The Fifth Wave of the COVID-19 Pandemic and Lethality

(Art design: Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli)

As the global fifth wave of the COVID-19 pandemic has now started, should we be worried about it? How lethal will it be?

This article and the next will focus on direct health-related impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic fifth wave. Indeed, these effects are those that determine all others. Here, we shall look at the potential lethality of the fifth wave. The next article will address the Long-Covid, a key yet rarely accounted for aspect of the pandemic.

We focus, first, here, on the lethality of the previous waves and examine if a pattern emerges. Then we address the various factors that will impact the lethality of the fifth wave, notably the two anti-viral treatments of Merck and Pfizer and the waning vaccinal immunity after six months. We use the U.S. as case study and, adding the case of Israel, we deduce possible global trends. We also highlights some hurdles that political authorities could face regarding the acceptance of the 3rd dose.

This series on impacts of the COVID-19 fifth wave is the second part of the previous article: “Towards a Covid-19 Fifth Wave?“. There, we assessed it was very likely the global start of the fifth wave of the COVID-19 pandemic had taken place at the end of October 2021. There we also highlighted the factors that would shape this fifth wave. We now use the elements identified in this first article as basis to ground our evaluation of impacts.

Global deadly waves of Covid-19

Using the available global statistics, unsurprisingly, we find a periodicity of waves of death similar to what we found with infections.

Global COVID-19 infections and deaths between January 2020 and 5 November 2021 (source Reuters COVID-19 Global tracker).

The deadly impact of the waves of contagion

Deadly impact in two phases for the first global contamination rise – until 17 October 2020

The first wave – the global contamination rise – lasted from December 2019 to 9 October 2020. It corresponds to a wave of deaths that lasted until 17 October 2020, i.e. 8 days after the turn towards the second wave of contamination.

However, here we have distinctively two phases. The first phase peaks around 15 April 2020 with 8.905 death per day, then recedes to 4.677 deaths on 26 May 2020 and 3.628 on 1st June. This is the lowest global number of death since the start of the pandemic. By 3 November 2021 (8.078 deaths), we have so far not yet lowered again the level of daily deaths to this number.

As far as the very early stage of the pandemic is concerned, the high number of death compared with the low number of infection shows the global unpreparedness as well as lack of medical understanding, then, of what was a completely new illness.

The second phase of this first wave is a slowly ascending plateau from 4.677 to 6.056 deaths per day, with small peaks, showing the global spread of the illness, while medical knowledge nonetheless improved.

Comparison of global yearly deaths for influenza in 2019 and deaths from the COVID19 1st wave

As a whole 1,16 million people lost their lives during this first wave (figures from “Cumulative confirmed COVID-19 cases and deaths, World“, Our World in Data).

For the sake of comparison, a 2019 study estimates the global number of deaths from influenza amounts to 400.000 per year, i.e. almost three times less (Paget, John et al. “Global mortality associated with seasonal influenza epidemics: New burden estimates and predictors from the GLaMOR Project” Journal of global health vol. 9,2, 2019, doi:10.7189/jogh.09.020421).

From the second to the fourth wave

The second wave

The deadly second wave lasted from 17 October 2020 until 9 March 2021, with a low at 10.524 deaths per day. The shape follows closely the shape of the wave of contamination with a first peak on 22 December 2020 at 15.430 deaths per day followed by a higher peak on 27 January at 18.357 deaths per day. It lasted around four months and three weeks.

The second wave represents 1,54 million deaths.

Compared with the second wave of contamination, the deadly wave started one week later, the peak of daily deaths took place 13 days after the contagion peak, and the end of the wave took place 20 days after the end of the wave of infections.

The third wave

The third wave, in terms of daily deaths thus started from around 10 March 2021 and lasted until 28 June reaching then 6.909 deaths, i.e. 65% of the previous low. The peak happened around 28 April with 15.471 deaths, i.e. 84% of the previous peak. The wave lasted thus approximately 3 months and two weeks.

Compared with the infections, the deadly wave started 3 weeks later, the peak occurred surprisingly one day before the peak of contagions. The deadly wave ended one week after the wave of infections.

Cumulated deaths per wave of COVID-19 pandemic January 2020 to Oct 2021 plus reassessment for India .

The third wave represents 1,23 million deaths. Actually, it is likely this figure is vastly underestimated. Indeed, the third wave includes the tragic spread of the Delta variant in India. A study using three different types of methodologies concluded that the death toll for India only between the start of the pandemic and June 2021 could be between 3.4 million and 4.9 million excess deaths (Abhishek Anand , Justin Sandefur and Arvind Subramanian, “Three New Estimates of India’s All-Cause Excess Mortality during the COVID-19 Pandemic“, Center for Global Development, 20 July 2021. These figures must be compared with the official death toll that counts 339.053 death on 1st June and 399.459 on 30 June 2021 (e.g. Financial Times).

The fourth wave

The fourth deadly wave started around 28 June 2021, lasting until 17 October 2021 with 4.067 daily deaths, i.e. 59% of the previous low. The peak occurred around 26 August 11.717 deaths, i.e. 75% of the previous peak. The wave lasted around 3 months and slightly less than 3 weeks.

Compared with the infections, the deadly wave started 1 week later, the peak occurred also one week after the peak of contagions. It ended on the same day as the wave of infections. In other words, the fifth wave started surprisingly being felt in terms of deaths without any time lag. This likely comes from the various stages of waves for individual countries mixed with varying vaccination and induced-immunity. This shows the limits of relying uniquely on global aggregated data when we need to evaluate the potential lethality of a wave.

Comparison total number of deaths (combat) for the US during wars and the fourth wave of COVID-19 (sources: see text)

The fourth wave represents 0,97 million deaths.

To understand better what this means in reality, let us give a couple of comparisons.

For the U.S., during the fourth wave, 131.276 (732.634 – 601.358) Americans died of COVID-19. This is 2,46 times more than the Americans who died fighting during World War I (53.402), almost half (45%) of those who died during World War II (291,557), 3,88 times more than those who died fighting during the Korean War (33,686), 2,76 times more than those who died fighting during the Vietnam War (47,434) (Wikipedia, United States military casualties of war). And this is for the least lethal of the last three waves of COVID-19.

Comparison total number of deaths (all causes) for the US during its most deadly wars and the COVID-19 pandemic (up to 7 Nov. 2021) – (Sources: see text).

Of course, the relative importance of wars compared with the pandemic waves will vary according to countries. However, considering the influence of the U.S. in the world as a superpower, it is key to understand that the COVID-19 so far as been more deadly for the U.S. than any other war it waged in the world.

The COVID-19 has killed more Americans than World War II that counted 405.399 American deaths (all causes of death – Wikipedia, ibid.). The pandemic has even been more deadly than the Civil War (1861–1865), the most lethal conflict the U.S. has ever known so far. Then, the number of deaths is estimated to 655.000, while by 7 November 2021, the COVID-19 pandemic has killed 752.196 Americans (CDC data, 7 November 2021).

A pattern for the lethality of the waves?

What can we deduce from the lethality of the four first waves of COVID-19? Is there a pattern and an evolution emerging that may help us evaluating lethality for the future and more specifically the fifth wave?

As far as lethality is concerned, the periodicity and length of the waves are far less regular than those of infections. Similarly, the relationship between, on the one hand, the wave of infections, and, on the other, its impact, the number of deceased, is also irregular.

The main reasons for the differences and irregularities lie probably in the very diverse capabilities of health systems according to countries, added to the heterogeneous availability type, and spread of pharmaceutical treatments and vaccines.

If we do not consider the very likely reality of the third wave in India compared with official estimates – which is a very big if – then, since the second wave, we see an overall diminution of the lethality of the waves of COVID-19.

The global trend for the last three waves would tend to indicate a diminution of the height of the waves – the peaks of daily deaths are successively lower for each wave, while the lower points are also similarly lower. Again, the reasons for this overall diminution of deaths are most probably a mix between an improvement of medical treatment and capabilities of health systems to handle the illness, alongside the spread of vaccination.

Thus, looking at this general trend, we could start our assessment with, as baseline, a wave lasting until the end of the wave of infections, i.e. around 20 February 2022 and peaking between 20 December 2021 and 20 January 2022. If the favorable trends towards less lethal waves of the pandemic continues, we could have a peak around 50% of the previous one, i.e. 5.858 deaths, and a low around 50% of the previous wave. i.e. 2.034 deaths.

However, the reality of the impact of the Delta variant in India cannot be ignored. This strongly stresses that our collective global efforts must be directed at preventing variants of concerns (VoC) to emerge and spread. They are indeed a major factor of lethality.

Our total inability to anticipate the emergence of new VoC, apart knowing that the more the virus circulate, the more likely a VoC will emerge makes it difficult to assess in advance the lethality of a wave. However, as we saw, borders’ control throughout the world, and notably in the U.S. are being relaxed (see Towards a Covid-19 Fifth Wave?; Reuters, “What you need to know about the new U.S. international air travel rules“, 7 November 2021). This considerably heightens the likelihood to see a VoC emerging and spreading, hopefully not for the fifth wave.

Besides VoC, assuming health systems capabilities and medical practice remain constant the availability of new treatments, vaccination and the length of induced immunity are the factors most likely to influence the lethality of the wave, as we shall now see.

Factors impacting the lethality of the COVID-19 pandemic waves

Too early or or just in time for the new anti-viral treatments?

In October and November 2021, two new antiviral treatment, easy to administer came to the fore. What are these treatments? Are they the anti-COVID-19 treatments that will allow us finally overcoming the pandemic?

Monulpiravir (Lavgevrio in Britain)

U.S.-based Merck & Co Inc and Ridgeback Biotherapeutics developed the new antiviral pill using the molecule molnupiravir. It has been authorised in the UK on 4 November 2021 under the name Lavgevrio and could have a positive impact on lethality (Pushkala Aripaka, “Britain approves Merck’s COVID-19 pill in world first“, Reuters, 5 November 2021).

As explained in the video below, Merck’s pills aims “to introduce errors into the genetic code of the virus” and thus generates random mutations (Deena Beasley, “Explainer: How does Merck’s COVID-19 pill compare to Pfizer’s?“, Reuters, 8 November 2021). It is also believed that, as a result, variants of concern will not evolve, as the mutations are random (ibid.).

At the probable start of the fifth wave of COVID-19, we only have the results of the phase III trial of the company, stemming from “a planned interim analysis [that] evaluated data from 775 patients” (Merck, News Release 1 October 2021). According to the company, if “at risk, non-hospitalized adult patients with mild-to-moderate COVID-19″ receive twice a day four pills for five days within five days of the onset of symptoms, then “molnupiravir reduced the risk of hospitalization or death by approximately 50%” (Ibid.; Aripaka, “Britain approves Merck’s COVID-19 pill in world first“, Reuters, 5 November 2021; Deena Beasley, “Explainer: How does Merck’s COVID-19 pill compare to Pfizer’s?“, Reuters, 8 November 2021).

The very interesting video by Dr. Seheult of Medcram helps understanding better the new treatment, how it works and the trials.

https://youtu.be/aI0xGfITaas
Merck COVID Pill (Molnupiravir): A New Treatment Option? (Coronavirus Update 130) by Dr. Seheult of Medcram – 20 October 2021

For readers who are not fluent in English, use translated captions:

Click on the small wheel (“Settings”) just before Youtube on the bottom right hand side of the video player.

Click on “subtitles”, then on “auto-translate” and then choose your language.

Furthermore, the way Great Britain will use the pills is still experimental (Aripaka, ibid.). Finally, safety data for the drug are not public for now (Aripaka, ibid.).

Pfizer’s Paxlovid

Pfizer’s drug is not yet authorised on 8 November 2021 and was annouced by the company on 5 November 2021 (Pfizer, News Release). It will be commercialised under the name Paxlovid (Ibid.).

The active molecule, used in combination with an older antiviral ritonavir, is “part of a class known as protease inhibitors designed to block an enzyme that the coronavirus needs to multiply. Pfizer said that because the drug targets a part of the virus essential to replication, the pathogen cannot become resistant to the treatment” (Beasley, “Explainer“, Ibid.).

Pfizer phase 2/3 trial for the “Evaluation of Protease Inhibition for COVID-19 in High-Risk Patients” began enrollment in July 2021, and two other studies, one for Standard-Risk Patients and one for Post-Exposure Prophylaxis are still ongoing (Pfizer, News Release, 5 November 2021). “The primary analysis of the interim data set evaluated data from 1219 adults who were enrolled by September 29, 2021” (Ibid.). Safety evaluation used a larger cohort of 1881 patients and continues (Ibid.).

According to Pfizer, for high risk patients, the drug was found to reduce the risk of hospitalisation or death by 89% if given within three days of symptom onset and by 85% if given within five days (Ibid.). Pfizer’s regimen is three pills in the morning and three pills at night (Beasley, “Explainer“, Ibid.).

Too early for a global impact on the fifth wave?

Results for Pfizer’s drug are thus much better than for Merck’s pills, and because they involve less pills might be more easily available. However, as for Merck, there are no independent studies, the number of patients who have used the pills is small and the trials are so recent that secondary effects, especially on medium and long term, can hardly be known with certainty.

It is thus too early to consider widespread and global use of the pills and impact. Furthermore, to envision such a global impact we would also need to take into account manufacturing.

What happens in the UK regarding the use of Molnupiravir will need to be closely monitored.

But panic leads political authorities to discard precautionary principles

Nonetheless, we should also note that countries, for example Indonesia as well as “The United States, Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines”, are hurrying up to authorise and pre-order Merck’s treatments, and most probably Pfizer’s (Reuters, “Indonesia reviewing Merck COVID-19 pill, up to 1 mln doses targeted“, 8 November 2021; Merck, News Release 1 October 2021; Pfizer’s news. Ibid.). They may thus have impacts – positive and negative – earlier than caution and safety would require.

It is worth here highlighting again that, usually, discovering a new drug and especially testing it takes a much longer time than what was done in the two cases of the antiviral pills, for example the 3 months of phase 2/3 trial for Pfizer, as we stressed in our earlier article “COVID-19 Antiviral Treatments and Scenarios“:

Once it is discovered, the new potential drug will have to go through the whole process of trial and development, including clinical trials (e.g. EU Drug Discovery and Development, U.S. Biopharmaceutical Research & Development).

Classically – i.e. when we are not in an emergency mode – this process takes 10 to 15 years (Drug discovery, Ibid.) as shown in the picture below:

Helene Lavoix, “COVID-19 Antiviral Treatments and Scenarios“, The Red Team Analysis Society, 30 March 2020.
EU Drug Discovery and Development
EU Drug Discovery and Development, p.11.

Here phases for clinical trials have been extraordinarily reduced. If things go well, then it will be perfect and optimism will triumph. If not, then we may be facing a tragic disaster, or even multiple disasters. The rule in strategic foresight and early warning is to always consider high impact scenarios even if the scenario is unlikely, for example when building wild cards scenarios (see Course on scenarios). This is what ought to be done.

Meanwhile, manufacturing of the pills has only started. However, Merck asserts that it could have manufactured 10 million courses of its treatment by the end of 2021 and more for 2022, at least 20 million according to Beasley for Reuters (Merck, News Release 1 October 2021; Beasley, “Explainer“, Ibid.). For its part, Pfizer would have 180.000 courses ready by the end of 2021, and 50 millon by the end of 2022 (Beasley, “Explainer“, Ibid.). Thus should these announcements all be correct and no bad surprise emerge, then severe illnesses and deaths could be significantly reduced (at least by 50%) for countries taking these drugs, before the end of the fifth wave.

We should consider widespread usage of these pills initially as an outlier that must be closely monitored.

For now, for the fifth wave, vaccination remains the major factor to consider as potentially altering the lethality of the fifth wave.

Vaccination, Immunity and lethality

If we want to have a better assessment of the lethality of the fifth wave of COVID-19 we need to consider vaccination.

Safety of the third dose

Note that we shall assume below that there are no serious side effects and safety concerns on the medium to long term for the third dose of vaccination. The existence or absence of such safety concerns is so far unknown. Israel, the first country to do so, authorised the administration of the so called “booster shot” on 30 July 2021 (Yinon M. Bar-On, “Protection of BNT162b2 Vaccine Booster against Covid-19 in Israel“, October 7, 2021, N Engl J Med, 2021; 385:1393-1400, DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa2114255). It is thus too early to know if there are any negative effects on the medium to long-term.

On the short term, according to the ongoing monitoring of the U.S. CDC (the US started administering booster shots on 12 August 2021), most effects reported were similar to those of the first doses (“Fever, headache, fatigue and pain at the injection site were the most commonly reported side effects”). They are estimated as “mild to moderate” (for 92% to 94% of reports). Nonetheless, 6% of reports were tagged as “serious” (“reactions reported after getting a booster shot”, on data “from August 12–October 10, 2021 for persons aged 12 years and older”).

When vaccinal immunity wanes

For our purpose, most aggregated statistics available are difficult to use. Indeed, these statistics were created for the initial “race to vaccination”, which took place during the first semester of 2021. They thus tend to show mainly the percentage of a population that has received one dose or two doses of vaccines, sometimes using the more relevant criteria of full vaccination scheme. Then they compare countries.

However, what matters to us is not only the proportion of a population that benefits from a full vaccination scheme, and how advanced or late a country is compared to others, but also when vaccination took place and for which proportion of the population.

Let us explain further why this matters.

Vaccinal immunity wanes “considerably” six months after the full vaccinal scheme

As we saw in the previous article, as the case of Israel shows, and as most governments now admit when they emphasise the need for a third dose, the immunity induced by many vaccines against the COVID-19 wanes. This waning certainly takes place after six months, and even possibly before according to vaccines (e.g. US CDC “Infections in fully vaccinated persons: clinical implications and transmission” in Science Brief: COVID-19 Vaccines and Vaccination – update 15 September 2021; Matthew Loh and Hilary Brueck, “Pfizer’s COVID-19 protection against infection may wane in months, but it still prevents hospitalization and death for at least 6, new studies suggest“, Insider, 8 October 2021).

This is also true for the Chinese vaccine CoronaVac from Sinovac, as scientists have shown that immunity falls after six months. A Chinese study concluded:

“Our study found that a two-dose vaccination schedule of CoronaVac (3 μg formulation) generated good immune memory. Although the neutralizing antibody titer dropped to low levels 6 months after the second dose, a third dose was highly effective at recalling a SARS-CoV-2-specific immune response, leading to a significant rebound in antibody levels.”

Hongxing Pan et al. “Immunogenicity and safety of a third dose, and immune persistence of CoronaVac vaccine in healthy adults aged 18-59 years: interim results from a double-blind, randomized, placebo-controlled phase 2 clinical trial“, medRxiv, 25 July 2021.”

Considering that such a large proportion of the world population uses the Chinese CoronaVac, which is administered in 26 countries and part of the global COVAX scheme, the results of Hongxing Pan et al. are key in terms of the global lethality of the fifth wave, as well as, potentially for next ones.

Update 25 November 2021: According to studies from Israel, a third dose administered at 5 months is highly effective in increasing protection against hospitalisation, severe forms of COVID 19, and death compared with two doses at least five months before. For example:

“Vaccine effectiveness evaluated at least 7 days after receipt of the third dose, compared with receiving only two doses at least 5 months ago, was estimated to be 93% (231 events for two doses vs 29 events for three doses; 95% CI 88–97) for admission to hospital, 92% (157 vs 17 events; 82–97) for severe disease, and 81% (44 vs seven events; 59–97) for COVID-19-related death.”

Noam Barda, MD et al., “Effectiveness of a third dose of the BNT162b2 mRNA COVID-19 vaccine for preventing severe outcomes in Israel: an observational study“, The Lancet,
Published:October 29, 2021, DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(21)02249-2

It would have been interesting to have similar studies checking more precisely when the full scheme of vaccination had taken place (5 months ago, 6 months ago, 7 months ago for example) to have a better understanding of the immunity boost on the one hand, waning on the other. Calculations below are don on the 6 months timeframe for an imperatively needed booster injection and not five months. If ever the truly dangerous waning generalised at 5 months, then results below must be adapted accordingly, The burden and risks are increased.

Waning immunity after six months and impact on the lethality of a wave

Thus, to estimate the lethality of the fifth wave, we must consider that at approximately 180 days after full vaccination, because levels of antibody will have strongly declined, the severity and lethality of the COVID-19 tends towards levels “similar” to those that would be known without vaccination. We do not know how fast a return to full lethality of the COVID-19 will take place. We do not know the proportion of the population who will be at risk and when. Both are nonetheless significant enough, considering studies and what happened in Israel (see previous article).

However, when a third dose is administered, enhanced protection against severity and lethality of the COVID-19 returns, for an unknown length of time. We shall only know if the length of immunisation after the third dose is superior to six months, earliest end of January to mid-February 2022, as third doses have started being administered in Israel on 30 July 2021 et in the U.S. on 12 August 2021 (Ibid,, CDC note 2), assuming no other variant of concern spreads.

We had warned about the key uncertainty relative to the length of immunity and the impacts on the idea of herd immunity as well as on the need for follow up vaccines in our article “COVID-19 Vaccinations, Hope or Mirage?” in October 2020. Knowing that if there is critical uncertainty, then we need to monitor the evolution of the key factors, as well as, preferably, to create scenarios, political and health authorities should not be surprised by the reality of the current situation. If an actor is surprised, then it means this actor should urgently revise its system of early warning (see our related training and online courses).

Waning vaccinal immunity, which impact on the lethality of a wave? The case of the U.S.

We now know that there will be an impact, that it will happen after six months and that it should have been monitored. However, how large or small could this impact be?

We are in the realm of trends because we do not know exactly how these dynamics work.

The figures of the Financial Times we use here, as they provide the multi-country historical series we need, consider all vaccination irrespective of age. As less than 18 years old are increasingly included in vaccination statistics, but as these specific vaccinations vary according to country and dates, distortions may be introduced when trying to assess lethality.

We are thus here rather in the domain of crude estimates. Further detailed research at country level would be need. It is nonetheless interesting to detail what could be happening.

For example, the U.S. has vaccinated between 8,6% of its population on 5 March 2021 and 40.6 % on 1 June (Data Financial Times – all ages). Thus, using the 180 days/six months interval, this means that on 5 September 2021 8,6% of its population needed a third dose or risked severe illness and death. By 1st December 2021, it is 40.6% of the population, whatever the age, that will need to have received a third dose.

Let us continue with the U.S. The country started administering the 3rd dose on 13 August 2021. On 4 November 2021, 11.9% of fully vaccinated Americans above 18 years old (11.1% of the total vaccinated population) had received their third dose (CDC statistics). If the 6 months limit for immunity is correct, we should look at the number of people vaccinated six months before 4 November 21, i.e. 4 May, to have an idea of the gap between those who have received their 3rd dose and those who should have received it. This gap represents the people who are facing increased risks of serious illness and death, if they become infected by the SARS-CoV-2. On 4 May 2021 31.7% of the Americans were fully vaccinated. Hence, on 4 November 2021, using total figures, 20,6% (31,7 – 11,1) of Americans are facing again rapidly rising risks of severe COVID or death. Actually this statement should be revised per categories of population (age, comorbidity etc.).

Thus, on 4 November 2021, the total number of Americans truly protected by vaccination is only 37,6% (58, 2 – 31, 7 + 11,1).

This happens when the country opens up its borders notably to air travels (see Towards a Covid-19 Fifth Wave?; Reuters, “What you need to know about the new U.S. international air travel rules“, 7 November 2021).

Note that if we use the proportion of Americans over 18 years old for the current level of vaccination and of booster doses, we obtain a larger coverage of 50,1% (69,9 – 31,7 + 11,9). This figure is however probably incorrect as the historical number for May given by the FT concerns the total of people vaccinated, irrespective of ages.

The U.S. thus starts the fifth wave with 30,1% of its population over 18 years old not vaccinated at all and 20,6% of the total U.S. vaccinated population facing renewed risks. The latter, furthermore, may be lulled into a sense of false security. By 1st December, as seen, it will be 40,6% of vaccinated people that will need a booster dose, knowing that on 4 November only 11,1% had received one. Thus 29,5% will need a booster dose. These figures will evolve with time as more people get a 3rd dose. We are nonetheless far from any herd immunity.

Now, let us look at what happened in the U.S. during the fourth wave (20 June to 20 October 2021). The fourth wave started apparently with 44,7% people vaccinated and ended with 56,4% vaccinated. We could thus think there is an improvement. However, we must consider the vaccinated people who were seeing their vaccine-induced immunity waning as the fourth wave progressed. These people who started being at risk again were those who had been fully vaccinated between 20 January (n.d.; less than 8,6%) and 20 April (25,8%) minus those who had received a booster dose.

The Americans really protected during the fourth wave decreased from 44,7% (minus an unknown number) on 20 June to 44% (52,5 – 8,5% on 5 March) plus those having received their booster dose on 5 September, to 30,6 % (56,4 – 25,8) plus those having received their booster dose 20 October (in the framework of an open-access article it is not possible to give more precise figures).

As a result, during the fourth wave, 131.276 (732.634 – 601.358) Americans died of COVID-19.

Let us assume that this corresponds to an average protection of 45%. If we imagine that the U.S will both slightly increase its vaccination of the population and accelerate its booster dose, we could take an average protection of 50% for the fifth wave, then we would have 119.341 deaths. The more third doses will be given and the more unvaccinated people will be fully vaccinated, the lower the actual figure will be.

However, we can use this type of crude estimate only if infections do not rise. Considering the opening up of borders and travels (ibid.), the decrease of non-pharmaceutical intervention, and possibly the feeling that the pandemic has ended, it is possible not to say very likely that the death toll worsen.

Vaccination and waning immunity, should we be worried about the global lethality of the fifth wave?

It appears clearly from the example of the U.S. that it would be meaningless to try to give a figure for the lethality of the global wave without entering into long simulations. We can nonetheless assess if we should be worried or not.

If we look again at Israel, between 20 June and 25 October 2021, cumulative deaths went from 6.427 to 8.049, i.e. 1.622 people died during the fourth wave. Comparatively, during the previous wave (21 November 20 – 21 April 20), 3.550 people died (6.346 – 2.796 – Our World in Data). Thus, vaccination with waning immunity, but with some non-pharmaceutical measures such as the mask being rapidly reinstated and with borders remaining closed led to a wave that was less lethal than previously by 54%.

From the Israeli and U.S. cases, we can deduce that even if we are very optimistic, we should nonetheless be worried about the fifth wave.

Israel, a country with a high level of vaccination, a highly efficient medical system, a very reactive policy in terms of non pharmaceutical intervention, and a small population succeeded to only halve the deaths caused by the virus as the fourth wave hit it.

The U.S., for its part, is dedicated to vaccination, but has the highest number of deaths in the world caused by the pandemic including because of politically biased relationships to caution. Its perspective for the fifth wave are that many Americans will still die, probably more than 100.000, especially if borders are opened without caution.

Now considering that the rate of vaccination worldwide is still very low (2,994 bn on 4 November 21, i.e. 37,89%), out of which an unknown number is already susceptible to become severely ill again and die, the prospects cannot be very good. We should brace to face again a wave with a high lethality (compared with no pandemic), including because of the reopening of borders.

Globally, in terms of vaccination an immense effort must still be made to fully vaccinate more than 60% of the world population. Yet, vaccination for the 3rd dose must, at the same time, be implemented for people already fully vaccinated, and that as soon as we reach 6 months after the last injection. The effort thus remains immense.

The initial assessment made out of the 2d, 3rd and 4th wave was probably too optimistic, including because, for the first waves, borders were closed. This is not the direction that still prevails at the dawn of the fifth wave.

One more hurdle

For countries which have already implemented a vaccination policy, a supplementary hurdle may exist, that could heighten lethality.

If governments have enticed their citizens in being vaccinated by promising the end of the pandemic and a return to a pre-pandemic time, then these citizens may develop various adverse reactions.

They may not believe a third dose is truly necessary, considering the bias called “belief perseverance” or “persistence of discredited evidence” (see course on mitigating biases or on analytical modeling). They may thus fall prey to conspiracy theories. They may also fail to adopt an appropriate behaviour to protect themselves and others.

If citizens realise that knowledge of the weakening immunity after 6 months was easily available or could have been anticipated, when they were given a contrary message, then they may think that their government is either incompetent or a liar. In both cases, this is very bad news for legitimacy and the capability of said government to implement any policy, including a mass vaccination campaign for the third dose, or any other campaign for non-pharmaceutical intervention.

Thus, according to countries and to the type of policies used for the campaign of vaccination for the first two doses, the fifth wave may become more or less lethal.

Conclusion

In general and globally, lethality, despite efforts, is very likely to continue until vaccination delivers an immunity that lasts and prevents also infections. We should be even more concerned considering the remaining high risks of emergence of new variants of concern, as seen.

The new treatments may completely alter these prospects. However, the risks entailed in spreading these treatments widely is also very high, even if they may materialise only much later.

As a result, the less borders will be opened without considering the 180 days of immunity, the more non-pharmaceutical interventions, notably face masks and quarantines, will be operative and reinstated flexibly, the less lethal the fifth wave will be.

What are Climate Wars?

As climate change intensifies, a major issue is to understand how rapidly changing geophysics and war are intertwined. Since 2013, at the Red Team Analysis Society we study the way climate change, the military and geopolitics interact (Climate change security, The Red Team Analysis Society).

Since then, things have changed dramatically. The complex relationship between climate change now evolves increasingly rapidly. To understand this relationship, we must first understand what are or will be “climate wars”.

“Climate wars” are wars

It’s politics, stupid!

All around the globe, there is a growing involvement of the military in response to multiplying extreme weather events. This may appear as an obvious link between climate and war. However, we must keep in mind that, as Clausewitz defines it “War is a mere continuation of policy by other means” (Carl von Clausewitz, On War, chap. I, 24, 1832)

In other terms, political authorities decide to wage war, or not. Politics is the decisive factor.

The French translation is done by artificial intelligence / La traduction française est faite par intelligence artificielle

Danger Zone

Furthermore, the state of the climate may have consequences upon the living conditions of human groups and impose a major stress. For example, climate change endangers agriculture and the water cycle of small, large and very large populations and societies (Jean-Michel Valantin, “The Midwest Floods, the Trade War and the Swine Flu Pandemic: the Agricultural and Food Super Storm is Here”, The Red Team Analysis Society, June 3, 2019).

This kind of situation has the potential to trigger competition for basic resources, such as food and water (Richard S. Cottrell, “Food production shocks across land and sea”, Nature Sustainability, 28 January, 2019).

As it happens, at the world level, several years of bad cereal crops took place between 2006 and 2011. Those bad crops resulted of a series of extreme weather events in the most important regions of cereal farming.

There was a heatwave in the rice farming Chinese south in 2006. In 2008 and 2009 and 2010, we had giant floods in the U.S. Midwest, heatwaves in Canada, Australia, Ukraine and Russia. Then, the relatively low agricultural yields triggered speculation (Werrell and Femia, The Arab Spring and Climate Change, 2013).

The consecutive price inflation badly hurt Arab societies from Morocco to Syria (Ibid.). Indeed, bread is the basic staple for 70% of the population in these countries (Ibid.). Thus, tensions were triggered in already overstressed countries. As a result, the first demonstrations to contest Ben Ali in Tunisia were demonstrations denunciating the unbearable price of bread (Ibid.).

These bread protests were the trigger events of the massive social, political and geopolitical reactions called the “Arab Spring”. This massive process entangles political upheavals, civil and international wars and prolonged itself with the Syrian war (Werrell and Femia, ibid).

Polarization

From Himalaya with (not so much) love

We must keep in mind that there are several families of war, and different levels of intensity and scales. We must not confuse a state of tension with a state of war. However, the latter may emerge from the former.  

For example, on 1 June 2020, Indian and Chinese patrols fought each other during a skirmish in the Ladakh region. Twenty Indian soldiers died and there were 43 Chinese casualties (Aijaz Hussain, “India: 20 troops killed in Himalayas clash with China”, AP News, 16 June, 2020). Since this uniquely violent incident, there has been military and political tensions flaring up between the two Asian giants.

This incident appears to have been triggered by mounting tensions between the building of roads, dams and fortifications by both China and India along the border. Since 2020, China and India keep on building military infrastructures while amassing thousands of troops. And thus, aggravating the risk of military and political escalation (Baani Grewal and Nathan Ruser, “ A 3D deep dive into the India-China border dispute”, ASPI- The Strategist, 21 October 2021) .

We must note that six months after this military skirmish, Beijing announced that PowerChina will build a dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo river in Tibet. This is likely to change the political context of these tensions into an explicit international water dispute. Indeed, when it leaves Tibet, this river passes through India. There, it becomes the Brahmaputra in India and the Jamuna in Bangladesh (Jagannath P. Panda, “Beijing Boosts its Position as a “Himalayan Hegemon” through Hydropower”, The JamesTown Foundation, June 7, 2021).

Dams for climate, dams for geopolitics

For China, on the one hand this new dam is necessary for securing enough water for the South-North Water Project. Mao first thought about this project in 1950. The new dam was finally announced in 2014. It aims at transferring water from the southern water rich region in order to support the development of the North.

On the other hand, the 60 gigawatts dam will support the Chinese climate change mitigation policy. Its renewable electricity production will support the development of the Chinese energy mix by diminishing the national coal consumption (Shan Jie and Li Xiaoyi, “China to build historic Yarlung Tsangpo river hydropower project in Tibet”, Global Times, 2020/11/29).

However, these new water politics and military tensions are inscribed in the already overcharged geopolitical and strategic landscapes. As it happens, China and Pakistan, India’s arch-adversary, have signed a memorandum of agreement for the construction of two giant dams on the Indus, one of them in the Gilgit-Batilstan region, in the Himalayas, claimed by both India and Pakistan and close to China (Drazen Jorgic, “Pakistan eyes 2018 start for China funded mega dam, opposed by India”, Reuters, June 13, 2017).

These dams will produce 4200 MW and 2700 MW of electricity respectively, and their construction will cost 27 billion dollars. They are parts of the Chinese “One Belt One road – New silk road” agreements signed between China and Pakistan in 2015 (Valantin, “China and the New Silk Road: the Pakistani strategy”, The Red Team Analysis, May 18, 2015). The Indian political authorities are concerned about the consequences of these dams on the Kashmiri water flow, which is a major source of water for the country, as well as for Pakistan.

These strategic tensions take place in a rapidly changing ecological and climate environment. This “dam race” happens when the melting of the mountain glaciers accelerate because of climate change.

Climate change: it changes everything

As it happens, climate change is a major factor of geopolitical and strategic tensions, because the sources of major Asian rivers, necessary to the lives of billions of people are located in these very glaciers.

And the development of these countries necessitate to use increasingly more water (Robert Scribbler, “The Glacial mega flood: global warming poses growing glacial outburst flood hazard from Himalayas to Greenland and west Antarctica”, Robertscribbler: scribbling for environmental, social and economic justice, August 19, 2013).

Who’s Water?

Now, China and India together dominate South Asia and East Asia, while being regional and international economic and political powerhouses. Furthermore, their overall population amounts to almost 3 billion people – i.e. almost 40% of all human beings.

As a result, the tensions created by their competition for water in a warming world is a new kind of geopolitical crisis. It means that climate change is putting an increasingly growing pressure on political and military actors, which are already at odds with each other, while putting water cooperation systems under an intensifying stress.

Since 2020, those military tensions are heightening and both powers are accelerating the militarization of the Himalayas (Shweta Sharma, “India and China Ramp Up border firepower with Howitzers and rocket launchers”, The Independent, 21 October, 2021).

The geophysics / geopolitics nexus

Climate change thus becomes an amplifier of current and future geopolitical crisis. Indeed, first it accelerates the glaciers melting. Then, for China, those dams are also a way to mitigate climate change, while having enough water for its development. Yet, this approach is a major driver of competition for India, which refuses to depend upon the Chinese hydropower.

So climate change drives the emergence of a new kind of geopolitical crisis of an incredibly large scale. The nexus of this crisis of a new kind is the complex relationship between securing access to water for giant countries while suffering the effects of climate change. In the same time, they try to mitigate climate change, while adapting to it.

In other terms, the very nature of the growing military tensions between China and India is the transposition of their historical depth in the context of the current geophysical crisis. Water being life, especially for 1,5 billion strong nations, climate change “turbocharges” those and turns them into something that may turn into existential conflicts.

War for basic needs?

The 2011 Arab Spring and the 2020-2021 military tensions between China and India reveal how climate change is inflicting major stress on food and water access to entire countries, including the two most populous countries on Earth.

This tells us that climate wars, under the guise of civil or international wars, are wars for basic needs. As such, if there is no massive effort for mitigation of climate change, the threat on basic needs may very well lead to military and strategic rise to the extremes.

Featured image: Image by Gerd Altmann, Pixabay, Public Domain. 

Towards a Covid-19 Fifth Wave

Are we at the beginning of a fifth wave of the COVID-19 pandemic? If yes, is it dangerous and should we be worried about it? Alternatively, is the COVID-19 pandemic over? Has the COVID-19 pandemic evolved towards an endemic illness that is not more dangerous than the seasonal flu? Meanwhile, have we just accepted COVID-19 related death as a fatality, not worth our concern?

How we “live with the COVID-19”, with different policies according to countries, will vary according to the responses we give to these questions. Success will depend upon the way our answers are adapted to the reality of the COVID-19 pandemic and its evolution in the future.

This article focuses on a global fifth wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. We assess it is likely the fifth wave has just started. We give possible estimates for its length and look at the factors that will shape this wave, namely anti COVID-19 restrictions and travel policies, vaccination and length of immunity, and finally the emergence of variants.

The next article will focus on possible impacts and consequences of this wave.

The dawn of a fifth wave: the emergence of a global periodicity

A couple of indications converge to warn us about the very likely start of a fifth wave of COVID-19, globally.

If we observe the overall statistical trends of the pandemic, using a seven-day average (the yellow line), we see the following graph.

Global COVID-19 infections and deaths between January 2020 and 24 October 2021 (source Reuters COVID-19 Global tracker).

The first wave or a global contamination rise – December 2019 to 9 October 2020

The first wave actually looks like a very large and long wave that did not recede. More than a wave, we can take the analogy of a global sea level rise. It corresponds to the time it took to the virus to spread globally and cover the world with a certain amount of infections and death. It lasted from the start of the pandemic until the beginning of October 2020.

The four months waves

Then, around 10 October 2020 started a second wave with a steep increase of cases (and of deaths) and a summit reached around 14th January 2021. That wave lasted until approximately 18 February, when we reached a dip in infections. At that time, the tides turned and infections started rising again. The second wave thus lasted approximately 4 months.

The next wave started on 18 February 2021, was at its top approximately on 29 April and then decreased until 20 June 2021. Here again, the wave lasted almost exactly 4 months.

The fourth wave started on 20 June 2021, reached a peak on 18 August 2021, and has been decreasing since, until around 20 October 2021. (Nota 3 November 2021: with the statistical updates, to date, infections reached a low on 17 October 2021 at 300.399 and then started rising again).

Even though two, almost three, instances are insufficient to make deductions that are certain, we can nonetheless make the hypothesis that, globally, a pandemic COVID-19 wave lasts four months. Considering the variation found in individual countries, it is amazing to observe such a regular periodicity globally. Once more, as for other phenomena, this pleads towards also adopting a global and systemic perspective on the pandemic, its evolution and its dynamics.

This global periodicity would vary according to simple mechanistic measures against the virus (masks, quarantines, social distancing, lockdown, and hinderance of travels), vaccination and its efficiency – and in the future possibly forthcoming treatments – and strength and length of induced immunity, and virulence and power of infection of variants.

The fifth wave is likely to last from 20 October 2021 to 20 February 2022

If the four months hypothesis is correct, then around 20 October 2021 we should have seen the start of the fifth wave. We are currently at this moment when the number of infections globally are at their lowest but when then nonetheless have started rising again.

Assuming none of the current conditions change, the fifth wave would reach a summit between 20 December 2021 (4th wave shape) and 20 January 2022 (2d wave shape) and then decrease until around 20 February 2022.

The main factors influencing the global shape of the pandemic wave

Let us see now how the various influencing factors are likely to play out

Worldwide relaxation of anti COVID-19 restrictions?

Flexible restrictive measures rather than relaxation

Globally, we are seeing a trend towards relaxing as much as possible various anti COVID-19 measures, called non-pharmaceutical interventions.

Countries try to get rid of masks, promise not to implement lockdown anymore, to stop quarantines and restrictions on travel for vaccinated people.

As examples, we have Australia changing it policy towards less restrictions (Frances Mao, “Why has Australia switched tack on Covid zero?“, BBC News, 3 September 2021).

Meanwhile, the UK government stresses that now the economy comes first. Indeed, according to The Times:

“British finance minister Rishi Sunak said there must be no return to “significant economic restrictions” despite a recent increase in COVID-19 cases in the country.”

Reuters, quoting The Times, “UK’s Sunak rules out return to major COVID restrictions -The Times”, 23 October 2021

The UK government indeed reasserts its COVID-19 policy despite demands by scientists to return as quickly as possible to anti-Covid-19 restrictions (e.g. Associated Press, “Scientists urge UK to prep rapid return of COVID measures“, Euronews, 22 October 2021; Skynews, “UK ‘dilly-dallying into lockdown’ – take Plan B action now, warns government adviser“, 23 October 2020).

Likewise, South Korea having vaccinated 70 % of its population aims at removing most constraints apart from face masks by February 2022 (Sangmi Cha, “South Korea plots course to scrapping COVID curbs by early 2022“, Reuters, 26 October 2021).

Travel restrictions are removed or relaxed as much as possible, as in Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand or Canada, that “drops travel advisory” (The Hill, 24 October, 2021; e.g. “Malaysia and Singapore ease international travel restrictions in pivot to living with Covid“, CNN, 11 October 2021; “Singapore launches quarantine-free travel to 10 countries“, Financial Times, 19 October, 2021; Reuters, “Thailand announces reopening rules for tourism reboot“, 22 October 2022), etc.).

Starting 8 November 2021, the U.S. imposes “vaccine requirements for most foreign national air travelers” whilst also “lifting severe travel restrictions on China, India and much of Europe” (David Shepardson, “Biden imposes new international travel vaccine rules, lifts existing restrictions“, Reuters, 26 October 2022)

That said, the trend towards relaxing non-pharmaceutical interventions may, actually, be a subjective feeling generated by a propensity of Western media to focus on changes and novelty.

To assess more objectively the situation, let us look at the Stringency Index, “a composite measure based on nine response indicators” to the COVID-19 developed by “Our World in Data” and based on the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker.

Video of the evolution of the COVID-19 Stringency Index, “a composite measure based on nine response indicators” to the COVID-19 developed by “Our World in Data” and based on the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker.

The video above shows we are still far away from the world as it was before the pandemic. Policies against the COVID-19 are less stringent they may have been, notably during the first semester of 2020 after the start of the pandemic, but they are still operative.

It also emerges that even though countries may try to relax their anti-COVID-19 measures, they reinstate them relatively rapidly when the COVID-19 starts spreading again and hospitalisations and deaths increase. This was the case in Israel when the fourth wave started (Israel to reinstate indoor mask mandate next week as COVID-19 cases keep rising, 24 June 2021; Statement by PM Bennett, 22 July 2020.

This is now the case in Germany, on some travels: “Travel Restrictions Tighten Up for Arrivals From Bulgaria, Croatia, Singapore, Cameroon & Congo” (22 October 2021).

This is also the case in the Netherlands where the government plans new restriction to face an increase in infections and hospitalisations, mainly so far among unvaccinated people (Reuters, “Dutch consider new coronavirus curbs as infections soar“, 25 October 2021).

Current vaccination as a blank cheque: an open door to increasing the global circulation of the virus?

Fundamentally, full vaccination of the most efficient vaccines tends to be seen as the condition, necessary and sufficient, towards a return to normalcy. The new order relative to travel restrictions President Biden signed on 25 October 2021 perfectly exemplifies this belief (White House, “A Proclamation on Advancing the Safe Resumption of Global Travel During the COVID-⁠19 Pandemic“). The vaccines authorised for entry in the U.S. are those the U.S. regulators or the World Health Organization recognise, which means that the Chinese Sinopharm et Sinovac vaccines are accepted, while the Russian Sputnik and other Chinese vaccines are still under review (“Status of COVID-19 Vaccines within WHO EUL/PQ evaluation process“, 20 October 2021). Mixed-dose coronavirus vaccines will also be accepted (Reuters, Ibid.).

Yet, our understanding of contagion and transmission in vaccinated people is still imperfect and inconclusive, as detailed in the US CDC “Infections in fully vaccinated persons: clinical implications and transmission” in Science Brief: COVID-19 Vaccines and Vaccination – update 15 September 2021. Notably, even if the strength of the contagion potential among vaccinated people remains unclear, studies show that transmission and contagion continue (Ibid.). The efficiency of the vaccines is especially assessed for severe form of COVID-19 – with the aim to prevent hospitals being overwhelmed – and deaths. Data are rarer and show less efficiency of vaccines against “symptomatic disease” in general or “infection” (e.g. Qatar study: 80% of effectiveness of COVID-19 vaccination against asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection, Delta variant, for Moderna, but 36% for Pfizer-BioNTech, Ibid.).

As a result, to consider vaccination as a blank cheque, if no other measure is applied, actually favours the global circulation of the virus rather than restricts it.

Vaccination and its efficiency

The case of Israel

Let us look now at the pattern of the pandemic waves in Israel, as a case study. Having reached a high level of immunization in its population early, Israel is in advance on other countries and provides us with advanced warning of what could happen elsewhere.

Pandemic waves in Israel January 2020 to 24 October 2021 – Infections and Deaths. From Reuters Graphics

On the graph above, we see that, in Israel, vaccination lengthened the time during which infections were at a low level. Rather than having a dip of a few days between the third and the fourth wave, we have a very low level plateau lasting between 9 April and 2 July – i.e. 3 months.

This low level plateau results from the meeting and dynamics of various forces: vaccination and length of the induced immunity, relaxation of non-medical measures and, on the other hand, the dynamic of the virus.

Before the end of the fourth wave Israel started an aggressive campaign of vaccination for a third dose (“Over 1 million Israelis who haven’t had 3rd dose to lose Green Pass on Sunday“, Times of Israel, 28 September 2021). Plans are made to reopen borders only according to relatively stringent conditions, notably a full vaccination scheme (two doses or one accordingly) that is less than six months old, or full vaccination with a third dose (“Hoteliers doubt eased tourist rules will make a difference“, Times of Israel, 24 October 2021).

During the fourth wave, deaths were lowered compared with the previous waves, but only approximately by half. Between 20 June and 25 October 2021, cumulative deaths went from 6427 to 8049, i.e. 1622 people died during the fourth wave.

The start of the fourth wave in Israel stems from two major factors related to vaccination. First, vaccination induced immunity starts to falter after 4 months for milder forms of the disease even so efficiency remains strong for most severe form of the illness for most probably six months (e.g. Matthew Loh and Hilary Brueck, “Pfizer’s COVID-19 protection against infection may wane in months, but it still prevents hospitalization and death for at least 6, new studies suggest“, Insider, 8 October 2021). After six months, data from an Israeli study shows that immunity is “substantially” lowered (Ibid.). Meanwhile, vaccination does not stop contagion, but only reduces it, as seen. Together, these factors mean that as soon as immunity wanes, then as the virus is present and circulates, we have a new peak in contagions, with new peak hospitalisations and deaths, true enough at a lower level than without vaccination.

Global vaccination: insufficient for an impact on the COVID-19 pandemic wave pattern

Knowing that at world level, 3,758 bn people have received one dose of vaccine, that 2,825 bn people are fully vaccinated (WHO COVID-19 dashboard), and that we are approximately 7.9 billion, then it means that only 47,56% of the world population has received at least one dose, and 35,76% is fully vaccinated.

As a result, as one dose of vaccine is quite inefficient against the virus, especially against the Delta variant – or a worse strain – and that the immunity of the fully vaccinated population has started waning, as shown in the case of Israel, it is hard to see vaccination right now having a very strong effect on the shape and pattern of the pandemic waves.

A major global effort, as many times highlighted by the WHO, must be made globally if we want to hope reducing or more boldly mastering the COVID-19 (e.g. AFP/Reuters, ‘Pandemic will end when world chooses to end it’ – WHO chief, RTE, 25 October 2021).

For the time being, if we consider the impact of the anti-COVID measures taken notably related to travel, and the relaxation endeavoured focusing on vaccination, then we can expect that the virus has started circulating more on the planet and that its circulation will increase in the coming weeks or months (actually as long as the current approach continues). As a result, first unvaccinated people will be more at risks. Then, as immunity related to vaccination wanes, as in Israel, we shall see a resurgence and probably rapid increase in cases (we shall look at prospects on lethality on the next article).

Globally, it is thus very likely (between 70% and 85%) that the coming wave will be as serious if not more so than previous waves.

We must also take into account that the second, third and fourth wave took place as borders were more closed and international travels more retrained than what may happen considering new policies. Thus, we should also envision that it is possible to see a new wave looking like the first “wave”, i.e. that would actually not be a wave but a new “global contamination rise”. In that case, the minimal global contamination reached between waves could be much higher than what we have known, and summits could be higher too. In other words, if we imagine the mass of contamination and shape of the pandemic as an iceberg, the height of the iceberg mass could be much higher with peaks over the main mass.

Furthermore, global circulation and contagion favours the emergence and then spread of variants.

The emergence and rise of variants of concern

Our main source for this part is GISAID, which maintains a global database of the genetic sequences of the pandemic coronavirus, EpiCoV, and “employs tools to assign phylogenetic clades and lineages to” these genetic sequences (website). Note that data for Russia, at the date of writing, were last updated on 1 October 2021 and thus do not account for the October 2021 rise in cases.

The variants of the first rise of the COVID-19 pandemic

The first period of “pandemic level rise” corresponded to the spread of the original virus, of its European types variants as well as other variants of concern (VoC) according to continents and countries.

The phylogeny of the SARS-CoV-2 variants is shown in the figure below as created by GISAID (access interactive image on GISAID by clicking on the picture below). We chose to use the now out dated GISAID clades to be able to see the diversity of past variants. The original “Wuhan strain” is the orange dot at the bottom left of the tree.

Phylogeny of the SARS-CoV-2, according to GISAID clade, between 23 December 2019 and 25 October 2021. (Source GISAID and Nextstrain).

The second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic and its variants

The second wave corresponded to the continuous spread of the VoCs of the previous period, to which we now had to add the Alpha, Beta (South Africa) and Gamma (South America/Brasil) variants. The Alpha variant had appeared probably on 1st September 2020 in the UK and notably drove the second wave in Europe. The Beta variant appeared probably on 30 September 2020 and the Gamma variant on 10 November 2020.

Phylogeny of the SARS-CoV-2, according to emerging lineage. Past variants are in grey (Source GISAID and Nextstrain).

The third and fourth wave of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Delta variant

The third wave corresponded to the rise and spread of the Delta variant. The Delta variant appeared probably on 5 October 2020 in India. It strongly drove the third wave and became preeminent.

Phylogeny of the SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant, according to emerging lineage (Source GISAID and Nextstrain).

The fourth wave is also coterminous with the Delta variant that has achieved predominance. The next image shows the global share of the SARS-CoV-2 variants in the world on 22 October 2021.

Global share of the SARS-CoV-2 variants in the world on 22 October 2021 (Source GISAID and Nextstrain).

Variants for the fifth wave?

So far, many variants are observed and surveilled but none has emerged as capable to replace the Delta variant (see, for example, ECDC VoC dashboard).

Delta AY.4.2 aka “Delta plus”

The UK has reported a rise in a new mutation of the Delta variant, AY.4.2 or VUI-21OCT-01, dubbed “Delta Plus” (included within the Delta variant section of GISAID and without a more specific name at the time of writing).

The UK government, produced on 22 October 2021 an extra briefing “to provide information on the new Variant Under Investigation VUI-21OCT-01, AY.4.2” (Technical briefing 26 – Official French analysis using mainly the British technical briefing: “Analyse de risque sur les variants émergents du SARS-CoV-2 réalisée conjointement par Santé publique France et le CNR des virus des infections respiratoires Analyse partielle du 21/10/2021 concernant le sous-lignage AY.4.2” – 21 October 2021).

According to the most recent and complete set of data, “VUI-21OCT-01 accounts for 3.8%, 5.2%, and 5.9% of Delta cases in England in the weeks beginning 19 September, 26 September, and 3 October 2021 respectively (Ibid.).

AY.4.2/VUI-21OCT-01 would also be present in Russia that faces record infections and deaths, and a few cases were observed in Denmark and in the U.S. (Reuters, Russia puts onus on regional leaders to step up COVID fight, 27 October 2021; “Covid-19: New mutation of Delta variant under close watch in UK“, BBC News, 19 October 2021). It was also detected in India and would be present to date in around thirty countries (Malathy Iyer, “Classification of AY.4.2 forces Indian scientists into a huddle …, Times of India, 27 October 2021).

To anticipate on the next article, it is too early to worry about this variant, yet the AY.4.2/VUI-21OCT-01 is closely monitored. Change in severity and lethality cannot yet be assessed (Technical briefing 26). The new variant would appear as maybe slightly more contagious that the original Delta variant but differences do not appear so far to be considerably significant (Ibid.). Assessment will evolve with time.

And the future?

Our understanding of variants, considering the fact that it is the first time in history that a virus can circulate so far and so quickly, is still insufficient to be able to make any valid projections.

What we know is that the more a virus replicates, the higher the odds to see a variant emerging that would also be more efficient, from the virus point of view (e.g. S.A. Rella et al., “Rates of SARS-CoV-2 transmission and vaccination impact the fate of vaccine-resistant strains“, Sci Rep 11, 15729, 2021; Sarah P. Otto, et al., “The origins and potential future of SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern in the evolving COVID-19 pandemic“, Current Biology, Volume 31, Issue 14, 2021; Jessica A Plante et al. “The variant gambit: COVID-19’s next move.” Cell host & microbe vol. 29,4 2021; Vaughn Cooper and Lee Harrison, “Massive numbers of new COVID–19 infections, not vaccines, are the main driver of new coronavirus variants“, The Conversation, 9 September 2021).

Thus, a first primary factor that we must consider is contagion (Ibid.). The length during which the virus stays within an individual also matters (e.g. S.A. Rella et al., “Rates of SARS-CoV-2 transmission, …).

There are also various perspectives, currently, on the dangers an imperfectly vaccinated population constitute regarding the emergence of variants that would escape the immunity induced by vaccines (e.g. S.A. Rella et al., “Rates of SARS-CoV-2 transmission and Cooper and Harrison, “Massive numbers of new COVID–19 infections).

Some scientists stress that, currently, considering the low rate of global vaccination, new variants of concern are more likely to emerge among the non-vaccinated population (Cooper and Harrison, “Massive numbers of new COVID–19 infections). As a result, the vaccinated population is not that much at risk, and the new variants may or not be capable of evading vaccines (Ibid.).

However, an interesting model also highlights that:

“The counterintuitive result of our analysis is that the highest risk of resistant strain establishment occurs when a large fraction of the population has already been vaccinated but the transmission is not controlled.”

Rella, S.A., Kulikova, Y.A., Dermitzakis, E.T. et al. Rates of SARS-CoV-2 transmission and vaccination impact the fate of vaccine-resistant strains. Sci Rep 11, 15729 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-95025-3

Assuming this result obtained through modelisation is correct and valid in reality, then it means that abandoning non-pharmaceutical interventions in largely vaccinated people, as is currently done, is a bad idea. It could indeed favour the emergence of VoCs evading current vaccines.

Thus, to this date, our knowledge is too imperfect for anticipation regarding the emergence of variants of concern. As a result, we can only monitor the through sequencing the evolution of these variants.

Meanwhile, we must also act preventatively by trying to mitigate contagion and length of infection and thus the development of variants, especially those that could escape induced immunity.

Unfortunately, this does not seem to be the direction current policies take.

As a result, it is likely we shall see other variants of concern emerging. The worst case scenario would be to see the emergence of one or many variants evading current vaccines. The capability to “rapidly” create new vaccines using technologies such as Messenger RNA (mRNA) would only partially help handling the threat, considering factors such as testing for safety, manufacturing, delivery of vaccines and then vaccination campaign.

Conclusion

Taken together these factors suggest that we are certainly, globally, at the start of a new wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. The exact start of the wave and its shape will vary according to country.

If measures regarding traveling continue to be relaxed and centred mainly around a simplistic understanding of vaccination, without care for related immunity and continuous spread of infection among and by vaccinated people, and if simple measures such as quarantine, notably at arrival in countries, and efficient face-masks are abandoned, then the coming wave could be worse than the previous one. In such a configuration, the odds to see new worrying variant of concerns would appear to also increase.

The flexibility various governments show to rapidly reinstate stronger and more adapted measures could let us hope that the fifth wave will be controlled.

A global planned approach must imperatively be designed and implemented if we want to move towards a future that we could truly call “post-COVID-19”.

Featured image: Image par Roger Mosley de Pixabay – Public Domain

The Military and the “Climate Blowback” – Summer 2021 (1)

The impacts of climate change are intensifying. Some of these are the multiplying extreme weather events, such as mega wildfires and giant floods. The intensity and the scale of these events are now so important threatening for infrastructures, ecosystems and human life, that they entail a growing mobilisation of military forces. Thus, we need to understand if this means that adapting to climate change implies that the military are an essential component of the answer by nation-states to climate change?

The Long Summer

Throughout the summer of 2021, all around the world, the militaries had to mobilize alongside civil security services against raging mega wildfires and giant, devastating floods.

In the U.S., thousands of troops from the national guard and from the armed services engaged the monsters Dixie and Caldor fires. They did so too for the 45.518 other wildfires that burned almost 6,3 million acres (National InterAgency Fire Centre).

La traduction française est faite par intelligence artificielle / The French translation is done by artificial intelligence.

Among these fires, 46 were very large and 15.533 civil and military personnel were necessary to fight them. Furthermore, the U.S. military had also to mobilise aircrafts and helicopters in order to help the firefighters (NIFC).

Meanwhile, in Russia, the military deployed dozens of military transport aircrafts, in order to move squads of firefighters from one giant forest fire to another in the Siberian Yakut country.

Exactly at the same time, in the south-east of Nizhny Novgorod, in the depths of the deep Russian forest, a huge battle against the fire was taking place near the secret city of Rasov (“Russian army helicopters join battle against Siberian wildfires”, Reuters, 14 July 2021). Starting during the Soviet Union era, Rasov has been the city where Soviet then Russian weapons nuclear have been developed. Containing the huge wildfire there was thus of strategic importance, hence the use of civil security and military forces (“Russian planes seed clouds as raging wildfires near power plant”, Reuters, July 19, 2021).

Soldiers, fire and flood

Casualties

Despite military involvement in Northern and Southern Siberia, the Kremlin sent firefighting and military capabilities in Greece and Turkey. They were to support the national civil security services. On 14 August, eight Turkish and Russian personnel died in a plane crash during a water bombing operation (“Eight dead as Russian firefighting plane crashes in Southern Turkey”, France-24, 14/08/2021). On 10 August, in Algiers, more than 25 soldiers died fighting the huge wildfires in Kabyle country (“Wildfires in Algeria leave 42 people dead, including 25 soldiers”, ABC News, by AP, 11 August 2021).

Urban crisis in China

Still during this catastrophic summer, very heavy downfalls poured in the Henan province. Because of breaking dams, floods literally drowned the 10 million people strong city of Zhengzhou. Against this massive threat, the provincial command of the People’s Liberation Army mobilised. It sent almost 46.000 soldiers and 64.000 militia men to sandbag the city, work on the dams and help rescue people (Elisabeth Chen, “Historic flooding highlights outstanding infrastructures problems”, The Jamestown Foundation, July 30, 2021).

Those are a few examples among the dozens of military mobilisations during the dreadful fire and flood summer of 2021.

However, those mobilisations are not exceptional events as we have highlighted and warned about since 2014 ( Jean-Michel Valantin, “Climate blowback and US National Security”, The Red Team Analysis Society, March 17, 2014).

They are part of a series of other military mobilisations that have become increasingly frequent since the beginning of the 21st century. Indeed, for the past dozen years, they have been occurring on an annual basis, and on an increasing scale, in the United States as well as in other countries. (Michael Klare, (Michael Klare, All Hell Breaking Loose, The Pentagon’s Perspective on Climate Change, 2019).

In fact, this type of military mobilisation is nothing but a strong signal, getting stronger every year, of the consequences of climate change (See Jean-Michel Valantin, “Global Apocalypse, The California Way”, “The Global Wildfire (1)“,  « The U.S Army versus a warming Planet », The Red Team Analysis Society)

Armies from the cold

Arctic warming, militarization of the Arctic

This new military reality is also quite pregnant in the rapidly warming and changing Arctic. As we have explained in The Red Team Analysis Society’s publications, and related conferences since 2014, notably the Russian, Chinese, Japanese, and Indian race towards the Arctic is contributing to drive the emergence of the continental Russo-Asian bloc.

Indeed, the vast Arctic Russian economic exclusive zone is attracting Russian and Asian energy developpers (Jean-Michel Valantin, “The Warming Russian Arctic: Where Russian and Asian Strategies Interests Converge?”, The Red Team Analysis Society, November 23, 2016).

The mammoth oil, gas, mineral and biological resources there are becoming a giant economic attractor.

Meanwhile, because of the effects of the Arctic warming, the Russian authorities open the “ Northern sea route”. This new sea lane follows the Siberian coast and connects the Bering Strait to Norway and the Northern Atlantic.

From geophysics to geopolitics

Thus, it also connects the immense Asian basins of economic development to Northern Europe and to the Atlantic. In the same time, Moscow militarizes the Siberian coast and the archipelagos.

In the same dynamic, the Russian Northern Fleet and Army multiply patrols and sea and land manoeuvres. Thus, over the last few years, NATO, the U.S. and Scandinavian militaries have also been multiplying national and regional manoeuvres in the Arctic. This is especially true in Norway and the Barents Sea. Those are very close to the Russian land, air and sea frontiers.

The number of air patrols and military exercises grows year after year. For example, on 20 October 2020, the U.S.S. Ross missile-guided destroyer sailed its third tour of the year in the Barents Sea (Thomas Nilsen, “Increase in NATO scrambled jets from Norway”, The Independent Barents Observer, and “US warship returns Barents Sea”, September 14, and October 2020).

The Arctic as military Area of responsibility

This follows the installation of the NATO Atlantic Command at the Norfolk Navy base, in September 2020. The area of responsibility of this new command is the protection of European and North American sea-lanes. Among them, we find the Greenland-Iceland-U.K. (GIUK) gap to and from the Arctic.

In other words, the Joint Force Norfolk Command’s mission is to project U.S. and NATO power in the Arctic (Levon Sevuts, “NATO’s new Atlantic command to keep watch over the European Arctic”, The Independent Barents Observer, September 18, 2020).

Adaptation

However, the mobilization of the military when facing the growing number and intensification of extreme weather events, as well as the militarization of the Arctic, are signalling a deeper level of the emerging reality, i.e the deep relationship between adaptation to climate change and military issues ( Jean-Michel Valantin, “Climate blowback and US National Security”, The Red Team Analysis Society, March 17, 2014).

Domestic and international threats

As it happens, the chain reactions of climate change consequences are generating an uninterrupted series of threats. Those are endangering the integrity of territories and societies, as well as the geopolitical distribution of power. This is why the rapidly growing involvement of the national defence apparatus becomes both a necessity as well as mean for the adaptation of nations to climate change.

When Europe seeks to move forward with its defense, this is a new component that must be integrated.

Towards “climate wars”?

This also means that the very complex issues of national and international security and of war are now rapidly merging with the climate change issue.

Are climate wars starting?

Featured image: U.S. Army Soldiers from the 2-3 Infantry Battalion, 1-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team, assigned to Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, led by strike team crew boss Ricardo Rubio, a National Interagency Fire Center fire fighter, walk down a vehicle trail as they look to hold and patrol containment lines while deployed in support of the Department of Defense wildland firefighting response operations on the Dixie Fire in Plumas National Forest, California, Sept. 4, 2021. U.S. Army North, as U.S. Northern Command’s Joint Force Land Component Command, remains committed to providing flexible DoD support to the National Interagency Fire Center to respond quickly and effectively to assist our local, state, and federal partners in protecting people, property, and public lands.(U.S. Army Photo by Sgt. Deion Kean) (U.S. Army Photo by Sgt. Deion Kean) – Public Domain

China’s Perception of U.S. International Politics

(Art design: Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli)

The relationships between the two superpowers, the U.S. and China, dominate the international world. Here, we look at the way China perceives American foreign relations.

How the U.S. perceives China and how much the former sees the latter as a threat, what this will entail in terms of future American actions and the impacts on the world and for individual actors are the topics of many articles and analyses. Patrick Wintour interestingly presents such analyses in his article “Is China stepping up its ambition to supplant US as top superpower?” (The Guardian, 22 September 2021).

However, as the third decade of the 21st century dawns, we are facing not one but two extremely powerful actors on the world stage. Thus, we cannot stop at U.S.’ perceptions of China. We must also look at the reverse, China’s perceptions of the U.S.

This is the purpose of this article, which focuses upon the way China perceives American foreign relations and international politics. We thus seek to understand the Chinese perception of the American world order. In a first part, we explain why perceptions matter in international politics and how understanding the perception of each actor is key for creating a valid international position and course of action. We then give instances of the way China conceptualises international politics. Finally, using the fact that visions and perceptions are historically constructed, we argue that China uses its own understanding of the international world to decrypt American international actions and decipher the U.S. vision of international politics. It is then within this framework for understanding that China will understand and assess American international relations and devise its own actions and reactions.

Perceptions in international politics: why does it matter?

A key approach in strategy and international relations’ analysis

At least since Jervis published his seminal book Perception and Misperception in International Politics in 1976, perceptions have been commonly used in international politics and foreign relations and recognised as very important indeed. Likewise, through taking into account biases and seeking to mitigate them, perceptions are a key part of intelligence and strategic foresight and warning analysis (see our course Mitigating Biases as well as our course on Analytical Modeling). The practice of red teaming and red team analysis is nothing else that taking the point of view of the enemy, and, by extension, of other actors. As a result, red teaming means fundamentally being able to perceive the world as others do.

We can also argue that considering the perceptions of others is much older, and a fundamental part of strategy, politics and international affairs. For example, how the other thinks thus perceives the world is part of Sun Tzu ‘s advice in The Art of War:

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, III. (Attack by Stratagem), 18.

Using perceptions

Hence perceptions, knowing and understanding who is perceiving what, is absolutely vital for students and analysts of international politics writ large.

The logic of perceptions in foreign relations and international politics runs as follows. To act in the world and achieve your vision and objectives, you need notably to anticipate what others will do. To do so, you must understand how these others perceive the world, besides knowing their objectives. The others behave similarly to decide about their actions. Once you have done this fundamental analysis, then you consider all other elements of power, including capabilities, and perception thereof.

Then, out of the resulting interactions a new situation evolves, which is also understood according to perceptions. The revision of perceptual models is very rare indeed (e.g. see Anderson, Craig A., Mark R. Lepper, and Lee Ross, “Perseverance of Social Theories: The Role of Explanation in the Persistence of Discredited Information“, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1980, Vol. 39, No.6, 1037-1049; Online Course on Mitigating biases, Online Course on Analytical Modeling).

As a result, and as highlighted by Sun Tzu, if you understand how actors perceive the world, then you are one step closer to be able to properly understand them, to anticipate their actions and thus to achieve your own objectives and then vision.

Without this perception, you are most likely to make mistakes and to fail to achieve your objectives.

Hence, considering China’s increasing weight in the 21st century world, as well as the tension and competition between the U.S. and China, it is crucial, for all actors, to consider Chinese perceptions.

China’s typical perception of the international order

The Tribute System

Since the masterful work by John Κ. Fairbank, “A Preliminary Framework” and the corresponding edited effort The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (ed. John Κ. Fairbank, 1968), the so called “Tribute System” plays a center role in our understanding of the way China organised and still organises its foreign relations, as grounded in this traditional Chinese World Order. Scholars will agree with, tend to disagree with, and amend the framework offered by Fairbank (see bibliography for selected examples). Nonetheless this framework remains central.

Portraits of Periodical Offering (Chinese official tributary documentary paintings) – Tang Dynasty: The Gathering of Kings (王會圖), by Yan Liben (閻立本, 601-673 CE) – Click here to access on Wikimedia Media Viewer or here for Zoom Media Viewer

According to Fairbank (ibid. p.108), the Chinese world order is a sino-centric hierarchical framework, historically constructed, expressed and informed by a set of practices and ideas that define the relations between China and the rest of the world.

At the heart of the system, we find China, Zhong Guo (中國/中国, the Central State, the Middle Kingdom).

Countries are then ordered according to concentric circles.

The first circle is composed of :

“… the Sinic Zone, consisting of the most nearby and culturally similar tributaries, Korea and Vietnam, parts of which had anciently been ruled within the Chinese empire and also the Liu-ch’iu (Ryukyu) Islands and, at brief times, Japan.”

Fairbank, “A Preliminary Framework”, p.108

Then comes the second circle:

“… The inner Asian Zone, consisting of tributary tribes and states of the nomadic or seminomadic peoples of Inner Asia, who were not ethnically and culturally non Chinese but were also outside or on the fringe of the Chinese culture area…”

Fairbank, “A Preliminary Framework”, p.108

Third we have the last circle:

“The Outer Zone, consisting of ‘outer barbarians’ (wai-yi) [外夷 also external barbarians] generally, at a further distance over land and sea, including eventually Japan and other states of Southeast and South Asia and Europe that were supposed to send tribute when trading.”

Fairbank, “A Preliminary Framework”, p.108
Portraits of Periodical Offering (Chinese official tributary documentary paintings) – Qing Dynasty: Huángqīng Zhígòngtú by Xiesui (謝遂), 18th century – Click here to access on Wikimedia Media Viewer or here for Zoom Media Viewer – for detailed pages see here.

Central Asian States under the Qing, for example, also belonged to this circle (Hsiao-Ting Lin, “The Tributary System in China’s Historical Imagination…”, 2009).

Communist theories of world order

The encirclement of cities by rural areas

“Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, and Lin Biao waving copies of The Little Red Book at the Tiananmen Palace in Beijing”, 1st October 1967 (Public Domain via Wikimedia Commons)

During the Cultural Revolution, in September 1965, General Lin Biao, published his famous article “Long Live the Victory of the People’s War!“, which defined the Chinese theory of the encirclement of the “cities” by the “rural areas”.

Lin Biao theorised that the revolutions that would increasingly take place in the rural world throughout the planet would end up fully encircling the cities that symbolised rich countries. The Popular Republic of China was of course part of the spreading and encircling rural areas.

Mao’s Three Worlds

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Bibliography

Cohen, Raymond, “Threat Perception in International Crisis,” Political Science Quarterly 93, no. 1 (1978);

Cranmer-Byng, J. L., “The Chinese Perception of World Order”, International Journal, Winter, 1968/1969, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Winter, 1968/1969), pp. 166-171.

Fairbank, John Κ., “A Preliminary Framework”, in The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations, ed. John Κ. Fairbank, Harvard University Press 2013 (1968).

Hsiao-Ting Lin, “The Tributary System in China’s Historical Imagination: China and Hunza, ca. 1760-1960”, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Third Series, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Oct., 2009), pp. 489-507 (19 pages).

Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, 2d ed 2017)

Jiang Yonglin, “Thinking About “Ming China” Anew: The Ethnocultural Space in a Diverse Empire – with Special Reference to the “Miao Territory“, Journal of Chinese History, 2 (2018), 27–78.

Schwak, Juliette, “Towards Post Western IRT: A Confucian reading of Northeast Asian international society”, Congrès AFSP Aix 2015.

Zhang Feng, “Rethinking the ‘Tribute System’: Broadening the Conceptual Horizon of Historical East Asian Politics”, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 2, 2009, 545–574

Zijia He, “Disparities between American and Chinese Perceptions on Chinese Foreign Policy“, CMC SENIOR THESES, 2018.

Wang Yuan-kang, “Explaining the Tribute System: Power, Confucianism, and War in Medieval East Asia“, Journal of East Asian Studies 13 (2013), 207–232

When Seas and Maps Impact Geostrategy and the Future

Sovereign territory is key for power and for activities. This principle will most probably remain more or less so in the foreseeable future. Thus, what is the territory over which each state is sovereign? What is the size of each of these territories? And where are these territories located? How does the geographical international world look like?

We think we, of course, know the answers to these questions. Certainly, for example, the largest states must be Russia, the U.S., Canada and China. Certainly, European states are strong only in geographical Europe. But what if these answers were wrong? What if the real international and global world within which we live and will live looked quite differently from the representations to which we are most often used?

Using maps, this article focuses on a representation of the world that is coherent with reality. It insists on the importance to consider the seas and sovereignty over maritime territories globally rather than to look solely at outdated representations centred on landmass. It highlights geo-strategic consequences of this “revised” territorial representation of the world and underlines a few recommendations.

Classical representation of the world

Representation of the world, maps and strategy

Representations of the world embodied as maps define how we think, plan ahead, act.

Representations influence how we think strategically. If we want to design and implement successful strategies, then we need to make sure our mental representations are close enough to reality.

Our conceptions of the geographical space within which we live will constrain and enable what we deem as possible, our vision and objectives, how we design and carry out strategies to realise our objectives, planning and implementation of policies.

They are keys in terms of envisioning global power interplay, which country we think has most chances to win or lose, to be a superpower or not, to be part significantly of the international order or not. They are keys in terms of defense and security, from classical defence and war to planning ahead for threats stemming from climate change, biodiversity loss and more generally ecosystems’ changes. The are key in economic terms. They are key in terms of deciding where to locate factories and offices. They are key in terms of logistics.

Changing our representation of space may change what we do and how we conceptualise ourselves, as well as our relationship to others.

For example, modern geography and especially mapping has been critical in the development of nation-ness and the idea of a nation. It has been no less critical in allowing for the imposition of the principles of the modern nation-state worldwide – i.e. sovereignty, territoriality and independence (see with a related bibliography Hélène Lavoix, “The Power of Maps“, The Red Team Analysis Society, 2012).

A classical focus on landmass

One of the most ancient maps of the world, a Mappa Mundi, is the Tabula Peutingeriana, possibly a medieval copy of a Roman map (ca. 250) created around 1250 (Ulrich Harsch Bibliotheca Augustana). It looks as illustrated in the images below:

Tabula Peutingeriana, 1-4th century CE. Facsimile edition by Konrad Miller, 1887/1888, Public Domain via Wikimedia Commons – Click on image to access on ZoomViewer.

The focus is on major landmass displaying road networks, cities, some geographical features such as rivers and mountains, with nonetheless known seas and islands, as shown here with Corsica and Sardinia (first image). The political centredness of Rome is also highlighted (second image).

Currently, the 21st century Mappa Mundi to which we are used looks as below:

Political Map of the World from the Central Intelligence Agency‘s World Factbook 2015, Public Domain.

This is a typical political map of the world. The source of the map, the CIA World Factbook, tells us that it is indeed the most common and widespread perception of the world in terms international security, international relations, and geopolitics, as well as economic activity.

With this type of maps, we focus on known land-mass, with small and tiny islands powered over oceans. We also look at distance between sovereign, independent and territorial states. We are interested in borders and especially contested boundaries.

In case of disputes on boundaries, then we focus on more precise and detailed maps, such as the one below for the potential for conflict in the East and South China Sea.

Chinese Territorial Claims and Disputes, the U.S. view – 2020 China Military Power Report to Congress – Department of Defense

Similar maps are drawn according to domains and interests, from energy to mining, through military commands and armies.

Whatever the outlook, the framework for the representation is landmass first, accessorily, unfortunately or even unimportantly in the middle of oceans, handled through ports and transportation lanes.

Seeing the Seas and under the Seas

Updating maps

Now, this focus on main continental landmasses gives us a wrong picture of reality. Two fundamental elements are lacking: exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and continental shelf, which led to claims for extended continental shelf (ECS).

Maybe the easiest way to understand what the EEZ and the continental shelf represent in geopolitical terms is first to imagine the earth without the oceans. Emerged lands (the current landmasses) would then appear as the top of more or less large mountains and plateaux. What we perceive usually as a state’s territory would be located starting from the top of these mountains or plateaux to the coast line (or land boundary as agreed with neighbours). Another slice of territory would be located around the country and spread over 12 nautical miles (the territorial sea). Then another much larger territory would be located within the next “boundary” line, at 200 nautical miles (the EEZ) from the coastline. Finally, a last slice of territory would spread, if it exists, over 360 nautical miles of the continental shelf to which the mountain or plateau belongs, starting from the coast line, or if the continental shelf is smaller than 350 nautical miles, then its end.*

Jean-Benoît Bouron provides a very clear graphic showing these different zones in « Mesurer les Zones Économiques Exclusives », Géoconfluences, mars 2017

All the ground within the last ECS revisited boundary is under the sovereign jurisdiction of the state, more or less as for usual emerged landmass*, which includes all exploitation rights.

Then you can fill in again the depth with the water of the seas and oceans. All the water that is within the 200 nautical miles is under the sovereign juridiction of the state.

For the European Union, for example, the right map with the EEZs looks like the image below (access through the European Marine Observation and Data Network (EMODnet) portal).

EMODnet Map of the EU countries plus the UK and their EEZ – 13 November 2020 – Click on image to access interactive map

Yet, even this much better map is not completely correct. We must add to it the extended continental shelf (ECS) claims each country had to submit by 13 May 2009 (for more details, Helene Lavoix, “The Deep-Sea Resources Brief“, updated 5 January 2018). We can see what these claims cover on the picture below.

Map – One Stop Datashop (OSDS) – Continental Shelf Programme – 13 Sept. 2021 – Click on image to access interactive map.

If you click on an area, on the interactive mapping website by GRID Arendal, then you will see which country laid claim to this area, as well as the status of the claim.

Now, if we combine all maps, we obtain a representation of the world that is very different indeed from what we are used to (note that Antarctica territories are still missing from these maps**).

Which international actors are truly global powers?

The only truly geographically global power is the European Union, as long as it remains united. The loss of Great Britain was a serious blow in geopolitical terms, with the loss of South Atlantic supremacy. Comparatively, the U.S. is a Pacific power. Furthermore, the EU’s total EEZs represent 20,07 million km2, while the next power, the U.S., only totals 12,17 million km2 (Jean-Benoît Bouron, “Mesurer les Zones Économiques Exclusives“, Géoconfluences, 23 Mars 2017).

First image: EMODnet Map of the EU countries plus the UK and their EEZ – 13 November 2020.
Second image: NOAA’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the United States and affiliated islands (dark blue). 

China Exclusive Economic Zones and disputes by ASDFGHJ, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons

China remains within its traditional boundaries, to which the disputed South and East China Sea zones must be added. The absence of maritime and continental shelf possessions for China contributes strongly to explain its extremely active multinational and international vision as well as its related efforts with the International Seabed Authority (ISA), regarding the Arctic and Antarctica (see Helene Lavoix, “The Ultimate Key Technologies of the Future (3) – Extreme Environments“, The Red Team Analysis Society, June 2021; Jean-Michel Valantin, “Antarctic China (2) – China’s Planetary Game” and “Antarctic China (1): Strategies for a Very Cold Place“, 31 May & 28 June 2021, as well as Jean Michel Valantin articles on the Arctic, The Red Team Analysis Society). If China wants to be a global power with a corresponding geographical basis, it has no other choice. China’s space strategy may also be seen within this framework as, by completely displacing the “theatre of operations”, and making it planetary and not only earthly, then China could make partly obsolete its worldwide lack of presence on the globe.

Changing a component of power: a different ranking relative to territory

With the new global map revisited to add the EEZs and ECSs, the real size and potential power of states changes.

Global territory per international actor (in millions of km2) – ranked per EEZs and ECS and ranked per total territory – Sources: mainly Bouron, “Mesurer les Zones Économiques Exclusives“, Ibid; USGS and NOAA; Portail national des limites maritimes; Wikipedia.  

Russia is the largest international actor, closely followed the EU. The U.S. arrives next. China is far beyond. India is even further away. Australia then Canada, however, arrive right after the U.S. Yet, Canada EEZs is exclusively located around its landmass, nonetheless making it an Arctic power. Australia has, thanks to the sea and its EEZs, a substantial presence in the Indian Ocean.

In terms of states, despite small initial landmasses, France becomes the 7th largest country in the world – on a par with China – while New Zealand and the UK respectively become the 9th and 10th largest countries. Germany ranks far below and was added only for the sake of comparison.

France, indeed, has the second largest maritime territory after the U.S. and this territory is spread principally in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The U.S. is absent from the Indian Ocean. Even though it is not visible on the maps, the U.S. is an Arctic power but not an Antarctic one, while France is an Antarctic power but not and Arctic one. The UK with also a global presence is especially strong in the South Atlantic Ocean.

The U.S. EEZs territory (left) and France 2014 EEZs and ECS territory (right)
Left: NOAA’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the United States and affiliated islands (dark blue). Right: SHOM map 2014 – used on the “Tableau des superficies” webpage, Limites Maritimes 

Taking stock of the maritime dimension of territory and power

Hence, it would be logical, strategically, that France, the UK and the EU conceptualise their power in terms of territory and notably maritime territory. This may come easily to the UK considering its history, but may be much harder for the EU and France.

On the contrary, China, and in a lesser way Russia, are fundamentally land-based powers, which, of course, is far from stopping them to develop maritime power (Valantin, Arctic articles, Ibid.). Yet, in the case of China, it has to do so without “points d’appuis”, hence the critical importance of the maritime part of the Chinese Belt and Road, that supplements China’s lack of substantial maritime territory (Valantin, “Militarizing the Maritime New Silk Road“, The Red Team Analysis Society, 3 April 2017).

The importance of this maritime territory seems to start being considered at the EU level, as, for example, the “EU extend[ed] trade defence rules to continental shelf and exclusive economic zones of Member States” on 3rd July 2019. Yet trade is only a part of the instruments of power. Further detailed research and assessment would be needed here.

A difficult adaptation: the complex case of France?

If we look, as another example, at the official 2019 French Army document, France and Security in the Indo-Pacific, it appears quite clearly that old representations are hard-lived. It seems to be difficult to fully start thinking in terms of global territoriality, as shown in the first map of the gallery below.

This does not mean that all French actors have an outdated vision, as shown for example, by the Ifremer, the report of the French Economic Social and Environmental Council (CESE) mentioned below, or the more recent portail national des limites maritimes, using only the maps they provide as weak signals (second, third and fourth map in the gallery below).

First image: French Army, France and Security in the Indo-Pacific, 2019 p.3 – Second Image: Ifremer
Third image: SHOM interactive map, access from portail national des limites maritimes – Fourth Image:  Gérard Grignon, “Extension of the Continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles:an asset for France“, Economic Social and Environmental Council, 2013, p.74

Yet, be it for lack of understanding, vision or something else, for unknown reasons, in 2009, France withdrew the filing of the preliminary information regarding the ECS of Clipperton, thus abandoning or postponing the assertion of sovereign rights. This was done under President Sarkozy, of the Republican Party (right, LR). This abandon was denounced, for example, by the special report of the French Economic Social and Environmental Council (CESE), which is only consultative (Gérard Grignon, “Extension of the Continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles:an asset for France“, 2013, pp. 25 & 33, 125-129), as:

“an unacceptable abandoning of the sovereignty of France over its legitimate pretentions.”

Grignon, “Extension of the Continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles:an asset for France“, p.33

Obviously, nothing has been done to remedy this incredible action and submit the claim as recommended, as the official website of the national maritime limits does not list any ECS for Clipperton (portail national des limites maritimes, “tableau des superficies”, access 15 sept 2021), despite French rights, the existence of resources such as hydrothermal sulfur (Grignon, ibid. p.141 using Ifremer, note N°3 Ocean Mineral Resources, September 21, 2012), and possibly polymetallic nodules.

In general, considering the overall French territory, it looks like the French ECS are particularly small. Indeed, for example, apart from Clipperton, other territories were not followed up and no preliminary information was filed for them during the Sarkozy and then Holland Presidency (Grignon, Ibid., p.61, 125-133). As a whole, it would seem that 725.297 km2 of ECS have been recognised (“tableau des superficies”), when the CESE calculates that 2.510.544 km2 could be claimed (Grignon, pp. 134-135). 2.5 million km2 correspond to 3,7 times the French emerged territory.

The diversity of visions – and actions – of the various French actors should not be a surprise and has long presided over the destiny of the country, notably when exploration and overseas territory are concerned (from Jacques Cartier and the Nouvelle France, to the “Loss of India” – actually trade posts – under Louis XV, through settlements in the French American territories, support of the Americans in the War of Independence, the necessity to go against Napoleon III for a global vision, or the refusal to rely on and completely consider Protectorates and Colonies during World War II, despite demands by the people of these territories – e.g. among others, Raoul Girardet, L’Idée Coloniale en France, (Paris, Hachette/Pluriel, [1972], 1978); Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, « La colonisation française 1931-1939;» in Histoire de La France Coloniale : III. Le Déclin, ed. Vol.3 (Paris: Armand Colin, Agora, 1991); Helene Lavoix, ‘Nationalism’ and ‘genocide’ : the construction of nation-ness, authority, and opposition – the case of Cambodia (1861-1979) – PhD Thesis – School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2005).

Yet, France is de facto the first power in the Indian Ocean. It is also a very strong power in the Pacific possibly on a par with the United States (for the Southern part).

Interestingly, if we think about the old 19th century idea of François Guizot, the policy of “points d’appuis” across the globe allowing for force’s projection (and initially coal and other supplies for steamboats in the then competition with the UK, see Lavoix, Nationalism and Genocide, Ibid.), then the French Caribbean Islands and Clipperton are important locations to reach French areas in the Pacific.

Improbable neighbours

Another consequence of looking globally at the territory of international actors is to become fully aware of the existence of “improbable” neighbours. For example, Australia and France are neighbours, around the Kerguelen islands and New Caledonia. Australia and Norway similarly are neighbours (North of Antarctica). These relationships exist also considering neighbourhood on Antarctica**.

This entails possibly thinking differently about alliances or to the least strong cooperation.

Why does that matter and recommendations

Among the crucial factors that will shape our future, we find climate change and biodiversity loss, or more largely ecosystems’ changes, and ressources (including energy) rarefaction, all leading us to increasingly use new, more extreme, territories.

One such extreme territory is the deep-sea, which involves knowing it, protecting it yet using it. As a result, being able to exploit in a truly sustainable way the abyss, to then transport the obtained ressources where they are needed, to police the related areas and secure them will be of primary importance.

Being sovereign over such territories, which are de facto maritime, will be a factor of wealth and survival. Being able to use these territories strategically is no less important, as shown by the Chinese efforts and successes in this field (e.g. Lavoix, “The Ultimate Key Technologies…”, Ibid.).

The links between the global maritime domain and space should be neither forgotten nor underestimated as space is key for navigation and communications for example.

Halieutic resources and their preservation, of course, should not be forgotten.

Groups of interested players, be they public, private or mix, should move forward to invest and develop sustainable capabilities and management of flows in the EEZs and ECS, more particularly in the deep-sea. They should include start-ups and make sure innovation and multi-disciplinary research is fully included. They may have to apply lobbying pressure on states. This strategy could be particularly useful when or if official rulers and administrations happily practice neglect to the point of default.

Companies should rethink their strategies to consider how the world truly looks like and how related alliances and tensions may evolve and impact their activity.

States, diplomats and armies should make sure they have and will have the means to ensure the security of the territory under their sovereignty, especially considering the increasingly tense context and the rising challenges of the future.

Note

* We are here adopting a geopolitical approach, not an international law dispute vision. Our purpose is not discuss the differences between sovereignty and boundaries related to territorial sea, EEZs, preeminence of the law of the sea, etc, nor the relationships between power, force, international relations, international law, international system, etc.

**”As the Washington Treaty of 1 December 1959 froze all claims to the Antarctic continent, possessor states, such as France, cannot exercise sovereignty or jurisdiction over the waters beyond the Antarctic territory they claim. Requests to extend the continental shelf are also suspended. As a result, the maritime spaces relating to Adelie Land are not included in the maritime spaces currently in force for France.” (Limites maritimes, Tableau des superficies, 2021).

Featured image: Photo by Dorothe form PxHere – Public Domain

From Seer to King – Success with Strategic Foresight and Warning

(Art design: Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli)

Have you ever heard about Cassandra’s brother, who shared his sister’s gift of prophecy but not her curse?

Could this legend, as other ancient myths, facts and histories, give us some clues to make our delivery and communication of strategic foresight and early warning products more efficient? Could it tell us something about improving the fate of strategic foresight and early warning practitioners and risk managers?

Listen to the article as a deep dive conversation on our podcast, Foresight Frontlines – Methodology series – created with NotebookLM.

After telling the story of Helenus, we highlight the lessons we can learn from the tale.

The Tale of Helenus

The story of Helenus comes from weaving together the texts of different Greek and Roman authors, each bringing light to a part of our hero’s life. We use here:

  • Homeric poems possibly created in the 8th century BC (between 8th and 6th century for their written form). English translation as in the text. Traduction française (FR) par Charles-René-Marie Leconte de L’Isle.
  • Virgil: Roman poet, 70 BC – 19 BC. English translation as in the text. Traduction française (FR) Anne-Marie Boxus et Jacques Poucet, 2009.
  • Conon: Greek grammarian and mythographer, 63 BC – 14 AD/CE.
  • Dictys Cretensis: fictitious account probably created in Greek around the 1st or 2nd century CE (e.g. “Dictys Cretensis“, Luwian Studies, 2005?).
  • (Pseudo-)Apollodorius, Library (or Bibliotheca): a compendium of Greek myths and legends: 1st, 2nd or 3rd century CE (e.g. Stefano Acerbo, “Anonymous: Apollodorus Bibliotheca [The Library of Apollodorus]. The Literary Encyclopedia“, January 2019, Researchgate).
  • Pausanias: Greek geographer, 110 AD/CE – c. 180 AD/CE.

Helenus was a Trojan Prince, the son of King Priam and Queen Hecuba and the twin-brother of Cassandra. One day, the two children fell asleep in the temple of Apollo Thymbraeus and were found in the morning with serpents at their side licking their ears. From then on they could see and tell the future, as they had received the gift of prophecy (Apollodorus, Library, Sir James George Frazer, Ed, 9.fn 20 Scholiast on Hom. Il. vii.44; Tzetzes, Scholiast on Lycophron, Introd. vol. i. pp. 266ff., ed. C. G. Müller).

Helenus became “far the best of augurs” (Homer, Iliad, vi. 76).

As Troy was attacked by the Greeks and the battle raged, during the first years of the war, Helenus went to Aeanas, a second cousin, son of goddess Aphrodite and favoured by Apollo, and to Hector, his eldest brother, and foretold them in detail how they could turn the tide in the battle and obtain a victory. His prophecy included seeing Hector advising the Queen their Mother that she should lead the offerings of the Trojan wives to “flashing-eyed Athene” so that the goddess would remove the feared most valiant Greek warrior Diomedes from the battle. The Goddess had to be won to the Trojans’ side as she was siding with the Greeks. Hector was wise enough to carefully listen to his brother and do as advised. As a result,

“… and they [the enemy] deemed that one of the immortals had come down from starry heaven to bear aid to the Trojans, that they rallied thus. [110] And Hector shouted aloud and called to the Trojans:
“Ye Trojans, high of heart, and far-famed allies, be men, my friends, and bethink you of furious valour, the while I go to Ilios* and bid the elders that give counsel, and our wives [115] to make prayer to the gods, and promise them hecatombs.”

Homer, Iliad, vi. 76

Some time later, as “flashing-eyed”, “daughter of great Zeus” Athene wanted to act to favour the Greeks and stop too many Trojan victories, Apollo, supporter of Troy, rushed to meet her. The god “king Apollo, son of Zeus” had to find a way to stop her meddling, thus preserving Troy, yet to also satisfy her. The gods finally agreed on a plan contenting them both and postponing a costly battle for singular combats against the most valiant Hector,

“… And Helenus, the dear son of Priam, understood in spirit [45] this plan that had found pleasure with the gods in council; and he came and stood by Hector’s side, and spake to him, saying: “Hector, son of Priam, peer of Zeus in counsel, wouldst thou now in anywise hearken unto me? for I am thy brother. Make the Trojans to sit down, and all the Achaeans, [50] and do thou challenge whoso is best of the Achaeans to do battle with thee man to man in dread combat. Not yet is it thy fate to die and meet thy doom; for thus have I heard the voice of the gods that are for ever.” So spake he and Hector rejoiced greatly when he heard his words… “

Homer, Iliad, vii. 44

Helenus was also an accomplished warrior and he fought against the Greek besides his brothers (e.g. Homer, Iliad, xii. 94).

As time went on, the heroes, both Greek and Trojan, were slain one after the other, the death of one leading to grief, retribution and the death of another. Patrocles, Hector, Achilles, and then Paris were killed. The gods were not in rest and fully battled and argued among themselves for their favoured side.

As Paris had died, Helenus sought to marry his widow, Helene. Alas, his younger brother Deiphobus was preferred through manipulations and “by the favour & faction of the Great” (Conon, Narrationes, 34).

In different and posterior version of the tale, Helenus and Aeneas were outraged to see sacrilege behaviour taking place in Troy, as Alexander, a son of Priam had tricked Achilles and wounded him in the temple of Apollo (Dictys Cretensis iv. 18).

In these two accounts, Helenus decided to leave Troy and take refuge on Mount Ida.

“…He [Helenus] feared not death but the gods, whose shrines Alexander had desecrated, a crime which neither Aeneas nor himself was able to bear. As for Aeneas, he, fearing our anger, had stayed behind with Antenor and old Anchises,…
… During the same time, the sons of Antimachus (whom we have mentioned above) came to Helenus as representatives of Priam. But he refused to do as they begged, that is, to return to his people; and so they departed. 

Dictys Cretensis iv. 18

The Greeks learning about Helenus retreat then either made him prisoner and forced him to speak, or enticed him in doing so.

While [Helenus] was living there quietly, Calchas persuaded the Greeks to set up an ambush for him, and to make him a prisoner of war, in which they succeeded. Helenus, intimidated, prayed to, caressed, and driven also by his resentment, revealed to the Greeks the secret of the state; that the fate of Troy was that it could only be taken by means of a wooden horse, & that it was necessary moreover to remove a statue fallen from Heaven, called the Palladium,[146] which of all the statues preserved in the citadel, was the smallest. “

Conon, Narrationes, 34 – Note: The Palladium is a wooden statue of Pallas Athena, “Athene the wise“.

And thus the fate of Troy was sealed. Troy fell.

Helenus destiny was now linked to the Greeks. He foretold Pyrrhus the elder that he would settle in Epirus, which Pyrrhus did. Pyrrhus granted Helenus the kingdom of Chaonians. Thus, Helenus became king. Helenus married Andromach, Hector’s then Pyrrhus’ widow (Pausanias, Description de la Grèce, Tome premier, l’Attique, i. 11, ii. 23, fn 139 and 140). Aenas, fleeing from the twice fallen Troy as the gods had ordered him, his father Anchises on his back, discovered thus described the surprising situation:

[294] “Here the rumour of a tale beyond belief fills our ears, that Priam’s son Helenus, is reigning over Greek cities, having won the wife and kingdom of Pyrrhus, son of Achilles, and that Andromache has again passed to a husband of her own race.

Virgil, Aeneid, iii. 294-490

King Helenus welcomed his cousin as he arrived. Then, Aenas, worried about his trip and his destiny, took the opportunity to seek the prophecy of the great seer.

[356] “… ‘O son of Troy, interpreter of the gods, who know the will of Phoebus, the tripod and laurel of the Clarian, the stars, and tongues of birds and omens of the flying wing, come, tell me – for every sign from heaven has uttered favourable words to me about my journey, and all the gods in their oracles have counseled me to make for Italy and explore lands remote; only Celaeno the Harpy prophesies a startling portent, horrible to tell of, and threatens baleful wrath and foul famine – what perils am I first to shun? And by what course may I surmount such suffering?

Virgil, Aeneid, iii. 356.

As during the beginning of the Trojan war, Helenus offered a foresight that was detailed and full of advice, even though incomplete as mortals cannot know all and the gods always hide some of their designs.

Then Helenus, first sacrificing steers in due form, craves the grace of heaven and unbinds the fillets of his hallowed brow; with his own hand he leads me to your gates, Phoebus, thrilled with your full presence, and then with a priest’s inspired lips thus prophesies:

[374] “’Goddess-born, since there is clear proof that under higher auspices you journey over the sea – for thus the king of the gods allots the destinies and rolls the wheel of change, and such is the circling course – a few things out of many I will unfold to you in speech, that so more safely you may traverse the seas of your sojourn, and find rest in Ausonia’s haven; for the Fates forbid Helenus to know more and Saturnian Juno stays her utterance…. Moreover, if Helenus has any foresight, if the seer may claim any faith, if Apollo fills his soul with truths, this one thing, Goddess-born, this one in lieu of all I will foretell, and again and again repeat the warning: mighty Juno’s power honour first with prayer; to Juno joyfully chant vows, and win over the mighty mistress with suppliant gifts….These are the warnings that you are permitted to hear from my voice. Go, then, and by your deeds exalt Troy in greatness unto heaven!’…”

Virgil, Aeneid, iii. 356-374

Aenas listened to Helenus and founded Rome. Helenus went on ruling wisely and with foresight over the kingdom of the Chaonians in Epirus.

What can we learn from Helenus?

Successful foresight is precise and actionable

In the tale of Helenus we find most of the elements usually stressed as key in terms of foresight, which thus stresses their timeless importance.

First of all, Helenus’s foresights are each time very detailed and precise.

Those who receive them can thus use these foresights very practically for action. We are not in the realm of generalities nor of vagueness, on the contrary.

Obviously and relatedly, the Trojan seer’s foresight is fundamentally actionable. Actually, it is more than actionable.

Foresight means advice for successful action

Helenus prophecies are concrete advice on what to do to obtain a desired aim in harmony with the forces at work.

Advice and not neutrality

On the contrary from the option chosen by intelligence services, where foresight and policy recommendations are separated (see From Cassandra’s Curse to the Pythia’s Success), with Helenus we are definitely in the realm of advice for the future.

Save if we are working for intelligence then, and still treading carefully not to create resentment, we may have to abandon the idea of separating foresight from policy recommendations. On the contrary, we may have to fully accept that we must also provide policy advice.

Indeed, Homer also shows that if people listen to Helenus and do as prophesied then success follows.

As a result, even though as strategic foresight and warning practitioners we must envision all possible scenarios, probabilize and monitor them, what we must give to policy-makers and decision-makers are advice for a victorious or winning response. Warning is necessary, but might be better received if it is accompanied by or transformed in “foresight and warning for success”.

Accessorily, nowadays, considering the propensity to be anxious and fearful when faced with reality and the wish for a happy end and “positivity”, such approach may save the strategic foresight and warning practitioner from many unpleasant situations.

However, being able to not only do exploratory foresight, as well as warning, but also to transform them in normative foresight for successful policy demands almost twice as much work. Thus, it remains to be seen if decision-makers and various actors are ready to give the resources necessary and pay the price to achieve this result (of course here I do not consider suboptimal and botched analysis and work).

Foresight and the gods

Very interestingly, and in a way that is related to what we saw with the Pythia (see Helene Lavoix, “From Cassandra’s Curse to the Pythia’s Success“, The Red Team Analysis Society, May 2021), the tale of Helenus tells us that successful foresight cannot be separated from listening to and then enlisting specific gods. How can we interpret this aspect in the 21st century?

Re-enchanting foresight

Helenus, as all the characters of the Iliad, is first and foremost living in a place that has not yet been victim of the disenchantment of the world brought about by modernity, as Max Weber (1917) explained. Their behaviour, including their foresight, cannot be comprehended if we do not try to understand their interactions with the gods and with a world where the gods play an all powerful part.

Transposing the tale and its wisdom in our age and century does not mean simply transforming a past sacredness and reverence for the gods by a present blind enslavement to science and technology believed to be free and laic.

To “re-enchant foresight” properly, we must use an understanding of the symbol and essence of the archetypes the gods of Homer and Virgil embody, following Jung (Man and His Symbols, 1964). As a result, we shall fully benefit from Helenus’ tale.

Bowing to the interweaving of greater forces

The foresight Helenus gives stems from comprehending evolving complex situations resulting from forces most often unseen and triggered by both humans and the gods. The gods indeed are an embodiment of these forces.

This corresponds to considering the interplay and interweaving of various dynamics – the “forces” – at work in the world. To understand this interplay, we must thus pay attention to and understand the underlying processes out of which phenomena result. This is what I would call true classical proper foresight analysis, which leads us to develop a model for each issue (see Course 1 on Analytical Modeling).

It is vital here to highlight that such understanding can in no way be obtained by a juxtaposition of multiple disconnected trends, as we often find nowadays (e.g. for some of the dangers and inadequacy of such approaches H. Lavoix, The Key Technologies of the Future (1), The Red Team Analysis Society, June 2021). The inability to create hierarchical taxonomies that is displayed by many in our field and more broadly increasingly in society is puzzling at best, dangerous at worst. Similarly the inability of individuals to understand transitivity in factors (if A implies B and B implies C, then A implies C) is as worrying.

What could result from such approaches, at best, is a patchy outlook completely unsuited for successful action.

To explain the spread of such unsatisfying perspectives, we may have, among other factors the Dunning Kruger effect (“Unskilled and Unaware of It… 1999, see Course 1 on Analytical Modeling, Course 3 on Mitigating biases). Worse still, we may worry that a general lowering of intelligence – measured through IQ scores – in developed countries – starts manifesting here (Evan Horowitz, “IQ rates are dropping in many developed countries and that doesn’t bode well for humanity“, Think, May 2019; Peter Dockrill, “IQ Scores Are Falling in “Worrying” Reversal of 20th Century Intelligence Boom“, Sciencealert, 13 June, 2018). Should such research be correct, then the drop would possibly be of 7 fewer IQ score points per generation starting after 1975, with variations according to various variables. Of course we can also break the thermometer but this would be a very destructive attitude.

If the spread of unsatisfying approaches, unable to consider complex interplays, were an established trend, then we would have to find ways to compensate and to convince people to use these ways.

Indeed, Helenus’ tale tells us that foresight must consider the forces, even unseen, that are at work and that it is a necessary condition for success.

It is however not enough.

The gods to honour

The story of Helenus also shows that human beings must accept and bow to these forces, which are greater than them.

In that condition, those listening to proper foresight will be successful.

In turn, this means that foresight must also include advice related to the best behaviour to adopt to be successful considering these forces greater than us.

For example, in the context of war, Helenus explains to Hector what must be done to cajole and please Athene. This is all the more important that Athene sides normally with the Greeks. Nonetheless Helenus’ foresight is right and the Trojans succeed. In other words, the qualities that Trojans had then to seek in war was wisdom as Athene is the goddess of wisdom and war strategy, the second being impossible without the first. They listen to Helenus and win.

In the third prophecy given to Aeanas, the goddess who must be please is Juno, Zeus consort. Juno, however, was the enemy of Trojans in general and of Aenas in particular. A straightforward transposition to our century is more difficult. We may hypothesise that Helenus’ advice was related to the need for Aenas to pay particular attention to those people still obeying to the great-goddess, which Juno may represent. The advice may also suggest that Aenas had not to marry until he had reached the end of his journey. In any case, what matters for us is the type and scope of advice Helenus gives.

To summarise, the lessons learned for us is thus to not only consider carefully those forces at work, but also the best way to address them.

The Seer and the Just Heroes

Helenus as a seer cannot be separated from those who seek his prophecies, listen carefully to him and then apply scrupulously his recommendations.

The two main heroes who listen to Helenus are not any character. They are Hector, the most valiant Trojan prince, meant to succeed King Priam, and then Aenas, half god, considered as very valiant and of high moral standard and then the founder of Rome. Despite their status and qualities, both listen to Helenus, as the seer is, at the end of the day, merely the one who unveils part of the gods’ plans. They are not interacting though narcissism, competition, and will to dominate another but at a higher level, which is to act together in a just way to achieve a greater goal.

Thus what we must retain here is the importance of cultivating as much as possible a primacy given to the objective and the world in both the strategic foresight practitioner and the user of foresight.

Then and exactly as we saw previously in the story of Tigranes, the disappearance of the heroes also somehow goes hand in hand with the absence of foresight that is delivered (Helene Lavoix, “Why the Messenger Got Shot and how to Avoid this Fate“, The Red Team Analysis Society, April 2021).

Furthermore, according to later accounts, the adverse attitude of Trojans themselves is stressed. It is this very attitude that causes Helenus to withdraw on Mount Ida.

It would thus appear, as we had deduced from Plutarch (Why the Messenger got shot, ibid.), that when a society or civilization decays, then both heroes and foresight disappear. It could be that only heroes can listen to foresight. If heroes are nowhere to be found anymore, then people practicing foresight have no other choice than to withdraw.

However, here, thanks to Roman Virgil and Greek Pausanias, there is an interesting twist to the story that brings us beyond Plutarch’s understanding.

Ultimate reward

When a civilization or a society decays, then, so far in humanity history, others take over, would it be only temporarily. This is exemplified in our tale by Troy as the decaying power and the Greek cities as the ascending one.

Once the ascending power has achieved supremacy, then it can use anew the foresight of those seers who have withdrawn, as did Pyrrhus. Showing wisdom, as one cannot win without it, they then reward the seer. This is how Helenus became King.

The later accounts try to further involve Helenus in playing a role in the fall of Troy. According to them, as the ascending power as it is still competing for supremacy, it then starts looking for the advice of those seers who have had to withdraw from their own societies. Getting these advice gives the ascending power the final elements necessary to usher a new age.

In these stories, at the end, the foresight practitioner is a winner, because the line of conduct s/he followed was to be true to greater forces, to the just values and wisdom that animated Troy until the fall of the heroes and not to the shell of what Troy became.

Then, and this can be found throughout the accounts, with more or less stress, by refusing to accept the decay of their own civilisation, not only Helenus but also Aenas, and even Hector, through his widow Andromach, the true representatives of Troy continue to exist and to thrive. Helenus not only rules over a kingdom but also thanks to his foresight, helps a Trojan found the next power, Rome.

Thus, the tale of Helenus ends on a twin message of hope for strategic foresight and warning practitioners. If they truly consider the forces at work, if they obey the spirit of these forces, of foresight and the values of their society, then, at the end, not only will they be personally rewarded but also contribute to see a better and more powerful civilization built.

To conclude I shall leave you with a question to ponder: why did our societies choose to remember Cassandra, her curse and tragic fate rather than Helenus, his benediction and glorious destiny?

Note

*Ilios and Troy were traditionally considered as synonymous in Homer Iliad (see María Del Valle Muñoyerro, “Troy and Ilios in Homer: Region and City”, Glotta, 74. Bd., 3./4. H. (1997/1998), pp. 213-226.

Further bibliography

Homer, The Iliad with an English Translation by A.T. Murray, Ph.D. in two volumes. Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann, Ltd. 1924.

Jung, Carl Gustav, Man and His Symbols, 1964.

Kruger, Justin, and David Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments“, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol 77, no 6, p 1121-1134, American Psychological Association (1999).

Weber, Max, “Science as Vocation” 1917.

Antarctic China (2) – China’s Planetary Game

(Art design: Jean-Dominique Lavoix-Carli)

A planetary Go game:

Most Western geopolitical observers seem to be unable to see the planetary scale strategy that China deploys in the Antarctic (Alexander B. Gray, “China’s Next Geopolitical Goal: Dominate Antarctica”, The National Interest, 20 March 2021). The roots of this “very Great Game” run deep in Chinese history and strategic culture. They do as well in the current Chinese development strategy (Jean-Michel Valantin, “China and the New Silk Road, from Oil Wells to the Moon… and Beyond”, The Red Team Analysis Society, July 6, 2015).

A Go Game from Pole to Pole

In order to understand the scale of this mammoth geopolitical undertaking, we have to keep in mind that China’s strategic style is deeply different from the Western one. As Scott Boorman establishes in 1971 and David Lai in 2002, the main principle of China’s strategy is not domination through the direct exercise of force (Scott Boorman, The Protracted Game – A Wei’Chi interpretation of the Maoist Revolutionary Strategy, 1969, David Lai, « Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China’s Strategic Concept Shi’ », 2004, GlobalSecurity.org). Indeed, force is combined with indirect mastery and a “surround and conquer” approach.

This approach is combined with “shih”. That notion encapsulates the meaning of “organizing” the strategic configuration of “circumstances”. It therefore aims to create an order of “circumstances” more favorable and advantageous to Chinese interests.

From a strategic point of view, “organizing circumstances” does not mean fixing parameters. It tries to “canalize” the flows of events as they deploy in the continuity of space and time.

As it happens, the development of the Chinese presence in the Antarctic is both a signal and a vector of the way China deploys a worldwide strategy of influence. This strategy extends from pole to pole (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Antarctic China-1: Strategies for a Very Cold Place” 31 May, 2021, and “Jean-Michel Valantin, “Towards a US-China War? (1) and (2): Military Tensions in the Arctic”, The Red Team Analysis Society, September 16, 2019 ».

The Invisible strategy

As we have seen in Antarctic China (1), Beijing drives the building of a fifth ground station. In the same time, it adds the Beidou satellite positioning systems to existing stations. Meanwhile, the Chinese fishing fleet is more and more active in the Antarctic Ocean (Anne-Mary Brady, “China, Russia Push GPS Rival in Antarctica”, The Australian, September 6, 2018).

Chinese strategy IS Chinese

If, from a Western point of view, these developing capabilities appear as a strategy in itself, they also have another dimension, anchored in Chinese philosophical and strategic thought (Valantin, “China and the New Silk Road: the Pakistani strategy”, The Red Team Analysis, May 18, 2015).

That dimension is grounded in an understanding of the spatial dimension of China, in the geographic sense. Space is not only conceived as a support to spread Chinese influence and power to the “outside”, but also to allow the Middle Kingdom to “aspirate” what it needs from the “outside” to the “inside”  (Quynh Delaunay, Naissance de la Chine moderne, L’Empire du Milieu dans la globalisation, 2014).

This is why we qualify some spaces as being “useful” to the deployment of the Chinese strategy. It is also why each “useful space” is related, and “useful”, to other “useful spaces”. In the same dynamic, the different countries involved in the deployment of the Chinese strategy are “useful spaces” for China. 

This philosophy of space and time as flows is the basic material of the Chinese strategic tradition. As Scott Boorman, Arthur Waldron and David Lai, among others, establish quite clearly, this tradition expresses itself especially well through the “Go game”. This very ancient game emphasizes the importance not to control, but to master the space of the adversary (Arthur Waldron, “China’s Military Classics”, Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1994). The strategy is to “convert” that space into one’s own. To do so, one has to “surround and conquer” the pieces, i.e. the space of the adversary.

The strategy of useful spaces

In order to turn the game into a victorious tendency, the main goal is to attack the strategy of the adversary and not “only” its space. This strategic philosophy suffuses some of the most important Chinese strategic works, such as Sun Zi’s The Art of War. It drove some of the major strategic developments during the twentieth century.

It is true, for example, of Mao’s “revolutionary warfare” against Japan and the nationalist military (Scott Boorman, ibid). As we have seen in The Red Team Analysis Society, it also drives the mammoth “Belt & Road initiative” (Jean-Michel Valantin, “China and the Belt and Road Initiative” section, The Red Team Analysis Society).

Hence, in this strategic context and tradition, the question arises of the “usefulness” of Antarctica. This “usefulness” appears in the context of the worldwide deployment of Chinese influence (David Lai, ibid). In other words, how is Beijing elaborating “shih”, the strategic configuration of favorable circumstances by installing capabilities in Antarctica?

From the Antarctic to a worldwide encirclement

The recent and rapid developments of the Chinese presence in the Arctic and in the Antarctic follow the same timelines. In other terms, we hypothesise that Beijing plays a worldwide “Go game” at a planetary scale.

Surround and Conquer

Within the framework of Go, China becomes the “Middle Kingdom” between the Arctic and the Antarctic. While it becomes a “near Arctic nation”, China “surrounds” the whole Indo-Pacific region between geographical China and the Antarctic  as a “useful space”. The same is true for the Atlantic Ocean, from the South Pole to the North pole ((Jean-Michel Valantin, “Is the West Losing the Warming Arctic?”, The Red Team Analysis Society, December 7, 2020).

This means that China uses its growing presence in the Arctic and in the Antarctic to increase its global influence. This happens through a subtle and multiscale Go and its strategy of “surround and conquer”. This game extends from one hemisphere to the other and joins the multiple continental and maritime “useful spaces”.

Encircling Australia

For example, the heightening Chinese presence in Antarctica “completes” the “encirclement” of Australia by the “useful Antarctic” at its south, while mainland China “occupies” its north. In other words, Australia is “under siege” in an immense “useful” Indo-Pacific ocean (Anne-Marie Brady, China as a Polar Great Power, 2017).

Australia is also directly useful to China, because of its coal and agricultural resources. Moreover, “surrounding’” it also means diminishing the “living space” of Japan and of the U.S. in the Pacific, i.e. some of the most powerful competitors of China in the Indo-Pacific region (Bonny Lin et alii, Regional Responses to U.S-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific Region, Rand Corporation, 2020)

Last Chinese standing

It is interesting to note that the Chinese strategic approach is located in a long game perspective. Furthermore, this relation to strategic time is embedded within the biological and climate change crisis. This mammoth crisis has deep consequences in the Indo-Pacific and Antarctic region.

A planetary crisis

The destabilization of different parts of the Antarctic glaciers is already accelerating and may soon reach an irreversible tipping point. This process is bringing massive quantities of water under the form of ice platforms. Then, those platforms literally crawl into the sea at a heightening rhythm and scale. During the 21st century, the breaking of the Antarctic ice sheet may add dozens of centimetres to the ocean global rise (Julie Brigham-Grette, Andrea Dutton, “Antarctica is Headed for a Climate Tipping Point by 2060, with Catastrophic Melting if Emissions Aren’t Cut Quickly”, The Conversation, 17 May 2021).

From a biological point of view, the current biodiversity crisis devastates the Indo-Pacific region, especially in its marine dimension. As a matter of fact, the quickly heightening levels of atmospheric greenhouse gases, among them CO2, which have triggered climate change, are also acidifying the seawater (“Climate change indicators: Ocean Acidity“, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2016).

This process combines with the chemical and biological impacts of land, industrial, and agricultural pollution. It endangers the fisheries, essential components of the food resources of entire maritime facades. These changes have direct geopolitical consequences, because they impact the most basic geophysical equilibrium upon which human societies and international relations depend ( Lincoln Paine, The Sea and Civilization, a Maritime History of the World, 2013).

Dead zones

The chemical and biological situation of the Indian Ocean keeps deteriorating because of the multiplication of two other giant dead zones in the Indian Ocean (Harry Pettit, ‘The ocean is suffocating’: Fish-killing dead zone is found growing in the Arabian Sea – and it is already bigger than SCOTLAND”, Mail on Line, 27 April 2017. One giant “dead zone” is also developing in the Gulf of Oman. It thus threatens marine life and fisheries in this part of the Arabian Sea.

Another giant “dead zone” spans at last 60.000 square km and grows in the Bay of Bengal. It, threatens the food resources of the 200 million people living on the littoral of the eight countries that surround the Bay (Amitav Gosh and Aaron Savion Lobo, “Bay of Bengal: depleted fish stocks and huge dead zone signal tipping point”, The Guardian, 31 January 2017). In other terms, climate and ocean change are directly threatening the food security of hundreds of millions of people in Africa, in the Arabian Sea area and in South Asia.

The Middle Kingdom and Survival

In other words, China deploys its planetary scale great strategy, while the current massive bioclimatic crisis unfolds and suffuses everything and everyone on Earth. This crisis becomes a driver of international competition for access to resources.

As the development of Chinese fisheries in the Antarctic Ocean emphasizes, Beijing seems keen on driving China through the immense “perfect storm” of the climate and resources crisis. In order to implement this long-term strategy, China organises the world and planetary “circumstances” in an advantageous way for its national interests.

We must now see how this Antarctic “surround and conquer” – “shih” strategy combine with the Chinese space program (Peter Wood, Alex Stone, Taylor E. Lee, “China’s Space Ground Segment, building the Pillars of a Great Space Power”, Blue Path Labs Report for the China Aerospace Studies Institute, U.S Air University, March 1, 2021).

The Ultimate Key Technologies of the Future (3) – Extreme Environments

Enabling human actions in an altered environment

This third article is the last part of our “equation” to identify the key technologies of the future.

We started, with the first article, in establishing that solely making laundry lists of new technologies was insufficient to identify the key technologies of the future. We needed more: a system explaining the logic behind the success of technologies. Thus, we developed a schematic model depicting the reasons for the use of technology, at individual and collective level.

Then, with the second part, we found conditions that make technologies key. Technologies that help satisfy one or more of the actions needed to meet individual and social needs, as well as the conditions for these actions, become key. Furthermore, because we have a model that allows for an evolution of technologies through time, our model is able to identify the key technologies of the future.

We must now look at the way these still potential key future technologies function in their environment. Indeed, they can only be key if they work and fulfil their function in a certain environment.

We first highlight the many ways through which our environment is degraded, indeed increasingly often leading to extreme environments. Furthermore, this degradation of our ecosystems forces us to increasingly use naturally extreme environments.

We then focus on the way key technologies of the future will have to be resilient to these extreme conditions. We explain that key technologies will need to enable actions in these extreme environments, with examples related to deep sea and deep underground environments. We also explore possible escalating feedback loops between the use of extreme environments and the alteration of the environment, using the case of disease and the rise of contaminated environments.

Finally, we highlight that some technologies will not only be key in the future but also for the future, if they can mitigate damages and, even better, heal our altered environment.

An altered environment

Our environment has changed compared with the past. This will be even more the case tomorrow, if we consider linear trends. Our ecosystems will change in ways that are essentially negative or threatening to the survival of individuals and societies. Several destructive forces are at work.

Adverse forces alter our environment

Numerous adverse forces, often interacting through positive feedback loops, alter our environment, notably:

  • Climate change (C02 in the atmosphere in particular);
  • Overpopulation;
  • Loss of biodiversity;
  • Invasive species;
  • Increase in diseases, epidemics and pandemics (stemming notably from the previous two factors);
  • Industrial, chemical and nuclear accidents;
  • Urbanisation;
  • Intensive agriculture;
  • Space activity and debris;
  • Etc

Towards extreme environments

The altered environment within which we, as individuals and societies, live will tend to become extreme. This will take place either as the altering forces transform the environment itself or as the new altered environment pushes us to discover new environments that were previously left aside because they were out of reach, harsh and because we did not need them.

Here we build upon the original idea of “extreme environments” as developed by the UK Ministry of Defence, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) in its Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040 (2010). There, the highly likely growing resource scarcity were to lead to strengthened interest in what was called “Extreme Environments”, i.e. the deep sea, space, the Arctic, Antarctica and the deep underground – and in their exploitation. The DCDC then abandoned this idea, despite its power.

Our future extreme environments will be:

  • The very cold: Arctic and Antarctica notably;
  • The very hot (with increased temperatures because of climate change) and the need to use all earthly spaces, such as deserts. Possibly we may have to move to very hot places on other planets;
  • Extreme weather events haphazardly shaking ecosystems;
  • Contaminated areas: pandemics, industrial hazards, radiations;
  • Space
  • Deep sea
  • Deep earth and underground
  • Digital and increasingly virtual environments: extreme for human beings as we need to adapt extremely fast to them and as these environments are totally alien to us.

(Photo Pandemic in India by Gwydion M. Williams, 2020_05_300100 – CC BY 2.0; Deep Earth : Professor Dale Russell , “The Future of Cities”, Samsung KX50: The Future in Focus, 29 août 2019, other images as on slide and Public Domain)

The key technologies of the future and extreme environments

The key technologies we identified will thus have imperatively to consider these extreme environments.

Extreme resilience, an imperative condition for the key technologies of the future

The key technologies of the future will imperatively need to function in altered environments, which become or are increasingly extreme.

No matter how wonderful a technology and how great it could be at helping satisfy human and social needs, if this technology is fragile and cannot cope with extreme environments, then it will be useless. It will thus not be a key technology of the future.

For example, wind turbines will need to be able to withstand increasingly powerful and frequent hurricanes and twisters (e.g. Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, “Wind Turbines in Extreme Weather: Solutions for Hurricane Resiliency“, 23 January 2018).

Computers and more broadly everything related to the digital world, including AI, will need to function under extreme weather events and under extreme temperatures. They will have to face possible disruptions or hard choice in terms of energy. As a result, energy-related technologies will become even more important. For example, photonic computing hardware, such as the chips LightOn develops, is a strong candidate for being a key technology of the future.

Here, to precisely identify the key technologies of the future, we shall need to add to our broad schematic model precise analytical mapping for each tech (or family of tech). We shall need to make sure all forces and their interactions are taken into account (see online course on analytical modeling). We must be sure some vulnerabilities are not overlooked. It will be crucial to analyse each and every technology in this way before to decide to use them if they demand substantial investments, if they have a crucial role within your company or organisation. Imagine that you invest millions, if not billions in integrating a technological system, to find out a couple of months or years later that this technology that is now at the heart of your system just fails repeatedly or worse definitely. This is also of course even worse for governments and state agencies and for governance infrastructures as whole countries could then face immense disruptions, with cascading adverse effects.

If you are investing in the development of new technologies, be it through portfolio on the markets or directly as a company or as a state agent in supporting this or that industry, use, then you will need, likewise, to check the “extreme resilience” of the technologies you support. Imagine what could happen if you chose wrongly.

To sum up, a sine qua non condition for a technology to be key in the future is to have as characteristics extreme resilience.

The key technologies of the future will need to help us access and operate in extreme environments

The key technologies of the future will need to help us access and operate in extreme environments.

Extreme environments are, by definition, those environments that are not favourable to human societies. As a result, it is always difficult to survive in these environments and most often hard to access them.

Even in the case of digital and virtual environments, negative and so far unknown impacts on human beings exist (e.g. Matt Southern, “Study Finds 4 Negative Effects of Too Much Video Conferencing“, SEJ, 27 February 2021; Cheryl Roy, “What are the harmful effects of virtual reality?“, Law Technology today, January 21, 2021; Lavoie, Main, King, et al. Virtual experience, real consequences: the potential negative emotional consequences of virtual reality gameplay. Virtual Reality 25, 69–81, 2021, etc.). Meanwhile, it is impossible to live only through and by digital and virtual reality. Finally, the countless companies handling cybersecurity, as well as the construction and development of the digital and virtual environment, are evidence of the difficulty of access to this type of world.

Detailed studies for each extreme environments will be necessary to determine conditions for access and operation. In the meantime and as example, we can give instances of new technologies helping us access the “under-worlds”, i.e. deep sea and deep earth environments.

Deep Sea

The deep sea is an extreme environment that is increasingly becoming crucial for the future (see Helene Lavoix, “The Deep-Sea Resources Brief“, The Red Team Analysis Society, updated January 2018, first ed 2012). It must be seen notably in the context of need for resources including energy, protection of fragile ecosystems, as well as strategically with the redrawing of real boundaries of states. Note that this last element, although fundamental, does not seem to have already permeated global awareness.

China is very advanced in developing and using deep sea technologies as Liu Feng, secretary general of the China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Development Association (COMRA), highlights (Interview by Wang Yan, “China’s deep-sea mining, a view from the top“, China Dialogue, 18 October 2019). Strategically, it is also active in being involved with the corresponding international authorities. In October 2019, for example, Beijing Pioneer Hi-Tech Development Corporation and the International Seabed Authority (ISA) signed an exploration contract for polymetallic nodules in the western Pacific Ocean (ISA Press release, 24 October 2019). On 9 November 2020, the International Seabed Authority and China launched a joint training and research centre (ISA press release, 9 November 2020).

China has the highest number of sea bed exploration contracts with the ISA (map 22 April 2021 ISA – click on image to access original on ISA website).

Technologically, China has developed, among others, an unmanned submersible, Qianlong 3, that carried out its first 3500 meters deep dive in April 2018 (Global Times). Its deep-sea manned submersible Fendouzhe finished a deep-sea mission in the Mariana Trench in the Pacific and reached a depth of more than 10.000 meters in November 2020. This is the second deepest dive after an American record set in 2019 (“New Chinese submersible reaches Earth’s deepest ocean trench“, Phys.org, November 2020).

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QO8AlkKtpYk
Deep Earth

The DARPA launched a Subterranean challenge in December 2017 to “develop innovative technologies that would augment operations underground”. The program should end in 2021.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bP6wTWiokVY

Meanwhile, futurists, such as Professor Dale Russell, imagine a life underground (“The Future of Cities” in Samsung KX50: The Future in Focus, 29 août 2019).

Some quantum technologies, for example quantum gravimeters, may become key to map the underground world (e.g. Dr Nicole Metje and Dr Michael Holynski, “How can Quantum Technology make the underground visible?” University of Birmingham, 2016; Geoff Zeiss, “Applying quantum effects to detecting underground infrastructure“, Between the Poles, 8 February 2021). Thanks to them, underground developments are and will likely be easier to implement, which will most probably be key as deep earth environments become more important. The observation of these constructions will also be crucial in terms of security (Ibid.).

Geothermal energy

Geothermal energy is also an interesting example of deep earth usage (e.g. John W. Lund, “Geothermal energy“, Encyclopedia Britannica, 30 Apr. 2018; Julia Rosen, “Supercharged geothermal energy could power the planet“, New Scientist, 17 October 2018). It is an energy of the underground extreme environment. Although it has been used for millenia through its naturally easily accessible output such as hot springs, technologies allowing for a more systematic and deeper use are more recent and evolve as more extreme depth and heat are reached and channeled.

Such technologies are both key in terms of energy and in term of access to and use of extreme environments. They could also have serious deleterious impacts, thus participating, in turn, in altering the environment.

Geothermal energy could also be a game changer for some countries, as could signal El Salvador efforts to couple its volcanoes’ geothermic energy and so far environmentally unfriendly bitcoin. Furthermore, here, social coordination, through political authorities via currency, is also impacted (Reuters, “Does money grow on volcanoes? El Salvador explores bitcoin mining“, 10 June 2021).

Technologies related to geothermal energy are thus highly likely part of the key technologies of the future. To the least they must be put under watch.

Extreme emergence of disease: From deep earth to contaminated environments

Using deep earth environments may also have unexpected and unintended consequences. That usage of an extreme environment has the potential to create an escalating feedback loop with other extreme environments.

Let us look at a case that may help us start understanding what could happen. Even though the Mojiang mine in Kunming, China, is an abandoned copper mine and thus probably not part of what we would call deep earth environment, we may nonetheless use this example to imagine possible impacts of deep – and less deep – earth activities.

Following the illness and death of miners working in the abandoned mine in 2012, a new virus of a rodent-origin – henipa-like virus – was identified in the mine, while 293 coronavirus were sampled in and around the mine, out of which “eight are “SARS-type” coronavirus” (Zhiqiang Wu et al., “Novel Henipa-like Virus, Mojiang Paramyxovirus, in Rats“, China, 2012, Emerg Infect Dis. 2014 Jun; 20(6): 1064–1066.; David Stanway, “Explainer: China’s Mojiang mine and its role in the origins of COVID-19“, Reuters, 9 June 2021).

If new viruses and new possible hosts emerge, then, potentially new diseases with pandemic capabilities may also follow. The Mojiang mine case could thus be an example of how new epidemics could emerge out of interactions between human beings and so far pristine environments. As a result, the extreme environment related to contamination would highly likely be activated.

If we follow this train of thoughts, and apply it to 2021, then the key question is not to know if China is guilty or not of being at the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic, possibly stemming from the mine. The real crucial question for the future would be to wonder how many of new extreme environment human activities enabled by technology, could unleash pandemics and how to mitigate the risk.

All locations surrounding extreme environments (namely deep sea, deep underground, very cold and very hot, space – possibly coming from other planets, virtual – by extension “cyber” viruses) would need to be closely monitored for the appearance of such new viruses and other organisms that could cause contamination. Bacteria and viruses emerging from the melting permafrost are another case exemplifying this possible threat (e.g. Jasmin Fox-Skelly, “Long-dormant bacteria and viruses, trapped in ice and permafrost for centuries, are reviving as Earth’s climate warms“, BBC, 4 May 2017). Technologies allowing for monitoring such risks and then necessary for accessing the extreme environments without triggering contamination would become key.

To sum up, those technologies, resilient enough to operate under extreme conditions, allowing us to access extreme environments and make them habitable for and exploitable by human beings and societies are very likely to be key in the future. Meanwhile, new possible alterations of our environment could appear, leading to deleterious escalating feedback loops.

This untoward possible twist, in turn, highlights a new need technology will have to meet, as we shall now see.

Ultimate Key technologies for the future

Taking into account our altered environment, we can consider two other functions that technology may play and that would make them key, indeed vital.

Technologies could mitigate the alterations of and negative impacts on the environment, as generated by previous human – and natural – activity.

Even more positively, we may imagine technologies that could repair the damages created and heal the environment.

Those repairing and healing technologies are more than needed. We may consider them not only as key technologies of the future but also ultimate technologies for our future.

Conclusion

To sum up, the key technologies of the future are those that help meet one or many of the actions and conditions critical to satisfy evolving individual and social needs. These technologies may notably help in ensuring energy as well as defense and attack needs. They may also be operative in three types of actions and tasks: motion and load transport, craftmanship and various types of implementation, and finally all the tasks related to calculation, memory, knowledge, understanding and transmission.

To be truly key in the future, and not only potentially so, these technologies will have to be resilient enough to function in an increasingly altered world and notably in extreme environments.

Furthermore, those technologies that will also allow accessing these extreme environments and enable human actions there will too be key in the future.

Finally, technologies that will help mitigate earlier damages to our environment, in the broader sense of the term, or even better heal this environment, will not only be key in the future but also key for the future.

Bibliography

DARPA, Subterranean challenge, 2017.

ISA Press release, 24 October 2019

ISA press release, 9 November 2020

Lavoie, Main, King, et al. Virtual experience, real consequences: the potential negative emotional consequences of virtual reality gameplay. Virtual Reality 25, 69–81, 2021

Lund, John W.. “Geothermal energy”. Encyclopedia Britannica, 30 Apr. 2018.

Metje Nicole, and Michael Holynski, “How can Quantum Technology make the underground visible?” University of Birmingham, 2016;

Phys.org, “New Chinese submersible reaches Earth’s deepest ocean trench“, November 2020

Roy, Cheryl, “What are the harmful effects of virtual reality?“, Law Technology today, January 21, 2021;

Russell, Dale, “The Future of Cities” in Samsung KX50: The Future in Focus, 29 août 2019.

Southern, Matt, “Study Finds 4 Negative Effects of Too Much Video Conferencing“, SEJ, 27 February 2021;

Stanway, David, “Explainer: China’s Mojiang mine and its role in the origins of COVID-19“, Reuters, 9 June 2021.WuWu

Wu, Zhiqiang et al., “Novel Henipa-like Virus, Mojiang Paramyxovirus, in Rats“, China, 2012, Emerg Infect Dis. 2014 Jun; 20(6): 1064–1066..

Yan, Wang, Interview “China’s deep-sea mining, a view from the top“, China Dialogue, 18 October 2019

Zeiss, Geoff, “Applying quantum effects to detecting underground infrastructure“, Between the Poles, 8 February 2021.

The Key Technologies of the Future (2) – Evolution

To be key, technologies must ease and improve human actions

In the first part of this series we found that solely making laundry lists of new technologies was insufficient to identify the key technologies of the future. Use of inadequate classifications made matters worse. We needed more: a system explaining the logic behind the success of technologies. Thus, we developed a schematic model depicting the reasons for the use of technology, at individual and collective level.

In this article, we apply our schematic model progressively to identify more precisely key technologies of the future. Using the logic we highlighted, we start with making the link between technology and human actions implemented to meet the needs of individuals and of society. Then we check that our model indeed allows us to look at evolution and dynamics as these are crucial if one wants to look at the future. This gives us first conditions or rules technologies must meet to be key in the future.

Key technologies enable actions and their conditions

As a reminder, we have a model that makes explicit the logic underlying why we need and use technologies (see part 1 for an explanation).

Now, we look again at this model from the perspective of the types of tasks and actions we need to carry out to make sure individual and social needs are met.

The individual and social needs (on the left hand side) are satisfied thanks to “tasks and actions” (the hand in the middle) enabled by technologies that will also help meet the conditions for successful action.

Key technologies are thus these technologies that participate in:

  • Enabling three types of actions
    • motion, load transport, as well as related force;
    • craftsmanship and various types of implementation, as well as related force;
    • all the tasks related to calculation, memory, knowledge, understanding, transmission, etc.
  • Helping meet the conditions for action
    • Energy: a sine qua non condition for action – and life. Indeed, without energy nothing is possible, as shown by Thomas Homer Dixon (The Upside of Down: Catastrophe, Creativity, and the Renewal of Civilization, Random House Canada, 2006).
    • “Defence and attack”: compared with energy, the “defence and attack” capabilities need not to be all exerted permanently. The willingness to exert it, however, must be permanent. It is the awareness that there is an unwavering willingness to exert defence and attack that will make this very exertion discontinuous and temporary.
      An example of this phenomenon is nuclear deterrence (e.g. Alexey Arbatov, “Nuclear Deterrence: A Guarantee or Threat to Strategic Stability?“, Carnegie Moscow Centre, 22 March 2019). Another example is the internalisation of norms and the related moral system that allows a society to function (e.g. Boyd & Richerson, “Culture and the Evolution of the Human Social Instincts“, in Roots of Human Sociality, 2006). A third key example is the legitimate monopoly of violence, where rational authorities and legitimacy allows for the monopoly of violence to be truly used as little as possible (e.g. Moore, Injustice: The Social Basis of Obedience and Revolt, 1978, 440-449)

Technologies that help meet one or many of these actions and the conditions of these actions also become fundamental to meet individual and social needs. As a result they become key technologies.

Key technologies evolve with time: Towards a phylogeny of technologies?

Let us now look at these enabling technologies from a dynamic point of view. Does our schematic model allow for evolution along time?

What we seek to establish here is the evolutionary relationships between the meeting of individual and social needs and actions helped by technologies. Thus, borrowing from natural sciences, where Phylogeny is the science/study of evolutionary relationships between organisms, we are setting the first stones for a phylogeny of technologies (“Taxonomy and Phylogeny,” Biology Library, LibreTexts project, 2019).

Example of a phylogeny, here for the SARS-CoV2 (GISAID). Such approach could be adapted to follow the evolution of technologies and detect future key technologies.

In this article, as test and first steps, we shall remain at a schematic level, as our aim is to create a framework model that can then be applied to specific technologies. Obviously, a developed phylogeny would need to precisely detail the historical evolution of each enabling technologies we use as examples below. Right now, a sketch, however imperfect, is sufficient for our purpose. What we want is to test the logic behind the model.

Evolving technologies enabling the conditions for action

Energy-related technologies

Energy-related technologies moved with time. We had first a situation when no technology or hardly any was used, when the sun (and probably lightning) as well as hunting and gathering – food being the fundamental energy for human beings as highlighted by Homer Dixon (Ibid.) – were the sole source of energy. We moved then to a time when “tech”, then rather primitive, started being involved in the discovery of fire, and the use of wind and water.

Moving forward in time, we had technologies included in sedentary agriculture and those that allowed or facilitated energy-related discoveries, for example technology linked to wood, then coal and oil or more broadly fossile fuel extracted energy. Then technology participated in intensive agriculture, nuclear energy, transformation into electricity. Finally, we have higher or more complex technological use of natural forces such as hydroelectricity, solar panels, wind turbine, precision agriculture, etc.

Defence and attack-related technologies

Defence and attack-related technologies went from none, when only the human body was used, to the use of tools as weapons and caves as dwelling. We then had the development of metal and related weapons, archery, siege weapons, crossbows, alongside walls and fortresses, etc.

We moved then to modern weapons, extension of theatres of operations and corresponding defense systems allowed notably by gunpowder and steam engines. Technologies allowing for aviation were then added.

We are now heading toward high tech weapons and defence (for example, see, all the articles related to security and geopolitics in our section on AI).

Evolving technologies enabling action

Motion related technologies

Motion related technologies evolved from use of animals to modern transportation means such as cars, trucks, planes, trains, ships, space shuttles, nano-enabled “movers”, etc.

Craftsmanship and implementation-related technologies

Craftsmanship-related technologies, for example, went from tying basic materials and pelt then fabrics, to cutting and sowing with thread and needle, while looms became increasingly mechanised, to smart fabrics and programmable textiles and the capacity to manufacture each at best.

Cognition, perception and transmission related technologies

Cognition-related technologies can also be seen as evolving with time. For example, for calculation, we went from the abacus to increasingly powerful computers to quantum computers. An obvious example here is also the development of narrow artificial intelligence (see When Artificial Intelligence will Power Geopolitics – Presenting AI).

Considering current knowledge and research, we must here look at both cognition and perception (e.g. article based in part on an Integrative Science Symposium at the 2019 International Convention of Psychological Science (ICPS) in Paris, by Alexandra Michel, “Cognition and Perception: Is There Really a Distinction?“, Association for psychological science, January 29, 2020). We echoed this perspective when we underlined the importance of sensors for AI, the actuators for AI being nothing else that the possibility to carry out our actions and tasks (see our related section on sensors and actuators for AI, starting with Inserting Artificial Intelligence in Reality).

The importance of perception and sensors also tells us something more.

It reminds us that the evolutionary use of technologies takes place in the world. Perception must have something to perceive. Sensors must have something to sense. Meanwhile, the actions and tasks enabled by technologies act somewhere and on something.

Thus, all these technologies, which we identified as key, in the future are, actually, only potentially key. What defined them as key were necessary but insufficient conditions.

Technologies can only be key in the future (and the present for that matter) if they work, if they fulfil their functions in a certain environment. This is what we shall see in the next and last part.

Bibliography

Featured images: Spaceship and planet by Reimund Bertrams of Pixabay  / Public domain; hydroponic farm by iamareri of Pixabay  / Public domain.

Arbatov, Alexey, “Nuclear Deterrence: A Guarantee or Threat to Strategic Stability?“, Carnegie Moscow Centre, 22 March 2019.

Biology Library, “Taxonomy and Phylogeny”, LibreTexts project, 2019.

Boyd, R. & Richerson, Peter. (2006). Culture and the Evolution of the Human Social Instincts. Roots of Human Sociality.

Dixon, Thomas Homer, The Upside of Down: Catastrophe, Creativity, and the Renewal of Civilization, (Random House Canada, 2006).

GISAID

Michel, Alexandra, “Cognition and Perception: Is There Really a Distinction?“, Association for psychological science, January 29, 2020.

Moore, B., Injustice: Social bases of Obedience and Revolt, (London: Macmillan, 1978).

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