces four-week England lockdown“, 31 October 2020). Finding out it was facing a new SARS-CoV-2 variant – known as 20B/501Y.V1, VOC 202012/01, or B.1.1.7 lineage (CDC) – it had to reinforce the anti-COVID-19 measures on 4 January 2021, as “on 29 December, more than 80,000 people tested positive for Covid across the UK – a new record” (Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s address to the nation on coronavirus on 4 January 2021). Sadly, as the epidemic is out of control, the UK will most probably have to reinforce the severity of its lockdown as positive cases remain above 50.000 a day (e.g. Alix Culbertson, “COVID-19: How could England’s lockdown restrictions get tougher?“, 12 January 2021).
To take another European example, on 16 December 2020, in Germany, restrictions were introduced according to states to mitigate a second wave. The country had then a 7-days average of 26.092 infections a day. The number of positive cases had started reaching 25.252 tests on 2 November 2020. As a result, the epidemic could not be controlled and a national stricter lockdown started on 11 January 2021. Then, positive cases had started to decrease, but trying to prevent the spread of the new UK and South African SARS-CoV2 variants – the latter known 20C/501Y.V2 or B.1.351 lineage (CDC) – had become a concern (Coronavirus: Germany’s stricter lockdown starts nationwide, dw.de, 11 January 2021).
Legitimacy, international influence and anti-COVID-19 objectives
We thus have a very stark contrast between two types of objectives. On the one hand, in China, COVID-19 contagions are unacceptable. This makes sense in the framework of a pandemic. Indeed, considering what an epidemic is, and considering the epidemiological characteristics of the SARS-CoV-2, notably pre-symptomatic contagion and contagious asymptomatic cases, the only way to control the pandemic is to aim for zero contagion (see Helene Lavoix, Dynamics of contagion and the COVID-19 Second Wave, The Red Team Analysis Society, 3 June 2020).
Numerous excess deaths because of a pandemic, are as unacceptable, for a host of reasons. Among these, first and foremost, such deaths would question the legitimacy of the political authorities. It would demonstrate their inability to rule properly as the fundamental mission of political authorities is to ensure the security of those who are rules (see Helene Lavoix, What is Political Risk?, The Red Team Analysis Society, 28 February 2020). Furthermore, in the case of China, it would also question their historically constructed legitimacy. Indeed, numerous deaths out of the COVID-19 could be understood as a vacillating “Mandate of Heaven” (天命 tianming) in the collective consciousness of people, which would mean a rising illegitimacy of political authorities (see John King Fairbank, Merle Goldman, China, a New History, Enlarged Edition, Harvard University Press, 1998; Andrea Janku, “‘Heaven-Sent Disasters’ in Late Imperial China: The Scope of the Stateand Beyond,” in Christ of Mauch and Christian Pfister, eds., Natural Disasters, Cultural Responses: Case Studies Toward a Global Environmental History, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books), 233–64; Chris Courtney, “The Dragon King and the 1931 Wuhan Flood: Religious Rumors and Environmental Disasters in Republican China,” in Twentieth-Century China , April 2015).
The reasons for the very different objectives chosen in Europe and in the U.S., would need to be researched and analysed in detail, as their influence, power and even survival depend on them.
China however tells us that winning over the COVID-19 starts first in our head, in the vision we have of ourselves and of the threat and in the way we set our overarching goals.
A simple strategy
Once the objectives are set, they define China’s anti COVID-19 strategy.
The overall Chinese strategy is simple. They are fighting a pandemic, not any disease. Their real enemy is the virus. They seek to block its entrance into human beings residing in China, hence into the Chinese territory, as well as its access to all possible intermediate or vectors. And for those viruses that would get through, China will isolate them until they disappear while stopping them spreading (see chapter “A Tight Prevention and Control System Involving All Sectors of Society” in “Fighting Covid-19 – China in Action 2020/06/07“). Actions on hosts and vectors are then taken accordingly.
It also means understanding the virus and its interactions with its hosts and vectors, hence the emphasis on science, as highlighted in “5.Science and Technology Underpin China’s Efforts” (Ibid.).
Mobilising everyone
Most crucially, the front line and the soldiers are not solely the medical staff as has been wrongly, and finally dangerously, promoted in Europe. The medical staff are heroes for China, but first and foremost each and every individual that could become prey to the virus or could have a role to play in blocking the virus is the front line. Indeed Chapter III of the Chinese action plan (Ibid.) is about “Assembling a Powerful Force to Beat the Virus”, through notably “2.Mobilizing the Whole Country to Fight the Epidemic” and “4.Uniting as One – China’s Billion People”, which is only possible because the safety of all is the overarching goal, and thus because “1.Lives Are Precious”.
In other countries, when some refuse this or that measure for any reason, whatever the justifications given, what they say to their fellow citizens is that they don’t care if they fall ill, suffer, and die and lose their loved ones. As a result, common action becomes impossible and, worse, society may only head towards breaking down, which is an even worse situation than seeing the state fail. The SARS-CoV-2 has already won.
The Chinese political authorities do not take this approach but, on the contrary, try to achieve the opposite. Xi Jiping’s September 2020 speech hammers the same message as found in the action plan, and it is worth quoting him at length:
“Our people across the country closed ranks and were united as one. We knew what was at stake: the well-being of every one of us, the honor of us as a community and the security of our country. Doctors and nurses in white coat, military personnel in green uniform, police officers in blue gear and volunteers wearing red waistcoat all pitched in, and Party members rushed to the epicenter. Their pledge to keep fighting until the job was done is heart-stirring…
Undaunted, we Chinese have confronted the raging virus head on in the spirit of going into the mountains well aware that tigers are roaming. Together, we have written a moving epic of fighting the virus.
Our Chinese nation has gone through many trials and tribulations, but each time we have emerged stronger. This is not because any saviour has rescued us, but because hundreds of millions of ordinary Chinese have stepped forward to fight when disaster strikes.
In fighting COVID-19, we the 1.4 billion Chinese have acted with a strong sense of responsibility, discipline, dedication and mutual support, thus creating a powerful defense of unity and solidarity against the virus.”
Moreover, transforming all people into heroes who fight the COVID-19 gives a sense to sacrifice, which will lower resistance to measures. As sense is made, efforts can take place. People have reclaimed their power, they are not anymore passive victims. This is crucial when the efforts demanded involve being locked down and thus externally inactive.
From the vision, the overarching goal, the objectives, the identification of the enemy and the mobilisation of everyone results the way China implements the various set of measures used to fight the pandemic, as we shall now see.
An uncompromising pragmatism
Chinese anti-COVID-19 measures can be best described as obeying a principle of uncompromising pragmatism. This includes characteristics such as measures being rapidly decided, flexible, adapted to the local situation, often heavy handed and lasting as long as needed. Above all, this means that Chinese anti-Covid-19 measures consider the reality of the pandemic and do not not fall prey to ideological wishful thinking, while including latest scientific approaches and technological innovations. In other words, the Chinese will do what they must to fulfil their objectives, using all available means.
Travels and quarantines
For example, China has an uncompromising policy regarding travels and quarantines be they international or domestic. Here, Chinese political authorities have recognised that one key component of the propagation of the virus – if not the key element – is mobility, be it international or domestic (for more on this point, see Helene Lavoix, The Hidden Origin of the COVID-19 and the Second Wave, The Red Team Analysis Society, 25 May 2020).
For instance, considering the now demonstrated increased contagious power of the new UK SARS-CoV2 variant, on 24 December 2020 China banned all travels to and from the UK until further notice (Reuters). Starting 22 December, for Hong Kong, China, people are considered as entering this category if they have spent 2 hours in the UK within the last 21 days (Gardaworld). There is no question of upsetting the UK, tourism, difficulties for one or the other type of actor. The reality of the danger primes all.
The increased infectious power of the two variants may, furthermore, lengthen the incubation time, or change the number of people infected according to days after infection. It is thus twice wise to decide for a stringent 21 days quarantine.
Quarantine must take place in centralised centers. China here uses the experience it developed in Wuhan. Throughout the first epidemic wave, China created 13 “hospitals” in public areas such as stadium to allow for the proper isolation of positive patients even with very mild symptoms (Talha Burki, “China’s successful control of COVID-19“, The Lancet, Newsdesk, Vol 20, Issue 11, Nov 01, 2020). This “network of Fangcang hospitals” had 13.000 beds available to isolate positive patients who did not need hospital treatment (Ibid.). As a result contagion, notably within the family, was stopped (Ibid.). China is thus able to use the lessons learned from the past, to build upon successes and correct mistakes.
Furthermore, in China, the quarantine ought to be respected and people during these stays are forbidden to leave the quarantine premises. According to the UK Foreign travel advice for China, “Failure to comply with the quarantine conditions or testing put in place, or any attempts to deliberately conceal health conditions can result in being sentenced to up to three years in prison. This applies to both Chinese and foreign nationals.”
The Chinese quarantine policy certainly contrasts with, for example, the 10 days of self-isolation demanded in Germany, where people can stop their quarantine if they test negative after 5 days (Federal Foreign Office, “Information on entry restrictions and quarantine regulations in Germany“, 11.01.2021).
In terms of travels and mobility, China thus considers the reality of scientific studies and tests, as well as epidemiological evolution, and does what is necessary to see the right length quarantine applied. As a result, apart from travellers coming from strongly contaminated countries, less and less people need to go through very unpleasant indeed quarantines. We see here again being sketched the new COVID-19 international order we saw emerging progressively earlier (see The emergence of a COVID-19 international order, 15 June 2020).
Genomic surveillance and beyond
China has been very quick in sequencing the SARS-CoV-2 genome. On 11 and 12 January 2020, the Chinese authorities shared the full sequence of the coronavirus genome with the world (Institut Pasteur, “Institut Pasteur Sequences the whole genome of the coronavirus , 2019–NCOV“, 30 January 2020 – It thus became the first European institution to do so on 29 January 2020, 18 days after China).
Furthermore, China continues research in this direction, as shown, for example by Wang F. et al. article, which explores “the host genetic contribution to COVID-19 severity and susceptibility” (Initial whole-genome sequencing and analysis of the host genetic contribution to COVID-19 severity and susceptibility. Cell Discov., 2020 Nov 10). China has also opened its own repository, the National Gene Bank: cngb.org (COVID-19 section here). If it is not as visual and user friendly as German Gisaid – which is most often the case for anything Chinese on the web – it is, nonetheless, a genomes’ bank.
Meanwhile, China also promotes genomic surveillance abroad, which may be seen as part of its “virus diplomacy”, but raises concern abroad (see for the whole paragraph Kirsty Needham, “Special Report: COVID opens new doors for China’s gene giant“, Reuters, 5 August 2020). The Chinese company BGI, which was the one that initially sequenced the SARS-CoV-2, not only classically exports its tests laboratories but also gives away the gene-sequencing equipment, through its philanthropic foundation, the Mammoth Foundation. Chinese embassies worldwide promote BGI equipment. This potentially goes much further than just diplomacy and U.S. officials notably see it as a national security issue because of the sensitivity of information on personal genetic material. Furthermore, this accentuates China’s global position in the high tech field, thus contributing to raise China’s profile – and capabilities – as superpower.
Surveilling the environment, from hospitals to shipments, trucks and frozen foods
Finally China is pragmatic in its way it considers the environment, i.e. all surfaces that could favour infections.
Even though media and governments worldwide tend to largely downplay or ignore this aspect of contamination, China has adopted a much simpler approach. It surveils anything that could help the spread of the virus. This includes logically all surfaces and materials and leads to corresponding surveillance and warnings, as exemplified in this article of the Global Times: “Hospital environment in N China’s Inner Mongolia tests positive for COVID-19“, 14 January 2021.
It is thus not only living beings that can test positive, but also things and areas. And of course, this also includes shipments.
China disregards here WHO recommendations that deny the possibility of contamination through foods and food packaging (see WHO, Coronavirus disease (COVID-19): Food safety for consumers, 14 August 2020). Note, however, the very cautious way the WHO answers its Q&A, thus protecting itself in advance, should the main doctrine change.
The Chinese measures regarding imported goods show also that, when it is for the protection of its interests, China easily discards any ideological commitment to trade and globalisation. Indeed, if shipments start being seen as a vector of contagion, which they are if we follow Chinese surveillance, measures and events, and if we consider scientific studies on the SARS-CoV-2, surfaces, and materials, then it is the whole global trade paradigm that is impacted.
A quick look at the very heavy demands put on meat exporters considering the COVID-19, as detailed by China Briefing, should they want to sell meat in China, better shows the strains the global trade system will have to bear. Furthermore, as people are afraid to be contaminated by foreign products, Chinese imports of meat products have started to fall (Global Times, “Chinese supermarkets, consumers seek domestic meats to cut contamination risks“, 3 January 2021).
Thus, the capacities of the global trade system to cope with these various strains, as well as the likely change that will emerge are topics for further research. It is however highly certain that the system will have to change. Impacts on individual business actors and even whole sectors, according to countries, are also likely to be important.
Similarly, China’s environmental surveillance emphasises – and to a point reveals for those who did not see it before – the threats the tourism industry, as well as business real estate, for example, face because of the COVID-19 pandemic and because of the importance of China for these sectors. Indeed, it is highly likely that China will make sure Chinese citizens and business people only go abroad if they are protected by the same kind of surveillance and measures as those implemented within China.
China thus implements with an uncompromising pragmatism all the measures needed to control at best the pandemic and to fulfill its stringent corresponding objectives. It can do so because of strong political authorities, that dare to use their legitimate monopoly of violence when necessary, while also benefiting from their society’s compliance and support.* As a result, the legitimacy of the political authorities is further strengthens, which, in turn, allows for more support from people.
Consequently too, and considering China’s economic and industrial way of development, willed by the industrial outsourcing promoted by globalisation and its proponents, China can boast to have seen its “exports gain 3.6 percent in 2020 amid virus-hit global supply chains” (Li Qiaoyi, “Goods trade growing in China only“, Global Times, 14 January 2021). It may also show huge celebrations taking place in Wuhan over the Summer thus highlighting its people can live normally… most of the time. Last but not least, China can also use its smart management of the pandemic to promote its international power.
The latest evolution of the SARS-CoV-2 with the emergence of more contagious variants, the uncertainties and difficulties linked to the vaccines and vaccination, the mink-related mutation, other possible mutations, probably the need to better understand viruses in such global setting and other surprises the virus may create could challenge China. Pragmatism, intelligence and strength are, however, certainly the best assets to face such difficult possible unknowns.
Notes and references
*We are here considering the strength of the state. This must not be mistaken with dictatorship or authoritarianism, the latter being types of regimes. Such confusions are increasingly frequent in media and blog posts out of ignorance, of prejudice and ideology, or of interest.
Bates Gill (2020); “China’s Global Influence: Post-COVID Prospects for Soft Power”; The Washington Quarterly; 43:2; 97-115; DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2020.1771041
COVID-19 Dashboard by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University (JHU)
Du, P., Ding, N., Li, J. et al. Genomic surveillance of COVID-19 cases in Beijing. Nat Commun11, 5503 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-19345-0
Janku, Andrea, “‘Heaven-Sent Disasters’ in Late Imperial China: The Scope of the Stateand Beyond,” in Christ of Mauch and Christian Pfister, eds., Natural Disasters, Cultural Responses: Case Studies Toward a Global Environmental History, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books), 233–64.
Munnink, Oude, B.B., Nieuwenhuijse, D.F., Stein, M. et al. Rapid SARS-CoV-2 whole-genome sequencing and analysis for informed public health decision-making in the Netherlands. Nat Med26, 1405–1410 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-020-0997-y
Sekizuka, Tsuyoshi, PhD, Kentaro Itokawa, PhD, Koji Yatsu, BS, Rina Tanaka, BS, Masanori Hashino, MVD, PhD, Tetsuro Kawano-Sugaya, PhD, Makoto Ohnishi, MD, PhD, Takaji Wakita, MD, PhD, Makoto Kuroda, PhD, “COVID-19 genome surveillance at international airport quarantine stations in Japan”, Journal of Travel Medicine, 24 November 2020, https://doi.org/10.1093/jtm/taaa217
Over the last few years, NATO, the U.S. and Scandinavian militaries have been multiplying national and regional manoeuvres in the Arctic. This is especially true in Norway and the Barents Sea, very close to the Norwegian and Russian land, air and sea frontiers.
The number of air patrols and military exercises grows year after year. For example, on 20 October 2020, the U.S.S. Ross missile-guided destroyer sailed its third tour of the year in the Barents Sea (Thomas Nilsen, “Increase in NATO scrambled jets from Norway”, The Independent Barents Observer, and “US warship returns Barents Sea”, September 14, and October 2020).
This follows the installation of the NATO Atlantic Command at the Norfolk Navy base, in September 2020. The area of responsibility of this new command is the protection of European and North American sea-lanes.
Among them, we find the Greenland-Iceland-U.K. (GIUK) gap to and from the Arctic. In other words, the Joint Force Norfolk Command’s mission is to project U.S. and NATO power in the Arctic (Levon Sevuts, “NATO’s new Atlantic command to keep watch over the European Arctic”, The Independent Barents Observer, September 18, 2020).
This current U.S. and NATO interest for the Arctic, especially as far as the European and Russian part is concerned, appears as being a response to the heightening economic and military development of the Arctic led by Russia and by a growing number of Asian countries, chiefly China among them.
However, if the growing U.S. military and NATO presence increase the level of military gesticulation, we have to wonder if this military presence is really up to the Russia-China strategic development of the Arctic.
From a Western point of view, some European, U.S. and Canadian private companies are developing their presence in the Arctic, but this does not amount at all to a strategy, be it from the U.S., from member states of the European Union nor from North Atlantic countries.
In other terms, the Russian part of the warming Arctic is becoming a planetary attractor for the Asian great powerhouses. Thus, it is increasing the power and status of Russia and China (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Arctic China: Towards new Oil Wars in a Warming Arctic?”, The Red Team Analysis Society, September 14, 2020). As a result, a major geopolitical question is to ponder if Western powers are not missing their own “warming Arctic Axis”.
The warming Arctic, cradle of the Russo-Asian block
Who is developing the Arctic?
As we have explained in The Red Team Analysis Society’s publications, and related conferences since 2014, the notably Russian, Chinese, Japanese, and Indian race towards the Arctic is driving the emergence of the continental Russo-Asian bloc.
The mammoth oil, gas, mineral and biological resources are becoming a giant economic attractor. Meanwhile, because of the effects of the Arctic warming, the Russian authorities open the “ Northern sea route”.
This new sea lane follows the Siberian coast and connects the Bering Strait to Norway and the Northern Atlantic. Thus, it also connects the immense Asian basins of economic development to Northern Europe and to the Atlantic. In the same time, Moscow militarizes the Siberian coast, the archipelagos. In the same dynamic, the Russian Northern Fleet and Army multiply patrols and sea and land manoeuvres.
The Arctic convergence of Russia and Asia
The combination of these two dynamics is also driving a continent-wide process of integration. It drives the construction of railroads, river and land roads, from Siberia to central Asia and China. In other words, the development of the Arctic is one of the drivers of the coupling of the Russian Northern sea route with the Chinese inter-continental Belt and Road initiative (Atle Staalesen, “Arctic gas finds new way from Yamal to China”, The Independent Barents Observer, April 1, 2020).
This massive shift of Asian and Russian societies towards the Arctic signals that this region is also becoming a convergence between states, economies and actors of different values, ideologies, and belief-systems, i.e. civilization (Norbert Elias, The civilizing process, vol.II, State formation and civilisation, 1982).
Hence, the Arctic Russo-Asian dynamic is nothing less than an adaptation strategy, at civilizational level, to the planetary upheaval of climate change (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Planetary Crisis Rules, (2)“, The Red Team Analysis Society, February 15, 2016).
This begs the question of the place of the West in the new “Game of Thrones” of the changing Arctic.
If we compare the way Russia and Asian countries develop the Arctic, and the Western countries’ corresponding actions, it comes that the latter remain largely passive. It becomes increasingly obvious that Western Europe, as well as the U.S. and Canada do not know how to project themselves in this new planetary and geopolitical reality.
This Western non-strategy results from an absence of real reaction by most Western countries to the warming of the Arctic (Edward Luttwak Strategy, the Logic of War and Peace, 2002). Indeed, these reactions become a geopolitical system of passivity.
Actually, the most visible kind of reaction is the built-up of military forces, without any clear long term strategic statement.
This is the case, for example, of the 2016 and 2018 massive Norway-Iceland exercises. Those added up to the multiplication of air patrols, and the growing presence of U.S. Navy war ships. This presence takes place along the air and maritime borders of Russia on the Barents Sea. The U.S. Navy manifests itself also by conducting manoeuvres around the Bering Strait (“Navy, Marine Corps conduct Arctic expeditionary capabilities exercise in Alaska”, CPF Navy Mil, 3 September, 2019”).
This naval and aerial military build up is a way for the U.S. to assert themselves as a sea power. And as such, they have to show their capabilities to disrupt the naval movements of land powers such as Russia and China. However, this capability does not support the definition of political aims and military goals (Luttwak, ibid). They are nothing but a presence that has no distinct effect on the Russian and Asian Arctic strategies.
Western integration to Asian stategies
The other category of Western Arctic “actors” embraces the countries that integrate and support Russian and Chinese strategies. For example, since 2014, China projects itself in the Arctic. Among other things, it obtained the status of “near Arctic nation” at the Arctic Council. In the same time, Beijing turned the “Northern sea route” into the Arctic segment of its “Belt and Road initiative”.
Among others, the Chinese president Xi Jinping promotes this “Polar Silk Road”. Between 2014 and today, he signed bilateral trade and technology with Iceland, Greenland, Danemark, Finland, Sweden, and Norway. In the same time, Russia and China multiply joint trade, industrial, transport and military operations ( Jean-Michel Valantin, “Arctic Fusion: Russia and China convergent strategies, 2014)”, The Red Team Analysis Society, June 23, 2014).
In other words, the very members of the Arctic council, all of them Western countries, at the notable exception of Russia, are becoming stakeholders and supporters of the Chinese strategy in the Arctic.
This means that, despite a growing military presence, Western powers are non-strategic actors in Russian and Asian Arctic strategies. At best, they are stakeholders. In other terms, Russia, China and other Asian countries are starting to dominate the warming Arctic, while Western powers are not (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Towards a US-China War? (1) and (2): Military Tensions in the Arctic”, The Red Team Analysis Society, September 16, 2019).
Embracing the planetary crisis
However, geophysically, what currently happens in the Arctic also signals the installation of a chronic and growing instability. This geophysical dynamic translates itself into geopolitics. It follows that the merging new politics of this region are also in a state of constant change.
It is interesting to note that the nations that react rapidly to this situation are Russia and China. They have in common to have gone through decades upon decades of dramatic and extremely violent changes.
That was the case for Russia and China since the start of the twentieth century, and even since the middle of the nineteenth century for China (Lucien Bianco, La Récidive, Révolution russe, révolution chinoise, 2014).
One can also note that for Asian belief-systems, such as Taoism, the world is in a state of constant flow. And when it comes to Russia, one must remember its collective resiliency and adaptation capability.
This capability emerges from the collective experience of centuries of social, climate and political harshness. Thus, those societies inherit from the collective experience of continuous rapid and necessary adaptation to extreme conditions (Giovanni Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing, 2007).
Elsewhere, Western countries have been through a long cycle of social and economic development since World War II. This took place alongside a long period of political stability. This collective experience inclines certainly to maintain stability. In the same dynamic, it motivates to reject extreme situations that induce the necessity to adapt quickly (Arrighi, ibid).
However, nowadays, climate change is hammering the whole world, i.e. Western countries, as well as Russia and Asia. In this context, the race to the Arctic is going to intensify. Indeed, accessing to the warming Arctic is becoming a major geo-economic concern. Indeed, during the next years, the destabilization of the Arctic is going to reinforce the global climate crisis.
Towards a Western awakening in the Arctic?
Paradoxically, change in the Arctic is also becoming a new template to support modern economies. Thus, it may also support their possible transition towards sustainability. Indeed, this transition, if it happens, will need arbitrations and settlements about who does what in this region.
This new reality is a very powerful driver for the definition and projection of Western strategies in the Arctic. They need to do so in order to install a new system of checks and balances in this very unstable region. As it happens, “the roof of the world” is also the ultimate geopolitical high ground. You hold it, or you don’t.
The second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic is sweeping through the world. It reached first the U.S., Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. By mid-November 2020 it started being visible in Eastern Asia (e.g. Reuters Covid-19 Global Tracker: World and Asia and the Middle East).
By the end of November 2020, South Korea and Japan face a rising number of cases. Yet their outbreak bears, so far, no comparison whatsoever with what happens in Europe or the U.S..
Meanwhile, international news on China tend to focus on the economy and economic recovery (e.g. James Hyerczyk, “Asia-Pacific Shares Down Across the Board; China Reports Upbeat Factory Activity“, Nasdaq, 30 November 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic appears to be almost forgotten, even though China was the place where the pandemic first broke out.
The situation in China, besides notably the very positive outlook taken regarding soon forthcoming vaccines, is a key factor in the optimistic mood of many actors.
What is thus truly happening in China as far as the COVID-19 pandemic is concerned? Has China truly become a much safer place than elsewhere, thanks to the way it now handles the pandemic? Can we estimate the prospects of the sanitary situation in China for the near future? What are the likely impacts of the way China will handle or mishandle a possible second wave? Does that truly matter considering the coming vaccines? How can we think the world both with the way China handled the pandemic and with the coming vaccines?
This article addresses the first of these questions and looks at the situation in China in terms of contagion and clusters.
China, an amazing control of the COVID-19 pandemic
Since the COVID-19 broke out in China in December 2019 and January 2020, starting the global pandemic, and the drastic measures implemented ended on 8 April 2020 (e.g. CNN), China has been amazingly almost free of COVID-19.
China registered COVID-19 4.750 deaths up to 28 November 2020. On 23 then 25 September China reported the death of one person for each date, then another one on 4 November, one on 5, one on 10 November and one (in Hong Kong) on 28 November (dxy network, 1point3acres).
It registered 93.113 COVID-19 symptomatic cases since the beginning of the pandemic up to 26 November 2020 and 93.465 up to 30 November 2020 (dxy network).
This is to compare with 62,57 million cases worldwide as of 30 November 2020, and notably the 18,02 million cases for Europe, and 13,38 million cases for the U.S. (ECDC). In other words in one day, between 29 and 30 November, there has been twice as many cases in Europe as since the beginning of the pandemic in China. In the U.S., for the same day there has been 1,5 times as many cases as since the start of the pandemic in China.
Thus, so far, China does represent a negligible share of the cases, even though the first pandemic outbreak started with China.
Learning by controlling clusters
It is not that China is COVID-19-free out of a miracle. It obtains these incredibly results through an extremely rigorous and efficient control of the pandemic. Indeed, throughout the last months, when the prospects for possible clusters emerged, China took sweeping and efficient measures that allowed for controlling rapidly the new outbreak.
Then, in Dalian on 22 July, a new cluster began (Xinhua, “Containing sporadic COVID-19 outbreaks the Chinese way“, Beijing Review, 27 November 2020). Its origin was the contamination of “a worker at a local seafood processing company” (Xinhua, 29 August 2020). The Dalian cluster included 92 locally transmitted COVID-19 cases and 26 asymptomatic cases. It was fully cleared on 29 August (Ibid,).
In Qingdao, Shandong province, on 11 October, three new COVID-19 cases were detected (Xie Chuanjiao, “Source of Qingdao outbreak identified“, China Daily, 19 October 2020; Yuhan Xing, Gary W.K. Wong et al., Rapid Response to an Outbreak in Qingdao, China, The New England Journal of Medicine, 18 November 2020). The cluster would count only 13 symptomatic cases and was considered as controlled on 16 October, as no new cases emerged (Ibid.). The origin of the cluster was two port workers who had unloaded imported goods (Xie Chuanjiao, ibid) and were in contact with other ship workers (Yuhan Xing, Gary W.K. Wong et al.). Both had tested positive on 24 September 2020 (Ibid.). Then, the virus spread through the hospital (Ibid.).
On 24 October 2020, a new cluster started in Xinjiang with an asymptomatic case being detected. On 2 November, the autonomous region counted 57 mild cases of COVID-19 and 233 asymptomatic cases (Bloomberg, “Xinjiang Covid Outbreak Is China’s Biggest Since Summer“, 2 Nov 2020). Millions were tested in and around the city of Kashgar where the cases were detected, and all those who were positive were isolated (Ibid., BBC News, “Covid-19: China tests entire city of Kashgar in Xinjiang“, 26 October 2020).
So far, thus, clusters have emerged and, each time, they have been successfully quelled. What is the current situation?
Rising contaminations and an increasing number of clusters
Rising daily contaminations
Since 17 November, if we look at the country-wide situation in China, the number of daily newly diagnosed symptomatic cases has been increasing slightly, as shown in the daily figures below, displayed on a fortnightly graph. Note that the last graph changes scale and that the ordinate axis now goes up to 150 cases.
Daily new symptomatic infections in China over a fortnight: ending 26 November 2020, 27 November 2020, 29 November 2020 – ncov.dxy.cn
These increases, however seem to concern mainly Hong Kong and Taiwan, as both the daily reports of the Chinese National Health Commission and the Chinese network of medical doctors – dxy.cn – include them, alongside Macau, in their statistics.*
As a result, the current number of ongoing infectious cases started rising again. Nonetheless, compared with the January 2020 outbreak the curve looks almost flat. This would be even more the case should we look at these figures in comparisons with other countries and continents.
Ongoing infectious cases in China – ncov.dxy.cn
In China the number of confirmed symptomatic COVID-19 patients reached 905 cases on 26 November 2020, 980 on 27 November, 1145 on 29 November 2020 and 1245 cases on 30 November according to the dxy.cn statistics. Out of these, detected asymptomatic cases went from 348 on 23 November to 279 on 28 November (National Health Commission). Thus, the number of asymptomatic cases decreases slightly.
An increase of symptomatic cases is thus taking place, mainly in Hong Kong and, in a lesser way, in Taiwan.
Let us now look at clusters and at the geographical spread on the Chinese territory
A rising number of clusters
Beyond rampant COVID-19 cases considered as identified and quarantined, on 27 November 2020, Chinese media singled out three main outbreaks taking place: in Tianjin – 15 symptomatic cases on 27 November 2020, Shanghai – 62 symptomatic cases on 27 November 2020, and in Inner Mongolia – 23 symptomatic cases on 27 November 2020), in the border city of Manzhouli (Xinhua, “Containing sporadic COVID-19 outbreaks the Chinese way“; “Manzhouli coronavirus cases likely imported“; China Daily, November 27, 2020).
In Manzhouli, the outbreak started on 21 November 2020. On 27 November, it counted 11 cases, 1 asymptomatic case and a suspected case (“Manzhouli coronavirus cases likely imported“). Imported infections triggered the cluster (Ibid.). According to dxy.cn, the cluster there went from 23 symptomatic cases on 27 November 2020 to 18 symptomatic cases, out of which 4 were imported, on 29 November. This would let us assume the authorities control the cluster.
Compared with the three clusters the media reported, the dxy.cn epidemic map for 27 November below shows higher numbers of COVID-19 cases in 7 provinces and cities (plus Taiwan and Hong Kong). These possibly could indicate future clusters, on top of the three identified. Indeed, considering a very nature of a pandemic, just one case represents a danger of contamination. This is even truer with the COVID-19 considering asymptomatic cases and pre-symptomatic contagion (see Helene Lavoix, Dynamics of contagion and the COVID-19 Second Wave, The Red Team Analysis Society, 3 June 2020). Hence, the extreme caution and care shown by the Chinese authorities.
The next map, for 28 November, shows one province (Anhui – the blue arrow) now free of detected COVID-19 cases. In the meanwhile, a new province (Zhejiang) joined its sisters with a higher number of cases. The next day, on 29 November, one more province was added, Gansu with only one case (the red arrow). Here, note that we are still dealing with very low number of cases, from 10 cases in Zhejiang, 12 in Tianjin, and up to 51 (but decreasing number of cases) in Shanghai.
We thus seem to have a rise in the number of possible clusters, compared with the previous six months. Yet, each time a rapid control leads to a decreasing number of cases.
China’s epidemic maps – Ongoing confirmed symptomatic cases on 27 November 2020, 28 November 2020 and 29 November 2020 – Access the latest updated epidemic map on ncov.dxy.cn
Interestingly, those provinces with more COVID-19 positive cases seem to surround China. This indicates once more the key importance of exchanges in the spread of the pandemic.
Thus, it seems that China is facing indeed an increase in cases, as elsewhere. Yet, China’s measures also would seem, so far, to show efficiency and even mastery at controlling the pandemic. With the next article we shall look further at these measures to assess the possible scope and intensity of the second wave in China. Will it remain almost flat as is now the case? Or, on the contrary, should we expect surprises?
*We should also note a discrepancy between the country-wide statistics of the Chinese National Health Commission and the dxy.cn network. The latter works with provincial statistics. The figures in this article rely mostly on the dxy.cn network.
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